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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the economic aftermath of ethno-national conflict in a small 
European economy. Events in 1963 and 1974, led to the de facto division of a small 
nation-state, ethnically and geographically. Since the conflict, the different 
communities have remained on a war footing, having had no normal communications. 
For each, one of these watersheds is perceived as an economic catastrophe. The effect 
of arbitrarily dividing an already small economy was significant. It has been argued, 
however, that the large-scale uprooting of one community was seized on as a 
development opportunity, so the thesis examines the recovery mechanisms employed by 
both communities and assesses their relative economic impact. In a comparative 
context, economic growth and development are compared before and after de facto 
division, both across the ethnic division and with similar small and regional economies 
that have, in the period, largely retained conflict within the politicai process. Despite 
Problems, economic growth both sides of a UN Buffer Zone compare favourably with 
ali of the selected peer economies. However, with both communities having a clear 
perception of the cost of division, a dynamic model has been created to determine a 
benchmark for all-island, integrated economic growth. How would the economy have 
performed, if growth had not been disrupted by ethno-national conflict? How 
sustainable are two competing, non-communicating economies, sharing one small 
Mediterranean island? 
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
Definiug the subject 
"Economic theorists have generally traditionally defined their subject so as 
to exclude analysis of the use of violence. One of the tasks of economic 
history is to overcome that exclusion. " 1 
"For all our interest in the desired outcomes and unintended conséquences 
of many government programmes, war remains the least evaluated of 
public policies... We do not fail to study wars' effects because wars are 
rare... Nor is it the case that we find wars conséquences trivial. 
Recognising that wars are an important agent of politicai, economic, and 
social change, scholars often use them to mark major turning points in 
human history, to separate one historical period from another. " 2 
In 1963, three years after gaining independence from Britain, the new and partially 
implemented constitution of Cyprus broke down, communal fighting erupted and 
much of the Turkish-Cypriot population withdrew into fortified enclaves. In 1974, 
following a mainland Greek engineered coup d'état, mainland Turkish troops acted 
to effectively divide the island ethnically north and south, the latter retaining control 
in the north. Since then, the two communities have had no normal communications. 
^ane F.C. 1958. "The Economie consequences of Organised Violence", Journal of Economie 
Historv. Voi. 18, No. 4, p.402. Quoted by Winter J.M. (ed.) 1975. War and Economie 
Development. Cambridge: CUP. 
2Stein A. A. 1980. The Nation at War. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
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This thesis will examine the economie conséquences of this organisée! violence in 
Cyprus. While most of the island's two communities, Turkish-Cypriots and the 
Greek-Cypriots, experienced their major economic shocks as a conséquence of 
différent violent episodes, the most significant economic change for the island 
occurred with de facto division in 1974. Clearly, the beginnings of two distinct non-
communicating économies are earlier and will be explored below. 
Economic history is an eclectic discipline, even more so when applied to Cyprus. 
Its politicai and economic history places it both in Western Europe and the Third 
World. The tremors from previous imperial impact: Ottoman, British, East-West, 
still reverberate. An analysis of recent Cypriot economic history requires more than 
the simple application of mainstream economic theory (developed in and perhaps 
most usefully applied to advanced industriai societies). As a developing country 
with a recent history of organised violence and politicai discord, a study of 
structural and institutional development is important for illuminating economic 
policy and performance, shedding new light on some of the politicai stances taken 
in Cyprus. 
Economies has its roots in politicai economy. For much of its history, politicai 
economy used historical examples as empirical evidence. In Britain, Marxist 
economists more recently monopolised the term "politicai economy", however, this 
research also draws on the example of other classical economists (Smith, Ricardo, 
and Mill) to rehabilitate a more general use of a wider perspective. 
14 
"The séparation of économies from politics and politicai motivation is a 
sterile thing. It is also a cover for the reality of power and motivation. And 
it is a prime source of misjudgement and error in economic policy. "3 
This thesis is a work of politicai economy, set loosely to commence with the 
breakdown of the new independent Cypriot constitution in 1963. It traces a 
beleaguered Turkish-Cypriot minority from the barricades of fortified enclaves, to 
the establishment of a proto-nation state and the successful marketing of resources 
through the création of their own multi-national company. This study also follows 
the progress of the Greek-Cypriot community from economic and politicai 
dominance, through virtual economic collapse in 1974, to around 1988 when the 
(Greek Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus became, by some estimâtes, a "high income 
economy"4. This deliberate trough to peak analysis is designed to illuminate the 
economic conséquences of politicai failure on the two communities, their différent 
approaches to economic recovery, the relative success of those recoveries and 
ultimately, to assess sustainability in both defacto économies. 
It would have been preferable, however, to follow the lead of others writing on the 
development of the Cypriot economy following independence : Meyer and 
3Galbraith J.K. 1991 (Penguin édition). A Historv of Economies. London: Penguin, p.299. 
4Both Christodoulou's (D.) claim (1992. Inside The Cvprus Miracle, Minnesota: University Of 
Minnesota, Modern Greek Studies Yearbook Supplement, Vol. 2, pp. xli, 280, 287) and by simple 
calculation of officiai income data, (Rep. of Cyprus, UN, IBRD) the Republic of Cyprus became 
what the World Bank describes as a "high income economy" in 1988. "The main criterion of country 
classification is gross national product (GNP) per capita." (Technical notes to the 1991 World Bank 
Development Report, p.270, see also table 1 "Basic Indicatore" p. 204.) Perhaps taking a wider 
view of development criteria, some Government publications contradict this. In a 1993 Press and 
Information Office publication: Cvprus. the chapter "Development Planning and Economic 
Development" (pp.43-66) begins by stating that Cyprus "is classified as a middle income economy". 
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Vassiliou's classic work5 published in 1962, Hald's 1968 study6 and Kaminarides 
more theoretical work7 published, with unfortunate timing, in 1973. Such an 
approach deals exclusively with economic development in a single political and 
economic entity, within internationally recognised and largely natural boundaries8. 
Unfortunately geo-political reality intervened, leaving subsequent researchers one of 
two options. Research can continue this intellectual tradition by dealing exclusively 
with one political and economic entity as Christodoulou9, Dodd10 and, to a slightly 
lesser extent, Wilson11 have done. Alternatively, again following the earlier 
approach, research could deal with the island as a whole, necessitating analysis of 
two very different economic realities. In a speculative and more legalistic sense, 
Andreas Theophanous alone has recently done this12. The current thesis attempts to 
offer some background and some more analysis along the road to justifying contrary 
conclusions to those offered by Theophanous. However, Theophanous has opened 
the way to viewing Cypriot economic development in a comparative context, asking 
5Meyer A.J. & Vassiliou S. 1962. The Economy of Cyprus. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
6Hald M.W. 1968. A Study of the Cyprus Economy. Nicosia: Printing Office of the Republic of 
Cyprus. 
7Kaminarides J.S. 1973. The Cyprus Economy: A Case in the Industrialisation Process. Nicosia: 
Socrates Publishing Company. 
8The Treaty of Establishment provided that Britain retain perpetual sovereignty over 256 sq. 
kilometres of the island's territory (British Sovereign Base Areas - SBA's) and reserved rights over 
15 other areas including water sources and off base radar and intelligence gathering installations. The 
SBA's are British Dependent Territories and the Commander of British Forces in Cyprus has 
executive and legislative authority. 
9Christodoulou 1992. op. cit. 
10Dodd C.H. (ed.) 1993. The Political. Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus. 
Huntingdon: Eothen Press. 
11 Wilson R. 1992. Cyprus and the International Economy. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
12Theophanous, A. 1996. The Political Economy of a Federal Cyprus. Nicosia: Intercollege Press. 
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how and why development followed the path that it did within the respective 
communities of the island, speculating on the possibilities for and of re-unification. 
Cyprus is the third largest Mediterranean island, about the size of the English 
counties of Norfolk and Suffolk combined. Much of its history has been as a 
conséquence of it location, 40 miles south of Turkey and 60 miles west of Syria. It 
has, however, benefited from more than its fair share of academic interest, given its 
small size, partly because of its recent turbulent politicai history. Unlike other 
locations nearby, that recent history posed few risks to outsiders. Perhaps, above 
ail, Cyprus has played host to much academic interest because of its attractive and 
welcoming ambience. The British connection has contributed to the quality and 
relative accessibility of archivai material. Consequently the island has found itself as 
something of a laboratory for social scientists. The Republic is a perfect empirical 
base for economists interested in development, macro-economic phenomena being 
relatively small-scale and reasonably well documented. Government Departments 
and commercial institutions use dominant international statistica! standards and 
British accountancy practices respectively, maintaining generally open access to 
researchers. Access to some economic data is, however, influenced by increased 
politicai tension13 and always more difficult when contemplating pan-Cypriot 
research. 
13 6/4/1998 Financial Times reported that "Because he [Denktash] contests the legality of the Greek 
Cypriots' EU application, Mr Denktash says he will refuse to let the Commission in Brussels gather 
any data on northera Cyprus, just as he did in 1992 when commission officiais were preparing their 
initial "opinion" on Cypriot membership." p.30, column 5. 
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As many questions raised by economic historians are politically sensitive in Cyprus, 
some basic politicai background is necessary. Cyprus gained independence from 
Britain in 1960 after a brief but violent guerrilla war waged by the extreme right of 
the (82%) majority (Greek Cypriot) population14. They fought, not for 
independence, but to annex the island to Greece. Cyprus had previously been 
annexed by Britain in 1914 and expected to go the way of other Mediterranean 
islands with sizeable Hellenic populations15. From 1878, Britain occupied the 
island, though technically it remained part of the Ottoman Empire. Following the 
Treaty of Lausanne, Cyprus became a British Crown Colony in 1925. Britain 
increasingly sought to thwart self-determination in Cyprus, which would then have 
meant annexation to Greece. Considering what had happened to other Muslim 
Mediterranean islanders following annexation with Greece, the (18%) Turkish-
Cypriot population were understandably hostile to such a move, so had been 
recruited by the British to assist in preventing such an outcome. An independent 
constitution was eventually hammered out at two conférences in 1959 (Zurich and 
London), specifically preventing self-determination and only grudgingly accepted 
by the majority community16. 
Separate economic development began with the breakdown of the new constitution 
in 1963, which led to communal fighting and the withdrawal of much of the 
14Republic of Cyprus, 1960. Census of Population and Agriculture. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance , 
Dept. Statistics and Research. 
15For example, in 1913 Crete unilaterally proclaimed its union with Greece, this was legalised by the 
Treaty of London, of the same year, following Turkey's abandonnant of her suzerainship. 
16Xydis, S.G. 1973. Cvprus: Reluctant Republic. The Haeue: Moulton. 
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Turkish-Cypriot population from co-operation in the Cypriot State. In 1974 a 
foreign sponsored coup d'état, and foreign military intervention led to further 
regional ségrégation and the de facto division of Cyprus into two non-
communicating, ethnically homogenous areas. Military intervention attempted to 
resolve a constitutional and political crisis with the imposition of new frontiers. 
Most academic shelf space is occupied by the political and legal implications of 
"the Cyprus problem". For many that "problem" is encapsulated into a few months 
of the summer of 1974. At its most polarised, opinion on this varies as to whether 
the large scale military intervention, which took place then, represented an act of 
premeditated aggression by a powerful, territorially ambitious neighbour, or a 
"peace opération"17 in defence of a beleaguered minority of fellow nationals, 
threatened by forces under the command of a foreign right-wing military junta. 
Historical analogies differ from Sudetenland18 to something akin to the Falklands 
war. 
Local interprétations of recent history tend to coincide with the main ethnie and 
political fault lines on the island. Papadakis has simplified these in chart and tableau 
form19 and they have been reproduced below in Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1. 
17Referred to as this by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities. 
18Attalides M.A. 1979, Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics. Edinburgh: Q Press, p.90. 
19Papadakis, I. 1993. Perceptions of Historv and Collective Identitv: A Study of Contemporarv 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cvpriot Nationalism. PhD thesis, Trinity College, Cambridge, pp. 89 & 
161. 
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Figure 1.1 The structure of recent history as viewed by the Greek and Turkish-
Cypriot authorities. 
Republic of Cvprus 
EOKA struggle begins 1955 
Independence 1960 
Coup and Invasion 1974 
TRNC 
1958 Turkish Cypriot armed résistance (TMT) 
to independence (ENOSIS) begins. 
1963 
Turkish Cypriot deaths mourned 
1967 
1974 Peace Opération 
1983 Déclaration of Independence 
Figure 1.1 above reproduces Papadakis' chronology of the "Years commemorated 
in Annual Rituals", which usefully simplifies the divergence between the different 
officiai interpretations of recent history. The dates celebrated in rituals represent 
what each community views as the major ruptures in recent Cypriot history, some 
of which were profound enough to have had major economie ramifications (and two 
of which, 1963 and 1974, are the main concern of this thesis). 
The major political divergence amongst the majority Greek-Cypriot community, in 
the interpretations of the recent past, is almost as great as the dominant ethnie 
interpretations (shown above, Figure 1.1). A simplified view of the different 
Greek-Cypriot interpretations of recent history can be seen in Table 1.1 (below), 
adapted from Papadakis' work20. Contemporary perceptions of the recent past, 
are delineated by this représentation of the views of the extremes. 
2Qibid., p. 161. 
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Table 1.1 Greek-Cypriot interprétations of recent history 
Politicai Party Context of 1974 War Belligerents 
AKEL21 (communist party of Cyprus -
33% of vote in 1996 parliamentary élections). 
History of Cyprus Insiders : Cypriots 
Outsiders: Greeks and Turks 
D I S Y 2 2 (centre-right party of the Président: 
1993 & 1998 - 34% of vote in 1996 
parliamentary élections) 
History of Greece Insiders : Greeks 
Outsiders: Turks 
As the voting strength indicates (Table 1.1, above), these "extremes" represent the 
politicai interests of the overwhelming majority of the electorate in the Republic of 
Cyprus, particularly their views on the most pervasive issue in Cypriot politics: the 
"Cyprus Problem". The views of the smaller parties, DIKO and EDEK, largely 
conform with either a national ist or an international socialist interprétation of recent 
history (not necessarily in that order). It is therefore, relevant to present Table 1.1 
as a rough représentation of the dominant cleavage in Greek-Cypriot historical 
perceptions. The Table illustrâtes that Greek nationalism and even perceptions of 
'Greekness' are far from monolithic. A Cypriot identity exists amongst the left (on 
both sides) which plays down ethnie arguments and emphasises the role of 
geopolitics, playing on cultural différences. 
21AKEL: Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou (Progressive Party of die Working People). 
22DISY: Dimokratikos Synagermos (Democratic Rally). 
21 
In terms of the topic of this thesis, a clear distinction can be drawn between the 
economic effects of organised violence in Cyprus before 1974 and after. From April 
1955 there was spasmodic organised politicai violence in Cyprus, commencing with 
a right-wing guerrilla war not for independence, but to unite the island with Greece 
(Enosis). Ethnie conflict followed, causing increasing numbers of Turkish-Cypriots 
to concentrate into defensive enclaves between 1956-58 and, again after 
independence and the breakdown of the power-sharing constitution, in 1963. After 
intermittent, inter and intra-ethnic conflict, violence amongst Greek-Cypriots was 
spurred by the fall of demoeraey in Athens in 1967. Between 1968 and 1973 
politicai violence in Cyprus was mostly intra rather than inter-communal. The 
politicai right used violence, intimidation and acts of terrorism to further a 
pereeived nationalist cause and, in the (majority) Greek community, the socialist 
left (EDEK) responding by arming and training its supporters. As the Greek junta 
imploded, (particularly after the overthrow of Colonel Papadopoulous in Athens by 
the more hard-line Brigadier Ioannidis), acts of intra-communal organised politicai 
violence increased. In 1974, violence and intrigue reached a crescendo, resulting in 
the Athens sponsored coup against the Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios. 
Brief, intense, open civil war began between the Athens controlied National Guard 
supported by EOKA B terrorists on one side and lightly armed police and EDEK 
(Socialist Party) units, loyal to the now almost exclusively Greek-Cypriot 
government of the Republic of Cyprus,23 on the other. This inter-Greek fighting 
2330/6/1970 Cyprus Mail reported that President Makarios had appointed a Turirish Cypriot, Dr 
Ihsan Ali, as his personal advisor. Less controversially (at least for the Greeks) there was an 
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was curtailed by large-scale, mainland Turkish military Intervention, when violence 
reached total war proportions24 and resulted in the permanent division of the island 
between Greek speaking and Orthodox Christian Cypriots and mainly Turkish 
speaking Muslim Cypriots25. 
After the long term, clandestine, illegal intervention of one guarantor power 
(Greece), another guarantor power (Turkey) intervened decisively. However, 
neither acted to restore the Constitution, their only legal justification for 
intervention as guarantors. In retrospect, Turkey's actions seem similarly 
unconstitutional, so that intervention must also be viewed as illegal, as no attempi 
was, or has been made to restore the 1960 Constitution; in this sense "intervention" 
becomes "invasion"26. The hypothesis to be tested here, however, is not concerned 
with constitutional niceties but proposes that the "short, sharp, shock" of "total 
war" released economic potentials, that prolonged internai conflict may have 
neglected or destroyed. Whilst in no sense justifying the action taken by external 
forces, the period surrounding the de facto division is analysed, to see whether this 
Armeni an Auditor. 
24The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993) has two définitions for "total war": a war in which 
ail available weapons and personnel are employed; a war conducted without scruple or limitation. " It 
is more the latter définition which is implied here with the figurative use of the term "total war 
proportions" and the contradictory juxtaposition of "short, sharp..." with "total war". The aim is to 
contrast the level of conflict in a war with a major NATO power, with the internai conflicts that 
preceded it. 
25The définition of Turkish and Greek Cypriotness seems to be entirely religiously based, as 
members of both communities spoke each others language, sometimes exclusively. (This was the case 
in and around Ayios Simion, in the Karpas, where exclusively Muslim villages spoke only Greek.) 
Though the conflict does not appear to be religiously based, as like the Bosnian Muslims, Turkish 
Cypriots were and are very liberal Muslims. 
26For a more sophisticated approach to these conceras see Hunt D. "Three Greek islands and the 
development of international law", in: Koumoulides, John T. A. (ed.) 1986. Cvprus in Transition 
1960-1985. London: Trigraph. 
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political landmark coincides with a long term developmental shift. How different 
was the structure of the Cypriot economy after 1974? Clearly, these questions are 
likely to be controversial in Cyprus. 
Amongst economists, the period represents a challenge. Following the events of 
1963 and 1974, in the Turkish and Greek-Cypriot community respectively, people 
did not always appear to act as rational economic agents27. The market was not 
always considered the most efficient mechanism, nor perceived to be the most 
legitimate distributor of Cypriot resources. More variables than the simply 
quantifiable need to be taken into consideration if data from the period is to be 
adequately understood. By doing so, this period of Economic History in Cyprus can 
be removed from the periphery of social and economic research and viewed in the 
light of a wider European experience. Clearly war and reconstruction have played a 
decisive role in recent European economic history. Economic integration and 
reconstruction went hand in hand, and both correlated with a period of unsurpassed 
economic growth. So it is worth re-evaluating the possible causes and the extent of 
27"I know about those government schemes for getting 'restarted'...The government people said they 
would give me a card and put my name down for any work I wanted to do.. .What do you want to do 
sir? they ask me.. .1 said to them I don't want to do a thing." Interview with middle aged former 
farmer, quoted by Loizos, (P. 1981. The Heart Grown Bitter. Cambridge: CUP, p. 123). "Other men 
repeated these sorts of things in discussion...Many insisted they were not disposed to start up a new 
enterprise, or hunt for a job. In April 1975 many of them proposed to 'wait and see' (p. 123)" . 
Looking closely at one particular village, Argaki, this time between April - December 1975, Loizos 
argues that over and above micro-social circumstances ("age, family size, capital assets, education 
and marketable skills") "...they could be divided roughly into those whose pre-war [economic] lives 
had mainly been turned inwards towards the village [farmers, tractor drivers, coffee shop owners, 
tailors and some other skilled workers; a majority of Argaki villagers] and those who had faced 
outwards... As refugees, without their land or the support of their fellow villages [the former] were 
badly disadvantaged, and were in general slower to start rebuilding their personal fortunes" (p. 159). 
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the economic "miracle in half an island",28 to determine the extent to which this 
assessment is still valid, and whether it can be applied to both sides of the 16th 
August 1974 cease-fire line, or even the island as a whole? Has reconstruction 
without re-integration left the people of Cyprus richer or poorer? 
Ignoring the politics and focusing on simple comparative économies, much 
understanding of recent Cypriot development would be lost. However, in terms of 
the current de facto situation, one economy began land-scarce, the other land 
abundant. The latter had abundant fixed capital assets, but found new investment 
and sufficient human capital to fully utilise, let alone develop, those resources, 
difficult to find. Both économies had severe infrastructural bottlenecks after 1974 
but the rump of the Republic in the south, found new investment funds relatively 
easy to find. Skill and labour shortages after 1974, were a problem for both 
économies, though the immediate conséquence of the war in the south was a short 
term problem of labour abundance. After another round of inter-communal 
redistribution, per capita income, the most important indicator of future growth 
prospects, begins the period of géographie and ethnie division looking similar (see 
Figure 7.1). Subséquent economic growth rates were not only influenced by 
différent constraints but by other factors: the role of government, investment levels, 
levels of human capital development and the part played by the private sector. What 
28Christodoulou (1992. op. cit.) has credited the labelling of the Greek-Cypriot recovery from war in 
1974 as an economic "miracle" or "Wirtschaftswunder" to the "German press". The Economist (27th 
August 1977, "Miracle in half an island", pp. 50-51) applied the accolade to Cyprus in August 1977. 
Hudson J. and Dymiotou-Jensen M. in (1989 Modelling a Developing Countrv. Aldersot: Avebury) 
used the term again, this time in inverted comas, though failed to credit earlier uses of the accolade. 
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were the mechanisms which encouraged private investment confidence in one 
economy and constrained it in the other? One economy increasingly adopted the 
language of neo-liberal economics, the other (which succeeded in maintaining high 
levels of private investment), remained unrepentantly Keynesian. These clinical 
facts may intrigue the economist, studying them in Cyprus, however, requires a 
more inter-disciplinary approach. 
Sketching the thesis 
This chapter offers a broad introduction; an overview of themes explored 
throughout the thesis. When referring to the Republic of Cyprus after 1963, it can 
be assumed that reference is to what is effectively the Greek-Cypriot economy. 
After 1974 that Greek-Cypriot economy was concentrated in the south, so reference 
may also be made to the south, meaning the Greek-Cypriot economy. When 
referring to the Turkish-Cypriot economy, which from 1967 to 1971 was 
administered by the "Provisionai Turkish Cypriot Administration", from 1971-74 
by simply the "Turkish Cypriot Administration", from 1974-75 by the 
"Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration"29, from 1975-83 by the "Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus", and from 1983 to date by the "Turkish Republic of 
2 9 As in the "Legislative Assembly of tlie Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration", Rüstern, K. 
(editor) 1987. North Cyprus Almanac. London: RustemK. &Bro., pp. 20-21. 
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Northern Cyprus"30, the Turkish-Cypriot economy will be referred to as such, or 
simply as the north or northern Cyprus after 1974. 
The Republic of Cyprus will be considered first because there is more and better 
data, and some secondary literature available to researchers in London. This chapter 
serves as a broad introduction to the literature, the région and the period, whilst the 
next chapter concentrâtes on developments in the internationally recognised 
Republic of Cyprus and the (Greek Cypriot) Government controlied parts of the 
island. The following two chapters depend on more primary research and look at 
developments beyond the scope of the Republic, that is the development and growth 
of a separate Turkish-Cypriot economy. 
Chapter 5 begins with simple hypothesis testing, the use of primary data to test the 
conclusions of other research; who or what provided the recovery mechanism for 
post (1974) war growth. This chapter will combine sectoral analysis with a 
preliminary examination of the rôle of the state in the re-establishment of private 
investment confidence. Though seemingly incongruous, the link between the 
construction industry in the south and export agriculture in the north is more than 
simply blind theoretics; the State is said to have re-allocated human resources 
displaced from the latter to the former in the south. In many ways, this historical 
process picks up the threads of long term themes addressed in earlier chapters, 
30Because the Republic of Cyprus (the Greek Cypriot, southern part of the island) is the only 
internationally recognised government of the island (by the UN, IBRD, IMF etc.) it is customary to 
refer to the northern, Turkish Cypriot "state" within inverted comas. 
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however, Chapter 5 concentrates on the short run, how was confidence re-
established and how successfully, while earlier chapters (2 & 4) map out longer 
term trends. 
The implementation of a Keynesian, déficit financed policy, designed to restore 
confidence and exploit the income multiplier, could have been employed across the 
island as a whole by the sepárate and distinct de facto administrations. If so, was 
this policy or necessity, politics or economics? Keynesian demand management is 
something of a concomitant of war. There appears to have been a key role to be 
played by the public sector in re-establishing a full-employment equilibrium, re-
establishing perceived key sectors formerly dominated by the prívate sector and 
thereby establishing more general economic confidence. However, whilst elements 
of a Keynesian approach could be applied to developments north and south, policies 
adopted by the Cypriots always partly conformed to older classical concepts, like 
comparative advantage. Moreover, there was an explicit shift in official Turkish-
Cypriot attitudes along with attitudes elsewhere, away from the oíd macro economic 
orthodoxy. Following political changes in Turkey, northern Cyprus attempted a 
quasi-privatisation strategy, one that was contemporary with the earliest, tentative 
experiments further west. 
Chapter 6 examines the possibility of determining a dynamic model to estimate the 
economic costs to the island as a whole of its de facto división into two non-
communicating parts. In the light of various static estimates of the costs to each 
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community of the other's sins31, can the economic consequences of war be viewed 
with sufficient detachment for possible alternative growth trends to be constructed 
and compared? Can dynamic models be used to estimate the costs of de facto 
division? Can these costs be disaggregated in terms of the inter-communal 
distributional consequences of war and ethnic division? 
Once the tools are in place to offer some rough benchmarks, growth projections in 
an idealised unitary Cypriot economy are extended to 1990. Results are compared 
with the aggregate Cypriot economic performance and the respective communal 
performances to 1990. Given the real performance of the economies of Cyprus, 
how do they compare both with idealised projections and with peer economies over 
the same period? Has Cyprus' recent turbulent history distorted its economic 
performance? Given that there has been a recovery in the economic performance of 
both communities from the trough that followed organised violence, in that neither 
community is as dependent on foreign aid as it was, Chapter 7 asks how successful 
and sustainable recovery has been, relative to other similarly endowed economies32? 
31Bicak H.A. 1993. "An Evaluation of the Turkish Cypriot Position: Debts of the Greek Cypriot 
Community", article submitted to the UN Resident Representative of the Secretary General. Republic 
of Cyprus April 1975. (Unpublished - i.e. "Restricted") "Economic Consequences of the Turkish 
Invasion and Future Prospects of the Cyprus Economy." Nicosia: The Planning Bureau. Republic of 
Cyprus 1992. Greek Cvpriot Properties in the Occupied Area and the Turkish Cypriot Policy. 
Nicosia, PIO. 
32Sachs, J .D. & Warner, A. 1995. "Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration." 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1. 1995. 
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Defining the title 
The first priority is to define and justify the use of the terms "ethno-national 
conflict" and "siege économies" in the title. The term "ethno-national" comes from 
the title of a 'C' Session Workshop at the 12th International Economic History 
Conference in 199833. Ironically, the term fits the historical context of the Cyprus 
conflict well because divisions were arguably neither ethnie nor strictly national. 
With the rise and propagation of nationalism in the 19th Century, divisions between 
Muslim and Christian Cypriots began to take on an ethnie stance34. Increasingly, 
supposed national links triggered, encouraged and enforced division in Cyprus. 
The fact that the Cypriot communities are economically distinct and therefore 
"économies" (plural) is not contested, while it is stili politically controversial. 
There are, however, three meanings ascribed to the word 'siege' used in this 
context. The first meaning is "the act of surrounding a town, building etc., with a 
hostile force (esp. military) in order to cut off outside communications and supplies 
and so facilitate capture". The other meanings of the word derive from its 
combination with 'economy' and 'mentality'. A "siege economy: in which import 
controls are imposed and the export of capital is curtailed; siege mentality: a 
3 3 Session C42: "Ethno-national divides and eeonomic coexistence: historical perspectives", 
organised by Metzer, J. (Dept. of Economies, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem) and O'Grada, C. 
(Dept. of Economies, University College Dublin). 
3 4 Kitromilides, P.M. "From Coexistence to Confrontation: The Dynamics of Ethnie Conflict in 
Cyprus", in Attalides M.A. 1977. (ed.) Cvprus Reviewed. Nicosia: The Jus Cypri Association with 
the Co-ordinating C'tee of Scientific and Cultural Organisations, pp.35-70. 
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defensive or paranoid attitude based on the assumption of the hostility of others"35. 
As the first definition can be applied literally to recent Cypriot history, the latter 
two definitions also have some applicability. The above definition of a 'siege 
economy' is relevant when applied to aspects of economic management and the 
definition of a 'siege mentality' is relevant when applied to the dominant social and 
political structures of the two societies. 
With varying degrees of accuracy, both sides of Cyprus can be described as 'siege 
economies'. The Turkish-Cypriot enclaved community experienced varying degrees 
of life under siege between 1963 and 1974. After 1974 their economy in the north 
conformed closely with the above definition of a 'siege economy', while a siege 
mentality was not entirely absent from the attitude of commentators, administrators 
and representatives, though this may not necessarily suggest paranoia. Import 
controls existed from the foundation of the 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' 
(1974) and "the export of capital is [still] curtailed" (as the creditors of Polly Peck 
discovered to their cost). In the north, Turkish military involvement and the Greek-
Cypriot sponsored "embargo" are said to provide overwhelming constraints on 
political pluralism and open market economics. Though the north is possibly, first 
and foremost a strategic entity, where the rules of accountability, modern economic 
management and efficiency take second place. This raises the question: to what 
extent is the north an autonomous, sovereign economy which can be studied as 
35BrownL. (ed.) 1993. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionarv on Historical Principies. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 2856. 
31 
such? Is northern Cyprus simply run as a 'spécial case' province of Turkey? These 
questions can only be answered by further research (see Chapters 3 & 4). 
The rump Republic in the south is more of an open economy with a siege mentality, 
though it is far from averse to the imposition of import controls and still maintains 
currency régulations limiting access to foreign exchange and the export of 
currency36. It is described here as a siege economy because of the resources it 
devotes to preventing the status quo being accepted as 'normalcy'. Many physical 
resources have obviously been tied up in a military and diplomatie capacity37, in the 
necessary duplication of facilities and provision for refugees. Many government 
outlays continue to fulfil a strategie, politicai rather than economic or social role. 
In [the (Greek Cypriot) Republic of ] Cyprus, the stance of both the 
government and the refugees is a commitment to 'repatriation\..as the 
prospects for this recede, and as the material and economic provision 
designed to satisfy short term needs take on the appearance of a long term 
permanent solution... [t]he refugees have exploited the ambiguities of the 
programme to enhance their politicai profile in a number of ways. 
Extracting from the government the rights to second (and eventually third?) 
generation housing is one example. Proposais to charge rent or impose 
maintenance charges are vigorously opposed.38 
36 6/4/1998 Financial Times, p.31, column 5 & 6. 
37"The broader economy suffers from the cycles of tension and uncertainty. Up to last year it was 
the government's proud boast that Cyprus was set to qualify for the European single currency. But 
higher defence spending and lower bookings from tourists, put off by a couple of clashes along the 
Green Line in 1996, helped to increase the budget deficit from 3.4% of GDP to 5% in 1997. ibid., 
p.29, column 7 & 8. 
38Zetter R. 1991 "Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming Bureaucratie Identity", Journal of 
Refugee Studies. Voi. 4, No. l , p.56. 
In this example, the growth potential in costs cannot seriously be challenged until 
refugee status has been removed, either by repatriation or a change in government 
and/or public attitudes. As the growth of the permanent refugee population has 
grown from 162,000 in 1974 to 209,000 in 199039, it has proved difficult for a 
politicai party to seil waiving the right to return. As long as there are refugees and a 
refugee lobby, no party could afford tampering with refugee provisions when 
définitions of refugee status cover a third of the population. Democratic constraints 
are not the only barrier; with no refugees there is less of a Cyprus problem. 
Officially described as "displaced persons" (UNHCR)40 the 40% of the population 
made "refugees" by Turkish military intervention, represent the most powerful 
argument for the re-unification of the island. 
An important element of the 'siege mentality', this time from perceived threats from 
within, was alluded to by Peter Loizos41. He argues that "institutionalised 
generosity" was necessary to prevent mass social unrest. The events of 1974 
necessitated a rapid expansion of welfare provision. "Welfare-socialist" policies42 
were drawn up to prevent a recurrence of the conséquences of the Asia Minor 
disaster (mass starvation, the rise of the left) from affecting Cyprus where the left, 
3 9 Republic of Cyprus 1994. The Cvprus Diarv 1994. Nicosia: Press and Information Office, p. 14. 
40United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Because Cypriot "refiugees" (in Greek prosfiyon) 
remained within the borders of their country of nationality they are consider "displaced 
persons"(Geneva Convention and Protocol, 1951 / 1967). 
41Loizos 1981. op. cit., p. 135. 
4 2 z m , p. 136. 
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unlike Greece in 1923, were already strong and highly organised. Going by 
contemporary reports, these policies were successful: 
The military bisection of Cyprus and the mass uprooting did not, strangely, 
cause any political upheaval. People voted in the post-invasion election in 
much the same way as in the one before. The social consequences have 
been much more marked.43 
Politically, the 'siege mentality' predates Turkish intervention. Because of the 
dominance of the "national issue", before 1978 there was only one contested multi-
party presidential election, and that was the one supervised by a departing British 
colonial administration44. In the nominally contested 1968 presidential election, the 
extreme nationalist, "protest" candidate, Takis Evdokas, received 3.7% of the 
popular vote. With a voter participation rate of well over 90%, the incumbent 
President and former popular resistance leader, Archbishop Makarios, was re-
elected with 95.45% electoral support. He had secured the support of both 
communists and nationalists and prevented the emergence of political parties. In fact 
all the left and an overwhelming majority of the right, had re-elected the amorphous 
Patriotic Front candidate. The constitutionally scheduled 1973 election was not 
contested. After the death of Makarios in August 1977, the transitional Presidency 
of Spyros Kyprianou inherited an increasingly fractious government of "national 
unity" (the Patriotic Front having been forced to split into political parties in 1969). 
A decade later, George Vassiliou provided a change from broadly consensus 
43The Economist, 27th August, 1977, "Miracle in Half an Island", p.51. 
44Mayes S. 1981. Makarios: A Biographv. London: Macmillan, p.143. 
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government in 1988 being, if nothing else, the final blow to the old Makarios 
coalition and the pretence of national unity amongst the Greek-Cypriot population. 
The rhetorical response of the 'Old Guard' (Clerides and Kyprianou) in the 1993 
election campaign adds credence to the view that a siege mentality pervades the 
politicai process in post-independence Cyprus. An element in Vassiliou's failure to 
be re-elected was the présentation of his stance on the dominant issue in Cypriot 
executive politics, "the Cyprus problem" (the post-war, politically correct term for 
the post-division extension and conséquences of the "national issue"). "The Cyprus 
problem" may not be decisively influential in électoral politics, partly because no 
candidate wants to be perceived as "soft on the Turks". More influential during 
élections is ideology, patronage and (family) history but, once in Government, "the 
Cyprus problem" dominâtes the executive and the présentation of Greek-Cypriot 
politics. At a superficial level the 'siege mentality' in the south amounts to nothing 
more than "the Cyprus problem" having been the first news item almost everyday 
in ali media for twenty years, despite the fact that the "problem" remained 
practically unchanged. 
The idea of two siege économies in Cyprus, is confirmed by the application of 
politicai theory to the island's history. "The Cyprus problem" is another case of a 
double minority (as in Ireland and many of the former Yugoslav Republics). The 
island lies just forty miles from the Turkish mainland, occasionally visible from St 
Hilarian in the Pentatactilos mountains. It is inhabited by a majority of Greek 
speaking and culturally Hellenic people. Whilst the Turkish-Cypriot minority sees 
itself as having been literally under siege since the constitutional crisis and 
communal fighting of 1963, the Greek-Cypriot majority (as a "beleaguered" 
Hellenic minority in the "Asia Minor" región), perceive themselves as having been 
surrounded and encroached upon for longer. More prosaically, but more painfully 
for many Cypriots, both communities feel themselves under siege because both have 
suffered recently as a consequence of being a relative minority in the midst of an 
alien and mutually antagonistic culture. This, its political consequences and its 
economic ramifications, provides the basis for this empirical enquiry. 
Partly because of a pervasive 'siege mentality', economic development in the 
island's two economies has never been simultaneously researched. While aspects of 
social, economic and political life have been researched on both sides of "the Green 
Line", they have never been put together in the context of post-war reconstruction. 
This thesis aspires to construct this, 'the big picture' by testing and amalgamating 
the results of previous research, much of it from other disciplines, along with new 
primary data to put together a comparative study of the two economies' approach to 
economic reconstruction behind the barricades. An attempt will be made (in Chapter 
6) to evalúate the contribution, if any, of the barricades themselves. 
Perhaps it is inescapable that all who are emotionally attached to the island should 
be susceptible to Christodoulou's most scathing criticism45: "...there has been a 
marked absence of depth in management of matters political, financial, economic, 
45Christodoulou 1992. op. cit. p. 285. 
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commercial and social..." Until 1993 Cyprus had no university yet it had more 
graduates per capita than any country other than the US and Canada. But "one is 
tempted to propound the hypothesis that the signal failure of this massive investment 
in people, this lack of productivity by the island's intellectual and scientific elite, 
goes a long way towards accounting for the fortunes and misfortunes of Cyprus 
since the 1940's. It is also a most decisive issue when one views the island's 
future."46 It is hoped that above ali, this thesis will attempi to construct an in depth 
analysis of the economie effects of the island's recent past, and one that does not 
shy away from presenting evidence that may offend politicai orthodoxy on either 
side of the UN Buffer Zone. 
Earlier analysis and the contribution of new research 
It is perhaps appropriate that Cyprus, an economy specialising in the leisure 
industry, should have spawned a leisurely analysis of its own economic history. At 
least three of the few secondary sources (Wilson 1985 and 1992, and Dodd 1993) 
began with holiday interests. Rodney Wilson and Demetrios Christodoulou47 have 
concentrated their recent studies on the Republic of Cyprus, and Dodd's (ed.) is one 
of the only English texts available that attempts some analysis of the development of 
a Turkish-Cypriot economy. Of the scholars who have considered recent Cypriot 
46 ibid., p. 284. 
47Wilson 1992. op. cit., Christodoulou 1992. op. cit. 
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economic history, Christodoulou's study has been the most comprehensive, though 
it deals exclusively with developments in the (since 1963, largely Greek Cypriot) 
Republic of Cyprus. Technically, however, a study of the Cypriot economy must 
include analysis of the island as a whole and its two major communities. Seemingly 
all researchers have found the prospects of pan-Cypriot research less than alluring, 
although many cite a few key indicators from the other side by way of comparison, 
introduction or conclusion48. Even the fact that key government economic statistics 
omit much (but not all) of the contribution of the Turkish-Cypriot minority to 
national income after 1963, means that direct temporal comparisons with data prior 
to 1974 must be viewed with caution. It is hoped, however, that new research, 
whilst acknowledging these and other difficulties, builds on these significant 
contributions and attempts to broaden the analysis of economic developments 
following defacto ethnie division, at least in terms of including developments in the 
island as a whole in one body of research. 
Despite the gulf between the interprétations of the recent past, a history of mutuai 
antagonism stili means a shared history. Shared experiences whilst little 
acknowledged in the literature, extend beyond the division of Cyprus. Many 
institutions have a shared history (see Chapters 2, 3 & 4). Insecurity over property 
rights affected both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, though this too is little referred to 
48Bicak, H.A. (June) 1990. "The Impact of the EEC on the Economic Structure of the TRNC. " 
Leicester University, Dept. of Economies, unpublished PhD Thesis, Christodoulou 1992. op. cit., 
Olgan, M. E. "Economic Overview" and "Sectoral Analysis" inDodd 1993. op. cit., Wilson 1992. 
op. cit. 
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in existing economic analysis. For Turkish-Cypriots moving north into a région 
where Greek-Cypriots had formerly been in the overwhelming majority, but who 
had fled south, subsequent property rights problems are perhaps obvious (see 
Chapter 4). Some Greek Cypriot refugees faced similar potential investment 
disincentives; they were discouraged from rebuilding their lives because of the 
imminent possibility of positive or negative future outcomes. Many Greek-Cypriots 
refugees feared a third round of fighting (see Chapter 5) and/or expected to return 
to their homes and former economic activity in the north49. 
Insecurity for private investors, obviously stemming from the undermining of 
property rights that was a conséquence of the war and the loss of territory, arguably 
necessitated a rôle for government. Seemingly, only government can allow the 
future to be fully discounted, and all resources to be fully applied to politicai and 
economic survival regardless of cost. The discount rate facing governments is quite 
différent from that facing private investors due to the différent risks and constraints. 
Capital remains relatively mobile, whilst the sovereignty of government is restricted 
to a specific territory. Any future, even one characterised by high levels of national 
debt, is better for the state, the Government, than no future. A war economy can 
offer significant short-term economic advantages which counteract the losses 
49"Such a person was Sophia Paphiti, who before the war had made a good living by baking 
...superior bread...[which] she sold to the wealthier families who preferred to pay a few coppers 
more for home-made bread...[I]n April she said she was wondering whether to set up an oven where 
she was and start again. 'But supposing we go back?'.. .By winter she had still done nothing... 'I 
simply pray that nothing worse happens. Surely we've had the worst? We won't find anything there 
if we do go back. We've lost so much." Loizos 1981. op. d i . , pp. 165-7. 
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incurred as a resuit of eonfl ict. However, most benefits accrue as a resuit of 
Government spending taking the place of private consumption and investment, 
which decline as a resuit of disruption, destruction, rising insecurity and displaced 
investment. Seemingly the war economy persisted far longer in the north, a 
concomitant of strategie concerns, "embargo" and international, legal and 
administrative considérations. To what extent did economic performance represent 
différent policies or différent constraints? What were the main policy différences 
between the two économies, comparing the différent institutional responses, the 
différent monetary policies and trade policies? New research must attempt to answer 
these questions and explain the differentials in recovery rates north and south, at 
least challenging dominant local explanations. The view in the north is that its 
performance, relative to the south's, results from the latter's monopoly of 
international récognition. Its conséquent access to aid and ability to manipulate 
international opinion, restricts trade with the area50. In the south, cultural 
différences are the dominant lay explanation for economic divergence51. 
Whilst it would be interesting to assess the Turkish sector's response to apparent 
windfall gains of securing the, allegedly, most productive and developed parts of 
the island, it would also be useful to look at the situation that prevailed before this, 
50Bicak 1990. op.cit. 
51Scott, (J. 1995. Identitv. Visibilitv and legitimaev in Turkish Cypriot Tourism Development. 
University of Kent at Canterbury, Dept. of Social Anthropology, PhD Thesis, submitted March 
1993, p.97), quotes the head of the Cyprus Tourism Organisation, A. Andronicou as saying: "The 
Greek Cypriot culture may... be described as competitive and individualistic... The Turkish Cypriot 
culture differs in not attaching such great importance to achievement and wealth, and the Turkish 
community was therefore relatively less well represented in the business and economic life of the 
island." 
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which is not only a critical, though infrequently acknowledged part of the island's 
political history, but also an important part of the island's economic history. Prior 
to 1974 much of the Turkish-Cypriot community spent ten years in fortified 
enclaves and inter-communal trade was limited by persistent, periodic Greek-
Cypriot embargoes and a Turkish-Cypriot boycott of the Greek-Cypriot economy 
(see Chapter 3). So, in theory, the Turkish-Cypriot community went from one 
extreme to the other; from extreme scarcity in spatially highly limited, scattered and 
militarily insecure enclaves, to abundance in a militarily secure región that 
amounted to nearly 40% of the island's territory. It is perhaps obvious, with a 
subsequent large scale immigration policy, that no housing shortages faced newly 
displaced Turkish-Cypriots in the north after 1974; rather the problem was the 
reverse, under-utilisation of newly controlled fixed capital assets (see Chapter 4). 
So researchers are faced with very different economic conditions, north and south, 
at the juncture of de facto división, faced by two communities with very different 
economic experiences immediately preceding their respective migrations. Given 
these circumstances, how important was uncertainty over property rights, the 
opposition of the international community, the so called "embargo"52, 
organisational and distribution problems, as barriers and bottlenecks to the efficient 
management of the resources available to the Turkish-Cypriot community after 
1974? 
52"So called" because most of the regions key exports continued to be traded with existing 
international customers, see Chapter 5, particularly Figures 5.24 to 5.26. 
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Christodoulou has concentrated his analysis on the Greek-Cypriot economy, arguing 
that Turkish-Cypriots were largely involuntary parties to the "TRNC": "...re-
unification depends on what the genuine will of the Turkish-Cypriots turns out to 
be, which hitherto has never been expressed freely...The Turkish-Cypriots will not 
agree to anything which Turkey does not want..."(pp 291). It is this Turkish 
dominance, particularly Turkish military dominance, negating politicai and 
economic independence, which removes the requirement and déniés the possibility, 
for Greek-Cypriots to study the région as part of Cyprus. 
Christodoulou has, however, developed a clear snap shot of what is effectively 
southern Cyprus, on a background of an orthodox view of the Cyprus problem. The 
main strengths of his significant recent worlc derive from his personal depth of 
knowledge of recent Cypriot history and his access to officiai sources (having been 
a former government minister). If there are weaknesses, they may lie in a lack of 
analytical debate and criticai argument and in the failure to confront inter-Greek 
(Greek-Cypriot) conflict and the reality of economic division, both in the 1960s and 
after 1974. Christodoulou seems to rely heavily on a narrative, descriptive view of 
recent Cypriot economic history, when what is needed is a more circumspect 
approach to acknowledge and illuminate controversy. There is very little use of 
theory in Christodoulou's analysis. Any criticism of post-1974 government policy is 
either vague or veiled and coded, following or followed by flattery and so lost on 
the uninitiated reader. The lasting impression after reading Christodoulou is that 
"Inside The Cyprus Miracle" is a book about the development of the Greek-Cypriot 
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economy following catastrophe. It makes a useful and valuablè contribution, though 
Cypriot history is more complicated and the writing of history (even economic 
history) more politically costly. 
If the resilience of the virtuous is worth study, so are the wages of sin. The problem 
with Cyprus is that the two visions are transferable. Christodoulou's recent work 
sometimes appears too closely aligned to one of those visions, defined by the 
atmosphère of an island under siege. Much of the politicai economy of Cyprus is 
stili a mystery because the role of the politicai process, the nature of private 
investment, the planning process, the role of dissent and the role of Turkish-
Cypriots before, after and during the retreat to enclaves is hardly referred to and not 
analysed53. Answers to some of these questions will be attempted here. What was 
foremost in the research objectives, however, was a first attempi at a bi-communal 
study, particularly a study of the economic effects of Cyprus' recent history on the 
Cypriots themselves, ali Cypriots, and the whole island. The endeavours here owe 
much to what Christodoulou has done, and can not hope to better his coverage of 
the Greek-Cypriot economy; its objectives are more circumspect whilst its social 
subject matter is wider. 
Interestingly though, Christodoulou has challenged the term "economic miracle", 
credited to Cyprus in the post-invasion period by foreign journalists. He argues that 
53Turkish Cypriots receive a mention in approximately 3 % of the book, much of which is devoted to 
their unwelcome exploitation of Greek Cypriot owned assets in the north since 1974. Christodoulou 
1992. op. cit., p.xlii-xlx, 5-6, 33, 35, 266-269, 272-273, 277, 290-291, 298. 
43 
any credit for successful economic performance should be báckdated to the pre-war 
independence period54. In the short interlude that followed British withdrawal and 
preceded Turkish invasion, Cyprus, he argues, transformed itself into a diverse, 
dynamic, rapidly modernising economy, more able to cope with massive shocks. If 
Cyprus did rapidly modernise itself, however, it did this despite constitutional 
stalemate and conséquent politicai discord, the latter of which features little in 
Christodoulou. 
For a tiny economy external trade is hugely important. If a rapid recovery is to be 
viewed, perhaps it can be seen first and foremost in the export sector? And if 
Christodoulou's argument about the seeds of the "economic miracle" having been 
planted after independence but before defacto division, then that too may be visible 
in export data. Once freed from the colonial yoke did the Cypriot export trade 
boom? 
An export led recovery (which earlier development priorities, projects and 
investment may have inadvertently prepared Cyprus for), can be seen in the rise in 
the proportion of domestic output exported. In the thirteen years that followed 
independence and preceded defacto division (1961-1973), exports averaged 18% of 
GNP; in the ten years after 1974 they averaged 25%, an impressive performance 
and one that must have made a contribution to recovery. The latter performance, 
however, almost exactly matches the export performance of pre-independence 
54ibid., p.xxxii-xxxiii. 
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Cyprus, in the ten years that preceded independence, 1950-59, Cypriot exports 
averaged 25% of Cypriot GNP55. 
Data on the composition, rather than the proportion, of domestic output exported 
(presented in Figure 2.1, Chapter 2) tends to contradict Christodoulou's time frame 
also. Clearly the diversification of exports and export markets carne only after 
1974, as a consequence of the loss of a región specialised in export agriculture. It 
will be argued here that diversification of production, and particularly production 
for external markets, was an important indicator of economic development. This 
occurred as a direct result of the war in 1974 and the necessary restructuring it 
engendered. 
Christodoulou gives a generally optimistic description of the social effects of 
economic growth against a pessimistic background of the role of planning, 
economic management and the sustainability of economic growth. Implicitly, 
economic growth has benefited almost all of society, seemingly compensating for 
gross political failures. In 1981 34% of the labour market earned a salary whilst in 
1989 that had risen to 45%. "..the figures seem to point to a tendency towards the 
embourgeoisement of Cyprus labour, and helps underscore the striking middle-class 
character of Cyprus society as a whole56". This argument ignores changes in 
55Republic of Cyprus 1995. Statistical Abstract 1993. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, Dept. of 
Statistics and Research, pp. 529-531. 
5 6 Christodoulou 1992. op, cit. p. 215. It is assumed that "Cyprus Society as a whole" refers to 
Greek Cypriots only. 
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banking technology, administrative convenience, and Cyprus ' relatively advanced 
banking system57. Social class is not determined by method of payment, nor by the 
trimmings of consumer society. The Cypriot Communist Party has had more 
électoral support than any other in Western Europe. In the 1996 élections to the 
House of Représentatives, the party polled 33% of the vote (2% more than in the 
1991 parliamentary élection). Discussing grants and subsidies to the agricultural 
sector, reflected in public investment elsewhere in the economy, favouring the rieh 
and well connected, Christodoulou argues: "The surprising thing is that this state of 
affairs appeals to ail, if one is to judge from rhetoric. The milking of the state by 
the better-off seems to be universally acceptable. Here is middle-class ideology if 
one is looking for it"58, as Christodoulou clearly is. 
Behind the statistics demonstrating rapid economic recovery, behind the significant 
social achievements of the refugee resettlement and reintegration, the contradictory 
implication is that the war accelerated the concentration of wealth. Christodoulou 
argues, the state was keen to promote and develop the entrepreneurial class as the 
medium of reconstruction and it is acknowledged that the richer entrepreneurs 
benefited most59. It is unclear from his text whether there were losers in the post-
(74)-war dash for growth (other than the environment which he acknowledges), to 
what extent they suffered and, if and how they expressed that politically. The 
57 6/4/1998 Financial Times, quoted Solon Triantafyllides, chairman of the Bank of Cyprus, the 
largest banking group in Cyprus accounting for over 40 % of the business: "Technologically, we are 
well advanced. We don't have to be jealous of any of the European banks", p.31, column 1. 
5 8 Christodoulou 1992. op. cit., p.70. 
59 ibid., p. 216 
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Republic of Cyprus experienced the 1980's zeitgeist, with its "yuppies" and its real 
estáte boom, but has inequality widened? "By applying the Gini coefficient for 
gross household income, it was suggested that Cyprus had an inequality of incomes 
comparable with European countries, with a hint that perhaps Cyprus taxation 
reduces inequality a little more than in European countries"60. This begs the 
question, which European countries? The UK, with a top rate marginal tax of 40% 
or France with a rate of 62 %61? Christodoulou's argument appears to be based on 
data from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey, conducted between 1984 
and 1985 by the Department of Statistics and Research, the results of which were 
published by the ILO/UNFPA62. In that publication the author, William House, 
states of Cyprus in the mid 1980s63: 
...at the level of the household, the size of the Gini coefficient of 
inequality is about what we might expect it to be in a middle-income 
developing country such as Cyprus [0.37]. It is lower than in relatively 
underdeveloped countries such as Kenya (Gini of 0.59), Zambia (0.56), 
Philippines (0.46) and Sudan (0.44) but higher than in some industrialised 
countries such as Denmark (0.30), Sweden (0.30), the United Kingdom 
(0.32) and Ireland (0.32). 
Does Christodoulou's "hint" at slightly more progressive taxation, than has been the 
général European practice, take into account the negative taxation of the "middle 
class ideology" (cited above) and the relatively high dependence on indirect taxation 
60 ibid., p. 223. 
61StewartM. 1993. Kevnes in the 1990's. London: Penguin Economies, p.93. 
62House, W.J. 1988. Socio-economic and Demographic characteristics of income distribution in 
Cyprus. Geneva: ILO/UNFPA. 
6Hbid., pp. 7-8. 
(which usually has a regressive impact)? It also sits uncomfortably with later 
conclusions. The Inland Revenue and Social Insurance derived data64 presented 
"tentative[ly] " by Christodoulou, appear to reveal that: wide income disparities 
exist between male and female workers, that income disparities are widening in 
rural areas, and between rural and urban areas65. Significantly, between 1973 and 
1983, Christodoulou found that income disparities in the private sector widened66. 
The extent to which these disparities widened and whether they increased more 
rapidly since de facto division in 1974, is not discussed by Christodoulou or any of 
the other authors cited here. Because of the lack of publicly available data prior to 
the ILO/UNFPA sponsored study, many questions regarding social mobility and 
economic disparities, before and after the major social upheavals in Cyprus, remain 
unanswered. However, House's findings, some of which are cited by 
Christodoulou67, demonstrate that by the mid 1980's the risks of poverty were 
concentrated amongst rural communities, women and the old68. The implication 
from what follows below is that these trends were accentuated by the kind of 
development that occurred after 1974 in the south: rapid urbanisation, the decline in 
the rôle of agriculture and an initial boom in labour intensive export manufacturing. 
6 4 Not publicly available. 
65 Christodoulou 1992. op. cit., Chapter 15: "Income levels and distribution: tentative readings", 
pp. 221-237. 
66 ibid., p.230. 
67 idid., pp. 226-227. 
68House, W.J. 1988. Socio-economic and Demographic characteristics of income distribution in 
Cyprus. Geneva: ILO/UNFPA, pp. 9, 16-21, 26. 
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Another writer who has analysed recent Cypriot economie history is Rodney 
Wilson69. Wilson's brief analysis of the effect of the various exogenous shocks on 
Cypriot trade in 1985 was expanded in 1992, the former of which forms a chapter 
in the latter. In the 1992 publication, he outlines three almost simultaneous shocks: 
the subdivision of an already small economy, the second oil shock and the 
disruption to its trading relations when its main trading partner (the UK.) joined the 
EC. Having twice tackled essentially the same question: the effects of exogenous 
shocks on the Cypriot economy, he has helped to highlight some important 
questions for future research. A question that remains vague throughout the Wilson 
research is the extent to which the war itself resulted in the restructuring of the 
economy, the re-routing of trade, increases in productivity and economie 
modernisation generally. What have been the changes in economie priorities and the 
level of communal and inter-communal redistribution?. What has been the extent 
and cost of rebuilding or constructing from scratch, and then (in most cases) run-
ning two separate infrastructures70. What were the physical and sectoral costs of 
relocating labour and what was the extent of strategie shortages, the extent and 
effect of the so called "brain drain", i.e. the high levels of skilled workers who left 
Cyprus in large numbers during and after the upsurges of violence? What 
69Wilson R. 1985. The Impact Of Exogenous Shocks Of 1974 Qn Cvpriot Trade. University Of 
Durham, Centre For Middle Eastern & Islamic Studies, Economie Research Paper No. 13 and 
Wilson 1992. op. cit. 
70Sewage, and now neurological health services in the Capital and to a lesser extent and more 
controversially, water and electricity supplies are run on a pan-Cypriot basis. Most of these co-
operative ventures have more to do with external relations (funding and constitutional anomalies) 
than locai pragmatism or economie rationality. 
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contribution did labour remittances make to economic development?71 Considering 
that the Cypriot economy expanded most rapidly as the violence escalated before 
independence, was recovery from the war in 1974, a result of a military multiplier? 
Put succinctly, has the war (and the other exogenous shocks that Wilson is 
concerned about) stimuiated or retarded the Cypriot economy? 
Seemingly Wilson sees flexibility to changing supply conditions, rather than access 
to scarce and valued resources and/or changing consumption patterns, as an 
explanation for the recovery and growth of the Cypriot economy. However, there is 
little institutional analysis, little on the role of the firm, the public and quasi-public 
sector. Perhaps important for Cyprus, north and south, particularly in the late 
1970s, was the role of the state, co-operative institutions and religious 
organisations. Wilson has not attempted to explain their role in any recovery. In the 
light of the theories of strategic investment and trade72 and the role of demand 
management in the restoration of business confidence73, the role of the public and 
quasi-public sector may have been important, though not always immediately 
obvious. 
Roger Zetter74 has argued that 1974 represented a "development opportunity" in the 
south which was exploited through strategic public funded investment, particularly 
71Paine S. 1974. Exporting Workers: The Turkish Case. University Of Cambridge, Department Of 
Applied Economics, Occasional Paper 41. 
7 2 Krugman P.R. (ed.) 1986. Strategic Trade Policv and the New International Economics. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
73StewartM. 1993. Kevnes in the 1990's. London: Penguin Economics, p.93. 
7 4 Zetter R. (Spring) 1992. "Refugees and Forced Migration as Development Resources: The Greek-
Cypriot Refugees From 1974", Cvprus Review. Volume 4, No. l , pp.7-39. 
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in the construction industry. The government secured investment for a rapidly 
collapsing domestic construction industry, simultaneously providing relief for the 
most acute physical and politicai need (mass homelessness / displaced persons). 
Large scale public investment in both public and private housing projects in the 
immediate post-war period, restored the battered confidence of a sector which was 
to replace fixed capital and provide (mostly indirectly) much necessary foreign 
exchange. It also triggered complementary consumption patterns (a replacement of 
lost household goods and furnishings, with [some] domestic products), with wages 
(a multiplier) provided by utilising costs (displaced persons) as resources (labour in 
the construction and manufacturing sectors). 
The economic performance and social mobility of refugees versus non refugees may 
be an important variable, both in the context of refugees being key economic 
resources and in the more general sense of offering an alternative explanation of the 
post-war recovery. Zetter, perhaps of necessity, does not include Turkish-Cypriot 
refugees in his analysis and also does not disaggregate refugees into social classes. 
Where human capital is concerned, Greek-Cypriots had more recently successful 
entrepreneurs amongst their "refugees" to apply new capital to. The différences 
between the "refugees" from the north and those from the south may be a factor in 
explaining subséquent divergence in recovery rates; différences in "human capital" 
resources (experience, skills and éducation), rather than "culture" and différences in 
the ability to secure new investment in a relocated economy. These questions, 
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having been inspired by Zetter's incisive research, have floundered on the difficulty 
in obtaining empirical data, north and south. 
Whilst there may be a few doubts about his analysis (outlined in Chapter 5), Zetter 
has provided one of the only direct answers to the problem of economic recovery in 
the south. It is for this reason, and to examine more closely some of the 
assumptions that support his approach, that the role of the construction industry in 
the post-war development of the south, will be considered in more detail in Chapter 
5. In their différent interprétations of the post 1974 recovery, Zetter and 
Christodoulou have inspired further investigation of the Keynesian / classical schism 
in the context of post-74 reconstruction in Cyprus. Zetter does this explicitly ("only 
the public sector, in conditions of risk and uncertainty, had the power to generate 
confidence")75, whilst Christodoulou implicitly introduces the Interventionist versus 
deregulated approach to a Cypriot context, bringing the period and the région more 
into the mainstream of economic historical debate. 
Admittedly, Christodoulou76 fits less comfortably into the role of a classical 
George, slaying the dragon of a pro-active state, than Zetter77 does as an advocate 
of government intervention. In the context (of war), even the most ardent classicist 
perceives an economic role for the state. Given the preconditions for a free market 
15ìbid., p. 22. 
76Christodoulou 1992. op. cit. 
77 Zetter 1992. op. cit. 
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(developed and secure property rights, freedom of movement and exchange) the 
state may not have had such a key economic rôle to play. 
Was it a disaster utilised as a "development opportunity", a triumph of planning and 
government intervention, or a sériés of fortuitous events following catastrophe, 
which strong extended families, dynamic and versatile firms, assisted by some 
pragmatic public policies, were able to exploit? 
"...at issue is whether a rétrospective coherence and comprehensiveness 
has been attributed to successful policies and actions, which at the time 
were essentially pragmatic responses to a highly constrained situation. Was 
massive population dislocation perceived and articulated as a development 
opportunity? ...the evidence, principally from the Emergency Action 
Plans, suggests that action was, by and large, purposive rather than 
idiosyncratic. " 78 
If this precondition for Zetter's conclusion is correct, then the Government of 
Republic of Cyprus was aware of and responded to, the developmental opportunities 
that the apparent disaster of war gave rise to, while, it could be argued (see 
Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7), the Turkish-Cypriot leadership concentrated on politicai 
objectives. Although Zetter understates the politicai dimension and ignores the 
Turkish-Cypriot economy, he argues that the Greek-Cypriot Government used the 
dispossessed as the engine of economic growth. Forced mobilisation briefly 
removed the labour constraint from the Greek-Cypriot economy. Perhaps as 
important, by Splitting rural communities in ad hoc mass urbanisation, 
78 ibid., p.30. 
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reconstruction also provided a means of labour pacification79 and modernisation, at 
once creating a more flexible labour market and a more sophisticated and 
acquisitive urban demand structure. The population under the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership moved in the other direction, becoming more rural and agricultural as a 
conséquence of de facto division. It is to determine the extent to which the Cypriot 
economy, both Turkish and Greek-Cypriot, was able to exploit economic 
opportunities that arose as a conséquence of political disasters, that this thesis 
develops some largely implicit themes, as the Iogical conséquence of earlier 
research. 
There has been even less international research into Turkish-Cypriot economic 
history. A further barrier discouraging greater understanding seems to be a lack of 
objective interest. Of the few to tackle the région in any depth, Dodd80, Bicak81, 
Ioannides82 do so exclusively. Ail can be clearly associated with the dominant 
political présentation of the Turkish and Greek-Cypriot case. The name of the 
région used by writers, usually détermines their respective position, whether 
referred to as the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" or the "occupied area" 
7 9 Results of which are in some way reflected in Figure 2.22. However, the political, and arguably 
more important, pacification was the more literal one: the détermination to cease the Greek on Greek 
violence which had been on an open civil-war footing since the beginning of the 1970's. Loizos 
1981. op. cit., p. 137) alludes to another reason for the deliberate ségrégation of refugee 
communities, this time as a lobbying body: "If, as seemed likely, whole areas of former Greek 
residence remained in Turkish hands, then a club (lobbying organisation) based on such an area 
might make itself felt in opposing...any particular settlement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots." 
80Dodd 1993. op. cit. 
81Bicak 1990. op.cit. 
82Ioannides C.P. 1991. In Turkev's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cvprus into a Turkish 
Province. New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Caratzas. 
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without the inverted commas. Moreover, the de facto division seems to have 
pervaded academic discourse to the extent that interest is focused in one place or the 
other, rarely both83 and is overwhelmingly concentrated on the internationally 
recognised Republic of Cyprus (the south). The middle ground is occupied 
exclusively by more general work, published for reasons of intelligence and 
utilising, presumably, more extensive information networks than those available to 
most academic researchers84. 
This analysis of economic development in the island as a whole, hopes to establish a 
more modest place for economic historians in the middle ground, because of its 
proximity to the economic realities of the recent past in Cyprus. The south can not 
be viewed except with the spectre of the north as a constant backdrop, and the north 
cannot be viewed except within the context of the regions comparative economic 
divergence since 1974. This work attempts to make these themes explicit. 
83Seemingly, and perhaps appropriately, geographers are able to get around the barriers that deter 
other researchers. The late Richard Patrick's work (Patrick R.A. 1976. A Political Geography of the 
Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971. Ontario: University of Waterloo, Dept. of Geography Publication 
Series, No. 4 - based on his LSE PhD Thesis) is perhaps the most comprehensive on the background 
of two political economies in Cyprus, dealing with the period before the coup and invasion in 1974. 
Douglas Lockhart, another geographer, deals with both parts of Cyprus as part of a comparative 
analysis of the development and utilisation of tourism potential: Lockhart D.G. (1993) "Tourism and 
Politics: the example of Cyprus", in Lockhart D.G., Drakakis-Smith D. and Schembri J. (eds.) The 
Development Process in Small Island States. London: Rouledge, pp.228-46 and in Lockhart, D . G . 
1997. "Tourism to Malta and Cyprus" in Lockhart, D. G. and Drakakis-Smith D. (eds.) Island 
Tourism: Trends and Prospects. London: Pinter, pp. 152-178. As mentioned above Wilson, 1992. 
op. cit., though not a geographer, deals briefly with developments in the Turkish Cypriot economy, 
although nearly 30% of the 24 pages he devotes to these issues are concerned with Asil Nadir and 
Polly Peck and another nearly 30% on prospects and possibilities. 
8 4 Solsten, E. 1993. "Cyprus: A country study". Washington: Federal Research Division, Library 
of Congress (Area Handbook Series). 
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Conclusion 
In analysing the extent to which development was accelerated by war, and assisted 
or constrained by government intervention, this research depends on officiai and 
"officiai" sources. Of necessity research encounters access and data limitations, and 
the effects of a possible "siege mentality" affecting information systems. Whilst 
there is an undeniable résistance to counter-cultural understanding, current politicai 
realities can not stifle a natural Cypriot warmth, openness and generosity to 
outsiders. 
Peter Loizos85 talks of "supercharged aspirations" encouraged by the new wealth, 
which began to trickle down through some of the villages of Cyprus (particularly 
around the citrus groves and new tourist destinations of the pre-1974 north of the 
island), with access to export earnings, in the I960's. With new riches came new 
prospects for the people of the new Republic, but also new politicai tensions: 
"Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please... 
The tradition of the dead générations weighs like a nightmare on the minds 
of the living. And just when they appear to be engaged in the revolutionary 
transformation of themselves and their surroundings... they timidly conjure 
up the spirits of the past to help them; they borrow their names86, slogans 
and costumes so as to stage the new world historical scene in this venerable 
disguise and borrowed language."87 
85Loizos 1981. op. cit., p.48. 
86 "Dighenis" was a Byzantium soldier "the legendary hero who guaided the outposts of empire in 
late Byzantine times and whose name George Grivas adopted". (Grivas foimded EOKA - translated 
as the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters - commanded the Cyprus National Guard from 1964 
to 1967, when Turkey demanded his recali. In 1971 he secretly re-entered Cyprus as leader of EOKA 
B, which he led tili his death in January 1974.) Also "Akritas" - as in plan - means frontiersman -
and "was the epithet of the original Dighenis" Mayes 1981. op.cit., pp. 60, 161). 
87 Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" (in Tucker R.C. (ed.) 1978. Marx-
Engels Reader. (2nd édition) London: W.W. Norton, pp.595). 
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The early period of independence had shown something of the economic promise 
that awaited the island freed from the constraint of colonial rule88. Within three 
years of independence from Britain, Cyprus, an island whose communities had lived 
peacefully for générations (so much so that it was at first doubtful as to whether 
Cypriots themselves could be recruited as "libération fighters"89), looked to be 
again, seriously at war with itself. 
Christodoulou has argued that the "economic miracle", if it occurred at ali, did so 
in the post-independence period. Christodoulou's argument is backed up by Peter 
Loizos1 "supercharged aspirations" (referred to above). But often, the ambitions of 
newly independent states flounder on prolonged internai confiict. In the immediate 
post-independence period, Cyprus conformed with post-colonial norms by 
conducting a series of typical post-independence internai battles, both "ethnie" 
(colonial roots) and ideological (accentuated by the cold war which, arguably began 
with the Greek civil war). Turkish military intervention may have prevented the 
application of the stereotypical view of third world poverty from being applied to 
Cyprus. Civil war proved to be economically disastrous to many post-colonial states 
further south. So in some senses the rhetoric of the Turkish invaders is justified: the 
"peace opération" did result in a long term cessation of violent confi ict and a return 
to developmental objectives. The then premier, Archbishop Makarios, used military 
terminology to describe the economic struggle that followed military defeat. More, 
88Wilson 1992. op. cit., pp. 29-31. 
89Mayes 1981. op.cit., p.52. 
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he drew distinct analogies with the conflict which would, he suggested, be 
continued on the economic front90. Now southern Nicosia flaunts its nouveau wealth 
in much the same way as West Berlin used to. The neon lights of its new car 
showrooms, night clubs and restaurants Stretch out along the mine-fields and barbed 
wire of Nicosia's "Green Line". The façade of an open market economy stretches 
out towards the now exclusively UN used "Nicosia International Airport", as much 
as to say the laws of économies have restored what international law failed to 
protect. Ironically the economic success of this part of the island seems to have 
been Consolidated by Turkish intervention. Perhaps what civil war may have 
gradually undermined, a short and costly, all-out-war seems to have sustained. 
Seemingly, even in the north, the advantages of economic autonomy (at least from 
the "Greeks") have proved to be one of the greatest barriers to progress in the inter-
communal talks. Until the collapse of Polly Peck and worsening monetary 
conditions in Turkey, stagnant economic conditions seemed to give way to a longer 
term structural convergence (see Chapter 3). As Olgan suggests91, with economic 
convergence the sticking point of property rights could possibly be overcome. This 
is perhaps the crucial factor: economic development has been successful despite 
politicai failure, so economic objectives could override politicai ones if either party 
is Willing to recognise the mutuai benefits of co-operation and conform more closely 
with dominant economic models (ignoring game theory) and utility maximise. This 
%The Economist, 27th August, 1977, "Miracle in Halfan Island", pp. 50-51. 
9101gunM.E. "An Economic Overview", inDodd 1993. op. cit., pp. 270-298. 
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seems to be the logie behind the long stalled UN sponsored Confidence Building 
Measures (CBM's). These advocated the initial steps of a process of German re-
unification in reverse, though in a climate of mutual hostility. The CBM's offered 
the possibility of some mutuai benefits from currently dereliet and abandoned 
infrastructure, some mutuai trade, some re-integration; they did not attempi to lay 
the foundations for the création of a unitary Cypriot state. However, even the 
former has proved too ambitious. 
Perhaps war in Cyprus accentuated changes already occurring in the social and 
economic life of the island (though much Greek-Cypriot opinion argues the 
reverse). Urbanisation, which had been accelerating in the twenty years prior to 
197492, experienced an immediate upward shift (in the Republic of Cyprus) as the 
overwhelmingly rural population from the north was displaced south. This was 
consistent with the decline in significance of the primary sector (both in terms of 
GDP contribution and as a major employer) and the subsequent meteoric rise of 
services, after the brief but seemingly cruciai manufacturing boom of the late 1970s 
(see Chapter 5). Generally, the literature on recent Cypriot economic history is 
sparse and not comparative, missing interesting questions. This thesis attempts to 
examine the economic conséquences of systematic and sustained organised violence 
92Between 1960 - 1974 the urban population grew by 31 %, over the same period the rural population 
grew by only 0.4% (Pearce R. 1981. "Part-Time Farming in Cyprus", University of Reading , Dept. 
of Agricultural Economies & Management, Development Study No. 21). 
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in Cyprus. The main objective is a comprehensive analysis of the différent and 
separate economic developments in the island's two communities; why do they have 
such différent economic backgrounds and conditions yet similar systems, economic 
structures and institutions? Did economic performance predominantly represent 
différent constraints or différent policies? How did the two separate and non-
communicating économies adapt to inter-communal redistribution and new factor 
proportions? To what extent did war and de facto division resuit in the restructuring 
of the economy, the re-routing of trade, increases in or a lowering of productivity 
and economic modernisation or distortion? What have been the changes in economic 
priorities as political stagnation followed political turmoil? The hypothesis to be 
tested here is whether war released economic potentials which may have been 
neglected or destroyed by peace or prolonged internai conflict. How much and how 
well were the events of 1974 exploited as a "development opportunity"? Put simply, 
has war stimulated or retarded the Cypriot economy as a whole and the Greek and 
Turkish-Cypriot économies individually? 
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CHAPTER 2. The impact of war on the economy of the Republic of 
Cyprus. 
Litroduction 
Popular wisdom assumes that governments attempt (symbolic) foreign policy 
successes to compénsate for economic failures, such as slow growth and/or 
prolonged high unemployment. When domestic pólices are not producing popular 
results, governments may attempt to divert attention to the international arena. 
However, the world has directed its gaze (and the Government of the Republic of 
Cyprus has acted to sharpen its focus) on this area of public policy, where Greek-
Cypriot policy makers have clearly failed. Until recently, little interest has been 
directed to the policy areas that have succeeded. Domestic pólices have facilitated 
sustained increases in living standards. The Republic of Cyprus rapidly regained 
growth rates comparable with some of the world's fastest growing economies, 
despite the loss of an estimated two-thirds of its resources,1 following war and de 
facto territorial losses in 1974. Yet this rapid recovery has received only cursory 
academic examination. The object here is to widen the academic argument, 
contributing research which assesses some of the positive elements of the recent 
past. 
Wilson R. 1992, Cyprus and the International Economy. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p.32. 
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The war proved a watershed in many senses: causing major structural change, with 
the immediate decline in the significance of agriculture; changing the direction and 
composition of visible trade and changing the macro economic and financial 
position of the Republic's economy. From becoming an international bad boy in 
political terms2, the Republic of Cyprus was increasingly perceived as an 
international victim. In economic terms, Cyprus had largely maintained fiscal 
propriety until 1974, government spending was matched by government revenue, 
borrowing was low. An open market economy dominated by the prívate sector, 
Cyprus conformed with policy perspectives of mainstream capitalist economies. 
After the 1974, as macro-economic fashions began to change in response to supply 
shocks, persistent inflation and structural change, Cyprus began to look like a centre 
of counter culture, still carrying out a conscious policy of full-employment, demand 
management, and systematic economic planning. In economic terms it began to look 
like an international bad boy again, maintaining strict financial controls, high tariff 
walls and high borrowing and international debt. Yet because of the tura around in 
its political fortunes, because Greek-Cypriots were no longer perceived as 
aggressors but as victims of aggression, let down by the West, unique political 
circumstances allowed the Republic of Cyprus, with its monopoly of international 
recognition, to be credit worthy beyond rational risk (discussed in Chapter 5). 
Following Turkish intervention, the (Greek Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus was able 
to get away with what other developing countries were not: increasing déficits 
(trade and budget), increasing debts (public and private), and increasing access to 
international finance. By the time anyone started worrying about it (a small country 
with large debts is very different from a large country with large debts) Cyprus was 
looking like a safer recipient of aid and international finance. A number of other 
2 "On the Greek Cypriot side they have preferred the fighting to continue, leading to the 
extermination of the Turkish Community." The Times, 4/1/1964; "On Christmas eve many Turkish 
people were brutally attacked and murdered in their suburban homes..." The Manchester Guardian, 
31/12/1963. 
favourable circumstances: industriai peace, the Lebanese influx, a booming Middle 
Eastern market for Cypriot manufactured goods, a good harvest enhanced by good 
international prices for (the much curtailed Greek) Cypriot food exports, were 
exploited by the well developed human capital resources and turned into a rapid 
recovery. 
This chapter draws a rough sketch of the economy of the (mostly Greek Cypriot) 
Republic of Cyprus, before and after 1974, attempting to draw a distinction 
between these two long term developmental phases. Generally it argues that, whilst 
war was a personal tragedy for many, and perhaps the island as a whole, many 
favourable circumstances (exogenous or otherwise) contributed to the recovery and 
war ultimately acted as an economic accelerator. After the immediate conséquences 
of war had abated, war and the de facto loss of territory led to the concentration of 
more Greek-Cypriot resources, in more dynamic areas of the economy. 
A snap-shot of the economy as it grapples with independence; an overview of 
the economy of the Republic of Cyprus 1960-1970. 
When Cyprus gained independence in 1960, it is thought to have done so as an 
under-developed British colony3. If the World Bank had produced a "World 
Development Report" in 1960, and Cyprus had been included, it would have been 
ranked above Spain, Lebanon, Greece, South Africa and Singapore and below 
3,1 Cyprus is a less-developed country only in the sense that much of its present production is not 
based on modem techniques, that it needs more capital investment, and that its level of living is low. 
It is certainly not underdeveloped in the sense that... vast natural resources [are] idly waiting to be 
utilised. To some extent, Cyprus may be regarded as over-developed in the sense of being exhausted. 
The present problems of drought, soil érosion, and water shortage are in part the product of past 
errors in the protection and préservation of natural resources. " UN. Programme of Technical 
Assistance, 1961. Cvprus - Suggestions for a Development Programme, (the 'Thorp Report'). 
Prepared by Willard L. Thorp. NY: UN, page 1, paragraph 1. 
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Uruguay, Japan, Trinidad and Tobago, and Argentina, respectively4. Using 
purchasing power parity estimâtes, the Penn World Tables5 have per capita income 
estimâtes, in current international prices, for 125 countrìes in 1960. On the basis of 
its per capita income of just over $5506, Cyprus would be ranked 41st out of the 125 
countries in 1960. By the same measure, Summers and Heston have estimated that 
per capita income in Cyprus in 1960 was nearly 20% of US per capita income in 
the same year, slightly less than Greece and slightly more than Turkey7. 
In many ways Cyprus looked like a typical newly independent country, with serious 
structural imbalances, most obviously manifest in pervasive underemployment, 
particularly in the agricultural sector. In 1960 two thirds of its 573,000 
population were still rural; 18% of the total population (over the âge of 7 years) and 
27% of women, were illiterate, which is understandable when 25% of the overall 
population and 36% of women, 20 years of âge or over, had never attended 
school8. So in 1960, it is perhaps not surprising to discover also that 44% of the 
gainfully employed were in agricultural sector, producing under 16% of GDP (see 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Out of the three main sectors of economic activity, primary, 
secondary and tertiary, only the tertiary sector looked very productive in Cyprus in 
1960. 
4 Ranking per capita income for all économies listed in the first "World Development Report", 
published in 1978, plus Cyprus (which was not included because it had a population below 1 
million), but excluding the centrally planned économies. Data for per capita income in this 
comparison dérivés from IBRD, World Tables 1971. World Bank Publications, Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University, table 4, and is in US$1964. 
5 Summers, R. & Heston, A. 1994. "Penn World Tables, version 5.6". Cambridge MA: The 
National Bureau of Economic Research (http://nber.Harvard.edu/pwt56.html). 
6 International $s at 1960 international prices. 
7 Summers, R. & Heston, A. 1994. op. cìt. 
8 Republic of Cyprus 1997. Statistical Abstract 1995. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, Dept. of 
Statistics and Research, pp. 36, 84. 
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Figure 2.1 Employment by main sector in 1960. 
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While no other sub-sector under-performed like agriculture, few looked particularly 
productive. Using the same data as in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, (and 1960 current 
market prices) construction exhibited signs of low productivity, 9.5% of labour 
producing just 5% of GDP. Manufacturing in 1960 did not look much like a 
modem sector able to productively absorb surplus labour from agriculture. Being 
essentially dominated by agricultural processing and small scale craft based 
industries, manufacturing exhibited signs of low productivity, over 13% of labour 
employed in the sector produced 12% of GDP. Income and employment in the 
tourist industry was low in 1960. If income and employment in restaurant and 
hôtels can be used as a rough proxy for the size and performance of the tourist 
industry, it also reveáis signs of under-employment, 3.5% of labour contributing 
less than 2% to national income. Only in the small, mining, transport, financial and 
property services industries, was under-employment entirely absent. Mining and 
quarrying employed 2.5% of labour and produced 5% of GDP. Transport storage 
and communications employed 4.5% of labour and produced 8% of GDP, while the 
65 
financial, property and business services sector9 was the economy's star performer 
with 1 % of labour producing over 20% of GDP. 
Figure 2.2 Composition ofGDP by main sector in 1960 (current prices). 
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So while the service sector as a whole looked the most productive part of the 
economy in 1960, this was true for only a very small part of it. The largest single 
service sector employer was government, employing approximately a third of 
tertiary sector workers10, but producing less than 20% of the sector's income. The 
9 Figures 2.1 and 2.2 both use the 1968 ISIC categories. For reasons of brevity, "Finance, 
insurance, real estate and business services" have been called "Financial, property and business 
services", "Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing", has been labelled merely agriculture, 
particularly as it is only really the latter that matters much in Cyprus in terms of employment and 
income generation. Similarly, "Restaurants and hotels" are labelled "Tourism", "Wholesale and 
retail trade", has been called simply "Trade". The category "Electricity, gas and water" is referred 
in the charts as "Utilities" and being small employers and contributors to national income in 1960 
and part of the public sector, are merged with the Government's share of employment and income. 
Govt also includes "Community, social and personal services" as well as utilities for similar reasons. 
In Figure 2.2, the Govt sector also includes import duties and all sectors include inputed (sic) bank 
service charges. For clarity, Figure 2.2 excludes unspecified "Other producers", who generated 
0.21% ofGDP. 
10 Until 1976 Republic of Cyprus, official statistics employment category "Community, social and 
personal services" included "Producers of government services", however, in that year 
"Community, social and personal services" represented just over 20% of "Producers of government 
services". On the basis of future trends "Community, social and personal services" would have been 
even smaller in 1960 and "Producers of government services" would have been larger. Therefore, if 
the categories together represent nearly half of all service sector workers in 1960, "Producers of 
government services" must account for over a third of them. 
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next largest service sector employer was trade, "Wholesale and retail trade", 
employing a quarter of the sector's workforce though producing only 20% of the 
sector's income. When examined more closely, tourism, or restaurants and hôtels 
particularly under-performed in 1960, employing almost 12% of service sectors 
workers but producing only just over 3% of the sector's income. The service 
sector's productivity saviours in 1960 were financial, property and business 
services, the ISIC category: "Finance, insurance, real estate and business 
services". Employing just 4% of service sectors workers, financial, property and 
business services reportedly produced a staggering 39% of the sector's income. 
If that is a rough sketch of what made up the domestic economy in 1960, what were 
its external relations and how important were they? Prior to World War Two, 
external trade mattered little to the Cypriot economy. The "healthy" trade balance 
that was maintained until then reveáis something of the lack of colonial 
development. It also reveáis the very low domestic purchasing power and the 
autarchie nature of the Cypriot's economy. 
Düring the 1930's the economy was basically self-sufficient, with imports 
adding relatively little to the consumption pattern. The majority of the 
population derived their livelihood from dry-land farming - a livelihood 
which fluctuated widely depending on weather conditions. Düring that decade 
the imports of goods varied between £1.5 and £2 million, while exports 
fluctuated between £1 and £2 million. There was normally a small balance of 
trade deficit covered by net invisible receipts and capital movements. It is 
probable that neither exports nor imports exceeded 10 per cent of national 
income, although no officiai estimâtes are available prior to 1950.11 
11 Republic of Cyprus 1966. The Second Five Year Pian 1967-71. Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, 
pp. 19-20. 
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By 1960 exports represented over 20% of GNP, whilst imports were twice that 
value. Domestic exports were dominated by a primary sector offering few 
opportunities for vertical spécialisation and increasing value added. In 1960 nearly 
95% of the value of visible exports derived from the sale of primary products, 61 % 
of which was from the mining sector12, dominated by one US multi-national 
company, the Cyprus Mines Corporation13. The economy's earlier boom, in the 
1950s, was mostly due to military expenditure by Britain14, although favourable 
prices for its minerai and agricultural exports (copper and citrus) played an 
important part too. However, after UK military expenditure declined and export 
prices feil, Cyprus experienced a severe recession between 1957 and 1960, when 
GDP fell by 10%15. Even ignoring invisible receipts, in 1960, the UK was Cyprus' 
most important trading partner, accounting for over a third of visible imports and 
nearly a third of visible exports (not counting NAAFI imports to the British 
Sovereign Base Areas)16. Most exports to the UK were agricultural products, West 
Germany being the main recipient of Cypriot minerai exports. 
12RepubIic of Cyprus 1994. Historical Data on the Economv of Cvprus 1960-1991. Nicosia: Dept. 
of Statisties and Research, Ministry of Finance, p. 167. 
13 Although it pulled out of Cyprus in 1974, following Turkish military intervention, the Cyprus 
Mines Corporation is now part of the Cyprus Amax Minerais Company, with assets in 1997 of US$6 
Billion, (source: www.cvprusamax.com/about/historv.htm ). 
14 The construction and opération of UK military bases in Cyprus made a contribution équivalent to 
approximately 90% of ail export earnings in 1960. Republic of Cyprus 1966. The Second Five Year 
Plan 1967-71. Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, p.20. Republic of Cyprus 1993. Historical Data on the 
Economv of Cvprus 1960-1991. Nicosia: Dept. of Statisties and Research, Ministry of Finance, 
p. 155. 
15Republic of Cyprus 1966. The Second Five Year Plan 1967-71. Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, 
p.2. 
16 Republic of Cyprus. (December) 1960. Statisties of Imports and Exports. Nicosia: Ministry of 
Finance, Dept. of Statisties and Research, pp. 3-5. 
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Figure 2.3 Principal exports as a proportion ofthe total value ofdomestic 
exports in 1957. 
Copper cernent 
Source: The Colonial List 1959, London: HMSO. 
The minerai extraction industry peaked during British rule, when it represented a 
large proportion of the export sector. Profits accrued to international companies and 
rents were absorbed by the colonial exchequer. Figure 2.3 above identifies the 
principie mineral exports just prior to independence: pyrites, cupreous concentrâtes, 
asbestos and copper cernent, as well as other key exports. The dominance of the 
sector in 1957 (Figure 2.3) is underlined by the proportion of exports it assumed. 
Mining in Cyprus was a typical enclave activity, with weak forward and backward 
linkages, creating few positive externalities. Due to very low wages and the 
location of most mining activity (in the north west, away from major population 
centres), mineral extraction also had a low multiplier effect. 
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Table 2.1 Domestic Exports FOB in 1958 by S.L : r.C. category: 
SITC code in Cyprus £'s % of total exports 
0 £5,000,065 31.10% 
Beverages & Tobacco 1 £1,314,158 8.17% 
Crude materiate, inedible, excluding fuel 2 £9,549,634 59.39% 
Minerai fuels, lubricants & related materials 3 £0 0.00% 
Animal & vegetable oils & fats 4 £40,554 0.25% 
Chemicals 5 £10,631 0.07% 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 6 £27,093 0.17% 
Machinery and transport equipment 7 £30 0.00% 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles.. 8 £47,498 0.30% 
Miscellaneous transactions & commodities, n.e.s 9 £88,732 0.55% 
Total exports £16,078,345 100.00% 
Source: Govt. of Cyprus. (Dec. ) 1959, Statistics of Import & Export, 
Nicosia. 
Nearly ali manufactured output exported just prior to independence in 1958 was 
processed agricultural goods, mostly wine and other alcohol products. And of the 
£1.3 million worth of beverages and tobacco exported in 1958 (SITC category 1, in 
Table 2.1 above) only £200,000 were tobacco products (representing 1.2% of 
exports). 
With independence, the Republic of Cyprus looked to the international community 
(the UN) and international trade to break out of both politicai and economic 
dependence. On the politicai front, the 1960 constitution was a compromised 
politicai solution which limited sovereignty, replacing British control with shared 
rights of intervention for Greece, Turkey and the former colonial power17. The 
17Althougk technically the shared rights of intervention by the guarantor powers was envisaged only 
to occur in the event of an emergency, clause 1 of section 4 of the 1960 Constitution is enlightening 
as to limitations of sovereignty which were enshrined in that document: "Notwithstanding that the 
Dhekelia Power Station will stand on territory of the Republic of Cyprus, if the Power Station 
fails... to provide adequate supplies of power to the United Kingdom authorities, authorised service 
organisations, United Kingdom personnel and their dépendants, and contractors, the United Kingdom 
may consult with, or in cases of urgency on notification to, the authorities of the Republic of 
Cyprus... ensure the provision of such supplies so long as the deficiency continues." HMSO 1960. 
The Cvprus Constitution, p. 17, Reprinted by the Printing Office of the Rep. of Cyprus. 
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constitution was only grudgingly accepted by the majority population18. It precluded 
annexation with Greece, the object of the self-determination campaign, and required 
complicated power sharing arrangements with the 18% Turkish-Cypriot 
population19. Greek-Cypriots in the Cypriot Government tried to circumvent these 
constraints by internationalising constitutional and ethnic crisis, appealing 
unsuccessfully, on the basis of democratic principles and "self determination". Only 
on the economic front, however, was internationalisation successful. 
A very few developing countries have remained relatively open since World 
War II or since the time of their independence - Barbados, Cyprus, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Singapore, Thailand, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North 
Yemen) - but most of the others opened much later, mainly in the 1980s or 
1990s, and usually in response to a deep macroeconomic crisis.20 
However, openness to international trade did not mean a laissez-faire approach to 
economic development. The legacy of development planning was inherited from 
British colonial administration, though development planning, in terms of civilian 
priorities, only really got underway after independence. In 1960 the Makarios 
Government followed UN advice and set up a planning bureau to replace British 
bureaucracy and co-ordinate development policy. In the 1950s, when colonial 
development peaked, total development expenditure did not exceed 12% of the 
Administration's budget. Between 1960 and 1973 development expenditure 
increased dramatically, representing an average of 22% of government expenditure. 
Yet in this period, unlike the latter part of the colonial era, the Government of 
Cyprus did not overly exploit deficit financing. The average Government deficit for 
18 Xydis, S.G. 1973. Cyprus: Reluctant Republic. The Hague: Moulton. 
19 Crawshaw, N. 1978, The Cyprus Revolt. London: George Allen & Unwin, pp. 365-6. 
20 Sachs, J.D. & Warner, A. 1995. "Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration." 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1. 1995, p.4. 
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the period (1960-73), the différence between total Government revenue and 
Government expenditure on ordinary and development budgets, was an almost 
insignificant 0.4% of GDP21. Its level of total external public debt in the 1960s 
compares favourably with économies that looked fairly similar to Cyprus22. Matsis 
& Charalambous23 have seen the formai adoption of economie planning as both a 
realistic appraisal of structural constraints and the démonstration of independence, 
in line with the then contemporary thinking. 
The new Republic had invited in foreign experts to assist in the development of a 
planning mechanism designed to diversify the economy away from the insecurity of 
dependence on a very few foreign exchange earners: minerais, citrus and invisibles 
derived mainly from the stationing of foreign troops on the island. Too small to 
pervasively adopt the import substitution stratégies followed by many newly 
independent nations, Cyprus, perhaps inadvertently, almost certainly of necessity, 
defied many fellow "Non-aligned" states by following a path of export led growth. 
Foreign trade first followed the colonial routes, still being dominated by the 
extractive industry. Throughout the I960's food exports (mainly citrus) took over 
from minerais as the key export sector, to be overtaken in the 1970's by the 
manufacturing sector and finally in the 1980's by services, predominanti tourism. 
21This aggregate figure masks a possible negative trend that the war effectively accelerated, see Bank 
of Cyprus Group, (December) 1974 Bulletin. Nicosia: Bank of Cyprus, Research and Development 
División. In 1973 public finances had been in déficit for three years when that déficit reached 3.2% 
of GDP. (The GDP comparison has been calculated from: Republic of Cyprus, 1992. 1960-1990 
Time Series Data. Nicosia, p . l l & Republic of Cyprus, 1994. Statistical Abstract 1992. Nicosia, 
p.295.) 
2 2 The economies referred to here, that looked similar to Cyprus in 1960, were either small, open 
economies, with populations below 1 million and similar per capita incomes, like Barbados, 
Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, Malta and Fiji, or members of the World Bank's "More Developed 
Mediterranean" category (IBRD. 1982/3 World Debt Report. Washington.) : Greece, Israel, Malta, 
Turkey, Yugoslavia (and Cyprus). See Chapter 6 for a more in-depth discussion of the selection 
process. In terms of the average external public debt as a % of GNP (at factor costs), 1961-67, Cyprus 
was the second lowest debtor out of the 10 economies for which there was data. The earliest period for 
which there is comparable data on debt to exports is 1967-70. By this measure and in this period 
Cyprus ranked 3rd lowest out of the 11 economies (Source: IBRD: World Tables 1971 & 1976). 
23Matsis S. and Charalambous A. (Autumn) 1989. "Development Planning in Cyprus", The Cyprus 
Review. Vol. 1, No.2, pp.30. 
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The progression from an eeonomy dominateci by a tiny enclave extractive industry 
and subsistence dry farming to a high income, mass consumption eeonomy, based 
on a relatively diverse foreign exchange sector, appears to be an example of 
successful development along neo-classical lines. However, in what sense was war 
and the de facto division of 1974 a major impetus for change and modernisation? 
Even by the end of the 1960s the relative importance of the main export components 
had changed significantly from those at the end of the colonial era (compare Figures 
2.3 and 2.5), but there was stili an overwhelming dependence on the primary sector. 
By the end of the 1960s, agriculture had overtaken minerais as the most important 
visible export sector, though minerais stili represented a considérable proportion of 
Cypriot exports (Figure 2.5). The first ten years of independence saw minerais make 
a contribution to the new State's balance of payments, though the relative 
importance of minerais subsequently diminished rapidly, though not because of the 
rapid development of other sectors, effective policy or planning, but mostly due to 
simple depletion. Turkish military intervention and subséquent occupation removed 
most of the residuai significance of the sector for the Republic of Cyprus, which 
was now denied access to most of the remaining resources. Even by 1970, 
manufactured goods other than tobacco and alcohol produets represented just 4% of 
exports (Table 2.2). Manufacturing remained small scale, simple and traditional, aimed 
almost exclusively at a locai domestic market, having increased its share of 
employment and its contribution to national income very little during the first decade 
of independence (compare Figures 2.1 and 2.2 with Figures 2.5 and 2.6). 
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Figure 2.4 Principal exports as a proportìon of the total value ofdomestic 






Sources: "Economic Report 1972", pp. 52, 64, & "Slatistics of Importa & Exports", Dee. 1969, p.2. Rep. of Cyprus. 
Modem manufacturing carne late and grew only slowly, arguably prevented from 
flourishing earlier because of colonial priorities24. A Government of Cyprus report 
in 1946 said that "...apart from mining... the Island does not present a promising 
field for major industriai development... "25 So early manufacturing had to follow 
the classic, underdeveloped country route of processing locai agricultural produets 
and other raw materials, usually on a very small scale, with traditional technology 
and mostly destined for domestic consumption. Even in 1970, 89% of 
manufacturing output was stili locally consumed. Including beverages and tobacco 
(by far the largest single components) manufactured goods only represented 16% of 
exports (Table 2.2). 
24Ckristodoulou D. (November) 1992. Inside The Cyprus Miracle. Minnesota: University Of 
Minnesota, Modem Greek Studies Yearbook Supplement, Voi. 2, p. 93. 
25Cyprus Govt. 1946. A Ten-Year Programme of Development for Cyprus. Nicosia: Govt. Printing 
Office, p. 120. 
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Table 2.2 Domestic Exports FOB in 1970 by S.I.T.C. category: 
SITC code in Cyprus £'s % of total exports 
0 £19,166,025 48.83% 
Beverages & Tobacco 1 £3,750,803 9.56% 
Crude materials, inedible, excluding fuel 2 £13,741,532 35.01% 
Minerai fuels, lubricants & related materials 3 £0 0.00% 
Animal & vegetable oils & fats 4 £134,529 0.34% 
Chemicals 5 £86,322 0.22% 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material... 6 £724,619 1.85% 
Machinery and transport equipment 7 £45,856 0.12% 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 8 £1,317,778 3.36% 
Miscellaneous transactions & commodities, n.e.s.... 9 £281,941 0.72% 
Total exports £39,249,405 100.00% 
Source: Rep. of Cyprus, (Dec) 1971. Statistics of Import & Export. "Nicosia. 
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So what did the structure of the economy, in terms of employment and income, 
look like after ten years of independence? The simple answer is, not much différent 
than it had a decade earlier. In 1970 agriculture included 4% less of the gainfully 
employed than in 1960, though the sector still produced under 16% of GDP 
(compare Figures 2.1 and 2.2 with Figures 2.5 and 2.6). Construction still 
exhibited signs of low productivity, 10.5% of labour producing just 7% of GDP. 
By 1970, manufacturing had become slightly less productive, over 13.7% of labour 
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producing 12% of GDP. Tourism (restaurant and hôtels) revealed similar signs of 
under-employment, 3.7% of labour contributing 2.1% to national income. Again, 
only in the mining, transport, financia! and property services industries, was under-
employment absent. Mining and quarrying employed less labour and generated 
more income; 2.0% and 6% respectively. Transport Storage and communications 
remained, in labour productivity terms, fairly static, employing in 1970, 4.7% of 
labour and producing 9% of GDP, while the financial, property and business sector 
was stili the economy's star performer, though slightly less so, with 1.7% of labour 
producing 17% of GDP. 
Figure 2.6 Composition of GDP by main sector in 1970 (current prices). 
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One of the major objectives of the economie planning adopted after independence 
was to restructure the economy so as to increase productivity and reduce 
dependence on a few insecure, external soùrces of income. 
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The principal purpose of planning has been to provide for the most efficient 
use of ail human, physical and financial resources... Expérience during the 
last fifteen years or so has shown that the market mechanism cannot be relied 
upon to ensure the desired restructuring of the economy... Without some 
Government intervention... Cyprus may well be subject to a répétition of the 
economic turbulence and ups and downs of the 1950s.26 
In terms of the structure of the economy: the composition of employment, the 
composition of GDP and the relative contributions to national income of the main 
sectors of the economy, the developments of the first decade of independence 
appear to have had little impact. The main structural changes over the decade were 
in the foreign exchange earning sectors. Essentially, this saw a shift in the 
composition of exports from overwhelming dependence on one type of primary 
product, minerals, to two, agricultural producís and minerals (see Figures 2.3 and 
2.4). The decade also saw the possible beginnings of a shift away from 
overwhelming dependence on one invisible earner, the stationing of foreign troops 
on the island, to another, tourism27. Where successful economic development is 
plainly visible is in the growth in per capita income and in its growth performance 
relative to other economies. By 1970 average per capita income (again in 
comparable, purchasing power parity terms) had risen to over $140028, which 
meant that out of 133 countries, for which there was comparable data, Cyprus 
would be ranked 36th on the basis of its per capita income in 1970. So not only had 
it moved up 5 places, but its per capita income was nearly 30% of US per capita 
income, as apposed to nearly 20% in 1960. Again, Cypriot per capita income 
relative to the US in 1970 was, like the 1960 figure, slightly less than Greece but 
2 6 Republic of Cyprus 1966. The Second Five Year Plan 1967-71. Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, 
p.l. 
27 In 1961 income from foreign military expenditure represented 67% of invisible earnings, whilst 
income from travel represented 20%. In 1971 income from foreign military expenditure had fallen to 
47% of invisible earnings, though income from travel had changed little, being equal to 19% of 
invisible earnings. Republic of Cyprus 1966 [& 1970]. The Second í& Thirdl Five Year Planisi 
1967-71 í& 1972-761. Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, p. 52 & pp. 67-68 respectively. 
2 8 (International $s at 1970 international prices.) Summers & Heston 1994. op. cit. 
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considerably more than Turkey, whose per capita income had changed little relative 
to the US over the preceding decade 29. 
The consequences of 1974 on the structure, orientation and potential of the 
economy. 
By 1980 average per capita had risen to over $380030. Admittedly significant 
inflation, particularly over the preceding decade, had made such an increase much 
less meaningful. In real terms, however, this was an increase in per capita income 
of 41% between 1970 and 1980, exactly half as fast as the increase in real per 
capita income between 1960 and 1970.31 So seemingly, all other things being equal, 
defacto division in 1974 had a negative effect on economic growth in the Republic 
of Cyprus. Using Summers and Heston's data set again, per capita income in 
Cyprus in 1980 had risen slightly relative to the US, to just over 32% of US per 
capita income, as apposed to nearly 30% in 1970. This meant Cypriot per capita 
income relative to the US in 1980 was considerably less than Greece's (at 38%), but 
still considerably more than Turkey's, whose per capita income relative to the US 
was little changed at 18% of US per capita income in 1980 (as apposed to 17% in 
I960)32. Out of 142 countries for which there was comparable per capita income 
data in 1980, Cyprus had slipped to be 46th ranked after having risen to 36th position 
in 1970. 
29 ibid. 
30 (International $s at 1980 international prices.) ibid. 
31Real GDP per capita in constant dollars (Chain Index) (expressed in international prices, base 
1985.) ibid. 
¿yry 
Real GDP per capita in current international prices relative to US [%] (current international 
prices) ibid. 
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Figure 2.7 Employment by main sector in 1980. 
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So during the 1960s, Cyprus had seen significant growth in income (82% growth in 
real per capita income between 1960 and 1970) but little structural change. Between 
1970 and 1980 Cyprus had seen a great change in the structure of its economy, the 
main sectoral composition of employment and the composition of GDP by main 
sector (compare Figures 2.5 and 2.6 with Figures 2.7 and 2.8), though growth in 
per capita GDP had been considerably less significant. 
In 1980 agriculture included proportionately half as many of the gainfully employed 
as it had engaged in 1970, while the sector produced 60% of the 1970 proportion of 
GDP and the same quantity of output33. Construction no longer exhibited signs of 
low productivity, 11.7% of labour now produced 13% of GDP. By 1980, 
manufacturing looked less productive, over 21.2% of labour producing 17% of 
GDP, though it now employed far more people and made a considerably larger 
contribution to GDP and an even larger contribution to exports (see Figure 2.10). 
Tourism (restaurant and hotels) was still a minor employment sector in 1980 and 
still revealed signs of under-employment, 5 % of labour contributing 3 % to national 
33 Quantity index when 1980 = 100, total agricultural output in 1970 was 100.8, source: Republic of 
Cyprus 1995. Statistical Abstract 1993. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, Dept. of Statistics and 
Research, pp. 375-376. 
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income. Mining and quarrying (now mostly the latter) employed even less labour, 
and generated proportionately less income: 0.9% of labour generated just over 1% 
of GDP. Transport storage and communications had become slightly less productive 
than they were in 1970, employing 5.1% of labour and producing 8% of GDP. By 
1980, financial, property and business services were looking more like other sectors 
of the economy, with 4.4% of labour producing 14% of GDP, rather than the 
dominant income sector. Another major change was that whilst the (mostly) public 
sector of: government, utilities, community, social and personal services accounted 
for 13.4% of employment in 1960 and a similar, 13.8% in 1970, by 1980 they 
accounted for 18.4% of employment, although when import duties are included, the 
public sector generated 24% of GDP in 1980, compared with only 18% in 1970. 
Figure 2.8 Composition of GDP by main sector in 1980 (current prices). 
Figure 2.9 (overleaf) illustrâtes development in terms of the composition of total 
exports. As illustrated in the previous section (Figures 2.3 and 2.4), before 1974 
exports were dominated by primary products, first crude minerais, then, 
increasingly by unprocessed agricultural products. After 1974 the export sector 
became less dépendent on a few key primary products, with an increasing 
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1973 domestic exports from the Republic of Cyprus increased in volume by 94% 
and in real unit value by 57%. Between 1975 and 1987 the volume of exports 
increased by almost 200%, while the real unit value increased by 52 %34. Clearly, 
splitting the export trend into two time sériés, before and after 1974, has historical 
validity as the data prior to 1974 refers to exports from the entire island, whilst data 
after 1974 refers to exports from the southern 63% of the island stili under the 
control of the Republic of Cyprus Government. The implications of the 
developments above and the change in the composition of exports (Figure 2.9) 
offers an indication of positive trends in the real economy that followed negative 
politicai developments. 
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Figure 2.9 suggests that 1974 represents a watershed for the export sector of the 
Republic of Cyprus, the transition from a typical under-developed economy, 
exporting food and raw materials, to a more sophisticated economy with a more 
diverse export structure. 
34ibid. p.532. 
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Figure 2.10 Principal exports as a proportion ofthe total value of domestic 
exports in 1980. 
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Table 2.3 Domestic Exports FOB in 1980 by S.I.T.C. category: 
SITC code in Cyprus £'s % i of total exports 
Food 0 £41,601,523 26.49% 
Beverages & tabacco 1 £15,901,912 10.13% 
Crude materials, inedible, excluding fuel 2 £9,962,121 6.34% 
Minerai fuels, lubricants & related materials 3 £8,049,920 5.13% 
Animal & vegetable oils & fats 4 £1,520,181 0.97% 
Chemicals 5 £4,059,828 2.59% 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material... 6 £25,237,535 16.07% 
Machinery and transport equipment 7 £4,218,397 2.69% 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 8 £46,203,527 29.42% 
Miscellaneous transactions & commodities, n.e.s 9 £271,311 0.17% 
Total exports £157,026,255 100.00% 
Source: Rep. of Cyprus. (Dec.) 1981, Statistics of Import & Export, Nicosia. 
The de facto division of Cyprus coincided with rapidly rising revenues in 
neighbouring oil exporting countries. In 1980, the three richest nations, in terms of 
per capita income, were small oil exporting Middle Eastern countries, none of 
whom had any data for the 1970 table. They were followed by the US and Canada 
who in turn were followed, in sixth place, by Saudi Arabia. Ten years earlier, 
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Saudi Arabia had been ranked, in terms of its per capita income, at 55th place35. So 
in the immediate post-invasion period this initially less discriminating Middle 
Eastern market acted as the growth sector for the mostly middling quality, Cypriot 
manufactured exports of the period. Despite the quadrupling of crude oil prices (as 
a resuit of the second oil shock in 1973-4) Cyprus received considerably more for 
its exports to the Middle East than it paid for its imports (mostly oil) in the crucial 
period which followed the coup and invasion. 
Figure 2.11 Exports to the Middle East as a ratio of imports from the région. 
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The change in the composition of exports, from a primary produci base before the 
(1974) war, to increasingly manufacturing centred export production after 1974, 
was accompanied by a change in the direction of exports. This change in the 
direction of trade alluded to above is illustrated in Figure 2.12. This appeared to 
signal an end to the imperiai passage of trade. In terms of the direction of exports 
the (1974) war represented a watershed also. 
35Summers & Heston 1994. op. cit. 
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Figure 2.12 The Destination of the Republics Exports, 1971, 1977, 1984: 
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In a small economy with a limited market and a limited resource base, a rise in 
incomes, more, a rise in the income elasticity of imports should not automatically 
be seen as a negative phenomenon, perhaps the reverse. Even a deteriorating trade 
balance is hardly cause for concern in a small economy as long as the balance can 
be met by invisible earnings, which is both historically and in the period of interest 
(war and de facto division), the position of the Republic of Cyprus. Though in the 
immediate post-(74)-war period this was not true, so improvements in the visible 
trade balance (see Figure 2.14) cannot be perceived as a positive development. 
84 
Figure 2.13 Trade disruption; the effect ofthe war on trade flows. 
For the Republic, the interruption in the trend of deteriorating visible trade déficits 
was due to a réduction in domestic demand. Perhaps nothing is more demonstrative 
of the loss of purchasing power and the loss of confidence than the shrinking trade 
deficit (Figure 2.14), despite the impact of a growth in domestic exports (Figure 
2.13). Many imports in the initial stage of the recovery represented the replacement 
of fixed and movable investment assets and Lebanese consumption, rather than the 
restoration of domestic consumer confidence. 
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Figure 2.14 Ambiguous indicators: The war was associated with a reduction in 
the visible trade deficit. 
Notwithstanding evidence from the composition of exports (Figure 2.9), the change 
in the structure of employment (Figures 2.5 & 2.7) and, to a lesser extent, the 
composition of GDP (Figures 2.6 & 2.8), other research suggests that 
industrialisation began to reach "take off stage" prior to the invasion36. In terms of 
output, but not employment or exports, measured by either relative contributions to 
real GDP or simply value added, the contribution of manufacturing (statistics for 
which include cottage industries) does seem to have accelerated just prior to de 
facto division. Given this optimistic interpretation of pre 1974 Cypriot 
manufacturing industry, the Greek coup and the Turkish invasion are seen to have 
acted as a force of retardation37. Contemporary Government reports tend to 
reinforce this interpretation, at least in the short run: "Apart from physical 
36Christodoulou 1992. op. cit., p.99. 
3 7 "The 1974 invasion and occupation of 37% of Cyprus territory resulted in the capture of 45% 
manufacturing capacity and destroyed much of the rest." ibid. 
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destruction of factories by enemy action, it is estimated that factories situated in 
areas controlied by the Turkish army employed 33% of the manufacturing labour 
force and produced 26% of output..."38. Value added in the manufacturing sector 
declined in 1974 by 11% and a further 4% the following year39. Despite 
Government initiatives, employment in the sector dropped by 20% in 1974 and a 
further 16% in 197540. Christodoulou's figures are more dramatic, though their 
origin is more obscure41. Recovery was, however, rapid. Overall gross 
manufacturing output increased by 113% between the pre war peak in 1973 and 
1978, and the value of manufactured exports increased by 370% over the same 
period with footwear, clothing and cement representing the bulk of such exports. 
The economic modernisation implicit in this, is reflected in Figure 2.10 in terms of 
the 1980 structure of exports compared with the earlier graphs and tables. 
38Republic of Cyprus, Aprii 1975. (Unpublished - i.e. "Restricted") "Economie Consequences of the 
Turkish Invasion and Future Prospects of the Cyprus Economy. " Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, p. 
5. 
39Republic of Cyprus 1993. Industriai Statistics 1992. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, Dept. of 
Statistics and Research, p. 71. 
40Republic of Cyprus 1994. Labour Statistics 1993. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, Dept. of Statistics 
and Research, p. 31. 
41By comparison, Christodoulou argues that 45 % of manufacturing capacity was lost or captured, 
wliilst manufacturing value added fell by nearly 24% in 1974 and a further 17.5% in 1975. From 
just before the invasion until the end of 1975 employment in the manufacturing sector fell by almost 
30%. Christodoulou 1992. op. cit., pp. 99-100. 
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Figure 2.15 Sìze of manufacturing establishment by numbers employed, 1967-
1989. 
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Sancce: Rep, o f C y p n » , Labour Statistici 1993, pp. 42-44. 
Despite its successes in the immediate aftermath of war in 1974, in generating 
employment and foreign exchange, the manufacturing sector changed little. The 
overall structure of the manufacturing sector remained predominantly small, low 
tech and family run, with low capital to labour ratios and low productivity. The 
main change, that followed the events of 1974, was in the proportions of output that 
was exported and the countries it was exported to. Significant government emphasis 
to both encourage growth and modernisation in manufacturing, particularly 
interventionist after 1974, made little impact on the industry in Cyprus (Figure 2.15 
above). Even in 1992 the largest sub-sector was stili Food, Beverages and Tobacco, 
with nearly a 30% share of gross output and stili largely dependent on the 
processing of locai agricultural products. The textiles, wearing apparel and leather 
goods sub-sector was the second largest contributor to manufacturing output and, 
together with Food, Beverages and Tobacco, they produced half the gross output of 
the manufacturing sector42. Cypriot manufacturing at the beginning of the 1990s 
42Republic of Cyprus. 1993. Economie Outlook. 1993. Nicosia: Central Planning Commission, 
p.30. 
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could still be characterised by small, and very small, family run businesses, (30% 
of ail establishments employing under 10 people and nearly 70% employing under 
50 in 198943), using old technology, organisational and management techniques, 
consequently still revealing low labour productivity44. 
In the early post-invasion period manufacturing grew despite relatively few 
government incentives; seemingly later it failed to grow regardless of them. Flaws 
in the planning process can be seen not in the generality of recovery, but in the 
spécifiés of sectoral growth rates. The Government failed to maintain the growth of 
the manufacturing sector after the immediate post-74, Middle East driven, boom 
and also failed to encourage the modernisation of the sector. In the post invasion 
period Government also failed to control the growth and avoid the subsequent 
dominance of the tourist industry45. The impact of 1974 was so profound because of 
the regional spécialisation that had previously occurred. Before 1974 the Cypriot 
economy was dépendent on four sectors for its foreign exchange: agriculture 
(particularly citrus production), revenue from the stationing of foreign troops on the 
island, tourism and the mining sector, three of which were heavily concentrated in 
the north. If one word could sum up the objectives of post-74 war development 
policy, it would be "diversification". In this sense, little had changed from earlier 
planning objectives: 
Furthermore, in the case of Cyprus there are many exogenous factors 
influencing the economy and, although Government cannot control such 
factors, yet it can plan to minimise their impact on incomes, employment, and 
pr ices.46 
43Republic of Cyprus 1994. Labour Statistics 1993. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, Dept. of Statistics 
and Research, pp. 42-44. 
44Republic of Cyprus. Five Year Development Plan. 1989 - 1993. Nicosia: Central Planning 
Commission, pp. 104-105. 
45An objective of 3rd and 4th Emergency Action Plans observed by Matsis & Charalambous (1989. 
"Development Planning in Cyprus", The Cvprus Review. Vol. 1, No.2, pp. 28-30 
4 6 Republic of Cyprus 1966. The Second Five Year Plan 1967-71. Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, 
p.l. 
By 1980 the economy of the Republic of Cyprus looked far more balanced (see 
Figures 2.7 & 2.8). Whether it is a failure of the planning process or a consequence 
of the constraints imposed on the economy by the invasion, the Cypriot economy 
has subsequently become more dependent, directly and indirectly on a single sector 
(Figure 2.16). 
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With de facto division, the Republic of Cyprus lost its most important coastal 
resorts, Kyrenia and Famagusta (Varosha), representing 65% of all tourist 
accommodation and 87% of hotel beds under construction47. More fundamentally, 
1974 saw a general fall in manpower of 30%48 coupled with a 1000% rise in 
unemployment49. Approximately three out of every five people displaced by the 
47 Republic of Cyprus, April 1975. (Unpublished - i.e. "Restricted") "Economic Consequences of 
the Turkish Invasion and Future Prospects of the Cyprus Economy. " Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, 
p. 8. 
48 Between 1973-76, the economically active population of the Republic of Cyprus dropped from 
279,700 to 195,300; Republic of Cyprus 1993. Historical Data on the Economy of Cyprus 1960-
1991. Nicosia: Dept. of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance, p. 181. 
49 The average rate of unemployment in 1974 and 1975, in the Republic of Cyprus, was 33 %, in 
1973 it had been 3 %, ibid. 
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invasion were rural dwellers50. As displaced persons represented 40% of the 
population, urbanisation and retreat from the agricultural economy accelerated 
dramatically. Landless farmers looked for work and housing in a newly land scarce 
environment. This resulted in changes in employment patterns - with the percentage 
of self-employed workers falling from 53 % to 25 %. The trend within agriculture of 
a growth in part-time farmers was also accelerated. The réduction in territory meant 
much necessary diversification both at a micro and macro level. However, the 
manufacturing industry failed to absorb many of the refugees from the dislocated 
economy. As is clear below, most long term and consistent employment gains 
occurred in the tertiary sector: the majority, directly or indirectly employed in the 
tourist industry. 




— " secondary 
tertiary 
50Zetter R. 1991. "Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratie Identity", Journal 
of Refugee Stnriias Volume 4, No. 1, pp. 25. 
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The scale of the disruption in the labour market in 1974 is clearly visible in Figure 
2.17 (above), which shows the number of people employed by broad sector. The 
coup and invasion precipitated a most dramatic 60% drop in the agricultural labour 
force, from which it never recovered. This amounted to a rapid, statistical at least, 
modernisation of the economy: agriculture and the primary sector falling from 
being the largest employers to the smallest, almost immediately after the Turkish 
military intervention. The 1977 Agricultural Census found that 55% of farmers had 
off-farm employment and for 94% of them, their off-farm occupation was the one 
which demanded most of their time. Only 25% of farmers had no off-farm 
employment at ali. As a result of the dislocation of population, 35% of pre 1974 
farmers were no longer engaged in any farm employment.51 
It is worth considering the changes in the structure of employment further because it 
had dramatic social and cultural, as well as economie implications (for changing 
supply conditions and the structure of demand). The share of employment in 
agriculture had fallen to well below 20% by 1985. Employment in the primary 
sector generally, fell precipitously in 1974 and had practically bottomed out by 
1975 (Figure 2.17). The war accelerated the role of part-time farming. Of 
necessity, it undermined any cultural constraints on female wage labour, 
particularly affecting formerly rural households, whose women had not generally 
sought employment outside the home and farm. The role of women in the labour 
market seemed to rise sharply after 197452 (more on which later). 
51Figures quoted by Pearce R. (July) 1981. "Part-Time Farming in Cyprus: A Pilot Study". 
University of Reading, Dept. of Agricultural Economics & Management, Development Study No. 
21. 
52 "As in other parts of Europe the activity rate of women has been rising in recent years. While it is 
not possible to make comparisons of participation rates defined in exactly analogous ways at two 
points in time, it is worth noting that the number of employed women in Cyprus rose by 31 % over 
theperiod 1976-1980, compared with only 14% formen." House, W.J. 1982. Population, 
Emplovment Planning and Labour Forcé Mobilitv in Cyprus. (Terminal Reporf). Nicosia: Planning 
Bureau & Dept. of Statistics and Research, p.22. 
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What is also visible in Figure 2.17 is the impact of an earlier economic shock with 
politicai foundations: the 1963 withdrawal into fortified enclaves of much of the 
Turkish-Cypriot minority, following renewed communal fighting. Most obvious is 
the withdrawal of Turkish-Cypriots from the tertiary sector of the Republic Of 
Cyprus' National Income Accounts in 1963. This illustrâtes something of the 
problems associated with a comparative study over time, using available 
government statistics. Clearly, the events of 1963, like those of 1974, had a 
significant though less profound53 structural impact on the Cypriot economy, yet 
how much do government statistics reflect the reality? Enclaved Turkish-Cypriot 
labour continued (in the 1960's and early 70's), perhaps less productively, to 
produce an income in the mostly (in terms of population) urban enclaves, though 
this activity was no longer reflected in officiai (Greek-Cypriot) statistics. However, 
the argument proposed in the "TRNC" by Dr Hasan Ali Bicak54 and others, that the 
1963 withdrawal was overwhelming, hermetic and permanent is partly contradicted 
by the data. Either some Turkish-Cypriots trickled back into co-operation with the 
(Greek-Cypriot) economy of Cyprus or the Greek-Cypriot work-force rapidly 
expanded and diversified. What does seem likely, however, and what is not 
contradicted by the data (Figure 2.17) was that for Greek-Cypriots, 1963 was an 
opportunity to monopolise government sector employment. 
The rôle of government and the rôle of planning have had their successes, for 
example the development of the tourism infrastructure in Varosha and subsequently 
of new resorts elsewhere, but perhaps as always, they proved to be more effective 
in terms of fire-fighting, responding to catastrophes, than in developing a more 
efficient economic structure in particular industries or in the economy as a whole. 
53Tlie events of 1963 were less profound for the economy as a whole than the events of 1974 simply 
because of the size of the Turkish Cypriot population, though for them the events of 1963 were at 
least as profound as the events of 1974 were for them or the Greek Cypriots. 
54Bicak H.A. 1993. "An Evaluation of the Turkish Position: Debts of [the] Greek Cypriot 
Community. " This paper was presented to the UN Représentative in Cyprus. 
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W h e t h e r taking the optimists approach (taken here), or something more negative, 
the effects of war and defacto division can be seen as having had a more profound 
and fundamental impact on the composition of GDP, employment structures, the 
balance of the economy, the composition and direction of exports, than either 
government or the market by itself in the 1970s. The question is, has it been good 
for the long term development of the economy, or has government policy, planning 
and / or the strength of the market, helped fire-fight the economy back to a position 
of strength? Clearly a move to more diverse exports, less concentration of resources 
in low productivity sectors, has been good for the economy and has been a direct 
conséquence of the defacto loss of territory. 
The problem of sustainability remains because some of the positive developments 
(such as the diversification of the economy following export led growth in 
manufacturing) were short lived, and other seemingly necessary developments, also 
shared the 1974 watershed. Government policy has managed to shift Cyprus from 
having one of the lowest public debts55 in the 1960s, to having one of the higher 
public debt levels by the late 1980s. Between 1967-73 and 1974-80, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the Republic's debt to export ratio doubled, in the 1980s it doubled 
again56. In small économies where foreign aid is a significant feature of invisible 
receipts, the level of debt to total national income may be another useful guide to the 
relative weight of international public debt commitments (see Figure 2.18). In terms of 
these criteria, Cyprus has risen from being the second lowest debtor in the I960's to 
being the second highest out of 11 similar économies57 by the mid to late 1980s. 
55 See footnote 22. 
56 Average debt as a % of exports of goods and non factor services between 1967-73 was 19%, 
between 1974-80 it had risen to 41%, by the 1980s, 1981-90, it had risen again to 83%. Source: 
IBRD. World Tables 1976 & 1993. World Bank Publications, Baltimore: John Hopkins University. 
57 See footnote 22. 
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Figure 2.18 Changes in the composition of external financing (% of total), 
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The World Bank's "Debt Outstanding and Dispersed" (DOD) category was below 
10% of GNP and fairly stable before 1974. The coup and invasion precipitate a 
ratcheting of foreign financing that continues to rise well into the 1980s, peaking at 
around 40% of GNP (Figure 2.18). The coup and invasion are also followed by a 
change in the composition of foreign financing; multilatéral aid, the major pre 1974 
financing item, accounting for 50% of external credit, rises sharply in 1974, peaking at 
a three quarter share of ail external financing in 1976. Suppliers crédits, another 
significant pre 1974 financing item, declined rapidly after de facto division. Bilatéral 
aid generally continued a long term decline, the events of 1974 having little impact on 
its contribution to overall external financing. In 1976, as supplies crédits, bilatéral aid 
continues to decline and multilatéral aid drops back to a 50% share of external credit, 
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financing from financial markets picks up and grows rapidly, overtaking multilateral 
aid in 1978 and remaining the dominant source of external finance until 1985. 
Between the 1960s and the late 1980s when the Republic of Cyprus moved from 
being one of the lowest debtor countries to being one of the highest, it had 
experienced significant and rapid economic restructuring. The structure of 
employment and the composition of GDP had changed profoundly between 1970 
and 1980. Both in terms of the composition of exports and the direction, Cyprus 
appeared to have matured as an economy, being less dépendent on a few primary 
products and less dépendent on old colonial links. The watershed for ail of these 
changes, again unsurprisingly, was the de facto division of the island, north and 
south. So while many of the real costs of war were reflected in the labour market, 
structural unemployment rapidly took on the appearance of frictional 
unemployment, as much of the financial costs of restructuring were borne by 
foreign aid and, increasingly, by the world's money markets. 
The same period saw a ratcheting of the tax bürden on the economy. While statistics 
before and after 1970 are not compatible58, prior to 1970 both taxes on income and 
expenditure had gradually declined as a percentage of GDP. In 1960 "taxes on 
expenditure" represented the équivalent of 10% of Republic of Cyprus GDP whilst 
"taxes on income" represented 5%. By 1970, "taxes on expenditure" had fallen to 7% 
and "taxes on income" to 3%. Similarly, using the newer Statistical catégories, in 1970 
"indirect taxes" represented the équivalent of 8% of the Republic's GDP, and "direct 
taxes" represented 4%. The total tax bürden in that year, which included social 
security contributions, represented 13% of GDP. By 1974, the composition of tax and 
total tax bürden was unchanged, although the intervening few years experienced some 
58 Republic of Cyprus, 1994. Historical Data on the Economy of Cyprus, 1960-1991. Nicosia: 
Ministry of Finance, Dept. of Statistics and Research, pp. 41-42, 143-144; Republic of Cyprus, 1995. 
.Statistica! Abstract 1993. Nicosia: Ministiy of Finance, Dept. of Statistics and Research, p. 290. 
96 
minor fluctuations. By 1980 however, the tax burden had risen to the equivalent of 
17% of GDP and three years later it had broken the 20% threshold, where it stayed 
(see Figure 2.19). Longer term, the costs of restructuring were passed on to the 
domestic tax payer. 
Source: Rep. Of Cyprus. 1994. Historical Data on the Econony of Cyprus 1960-1991, pp. 41-42,143-144. 
1974 appears to be a watershed in terms of the Republic's economic structure and 
its foreign trade. As a consequence of the loss of key natural resources, the 
economy rapidly modernised. In some ways we have a story that looks a little like 
the Dutch disease59 in reverse. The loss of natural resources in Cyprus seemed to 
make industry more competitive. Following the loss of two thirds of its resources60 
the Greek-Cypriot economy relocated itself around the urban sector. In the period 
immediately following those losses, the traditional sectors of the economy 
(essentially the primary sector) experienced rapid and permanent decline (see 
Figures 2.6, 2.8 & 2.17) while the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy 
59 The exploitation of natural resources (in the case of Holland, natural gas) precipitates the decline of 
other industries as the new industry pays higher wages to attract staff, pushing up wages in other 
sectors, and making them less competitive. See Corden, W.M. and Neary, J.P. 1982. "Booming Sector 
and De-industrialisation in a Small Open Economy", in the Economic Journal, Vol. 92, pp. 825-848. 
There are also foreign exchange and interest rate consequences (of the Dutch disease) which are not 
relevant in the Cyprus case because of its statutory interest rate ceiling and the fact that its currency is 
fixed (against a trade weighted basket of currencies) rather than floating. 
60Wilson R. 1992, Cyprus and the International Economy. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p.32. 
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grew rapidly. In the immediate aftermath of the de facto division of the island, 
manufacturing exports, output and growth experienced a significant boom. 
However, there were downsides to ali this forced modernisation. After 1974, 
Cyprus became more dépendent on external financing, government became more 
interventionist and the total tax burden on the economy grew considerably. 
The impact of the war on the labour market and labour relations 
The most obvious effect of the coup and invasion on the labour market of the 
Republic of Cyprus, was on the unemployment rate. Suddenly the percentage of the 
economically active population registered as unemployed increased sharply from 
1.5% to nearly 30%. What has to be taken into considération, however, is that the 
pre and post 1974 Republic represents two very différent economie entities. Also, in 
the pre 1974 period there was much hidden unemployment and under-employment, 
particularly in the Turkish-Cypriot economy, which is not reflected in Republic of 
Cyprus statistics (see Chapter 3). However, if generally unemployment was very 
low in the Greek-Cypriot community before 1974, it rapidly rose in the summer of 
that year. Much of this rise can be seen as instant structural unemployment, as 
whole industries, such as mining and major parts of other industries, for example 
export agriculture, were lost to Greek-Cypriot labour overnight and forever. With 
the rapid adjustment to the de facto territorial changes, which of necessity triggered 
these structural changes, what initially looks like structural unemployment 
increasingly looks like frictional unemployment, because of the speed of labour's 
absorption into new growth sectors of the economy (Figure 2.20). 
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For most of the period following independence, the Republic of Cyprus (as distinct 
from the Turkish-Cypriot economy) has faced significant labour shortages. Between 
1960-73, despite the recession the Republic inherited in 1960, average 
unemployment ran at 1.6% of the economically active and real rates of pay rose on 
average by 4.8% per annum. Whilst the coup and invasion may have reduced 
labour shortages, they soon returned. Between 1977-83 average unemployment had 
fallen to 2.5% and real rates of pay rose on average by 10.6% a year. Düring the 
longer time period of 1977-93 average unemployment was still 2.5% and real rates 
of pay rose on average by 6.8% per annum. These statistics tend to suggest a tight 
labour market, with unemployment at a naturai rate consistent with frictional 
unemployment and increases in real rates of pay reflecting limited supply of labour, 
rather than productivity increases61. 
61 Republic of Cyprus 1994. Labour Statistics 1993. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, Dept. of 
Statistics and Research, pp. 81, 129. 
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One of the major problems facing the Cypriot economy at the time of independence 
was the level of émigration. From the 1950's Cyprus has shed more than 25% of its 
population through migration. By the time of the Second Five Year Plan, 1967-
1971, this had largely been corrected62. As can be seen below (Figure 2.21) peak 
flows in out-migration have tended to correlate with periods of politicai upheaval. 
The data set in Figure 2.21 represents the level of permanent émigration. It does not 
include the numerous (almost exclusively maie) Cypriot workers who spent some 
time working abroad, particularly in the oil exporting countries of the Middle East, 
after 1974. Labour remittances have always been an important source of foreign 
exchange in the Republic63, particularly so when other sources remained depressed. 
In 1975, '76 and '77, labour remittances accounted for 6%, 6% and 10% of 
invisible receipts respectively64. By 1976 8,500 Cypriots were "temporarily 
employed abroad", rising to a peak of 13,500 the following year65 or approximately 
7% of the economically active population, the overwhelming majority of whom 
were employed in either the gulf states or Greece. 
62Republic of Cyprus, 1970. The Third Five Year Plan 1972-76. Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, pp. 
3-4. 
63In 1960 William L. Thorp estimated that the UK bases in Cyprus accounted for some £14 million 
(by far the single most important invisible earning and more important to foreign exchange than any 
single export category). In the same year he estimated that remittances from Cypriots living in 
Britain were an important element in the Cypriot balance of payments, amounting to up to £3 million 
annually. UN. Programme of Technical Assistance, 1961. Cyprus - Suggestions for a Development 
Programme, (the 'Thorp Report'). Preparedby Willard L. Thorp. NY: UN, p.60 &p.90. 
64 Christodoulou 1992. op. cit., p. 42, Republic of Cyprus 1993. Historical Data on the Economy of 
Cyprus 1960-1991. Nicosia: Dept. of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance, p. 104. 
65 Christodoulou 1992. op. cit., p. 42. 
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Figure 2.21 The impact of politicai events reflected in the level of émigration 
from Cyprus, 1956-88. 
(Data from 1974 refers to Rep. of Cyprua only.) 
1 6 0 0 0 t 
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The short run effect of the war in 1974 was to increase net out-migration flows. The 
immediate economie conséquences of the rise in émigration was both increased 
labour remittances (even from permanent migrants) and reduced social costs (of 
relocating some of the displaced population). The dominant constraint on the 
Cypriot economy in the post-independence era, however, had been the labour 
supply constraint. Longer term, the problem of large scale émigration has been 
stemmed (at least in the Republic of Cyprus) by rising prosperity and relative 
politicai stability seemingly engendered by de facto division66. 
Despite prolonged high level labour migration and a general and sustained shortage 
of labour, the mobilisation of women in the labour market has been relatively late in 
66Although the war may have reduced organised politicai violence, Greek-Cypriots argue that 
continued Turkish occupation represents an act of organised politicai violence. The Republic of 
Cyprus is, however, far more stable internally than it was before the war. Though it must be added 
that the failure of a politicai settlement has contributed to tensions in the région and worsened Greco-
Turkish relations. 
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coming, only concerning policy makers from the late 1960's67. Much economically 
active female labour has been involved in unpaid agricultural work on family 
farms68. The cultural stigma of paid employment for rural wives and daughters 
began, of necessity, to dissipate with the new economie conditions and the rapid 
urbanisation brought about by the war in 197469. As The Economist noted "the 
libération of women has been advanced" [by the Turkish invasion - sic]70. This view 
may be implicitly confirmed by an ILO study: 
As in other parts of Europe the activity rate of women has been rising in 
recent years. While it is not possible to make comparisons of participation 
rates defined in exactly analogous ways at two points in time, it is worth 
noting that the number of employed women in Cyprus rose by 31 % over 
the period 1976-1980, compared with only 14% for men. 71 
There are a number of problems associated with viewing the 1974 war as a 
fundamental cause of the rising participation of women in the formai labour market. 
If 1974 was a watershed in the development of the Greek-Cypriot labour market, 
the war was only indirectly responsible and a change in attitudes, let alone the 
"libération of women", was not a necessary prerequisite. The very fact that the 
agricultural sector was affected so dramatically by the de facto loss of territory (the 
formai labour force in agriculture dropped by 63% between 1973 and 1975 and 
never recovered72) meant that much of the then unrecorded and unpaid family 
female labour were unemployed also. In being relocated in or close to urban areas, 
as most Greek-Cypriot refugees were, they were more likely to seek and find work 
67 Christodoulou 1992. op. cit., p.22. 
68 Republic of Cyprus 1979. Census of Agriculture 1977. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, Dept. of 
Statistics and Research, p. 66. 
69 Loizos P. 1981. The Heart Grown Bitter: A Chronicle Of Cypriot War Refugees. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 178-179. 
70, The Economist, 27th, August 1977, "Miracle in Half an Island", pp. 50-51. 
71House 1982. op. cit., p.22. 
72Republic of Cyprus 1994. Labour Statistics 1993. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, Dept. of Statistics 
and Research, p.31: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (but when the former represented the bulk of 
employment in the sector, e.g. in 1987 Forestry and Fishing accounted for only nearly 4% of the 
total Republic of Cyprus 1994. Agricultural Statistics 1993. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, Dept. of 
Statistics and Research, p. 66). 
in the formai employment sector and so be included in subséquent employment 
statistics. 
In the same year as The Economist article was published (declaring that "the 
libération of women ha[d] been advanced" [by the Turkish invasion - sic]73), 45.6% 
of the agricultural work-force was stili unpaid female family labour74. Ten years 
later female family labour stili represented 40% of the agricultural labour force75. 
At least in that sector it is difficult to think in terms of "the libération of women 
ha[ving] been advanced". Given that the first "Emergency Action Pian"76 
encouraged labour absorption77, a lack of progress in the recruitment of women to 
paid employment immediately after 1974 is perhaps understandable. Although, due 
to the success of the first "Emergency Action Pian" or the residuai strength of the 
economy, or the modernising impact of exogenous shocks, it had to be amended as 
early as 1977 to encourage capital intensive production to cope with significant 
labour shortages. Even so, the only available officiai statistics suggest that increases 
in the numbers of women in the labour market have been graduai and not dramatic 
following the events of 1974 (see Figure 2.22 below), as is implied by House's 
sample survey and given explicit voice in The Economist report . In 1967 women 
represented 23% of non-farm employment, by 1976 that had risen to 30% and by 
1989 women were 37% of non-farm employment. These developments are perhaps 
less significant because they occurred while significant labour shortages persisted, 
73, The Economiste 27th, August 1977, "Miracle in Half an Island", pp. 50-51. 
74Republic of Cyprus 1979. Census of Agriculture 1977. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, Dept. of 
Statistics and Research, p.66. 
75ibid. 
76Republic of Cyprus 1975. Emergencv Action Plan 1975-76. Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, p. 12. 
7739% of the economically active population were unable to continue their existing employment as a 
resuit of the de facto division of the island in the summer of 1974. Republic of Cyprus, April 1975. 
(Unpublished - i.e. "Restricted") "Economie Conséquences of the Turkish Invasion and Future 
Prospects of the Cyprus Economy." Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, p. 12. 
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with particular bottlenecks affecting certain skills and sectors and requiring the 
import of foreign workers, both legally and illegally78. 
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Perhaps this seeming paradox, labour shortages, the slow recruitment of women, is 
partly explained by the fact that women remained significantly over-represented 
amongst low income groups and under-represented amongst high earners. In an 
admittedly small and unrepresentative (i.e. entirely rural) Government study aimed 
at attempting to boost the iemale participation rate in the wage economy around 
198079, almost half of the respondents cited the level of rémunération as a factor 
discouraging participation (the other factors were the distance from the workplace 
and the availability of child care facilities)80. Around this time, average female 
earnings appear to be just over half those of men81. So if the "libération of women" 
78 By 1992, foreign workers represented 6% of the Labour force, Republic of Cyprus 1994. Labour 
Statistics 1993. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, Dept. of Statistics and Research, p.14. 
79Republic of Cyprus, 1984. Tappine the Female Labour Reserve in Cvprns and Government 
Perspectives on the utilisation of Research for Women's and Population Issues in Cvprus. Nicosia: 
Ministry of Finance, Dept. of Statistics and Research. 
mìbid., p.2. 
81 "In 1979 the ratio of average monthly earnings of females compared with males was only 0.56, 
according to data gathered from 40,000 employees. This differential compares unfavourably with the 
female-male earnings ratio of 0.60 for Canada, 0.66 for the United States, 0.59 for Singapore, 0.80 
for Kenya and 0.60 for Indian non-agricultural occupations and 0.66 in Indian farming. However, 
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in the labour market had been forced on Cypriot society by the shock of war, as the 
Economist suggested, it is not demonstrated in the very limited official statistics82. 
Although there have been few studies of social mobility, the growth and 
development of the economy and departure of the colonial power (vacating all 
middle and high ranking civil service positions) clearly left considérable room for 
middle class recruitment in the immediate post-independence area. According to the 
first House study (1981)83, the immediate post de facto division period also saw 
significant occupational mobility. 
"Labour mobility in Cyprus over a very dramatic growth period appears to be high, 
especially when compared with the results from a similar study in Australia. 
Twenty-four percent of the persons in our sample changed occupation and 7% 
changed their industry of employment between 1975-79. This resuit is a reflection 
of the internai labour market, whereby employees attain upward mobility and pay 
advancement within their industry of work. "84 
In the 1980s the percentage of persons changing occupations had slowed by a third 
to around a 16% turnover. By this latest survey covering the period 1979-198585, 
nearly half of ali mobility occurred between adjacent occupational catégories with, 
unsurprisingly, women and older workers being least mobile. Düring the period of 
rapid growth following 1974, female occupational mobility was less than the 
corresponding male rates: 
the women of Cyprus do relatively better than those in the Republic of Korea and Japan, where the 
differential is 0.45 and 0.53 respectively. " House, W.J. 1985. Cvpriot Women in the Labour 
Market. Geneva: ILO, p.31. 
82"Any discussion of the advancement of the female half of the population of Cyprus is beset by 
additional difficulties because in the inadequate records in general the female half of the population 
in particular has suffered from enhanced invisibility." So said former Government minister 
Christodoulou (1992. op. cit., p.22). According to Stavros Karayorgios, an Economist in the 
Ministry of Finance' s, Dept. of Statistics and Research (interview 03/7/95), the Republic of Cyprus 
only began collecting employment data by gender in 1980. Earlier snap-shots, such as 1967 and 
1972, are based on estimâtes derived from Census data and démographie reports. 
83House, W.J. 1981. Aspects of Labour Mobility in Cyprus. Geneva: ILO/UNFPA. Conclusions 
reported in House 1982. op. cit., p.20. 
uibid., p.20. 
85 House, W.J. 1988. Mobility in the Labour Market in Cyprus. Geneva: ILO/UNFPA. 
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"We attributed this finding to the narrow and limited occupational and industrial 
base of female employment... "86 
Skewed income distribution may have had political conséquences in Cyprus, but 
only in terms of class not gender. The Greek-Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) has 
had, in recent years, more popular support than any other in Western Europe. 
Whilst communism in Cyprus did not begin in the mines, they were its earliest and 
most successful breeding grounds. Widespread unionisation, the persistent strength 
and grass-roots spread of left-wing organisations and political affinity is about the 
only lasting contribution of the mining industry to the modem Cypriot economy. 
Ironically, World War II saw the relaxation of martial law (or "Palmerism", named 
after the governor Sir Richmond Palmer who imposed it) and trade unions and 
organised labour openly campaigned for the first time. The Communist Party 
surfaced and reformed under its Greek acronym AKEL (The Progressive Party of 
the Working People). The following year the nationalist party KEK (The Nationalist 
Party of Cyprus) was set up to meet the challenge of the left, protect the vested 
interests of the church and the Greek-Cypriot proto-bourgeoisie, encouraging the 
setting up of employer organisations. The Turkish-Cypriot minority began to form 
their own unions under pressure from ethnie leaders, following the continued calls 
for Enosis by Greek-Cypriots, calls which AKEL found difficult to counter87. The 
Confédération of Turkish Trade Unions was formed in 1945, though it continued to 
retain close ties with the communist led PSE (Pancyprian Trade Union Committee). 
The latter was banned in 1946 and its leaders imprisoned by the colonial authorities 
for "unlawful association", having first been accused of sédition. On the release of 
86House 1982. op. cit., p.21. 
87Adams T.W. 1971. AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus. Stamford: Hoover Institute Press, 
pp. 3, 40-45 & note 28, p.251. Attalides M.A. 1979. Cvprus: Nationalism and International 
Politics. Edinburgh: Q Press, pp. 105-6, 108-121. 
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its leaders, the PSE was renamed the PEO in 1947 (Pan Cyprian Labour 
Fédération). After long and bitter industrial disputes, ruthlessly suppressed by 
colonial authorities particularly in the late 40's, PEO increasingly became the victim 
of Grivas' pathological anti-communism88. EOKA89 "executed" some leading PEO 
members during their campaign of violence in the mid-fifties. In 1959 the 
Employers Consultative Association was formed from the few small, disorganised 
employer associations. 
Concealing this recent history of mutual antagonism, the infrastructure for 
subséquent "tripartism", affecting labour relations and employment législation, has 
its roots in these developments. The more broadly corporatist policy which formed 
the basis of development planning and implementation ever since independence, was 
created to respond to these largely grass roots developments in the colonial era. 
Consultative Committees, commissioned after independence, form a major element 
of the planning process. They are made up of government officiais and 
représentatives from employer and trade unions organisations and meet to co-
ordinate economic policy. 
Whilst Greek-Cypriot "tripartism" appeared to come into its own immediately 
following war and de facto division in 1974, the importance of the broad 
consultative element in the development and implementation of economic policy 
needs further analysis if the response to the challenges of the 1970's is to be fully 
understood. On cursory examination, collective bargaining seems to have had a 
positive (if not indispensable) contribution to planning in the immediate post-war 
period, though most of the benefits appear to have been more politicai than 
economic. The evidence suggests, however, that collective bargaining worked in 
88See Adams 1971, op. cit. p.46, Mayes (S. 1981. Makarios: A Biography. London: Macmillan) p. 
24. 
89EOKA: Ethniki Organosis Kypiou Agoniston (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters). 
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aiding the recovery from the coup and invasion, but only worked effectively in such 
adverse economic and politicai conditions (Figure 2.23). 
The role played by war on labour relations and the kinder, gentler, Greek on Greek 
politics could be given as a possible economic benefit of defacto pacification and a 
newly established national cohésion in culturally simplified Cypriot society, 
although the consultative process probably played a role. In the aftermath of the 
invasion, P.O.E., the AKEL (Communist) led trade union movement, headed by 
Mr E. Papaioannou, agreed to an immediate 25% cut in pay, a wage freeze and a 
ban on strikes (see Figure 2.23 below). With the massive rise in unemployment 
which followed the structural dislocation of the invasion, it has been pointed out 
that such a move by the trade union movement was motivated by "enlightened self-
interest"90. Yet it proved effective both in boosting productivity and reducing 
inflationary pressures. An extension of the labour movement in Cyprus, the co-
operative movement, also played a significant role in reducing inflationary pressure 
by holding prices down, following the disruption caused by de facto division and 
distributing "refugee" relief through its then pervasive retail presence (so reducing 
the need for more costly bureaucracy). The war and its effects, arguably, focused 
the collective psyché on material advancement through the reconstruction and 
maintenance of a successful mixed economy; in this "tripartism" and the 
consultative process played a role. The open and bloody conflict of nationalist and 
socialist agendas elapsed in a post-74 context. Public policy made greater 
concessions to consensus politics, reflecting more homogenised expectations and 
goals coinciding with the homogenous cultural conditions which then, and for the 
first time, generally prevailed, though they were created and maintained by the ever 
present perception of a continued threat from Turkey. In the immediate aftermath of 
%The Economist, 27th August, 1974, "Miracle in Halfan Island", pp. 50-51. 
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the Junta sponsored coup and its conséquences, the political right had lost 
credibility. 
Figure 2.23 Short run conséquences ofwar on industrial relations. 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Sources: Republic ofCyprus, 1991 & 1993. "Slatistical Abstract 1989-90", & "Labour Statisiics 1991". Nicosia. 
The contribution of labour to the recovery in terms of a réduction in real wages can 
be seen above (Figure 2.23). Underlining its significance is the idea that human 
resources are Cyprus' most valuable asset91, even more valuable when not striking 
or fighting. Although the political situation in Cyprus complicates analysis of 
industrial relations, décliné in real earnings would normally be expected to usher 
rises in industrial disputes. After 1974 Greek-Cypriot workers did not respond 
accordingly, despite the décliné in self-employment (as a resuit of the loss of prime 
agricultural land) and the concomitant rise in the number of potentially discontented 
workers. The immediate response by organised labour to the crisis of 1974 appeared 
self-sacrificial, although longer-term, mutual self-interest seems to have played a 
part. The rapid rises in unemployment had escaped no ones notice. Through 
negotiation they had been able to secure regionally enviable conditions of 
91Cliristodoulou 1992. op. cit., p.3. 
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employment: rapidly rising real earnings, index linked pay in some sectors, a 
minimum wage and graduai réductions in the working week. 
Underlining the perceived significance of the conflict resolution, the consultative 
element of the planning process had been stepped up during the development and 
implementation of the Emergency Action Plans in the immediate post-war period92. 
More broadly, this illustrâtes the importance of earlier social and politicai 
developments on the institutional framework underpinning the Cypriot economy, 
seemingly important in assisting a rapid Greek-Cypriot recovery. The extent to 
which these developments failed to respond to the long looming politicai crisis 
which came to a head in 1974, can only be left here as a moot point. The 
corporatist, inclusive, planning strategy also failed to secure one key objective 
during post (74) war reconstruction, it failed to encourage and ensure long term 
diversification; failed to prevent a récurrence of the domination of the Cypriot 
economy by one industry, in one sector, regionally specific, this time limited to the 
coastal fringe. 
War had briefly shocked the economy with a massive increase in unemployment, 
which in turn had briefly reduced the labour supply constraint. However, despite 
the very significant success of the Emergency Action Plan 1975-76, the surplus 
labour created by the de facto division of the economy could not be immediately 
absorbed by the economy, so leaked out in another upsurge in out migration93. As a 
conséquence of the dislocation of a third of the (mostly rural) population, the rôle 
of women in the formal labour market increased. Although direct comparisons are 
92Matsis S. and Charalambous A. (Autnmn) 1989. "Development Planning in Cyprus", The Cyprus 
Review. Vol. 1, No.2, pp. 21. 
93"Another important feature of the démographie scene has been the large loss of external migrants, 
particularly in the years of politicai strife. For example, during the two years following 1974 
émigration eliminated more than the whole of the naturai increase in population." House, W.J 1982. 
Population. Empiovment Planning and Labour Force Mobilitv in Cvprus. (Terminal Report). 
Nicosia: Planning Bureau & Dept. of Statistics and Research, p. 4. 
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not possible, increases in the paid employment of women, as a conséquence of the 
politicai upheavals, have not been as dramatic as some commentators have 
suggested. The rôle of organised labour and the co-operative movement in the 
recovery, has been recognised as significant. What has been less commented on is 
the homogenised goals in the Greek-Cypriot community which followed Turkish 
intervention; the dissolving of a "civil war in miniature, which was stopped only by 
the invasion by Turkey."94 The rôle of a formai consultative process, inherent in the 
planning process, came into its own following the disruption of war. When growth 
returned, as it rapidly did, the Greek-Cypriot labour force had to adapt to work in a 
différent economy, with new sector and sub-sectors looking increasingly significant. 
Tertiary developments; re-establishing tourism and attempts to relinquish its 
dominance 
The deliberate promotion of tourism in Cyprus only dates back to the i960's, so it 
should corne as no surprise that at the turn of the century, this leased Ottoman 
Province had only 10 hôtels offering basic accommodation. By the time of the 1946 
Census, 173 innkeepers and managers registered the hôtel trade as their profession. 
The 1946 development report pointed out the... 
...disadvantages of the island from the point of view of the visitor trade are 
the inconveniences of communication by sea and air, its remoteness from 
the beaten track of the large passenger steamship lines, its lack of properly 
organised road transport services, the limited accommodation available in 
hôtels, summer cottages and camps and the poor quality of its places of 
entertainment.95 
94Loizos 1981. op. cit., p. 132, see also pp. 54-62. 
95Goverament of Cyprus, 1946. A Ten-Year Programme of Development for Cyprus. Nicosia: Govt. 
Printing Office, p.96. 
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Until the intervention of public finance initiatives and the arrival of cheap air travel, 
Cyprus offered three types of resort. The earliest resorts were up-market summer 
retreats in the cool of the Troodos mountains, attracting visitors from the existing or 
former British Protectorates and Mandate Territories of the Middle East. Mirroring 
these fashionable resorts were minor hill resorts which attracted wealthy local 
townspeople (especially from Nicosia) away from their trade during the 
uncomfortable August heat. Sun and sea resorts, such as Kyrenia, began as winter 
retreats for wealthy Northern Europeans (particularly Britons, with their colonial 
links). Following the advice of a UN mission to Cyprus in I96096, the independent 
government directly and indirectly acted to sponsor the development of tourism. 
Direct government funding was put forward for the development of the Golden 
Sands Complex in Famagusta and the construction of the Hilton International in 
Nicosia. With UNDP funding, a hotel and catering college was established in 1969 
to provide the relevant skills to aid the development of the sector. 
After the coup and invasion, tourism initially suffered from transport and supply 
problems: the loss of most tourist infrastructure, the islands main airport and 
seaport, an estimated 82% of tourist accommodation and 96% of hotels under 
construction97. Also, demand was down as a consequence of perceived security 
problems associated with visiting Cyprus. The unrelated introduction of surcharges 
by airline companies (after 1973-4 oil price rises), particularly important for 
tourism to more distant European holiday destinations, also had an impact on 
Cyprus as a holiday destination. Arrivals by air fell by 45 % in 1974 and a further 
50% in 197598. In 1975 the windfall of the Lebanese influx (by sea, following the 
96 UN. Programme of Technical Assistance, 1961. op. cit., p.56. 
97 Lockhart, D. G. 1993. "Tourism and Politics: the example of Cyprus", in Lockhart D.G., D. 
Drakakis-Smith and Schembri J. (eds.) The Development Process in Small Island States. London: 
Rouledge, p.236. 
98Republic of Cyprus 1987. Tourism. Migration and Travel Statistics 1986. Nicosia: Ministry of 
Finance, Dept. of Statistics and Research, p.37. 
112 
fall of Beirut as a regional commercial centre) filled some of the foreign exchange 
vacuum and many hotel beds left empty by the fall in tourism following the Turkish 
invasion. 
As a resuit of swift government action, building a new airport, making state land 
available for development, guaranteeing and subsidising private investment in 
tourism, recovery was spectacular with realised growth rates far exceeding planned 
growth". For the World Bank100, this sector offers an explanation for the successful 
development of the post-1974 Republic of Cyprus. By the 1980s Cyprus was 
considered a "service and remittance country" by the IBRD's sister institution, the 
IMF. By 1990, this meant that total domestic exports represented just 44.6% of 
tourist receipts with the latter accounting for 22.6% of GNP (for the relative rise of 
revenue from tourism, compared with export income, see Figure 2.16). It must also 
be remembered that this is not mere recovery but a completely new phenomenon. In 
1973, when tourist numbers peaked before de facto division,101 receipts from 
tourism represented under 10% of export income (see Figure 2.16). The dominance 
of tourism, even in the service sector where it had mostly played second fiddle to 
revenue derived from the stationing of foreign troops on the island, was new to 
Cyprus and a post '74 phenomenon. In many ways the rapid recovery, the rapid 
growth of the sector reflects the success of planning and government incentives. 
The subsequent establishment of new incentives to encourage the growth of an 
offshore sector102 was an attempi to diversify the tertiary sector, and the economy as 
a whole, from its overwhelming dependence on the whims of international tourists 
"Matsis & Charalambous 1989. op. cit., pp. 9-45. 
100I.B.R.D. 1987. "Cyprus: A Long Terni Development Perspective". A World Bank Country 
Study. Washington DC: World Bank Publications, pp. xi, 2. 
101Republic of Cyprus, 1987. Tourism. Migration and Travel Statistics 1986. Nicosia: Ministry of 
Finance, Dept. of Statistics and Research, p.37. 
I02Coopers & Lybrand. 1994 édition. Cyprus: The wav for businessmen and investors. Nicosia, pp. 
155-179. 
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to pick the Republic of Cyprus as their holiday destination. Officiai figures 
understate the overall dependence of the Republic on tourism; the construction 
industry, local manufacturers, retail and service sector and ultimately the 
speculative demands of the real estate market feeding equity rates ali depend on a 
buoyant tourist industry. Due mainly to the speed of development and the need to 
re-deploy resources, coupled with a lack of geographical planning and sectoral 
zoning in new development, Cyprus has suffered a general down-grading of the 
tourist produci since 1974. Excessive compétition in the market for package 
tourism, has led to low and falling profit margins per visitor, as reflected in the 
declining trend in income per tourist in Figure 2.24 below. 
Figure 2.24 Income per tourist in constant 1980prices, 1980-1993. 
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Increasingly Cyprus became more and more dépendent on mass tourism to maintain 
consumption levels and make up for visible trade déficits. Despite ali the planning 
initiatives designed to encourage an upgrading of the tourist product and a 
diversification, of export earnings, once it overtook visible exports sometime in the 
mid 1980s (see Figure 2.16), tourism, increasingly dominated by mass tourism, 
remained overwhelmingly important to foreign exchange earnings, though with 
falling incomes per head, this led to the need to attract ever increasing numbers of 
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tourists to the island. The result has been massive over capacity, high seasonality of 
earnings and an overwhelming strain on natural resources and (during peak season) 
on tourist infrastructure too. It has also led to questions about the sustainability of 
development trends: in the first 11 months of 1994, the Republic of Cyprus 
received nearly two and a half million foreign tourists103, nearly four times the 
population. The last time the Cypriot economy was so dependant on a single sector 
for its, what today would be called, foreign exchange earnings, was during the 
colonial era when the Cyprus Mines Corporation represented the export sector 
almost entirely. 
A great hope of post-74 planning initiatives was, however, the offshore business 
sector104, particularly in the aftermath of the fall of Beirut. 
"Tourist development holds a special place in the Third [Emergency 
Economic Action] Plan as a permanent source of activity to maintain 
foreign exchange earnings. For the same purpose the Plan also points to the 
need for the development of other sources of export services... Such 
sectors are considered to be the transit trade, professional services, 
insurance, Banking and shipping services...Increased contribution by the 
above service sectors will further stabilise the economy and reduce risks 
and uncertainty in the future. "105 
Whilst the statistics on the growth of the offshore sector look impressive (see Figure 
2.25 below), most offshore companies registered in Cyprus were little more than 
fax numbers and registration certificates. Even in 1994, a confidential Central Bank 
document estimated that out of the 17,258 offshore companies registered in Cyprus 
in that year, only 1096 were fully fledged companies (that is they employed staff 
directly in Cyprus) and only 423 employed three or more staff. Whilst the numbers 
mThe Cyprus Weekly, 7/1/95, p. 11. 
104"In 1975 the Government of Cyprus began offering the first incentives aimed at encouraging the 
establishment of legal entities by foreign persons in order to manage their overseas affairs or to 
render services abroad from the island." Rep. of Cyprus. 1992. Cyprus: A Guide For Offshore 
Enterprises & Regional Offices. Central Bank of Cyprus, p.3. 
105Republic of Cyprus, 1979. Third Emergency Economic Action Plan 1979-81. Nicosia: The 
Planning Bureau. 
of offshore companies registered in Cyprus increased every year, the only available 
data106 suggests that this has not been an entirely positive trend. In 1994 only 6% of 
offshore companies were fully fledged companies and just over 2 % employed three 
or more people. In 1993 8% of offshore companies were considered to be fully 
fledged by the Central Bank and 3% employed three or more people, whereas in 
1992 it was 10% and 4% respectively. Essentially, a lot of new offshore companies 
were registered in Cyprus every year, but very few of them (and in recent years a 
declining number of them) contributed anything other than a registration fee to the 
economy of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Figure 2.25 The growth of other invisibles; the number of offshore companies 
registered in Cyprus, 1976-1994. 
Source: Central Bank of Cyprus 
However, by the late 1980s the offshore sector generated a significant amount of 
foreign exchange (see Figure 2.26 below). Even without considering the 
contribution of the many shipping companies (many of which simply relocated from 
Greece to Cyprus to reduce their exposure to taxation), the income generated 
directly from the offshore sector appears significant. 
106Confidential Central Bank Report: "Offshore & Shipping Developments Düring 1994". 
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Figure 2.26 Gross foreign exchange revenue from the offshore sector. 
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Source: Central Bank of Cyprus. 
When offshore shipping companies are included as well, the contribution of the 
offshore sector to the balance of payments looks highly respectable compared with 
that of visible exports (Figure 2.27), so despite any discrepancy between 
registration and real economic activity in Cyprus, this appears to rëpresent a major 
success for planners and participants, to successfully diversify the Republic's 
economy away from over dependence on the potentially highly volatile tourist 
sector. 
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When compared with the rapidly rising revenue from tourism, reflecting the 
increasing numbers of tourists staying in Cyprus, the offshore sector has made little 
headway in deflecting dependence from increasing numbers of cheap package 
holidays on the island. Even during the offshore sector's most rapid period of 
growth in earnings, during the mid to late eighties and early nineties, its value as a 
proportion of earnings in the tourist sector grew only very gradually (Figure 2.28). 
Despite some impressive looking growth statistics, the offshore sector has been a 
tiny enclave within the Cypriot economy. In 1994 it employed only five and a half 
thousand people, a total figure that had grown by 35% in the two preceding 
years107, although only just under two thousand of them were full tax paying locai 
hires108. 
™ibid. 
108Permanently resident expatriate employees are taxed at half the Cypriot rate of income tax 
(therefore max. 20%), and benefit from duty free status with regard to vehicles and many other 
goods and services purchased in Cyprus. Coopers & Lybrand. op. cit., pp. 158-159, pp. 173-4. 
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Figure 2.28 Invisible changes; revenue from the offshore sector as a % of 
revenue from tourism, 1985 to 1993. 
20% T 
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Source: Central Bank of Cyprus. 
Seen as a whole, foreign exchange earnings have diversified little since the offshore 
sector increased its contribution to export earnings. The increased contribution of 
foreign exchange from the offshore sector seems simply to have made up for the 
losses in visible exports (see Figure 2.29 below). What also can be seen very clearly 
in Figure 2.29 is the volatility and potential volatility in revenue derived from 
tourism from which diversification has attempted to insulate the economy. The fall 
in the proportion of foreign exchange earnings in 1991 and the conséquent rise in 
the contribution of (mainly) visible exports, were the resuit of the Gulf War. 
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Figure 2.29 The changing composition offoreign exchange earnings, 1985 to 
1993. 
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Source: Central Bank of Cypius. 
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Following defacto division in 1974, the tourist industry rapidly recovered and grew 
to dominate the Cypriot economy as it never had before. Subséquent efforts to limit 
and curtail tourism's dominance, with the development and encouragement of new 
invisible earning service sector enterprises, have so far proved to have had only 
limited success. Whilst tourism contributed to a sustained recovery, the extent to 
which it can continue to contribute to the economy's sustainable development can be 
questioned in view of its particular sensitivity to politicai instability; in a politically 
unstable environment there are significant costs associated with such a level of 
dependence. 
Conclusion 
Using IBRD109 criteria, the Republic of Cyprus joined the rich nations of the world 
in 1988, when its per capita gross national product (GNP) exceeded the 1990 & 
109Althougk a member of International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank) 
Cyprus is not included in its annual publication of basic economie and social indicators World 
Development Report (World Bank Publications, New York: OUP) because its population is below a 
million. 
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1991 World Development Report middle income economy ceiling of $6,000110. 
Seemingly, Cyprus has done this by exploiting its comparative advantage in natural 
resources, initially minerais: copper, pyrites and asbestos, then its climate, first to 
grow citrus and early new potatoes (mostly for the British market) and subsequently 
to attract foreign tourists. With a loss of nearly 40% of territory, the Republic's 
economy had to do otherwise than simply rely on the exploitation of natural 
resources. 
In the south, the loss of agricultural land led to much modernisation in the 
agricultural sector and the economy more generally. Agricultural productivity 
increased rapidly and was said to be over three times higher by the 1980s111, than it 
was in the north, where the most productive agricultural land used to be112. The loss 
of the most intensively farmed agricultural land led to the release of much under-
employed rural labour, increasing productivity generally, temporarily removing the 
labour supply constraint and producing little inflationary impact at a time of high 
global inflationary pressure. This type of economic modernisation has proved 
politically difficult in most European économies, with low productivity agriculture 
receiving, or at least being the target for the bulk of direct EU subsidies. 
110The $6,000 ceiling relates to a per capita GNP two years prior to publication, given for Cyprus 
(World Tables 1992. World Bank Publication. Baltimore: John Hopkins University, p.209) as 
US$6,450 in 1988, relating to World Development Report 1990 (World Bank Publications, New 
York: OUP) and US$7,230 in 1989, relating to the World Development Report 1991. Dollar 
estimâtes in Officiai Cypriot statistics put per capita income somewhat higher at US$7,754 and 
US$8,136 respectively. Seemingly the différence represents exchange rate fluctuations and a 
relatively strong Cyprus Pound. The Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, Mr A.C. Afxentiou, 
speaking in London, revealed that recent calculations show that per capita income has practically 
doubled in Dollar terms since 1988. In his introductory address to the Cyprus British Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry on the 8th April 1994, he estimated that in 1993 per capita income had 
reached US$12,000 per annum. 
n iDodd, C.H. (ed.) 1993. The Politicai. Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus. 
Huntingdon, Eothen Press, p.300. 
112The 37% of the island north of the UN Buffer Zone accounted 46% of plant production in 1972 
(79% of citrus, 68% ofcereals, 45% of olives, 25% of potatoes, 100% of tobacco, 86% of carrots, 
32% of other vegetables, 65% of green fodder, 30% of carobs) and 47% of livestock. Republic of 
Cyprus, Aprii 1975. (Unpublished - i.e. "Restricted") "Economic Conséquences of the Turkish 
Invasion and Future Prospects of the Cyprus Economy." Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, pp. 3-4. 
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The structure of the economy, the composition of employment, the composition of 
GDP and the relative contributions to national income of the main sectors of the 
economy changed little during the first decade of independence. Where successful 
economic development was plainly visible, was in the growth in real per capita 
incomes. 1974 provided the decisive break, in which the structure of employment 
and the composition of GDP changed fundamentally. The composition and direction 
of exports also changed significantly after 1974. Though at a cost, the Republic of 
Cyprus shifted from having low external debts to high external debts, a low tax 
bürden to a much higher one. Seemingly, many of the financial costs of 
restructuring were borne by a combination of foreign aid and the world's money 
markets, but also by the domestic tax payer. War had briefly shocked the economy, 
with a massive increase in unemployment, which in turn had briefly reduced the 
labour supply constraint, but also caused an upsurge in out migration. The role of 
women in the formal labour market increased, though not as dramatically as some 
commentators suggested. The role of organised labour, the co-operative movement, 
the formal consultative process inherent in the planning process, contributed to the 
rapid recovery, but so also did a decline in politically motivated violence. 
Following de facto division in 1974, the tourist industry began increasingly to 
dominate the Greek-Cypriot economy, becoming increasingly responsible for much 
economic growth that took place after the initial recovery had restored confidence. 
Subséquent efforts to diversify export oriented services, have had limited effect. 
But what of developments in the Turkish-Cypriot economy? After 1974, per capita 
income began the period of regionally distinct economic development looking fairly 
similar on both sides of the UN Buffer Zone (see Figure 7.1). Another period of 
inter-communal redistribution 1974/75 had seen Turkish-Cypriot total income rise 
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by over 60%113 whilst Greek-Cypriot income had fallen by nearly 35 %114. So in 
1976, officiai estimâtes put Greek-Cypriot per capita income at $1520 and Turkish-
Cypriot per capita income at $1504 (in 1977 US dollars). After 1976, however, 
Cypriot economic growth trajectories diverge dramatically, (see Figure 7.1) and yet 
little has been written of these developments in Cyprus' other community. Whilst 
the Greek-Cypriot economy bounced back from another bout of fighting (anti-
colonial 1955-58, inter-communal, 1963-67, intra-communal 1967-74, and coup 
and invasion in 1974), Turkish-Cypriots appear to have fared less well. 
The following chapter attempts to piece together a rough sketch of the development 
of a separate Turkish-Cypriot economy, while chapter 4 looks at developments in 
the Turkish-Cypriot economy following de facto division. In chapter 5, many of the 
long-term themes introduced both here (in chapter 2) and in chapter 4, are 
developed as the focus is sharpened onto the short-term recovery. Do they provide 
an explanation for the growth trends observed in the island's two économies? 
Chapter 6 draws it all together, looking back at the island as a whole, and asks 
whether a single, integrated economy would be greater than the sum of the two? But 
first a closer look at the évolution of a separate Turkish-Cypriot economy. 
113Bicak 1993. op. cit., p. 8. 
[14Represents loss of real GNP in 1974 and 1975. Rep. of Cyprus. 1994. Historical Data on the 
Economy of Cyprus 1960 - 1991. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, Dept of Statistics and Research, pp. 
19-20. 
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CHAPTER 3. The foundations of Takism; The development of a 
separate Turkish-Cypriot political economy. 
Introduction 
This chapter looks at the internal political, practical and institutional developments 
that led up to de facto division in Cyprus along ethnic and regional lines. Most of 
what follows is derived from a series of interviews with significant players 
(footnoted below). In the absence of other records, their recollections, cross-
referenced where possible with contemporary independent reports, provide useful 
and largely unreported background and detail to the clinically, statistically biased 
economic consequences of war and ethnic division described elsewhere in the thesis. 
In this and the following chapter, the object is to map the development of a separate 
Turkish-Cypriot economy, from the largely subsistence and aid dependent enclaves 
of the 1960's to the creation of their own multi-national in the 1980's. Here, the 
significant developments that preceded the coup and invasion are the main concern. 
In Chapter 4, the developments which led up to the creation of the region's own 
multi-national enterprise, will be examined. 
At one level, the diplomatic conventions which determine syntax and grammatical 
style1, when referring to northern Cyprus, can easily be confused with bias, simply 
^ven in the 1960's "because of the nature of the Cyprus conflict, and because UNFICYP had to 
remain impartial, it could not, for example, use the phrase 'Turkish Cypriot Government' in reports 
or during negotiations. UNFICYP therefore drew up a list of terms to be used when referring to 
Turkish Cypriot officials, e.g.: Turkish Cypriot Leadership...Turkish Cypriot Police Element..." 
Patrick R. A. 1976. A Political Geography of the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971. Ontario: University of 
Waterloo, Dept. of Geography Publication Series, No. 4, p. 99, footnote 70. 
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because they underline the lack of diplomatie récognition for an autonomous 
Turkish-Cypriot politicai entity. A product of this lack of récognition is a lack of 
international research interest. Seemingly, the very act of conducting research may 
be seen to add a level of credence and récognition to a separate politicai economy 
that is at odds with long-standing Greek-Cypriot policy, which has so actively 
opposed division2. The Republic of Cyprus is of necessity the host of anyone 
considering pan-Cypriot research, though it requires a determined effort to maintain 
a pan-Cypriot approach3. It is hoped that bias will be avoided here and that the 
reader will appreciate that the motive for investigation remains the desire to 
understand the economic conséquences of ethno-national conflict and division in 
Cyprus. 
Despite dire warnings to the contrary4, access to available "officiai" sources in the 
"TRNC" has been relatively good. From the late 1970's the quality and quantity of 
data improved. Earlier data is highly limited in either scope, reliability and / or 
availability with the crucial period before, during and immediately after 1974 being 
particularly problematic. At criticai periods in the community's recent turbulent 
history, most recently on the 20th July 1974 (when it loolced as if the Nicosia and 
2 An example of this policy can be seen in a PIO publication written by Dr Elenora Gavrielides, a 
Press and Information Officer (Rep. of Cyprus. 1992. Greek Cvpriot Properties in the Qccupied Area 
and the Turkish Cvpriot Policy. Nicosia, PIO, p.4): "Another aim of the Turkish Cypriot illegal 
regime's policy regarding Greek Cypriot properties is to create the impression that a perfectly 
organised state is operating in the occupied areas and that is, at least partly, why 'law' and 
'régulations' were adopted to regúlate the matter at issue." 
3For example, current authorised international points of entry are located within the areas controlied 
by the internationally recognised Government of The Republic of Cyprus. Other points of entry are 
illegal and people using them are subject to prosecution there. If pan Cypriot research is to be 
conducted, access to the north is only possible from the south via the Ledra Palace Checkpoint in 
Nicosia. Special permission is required to visit the area more than once per visit, to stay beyond the 
5.00pm curfew, to leave the confines of (north) Nicosia and to visit before 8.00am and after l.OOpm. 
Special permission is complicated and time consuming to arrange, and has to be periodically re-
negotiated with officiais at the Checkpoint. 
4David Barchard of the Financial Times (FT), a far from unsympathetic journalist, said "economic 
information about Northern (sic) Cyprus was regarded as a virtual military secret by the Turkish 
Cypriot authorities..." (Barchard D. 1992. Asil Nadir and the Rise and Fall of Pollv Peck. London: 
Victor Gollancz, p. 91). Barchard was a periodic contributor to Nadir1 s flagship publication 
Turquoise. A publication that Barchard himself described as the "in flight magazine" for the 
"cultural image" of Turkey and northern Cyprus. 
125 
Famagusta enclaves would be over-run before significant numbers of Turkish 
Troops could reach them), Turkish-Cypriot administrators were instructed to burn 
specific documents before leaving their civil ian posts to take up military duties. 
Administrators possessed a list of documents which were to be destroyed during 
military emergencies; economic data was amongst them5. In the aftermath of 1974, 
security concerns were dominant and economic statistics were either not gathered or 
not published. Interviews, investigative research and further trawling of secondary 
literature in other fields, attempt to fill these gaps. The recent and controversial 
nature of the establishment of the "TRNC" means that gathering data is sometimes 
slow, though satisfaction arises from providing a more accessible and clearer picture 
of the formation of a separate Turkish-Cypriot economy. 
The data viewed and information gleaned from primary sources provides the basis 
for an introductory analysis of the development of a Turkish-Cypriot economy6. No 
published work has so far attempted to construct a coherent analysis of its 
development. The narrative form taken in this chapter makes a contribution to 
knowledge if it stimulâtes further interest, leading to the discovery of new archives 
which may disprove tentative conclusions reached here. Unfortunately those 
archives, if they exist, were not available to this writer. The limited Statistical 
analysis provides some data revealing the difficulties associated with transitional 
économies at both a practical and theoretical level. 
5This information dérivés from a sériés of interviews with Ozalp Sarica, carried out in his office, at 
the EMU, on the following days 17/3/95, 21/3/95, 24/3/95. Ozalp Sarica was the first Assistant 
Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, employment he left on 23 December 1963 along with the 
rest of the Turkish Cypriot community. Since then he has held senior positions in the various Turkish 
Cypriot "administrations" and key economic institutions that helped to create and maintain a separate 
Turkish Cypriot economy. From 1964 to 1968 he was the Director General of Evkaf (the second 
largest landowner in Cyprus). He became the first Director General of the "State" Planning 
Organisation when it was founded by the provisional administration in 1968. While there, he set up a 
company called Eti, which he fronted from 1972, with the aim of opening and increasing economic 
links with "mainland" Turkey. 
6Where possible information provided in interviews has been cross-referenced with independent 
sources, contemporary newspapers, the UN (and former serving UN officers - Patrick 1976. op. 
cit.,) and other independent secondary sources. 
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Cyprus is a small island with one history which has bestowed on it two non-
communicating économies. An element of shared institutional foundations and 
structures is however difficult to disentangle from the economic development that 
took place as the lines of communication were cut. The object of this and the 
following chapter is to establish the rôle of those institutions within the Turkish-
Cypriot community. This approach will be taken within a general pan-Cypriot 
context of establishing what the economic effects of ethnie conflict in Cyprus were, 
the agents of recovery and the rôle of différent public and private institutions in the 
development that followed de facto division. Perhaps a further question is necessary 
when considering the minority community of the island, and that is to establish the 
rôle of economic décision making, to determine the extent to which the Turkish-
Cypriot economy evolved from its apparent roots as a highly controlied war 
economy. This raises other questions like; is Turkish-Cypriot economic dependence 
on Turkey a resuit of exogenous constraints (as the House of Commons, Foreign 
Affairs Committee suggested7), or does this reflect non-economic concerns? To 
what extent have economic policy makers' choices been constrained by the 
community's evolving relationship with the "mother" country and has the Turkish-
Cypriot community benefited economically from that relationship? This latter 
question will be left until Chapter 6, though the context from which they can be 
more clearly understood is outlined below. 
7HMSO, May 1987. House of Commons Foreign Affairs C'tee, Third Report on Cyprus, paragraph 
65, p. xx. 
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The historical context of separate economic development 
Despite a powerful Greek-Cypriot officiai rhetoric to the contrary, Turkish and 
Greek-Cypriots did not live together in Cyprus before 1974, 1963, or even 1955. 
They may have shared the same villages and been neighbours, even been of the 
same ethnicity8, though at best it was coexistence rather than integration. Important 
parts of their lives remained distinct. Kitromilides has argued9 that in traditional 
society, before the expansion of literacy and the transmission of nationalism into the 
villages, they lived separately in mixed communities, geographically and culturally 
close together and without "ethnie" hostility. Divisions were not regional, perhaps 
portraying the level of coexistence, though a rising trend of spatial séparation had 
been accelerating since the late nineteenth Century10. As Patrick11 and Loizos12 have 
pointed out, as well as the rise in politicai tensions concomitant with the rise of 
nationalism, another factor in the decline of mixed villages may have been différent 
rates of migration to urban centres. 
Economic distinctions had followed a typical Ottoman religious / cultural division of 
labour within the context of a primitive economy: Greek-Cypriots were stone 
masons whilst Turkish-Cypriots were carpenters, Turkish-Cypriots aspired to the 
prestige and security of administrative positions, whilst Greek-Cypriots aspired to 
trade. Though the wealthiest elite were merchants, most Turkish-Cypriots were poor 
farmers. Just prior to' December 1963 Turkish-Cypriots produced 13% of gross 
value added in agriculture whilst representing (in 1960) 17% of the rural 
8Kitromilides P.M. "From Coexistence to Confrontation: The Dynamics of Ethnie Conflict in 
Cyprus", in Attalides M.A. 1977. (ed.) Cvprus Reviewed. Nicosia: The Jus Cypri Association with 
the Co-ordinating C'tee of Scientific and Cultural Organisations, p. 37. 
9ibid., pp. 36-47. 
10Patrick 1976. op. cit., p.12, figure 1.5. 
nibid., pp.8, 75. 
l2Loizos P. (Spring) 1994. "Understanding 1974, Understanding 1994", The Cvprus Review. Vol. 
6, no. 1, p . l l . 
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population13. A proportionately small minority were Professionals and a larger 
number of Turkish-Cypriots (a proportionately large number) filled the lower ranks 
oi public service, tHèx^olice and the civil service. In 1901 Turkish-Cypriots 
represented 13% of advocates and 2% of registered chemists. Out of 37 doctors, 32 
were Greek-Cypriot and none were Turkish Cypriot, yet in the same year they 
represented 38% of the police force.14 
The main cultural distinction between the two communities was religious. Différent 
family connections (there was little inter-marriage, which was proscribed by 
Orthodox Canon Law) followed the religious divide. Also following the religious 
divide was a separate éducation and a différent language (though many shared 
villages had bilingual communities, some Muslim villages were exclusively Greek 
speaking and the Turkish-Cypriot elite spoke Greek15). Kinship ties, reinforced by 
language, religion and a separate éducation, meant that Turkish-Cypriots tended to 
use their own shops, cafés and restaurants. These cultural différences meant that 
Turkish-Cypriots also tended to used différent professional services: doctors, 
lawyers, banks16 and money lenders. Like the co-operative societies however, which 
increasingly provided agricultural credit for the mainly rural communities of 
Cyprus, infrastructural provisions (public transport and hospital services), when 
they came, were bi-communal. The economic position of Turkish-Cypriots in the 
income distribution of the Republic of Cyprus prior to December 1963, was 
13Republic of Cyprus 1964. Statistical Data bv Ethnie Group. Nieosia: Dept. of Statisties and 
Research, Ministry of Finance. 
14Attalides M. A. "The Turkish Cypriots: Their Relations to the Greek Cypriots in Perspective" in 
Attalides M.A. (ed.) 1977 Cyprus Reviewed. Nieosia: The Jus Cypri Association with the Co-
ordinating C'tee of Scientific and Cultural Organisations, p. 87. Figures dérivé from attributing 
ethnicity according to name cited in the "Handbook of Cyprus 1901". 
15According to the 1960 Census, 38% of ail Turkish Cypriots spoke Greek, whilst only 1% of Greek 
Cypriots spoke Turkish. 
16The Turkish Bank Ltd was established in Nieosia in 1901 by Turkish Cypriots, Christodoulou D. 
(November) 1992. Inside The Cyprus Miracle. Minnesota: University Of Minnesota, Modem Greek 
Studies Yearbook Supplément, Vol. 2, p. 164. 
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generally concentrated in the lower 30% group17, though economic differences were 
only really obvious in urban areas. Differences between the Greek and Turkish-
Cypriot community generally were more apparent outside village life. 
"...separation... tended to intensify rather than diminish with economic 
development and be most marked amongst the more affluent, the better 
educated and those with higher social status."18 
With the limited proletarianisation that occurred with the development of a modern 
mining sector (asbestos from 1904 and copper during the First World War), the 
rising labour movement challenged the nationalist ideology of elite Cyprus. A 
minority of the workforce (Turkish and Greek-Cypriots) began to share the same 
conditions of employment and the same interests in collective action, re-establishing 
some of the intra-ethnic horizontal bonds that Kitromilides noted in traditional 
society19. Elements of the Greek right responded by linking the conditions of the 
masses with colonial occupation, an approach that culminated in the uprising of 
1931. Violent Greek nationalism with the beginnings of the EOKA campaign in 
1955, and finally the onset of independence killed off joint trade unions in the 
1950's20 and a central joint co-operative organisation in September 1959. Although 
far from integrated, the two communities contributed towards the maintenance of 
the same economy or at least until the events of 1963 put an unbearable strain on 
even that level of co-operation. 
17Interview with Suleyman Kiryagdi, General Co-ordinator & Acting Secretary and General Manager 
of the Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. (est. 1959). Interviews carried out, 20/04/95, 
21/04/95 - 11:00am - 1.30pm. A UN economist, Notel Rudolph, estimated that Turkish Cypriotper 
capita income was 20% lower than the Greek Cypriot, at £130.5 instead of the Greek £160.5. 
Rudolph N. 1973. "Economic Integration on Cyprus", paper presented at "An Enquiry into the 
Resolution of the Cyprus Problem" seminar, held at the Centre for Mediterranean Studies, Rome, 19-
24/11/1973, quoted in Attalides 1977. op. cit., p. 87. 
18Wilson R. 1992. Cyprus and the International Economy. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 118. 
19Kitromilides 1977. op. cit., p. 36. 
20The first separate Turkish Cypriot trade union appeared in 1943, as the Turkish Cypriot elite began 
to organise a separatist approach to the sirens of Enosis. The overwhelming majority of Turkish 
Cypriot Trade Unionists continued, however, to remain part of the unified left wing trade union 
syndicate, PEO, until the late 1950s. 
130 
Some of the Turkish-Cypriot community had already sought security in numbers by 
moving to predominantly Turkish areas of the main towns and cities of Cyprus in 
response to the activities of EOKA beginning in 1956. Effectively the Green Line (a 
neutral zone dividing the two communities) had been established in Nicosia in the 
summer of 1958 by British Troops attempting to separate the two communities 
during the unrest triggered by the EOKA campaign21. When fighting waned and 
after the restoration of confidence as a consequence of the signing of the Zurich and 
London Agreements (February 1959), communications between the two 
communities in the major towns, and even the capital, were restored. However, by 
1 April 1961, just over seven months after it came into operation, the new 
constitution already showed signs of severe strain22. On the 30th November 1963 
President Makarios, in a letter to the Turkish-Cypriot Vice President, suggested 13 
amendments to the constitution favouring the Greek majority. On 11 December 
these amendments were made public. The atmosphere thereafter was tense. The 
consequences were that a street brawl in the Turkish quarter between the (ex 
EOKA) Interior Minister Yorgadjis' plain clothes special constables and a Turkish-
Cypriot crowd was immediately followed by a major assault by various Greek-
Cypriot paramilitary elements on Turkish-Cypriot areas of Nicosia and Larnaca. 
Since the publication of the 1964 Foreign Office documents, it is no longer 
controversial that the British High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Clark, actively 
supported, if not influenced, President Makarios' moves to change the recently 
21 Interview with Ozalp Sarica, op. cit., And Harbottle M. 1970. The Impartial Soldier. London: 
OUP, p. 63: "Those who were in Cyprus during the EOKA campaign of 1955-9 will remember that 
the Greek and Turkish quarters of Nicosia were divided by a wire fence which acquired the sobriquet 
of the 'Mason Dixon Line'. Within the walls of the Old City, the Green Line almost coincides with 
its predecessor... " 
2 20n 1/4/1961, the Cyprus Mail reported that President Makarios acted unconstitutionally to 
reinstate a colonial taxation law after the failures to secure the required separated communal 
majorities to approve new taxation authority. Turkish Cypriots failed to support new taxation 
legislation to put pressure on the Govt to speed up the pace of positive discrimination and fully 
install the constitutionally guaranteed 30/70 ethnic ratio at all levels of public service. 
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agreed Constitution. Seemingly Clark's knowledge and support was given contrary 
to considered opinion at the Foreign Office in London. The current President of the 
Republic, Glafkos Clerides who drafted the 13 amendments, has gone on record as 
saying that Makarios showed him the draft v/ith suggested altérations added in Sir 
Arthur Clarke's handwriting23. Clerides said that Clarke told him that lie had given 
advice to Makarios on this matter as a personal friend. President Makarios justified 
the move as eliminating divisive elements in the constitution: "certain unreasonable 
rights the misuse of which creates obstacles to the smooth running of the state"24. 
He distanced himself from the subséquent violence which he publicly considered to 
be the acts of extremists and irregulars. Turkish-Cypriots saw it as an attempt to 
relegate them from a position of partnership to the status of a minority. When they 
refused to accept the constitutional amendments as a fait accompli, they saw the 
violence as a means of removing them entirely.25 
The December 1963 constitutional crisis and the re-occurrence of communal 
violence saw the beginning of a rigid separate economic development on the island. 
Turkish-Cypriot government employees withdrew en masse (only médical staff, 
23Kyle K. 1984. Cyprus. London: Minority Rights Group, p.22, footnote 12. 
uCyprus Mail, 26/10/1963. 
25As these events are still controversial, it is worth re-quoting two conflicting explanations at some 
lengtli as a health warning (originally quoted by Robert McDonald [McDonald R. 1989. The 
Problem of Cyprus. London: International Institute of Strategie Studies, Adelphi Papers No. 234, 
note 25 to Chp. 1] ): Field Marshall Lord Carver, Commander of the Peace Force wrote in 
[Koumoulides J. (ed.) 1986. Cyprus in Transition. London: Trigraph, p.22] that "botli sides had 
armed bodies of men ready to go into action immediately... the Turks had a plan which they 
executed, to leave ail government service, and try and set up a parallel administration... at the same 
time abandoning a number of mixed and isolated villages [103 according to Turkish-Cypriot sources] 
and concentrating their population in areas where they were less vulnerable; and... the Greeks had 
plans which they executed with brutality and callous disregard of human life, to drive Turks out of 
certain areas, particularly in the northern suburbs of Nicosia..." Whereas Robert Stephens has argued 
[Stephens R. 1966. Cyprus: A Place of Arms. London: Pali Mall, p. 101] that "neither the suggestion 
of a carefully planned Turkish rebellion nor that of a systematic Greek attempt at extermination or 
terror will bear close examination. Despite their clandestine activities, both sides were ill-prepared 
militarily or politically when the clash came. Nor had either side taken the elementary précautions 
which should have been evident if they had been preparing for battle, such as the remo val of their 
compatriots from unsafe areas. It was not until the fighting had begun that the Turks began to move 
out of some of the mixed villages and to concentrate in the Nicosia area, either voluntarily or from 
fear, or in some cases, under pressure from the Turkish leadership. The same is true of the Greek 
évacuation from areas where they were outnumbered and in danger". 
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some police and some CBC26 staff stayed behind in Greek areas). Turkish-Cypriots 
say a number of rumours had been circulating before the outbreak of violence, 
substantiated on the day of the 23rd December by the appearance of armed civilians, 
known EOKA activists. The fact that the British High Commissioner, Sir Arthur 
Clark, vacated his residence in Shakespeare Avenue (in the Turkish Quarter) three 
days prior to the outbreak of violence, alerted the community of the possibility of 
violence27. Put simply, Turkish-Cypriots say armed irregulars and the threat of 
violence forced them to leave officiai positions, mixed areas and more general co-
opération in the Republic of Cyprus. The (Greek Cypriot) Government maintains 
that they absented themselves from the civil service and mixed areas on the orders 
of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and were carrying out a concerted policy of 
séparation and communal autonomy28. 
On Christmas Eve 1963, the Vice Presidenti Office was ransacked and the Turkish-
Cypriot Vice President, Dr Kuchuk, remained in his residence where he set up 
office. Within four days radio Bayrak was broadcasting "illegally" to the Turkish-
Cypriot people. The fighting continued when, by the 28 December 1963, Turkish-
Cypriots in the Nicosia enclave were confmed to their smallest area of Nicosia and 
according to first hand reports, nearly exhausted29. Intervention by the Turkish 
Airforce, over-flying Nicosia, and the speedy dispatch of a Turkish Task Force30 
caused Britain to send a contingent to Nicosia from its Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) 
to act as a peace keeping force. British Troops were again manning the inter-
communal boundaries in Nicosia and Larnaca. The politicai and economic 
26Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (PIK, PaÔio<j>cùviKo 'I8pu|aot KoTipou). 
27 Interview with Ozalp Sarica, op. cit. 
2 8 E •g. "Within four years of Independence the Turkish Cypriots were concentrated by their leaders 
with the aid of an underground armed force in a number of enclaves and took no part in the 
Republic's government and institutions and only a small part in the economy... the policy of Turkish 
Cypriot withdrawal into enclaves was put in hand. " So says former government minister Demetrios 
Christodoulou 1992. op. cit., pp. xxxii, xliv. 
29Interview with Ozalp Sarica, op. cit. 
30Kyle 1984. op. cit., p. 10. 
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séparation of the communities began to take on the appearance of permanence. By 
March 1964, the Greek-Cypriot National Guard was being established and the UN 
Security Council had created a role for international peace-keepers in Cyprus. By 
June, General George Grivas31 had returned to Cyprus to command the newly 
formed Greek-Cypriot National Guard. Greek army officers were becoming 
increasingly apparent on Greek-Cypriot check-points32. By then, leading Turkish-
Cypriot figures knew they would not be returning to their officiai positions in the 
Government of the Republic of Cyprus33. Field Marshall Lord Carver, Commander 
of the Truce Force and then Deputy Commander of UNFICYP from February to 
July 1964, claims that the objective of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership was "to 
concentrate their population in the north and bring about partition"34, and that: 
Policy was clearly dictated from Ankara, and any déviation from it was 
liable to lead to condign punishment by the TMT, the Turkish-Cypriot 
fighters organisation.35 
The Nicosia enclave had two open Checkpoints, three if you count the VIP 
Checkpoint at the Ledra Palace (still in opération). When inter-communal violence 
had broken out again in December 1963, the Turkish Army contingent had moved 
out of its Nicosia Barracks and taken up strategie positions covering the Nicosia to 
Kyrenia trunk road. Whilst Turkish-Cypriot fighters, with or without Turkish army 
assistance, captured the strategie strong point of St Hilarión in the Pentadaktylos 
31Leader of the violent campaign by EOKA for the union of Cyprus with Greece (enosis) 1955-60. 
"...the fanatical General George Grivas ...a native Cypriot, took Greek citizenship to join the 
Hellenic Army. In the wake of the libération of Greece from the Nazis, Grivas led a white-terror 
campaign against communist partisans which helped precipitate the second round of the Greek civil 
war, 1947-9." McDonald 1989. op. cit., p.8 and note 8, p.81. 
32 Former Greek Prime Minister, and a Minister in his father George Papandreou's government at 
the time, Andrea Papandreou, claims that after the breakdown of the Cypriot constitution: "A 
clandestine opération then began on a huge scale of nightly shipments of arms and troops, of 
'volunters' [sic] who arrived in Cyprus in civilian clothes and then joined their 'Cypriot' [sic] units. 
The process was not completed until the middle of the summer. No less than 20,000 officers and 
men, fully equipped, were shipped to Cyprus." Papandreou, A. 1970. Democracv at Gunpoint. 
Andre Deutsch, p. 100. 
33Interview with Ozalp Sarica, op. cit. 
34 Field Marshall Lord Carver, in Koumoulides 1986. op. cit., p.30. 
35 ibid., p.31. 
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range, overlooking the pass through which the Nicosia to Kyrenia road ran. This 
effectively extended the Nicosia enclave to a point that overlooked the Northern 
Coastline, aiding the area's security. However, to the discomfiture of the 
community, UN organised convoys (in September 1964) escorted Greek-Cypriot 
vehicles through the area twice a day, during which they required Turkish-Cypriot 
traffic to pull over. 
Responding to the Turkish-Cypriot withdrawal into fortified enclaves the (now 
exclusively Greek Cypriot) Government of Cyprus operated a policy of embargo on, 
what it termed the "rebel" element. For much of 1964 the blockade of the Turkish-
Cypriot enclaves of Nicosia, Lefka, Limnitis and Kokkina was total, a situation that 
was periodically restored. Under pressure from the UNFICYP36 and the 
International Red Cross and with the concession of the opening of the Nicosia and 
Limnitis enclaves to UN escorted Greek-Cypriot traffic, the Makarios Government 
let in quotas of food, clothing, kerosene and médical supplies. In mid September, as 
the Unes of engagement remained around Nicosia, Kokkina, Lefka and other 
villages and groups of villages where tension remained, an ever changing list of 
items were specified as "strategie materials" and proscribed. Strategie items 
generally included building materials, tiles, timber, cernent, certain items of 
clothing, many raw materials, spare parts and vehicle accessories, electrical 
equipment, batteries, chemicals and large quantities of fuel. Dipsticks were used to 
check the quantity of fuel in cars entering the Nicosia enclave (the largest enclave 
and the administrative centre of the Turkish-Cypriot community). Anything over a 
gallon would be siphoned off and spilled over the pavement. All the fuel used by 
the Turkish-Cypriot military before 1968 was, however, smuggled in. The 650-man 
Turkish Army contingent supplied themselves and was monitored in doing so by the 
36United Nations Force in Cyprus, established by Security Council resolution (S/RES/186) on 4 
March 1964. 
135 
UN.37 Some additional supplies must have reached either the Turkish military or 
Turkish-Cypriot units from the Kokkina enclave over which they fought so hard in 
1964. However, these goods also had to be smuggled to population centres before 
196838. 
On the 20 November 1964 the Government removed rationing of non-strategic 
materials for the Nicosia enclave and allowed Turkish-Cypriots to move in and out 
of the area, subject to thorough searches. (Prior to this the UN estimated that 10-20 
Turkish-Cypriots had been permitted to enter the area daily39.) According to 
Patrick40, restrictions on freedom of movement and the rationing of non-strategic 
goods had already practically disappeared from the Lefka enclave, although the 
Government maintained a strict blockade of Kokkina until 10 June 1965 when non-
strategic materials could also be transported freely there. 
For most of 1964, the areas under effective Turkish-Cypriot control amounted to 
little more than the Nicosia enclave, the Lefka enclave, the Limnitis enclave and the 
Turkish quarters of ali the main towns other than Limassol (see UN map41 - top of 
next page). There was an element of consolidation as the Turkish-Cypriot leadership 
became more effective and as the problems of communication eased after 1967. 
37 Turkish Cypriots, whilst having a rank in Turkish Army and therefore integrated command, did 
not share Turkish Army resources. Interview with Ozalp Sarica, op. cit. 
38Smuggling was rife during the period and there are a number of reported incidents in the locai 
press, however, due to the people likely to be involved, (regulär and irregulär military personnel) it 
is assumed that the detection rate was low. On the 23 March 1966 The Cyprus Mail reported that 4 
British soldiers, serving with the United Nations peace keeping force in Cyprus (UNICYP), had been 
sentenced by Court Marshall to between 9-18 months in custody, for smuggling arms and other 
"strategie materials" into the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. 
39UN Security Council, 12 December 1964. "Report on UNFICYP and the Cyprus Situation for the 
period 10 September to 12 December 1964". NY. S/6102. 
40Patrick 1976. op. cit., p. 107. 
41UN Map Collection, F6/42/11/1964, UN Headquarters, NY. 
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Figure 3.1 Areas under Turkish-Cyprìot control, 1964 and 1970. 
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Seemingly, by 1970 the Nicosia enclave had grown considerably and was joined by 
many new groupings of villages which had banded together (such as the group of 
Turkish villages in the northern Mesaoria piain around the Nicosia/Lefkonica road) 
to form new areas beyond the scope of the internationally recognised Government of 
the Republic of Cyprus42 (see Patrick's map43 - bottom of last page). 
Patrick argues that the politicai geography that had emerged by the end of the 
hostilities in 1964 changed little by 1970 (and by logicai extension also by 1974). 
Perhaps much of the difference between his map and the UN's, is the latter's 
cautious approach at defining reality; it was after all a guest, invited in by the 
government of the Republic of Cyprus. The UN was only likely to classify areas of 
clear, unambiguous communal control, demarcated by an inner ring of defenders, 
an outer ring of Government military and in the middle a ring of UN Observation 
posts. Most areas of communal division were, however, not like this. Many areas 
did not permanently accommodate UN observers, though many were periodically 
contested, with fluid boundaries; some had no boundaries at ali. When tension rose, 
Greek-Cypriots knew where Turkish-Cypriot fields began and Turkish-Cypriot 
fighters were sometimes prepared and Willing to defend them. What Patrick mapped 
in 1970 is areas where Turkish-Cypriots could, most of the time, carry out 
successful autonomous control, largely defined by its ability to control and restrict 
access. On that basis, it can be extrapolated from Patrick's work44 that the vast 
majority of the Turkish-Cypriot population (over 92% in 1971) were under the 
control of the (Turkish Cypriot) "Provisionai Administration" rather than the 
Government (of the Republic of Cyprus). 
42President Makarios acknowledged, in an interview wiüi a eorespondent from Eleftheros Kosmos 
(Free World), that a de facto separate "Situation" had existed in Cyprus for some time, but that the 
scattered Turkish areas did not easily lend themselves to the full establishment of a pseudo-state. He 
declared that currently they controlied an area not exceeding 2% of the island. Front page report, 
Cyprus Mail, 20/8/69. The long term leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, "President" 
Denktash, said that during the enclaved period, Turkish Cypriots were restricted to 3 % of the island: 
Interview with Rauf Denktash, carried out in his office, 28/7/95. 
43The map is a simplified form of Patrick's (1976., op. cit.) figure II.l (p. 279). 
44 Patrick 1976. op. cit., Appendix II, pp. 278-323. 
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The economy under Turkish-Cypriot administration 
Much of the economic activity in the enclaves (particularly in the 1963-68 period) 
was not recorded in Republic of Cyprus national income accounts. The community 
neither paid taxes to, nor benefited from transfer payments from the Government of 
the Republic of Cyprus45. Multilateral aid designed for the community was mostly 
neither claimed nor received. Being Channelled through the Republic of Cyprus, 
Turkish-Cypriot Claims were seen as confirming the Government's legitimacy46. 
Movement in and out of the key Turkish-Cypriot enclaves was periodically 
constrained and permanently monitored. Some necessities of life and many 
necessary prerequisites of efficient economic activity were considered "strategie 
mater ials" and either prescribed or, in the case of fuel, limited and control led. 
Smuggling was rife in these items and also, ironically, involved extremist types on 
the Greek side. Illegal drops of prescribed materials would be made in no-man' s 
land and would be retrieved later by Turkish-Cypriot Fighters (communal defence 
force). These materials would have registered initially as imports, therefore entering 
national income accounts, but the income multiplier that followed the application 
subsequently undertaken would not47. Not that there was much of an income 
multiplier. Many Turkish-Cypriots living in the enclaves were displaced from 
elsewhere, having lost their economic foundation, either with the move or with the 
loss of public sector employment. 
Financial assistance began to arrive from Turkey48 in March 1964, via the London 
branch of a Turkish bank and the offices of the Central Bank of Cyprus. Payment 
45Marjorie Haid is one of the few writers on the economy of Cyprus who acknowledges tliis fact 
[Haid M.W. 1968. A Study of the Cvprus Economy. Nicosia: Printing Office of the Republic of 
Cyprus, p. 43, footnote 63] : "Since 1964 statistics on the economic activities in Turkish areas have 
been incomplete. " 
46 Patrick 1976. op. cit., p. 168. 
47Interview with Ozalp Sarica, op. cit. 
48Criticising mismanagement of fiinds, Turgut Mustafa, a member of the General Committee, said 
aid from Turkey in the six years to the end of 1969 amounted to £7,500,000, Cyprus Mail 
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was made on the basis of a fixed income allowance to the head of each eligible 
family. In 1964 the sum paid amounted to approximately £20 per month, a figure 
that was paid to Turkish-Cypriots as members of military units or as public officers, 
irrespective of rank. The Turkish Army Contingent received its own pay and 
conditions as members of the Turkish Military. Payment for Turkish-Cypriot heads 
of families through the military unit, provided income to most Turkish-Cypriots. 
All able bodied Turkish-Cypriot men were members of military units which, in the 
absence for many of other forms of employment49, became via the male head, the 
source of all payment and food distribution. Through the medium of the family unit, 
people either received financial assistance as members of an army unit or the army 
unit organised distribution to known needy people within its area of opération. 
However, the private sector was still permitted to operate; the public sector and the 
military merely facilitated the distribution of aid, acting as an information service 
and in some cases, a welfare and distribution service as well as an employment 
service50. 
Even during the period of total embargo in 1964, the central distribution of food in 
the Nicosia enclave was organised by civilian authorities though the military played 
a key rôle in distribution. Again because of spatial séparation of this the largest 
enclave from both grain producing enclaves and from the coast, the provision of 
grain to the mill in Nicosia and flour to the bakeries was co-ordinated by public and 
quasi-public bodies. Despite the shortages deriving from the embargo and dislocated 
production, the Turkish-Cypriot population were not issued with ration cards. As a 
1/11/1969. Patrick (1976. op. cit., p. 108, p. 161) states that Turkish Cypriot sources confirmed a 
slightly higher figure. In 1968 alone he claims Turkish aid amounted to £8,000,000 and by 1971 that 
had risen to a total of £10,000,000. "The budgets were never published, nor were they dépendent 
upon any form of legislative approvai. In these circumstances, the leadership's critics were free to 
speculate about mismanagement or even misappropriation... " p. 161. 
49In December 1966 a UN report estimated that a third of the Turkish Cypriot population needed 
some form of welfare. UN Security Council, Dec. 1966. "Report on UNFICYP and the Cyprus 
situation for the period 11 June to 5 December 1966." NY. S/7611. 
50Patrick 1976. op. cit., p. 160, and Chapter 5, footnote 33. 
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small community, they were known to each other through inter-connecting families, 
employment and most importantly, active service in military units51. The displaced 
and destitute, created by politicai events, were required to register at a social 
welfare office which had responsibility for the issuing of food. Each eligible family 
was then added to a list which entitled them to weekly food distribution. In March 
1964 when Red Crescent aid was interrupted, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership began 
to organise the Stockpiling of food, to be distributed when food supplies were 
curtailed. When Red Crescent assistance came in through Famagusta, the UN 
escorted it to the enclaves52. 
Financial assistance to family heads gradually rose: from £20 per month in 1964 to 
£30 in 1965. In 1966 financial assistance rose again to £40, however, it was not 
until the beginnings of the easing of pressure on the movement of goods and people 
in 1967/8, that pay differentials began to appear. In 1967 Turkish-Cypriots received 
extra financial assistance from Turkey allowing them to receive a percentage of 
their former salary. To deflect potential criticism and maintain unity in a period of 
continued politicai instability and deprivation, the allocation of differentiated 
financial assistance commenced on a depreciating scale: the highest paid former 
government employees received 20% of their former pay, whereas the lowest paid 
received 100% of theirs53. In November 1969, the "Provisionai Administration" feit 
confident enough to begin deducting income tax54 although most income stili 
51Patrick (1976. op. cit., p. 10-11) has estimated that Nicosia, the largest enclave, contained between 
twenty and thirty thousand people during the period 1964 to 1974, or approaching 20% of the 
Turkish Cypriot population. 
52A report in the Cvorus Mail. 15/6/1965, quotes the UN Secretary General (U Thant) saying that 
the hardships facing Turkish Cypriots were due to "seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregation" 
and that "Turkish Cypriot leaders adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve 
having members of the two communities live and work together". 
53Amid criticism in the Turkish Cypriot press (Zafer) Vice President Kuchuk and other Turkish 
Cypriot leaders voted to raise their salaries by 80%. It was also reported that tliis would put Dr 
Kuchuk's salary at £400 per month, from £225, and the salaries of the other former ministers in the 
Republic, Mr Osman Orek and Mr F. Plumer, were raised from £175 to £275. Cyprus Mail, 
4/11/1969. 
54Cyprus Mail, 4/11/1969. 
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derived from Turkish transfer payments. Even prior to 1969/70, once people started 
earning an independent income their financial assistance stopped. From mid 1964, 
when shops in the enclaves began operating again, financial assistance was given on 
the basis of need; only those without independent means were entitled to it. Wealthy 
merchants received nothing except food stuffs when other supplies were 
unavailable. 
Some Turkish-Cypriots still lived outside the "Provisionai Administration's" 
control, particularly in areas within or close to the two large British Sovereign Base 
Areas55. Therefore some economic activity still continued as part of the economic 
life of the Republic of Cyprus. Despite periodic disruption during periods of tension 
(when Turkish-Cypriots were glad to see their harvest safely loaded on Greek-
Cypriot lorries for the protection it offered) grape production in the Limassol and 
Paphos régions (a major Turkish-Cypriot activity prior to 1974) generally went on, 
with only periodic disruption throughout most of the period after 1964. Through 
inter-communal co-operation, Turkish-Cypriot grape production became Cypriot 
wine and spirit products. Patrick mentions four carob processing plants in the 
village of Zyyi, an exclusively Turkish-Cypriot village. Greek-Cypriot managers 
and foremen would commute into Zyyi on a daily basis to co-ordinate the 
exclusively Turkish-Cypriot workforce56. Much other large-scale agricultural 
production was not bi-communal and therefore did not always register in the 
national income accounts of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkish-Cypriot wheat 
production from villages in the Mesaoria Plain and the greater Nicosia enclave, was 
often diverted from the Grain Commission and delivered directly to the new flour 
mill in the Turkish Quarter of Nicosia (built after much haggling in 1962)57. After 
55 Patrick 1976. op. cit., pp.302 & 307. 
56 ibid., p.300. 
57Interview with Suleyman Kiryagdi, op. cit. 
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1963, much Turkish-Cypriot cereal production and its products would not be 
registered as part of Cypriot national income. 
Suleyman Kiryagdi58 challenged the level of economic séparation that former 
Deputy Governor of the Central Bank, Ozalp Sarica, emphasised. Most Turkish-
Cypriots were farmers. Ozalp Sarica acknowledged that significant bi-communal co-
opération went on in grape related production. Suleyman, however, argues that in 
other crops, co-operation continued after December 1963. A government body 
founded in the colonial era, the Grain Commission, continued to buy ail grain 
produced in Cyprus at a fixed price. In some Turkish-Cypriot villages, controlied 
by the "Provisional Administration after December 1963, Turkish-Cypriots still sold 
grain to the (exclusively Greek Cypriot) government controlied body, sometimes via 
the médiation of the Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central Bank. There is clearly 
stili some confusion as to how much went directly to the Grain Commission and 
how much directly to the Turkish-Cypriot flour mill in Nicosia and more generally 
the extent to which Turkish-Cypriots had reverted back to subsistence agriculture as 
Wilson suggests59. Suleyman said that if there were three villages near each other 
and one was Greek Cypriot, one Turkish-Cypriot and one mixed (not an unusual 
ethnie distribution), and if there was trouble in one village, life went on as normal 
in the other two, and that meant economic life. Henee, according to Suleyman 
Kiryagdi60, grain was generally still sold to the Grain Commission by Turkish-
Cypriot villages, and other forms of economic co-operation went on61 despite overt, 
even violent discouragement from hard-line elements on both sides. 
5*ibid. 
59" The marketing of agricultural produce by Turkish Cypriot farmers was disrupted, and the rural 
economy for the Turkish community became increasingly subsistence based. The emphasis was on 
self support not cash sales." Wilson 1992. op. ciL, p.117. 
60Interview with Suleyman Kiryagdi, op. cit. 
61The Cyprus Mail reported on the 12/6/1969, that the Chairman of the Nicosia Chamber of 
Commerce, Mr Zenon Severis, said that despite the suspensión of political co-operation, trade 
exchanges between Greek and Turkish Cypriots had made progress. 
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Patrick has offered a more complicated contemporary dissection of the 
controversy:62 In 1964 Turkish-Cypriots were generally unable to sell their grain 
and grapes through the government's marketing agencies. Turkish-Cypriot farmers 
were thus forced to sell surplus requirements to their Greek-Cypriot counterparts at 
a substantial discount or dump the crop. In 1965 the marketing boards were willing 
to receive Turkish-Cypriot produce provided the farmers were willing to pay off the 
debts for the advance payments they had received in 1963, for the crop that was not 
delivered in 1964. The Grain Commission deducted 20% from payments to Turkish-
Cypriot farmers until the debt had been repaid. Attalides argues that the intention 
was not to pay Turkish producers less: 
Since the [Turkish] Co-operative Bank owed a sum of money to the 
Grain Commission, the sum was eut in instalments from lump payments 
to the Turkish Co-operative Bank. If the Bank, which engaged in many 
other activities than purchasing grain, chose to pass this on in the form 
of lower prices... it was true that to the producers it would appear that 
the Government was discriminating against them.63 
Patrick relates how in 1966 the Government tried to raise a compensation fund for 
Greek-Cypriot Farmers displaced by communal fighting64 (mostly from around the 
northern Nicosia enclave) by imposing a 30% déduction on payments for grain 
grown in the Nicosia enclave. This is in addition to the 20% réduction that 
producers already experienced, amounting one way or another, to a 50% réduction 
in the likely payments due to cereal farmers in the Nicosia enclave. Consequently 
no grain was delivered to the Grain Commission in 1966 from the Nicosia enclave 
and the 30% Government "Emergency" rent was withdrawn. The picture thus 
62Patrick 1976. op. cit., p. 110. 
63Attalides 1977. op. cit., pp.88-89. 
64UNICYP estimated that half of the farmland abandoned by Turkish Cypriots was being leased to 
Greek Cypriots, sometimes under allegedly less than favourable terms. UN. Security Council. 8 
December 1966, "Report on UNICYP and the Cyprus Situation for the period 11 June to 5 Dec. 
1966". NY: S/7611. By comparison only a very small proportion of Greek Cypriots lost access to 
property in 1963/4 and most of that was in and around northern Nicosia. Rep. of Cyprus 1967. 
Report hy the Special Parliamentarv C'tee set UP to Examine the Question of Emergency Victims. 
Nicosia: House of Représentatives. Both sources quoted by Patrick, 1976. op. cit., p. 110. 
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reveals that in one year, 1964, there was no inter communal co-operation in grain 
production, and in at least another year, 1966, there was very little co-operation. 
Ozalp Sarica acknowledges however that between 1964-74, inter-communal trading 
links were sporadically maintained, although he emphasised that from 1964 to 1968 
it was restricted by controls on the movement of "stratégie" goods and periodically 
of people too, The controversy as to the level of inter-communal co-operation and / 
or the autarkic nature of the Turkish-Cypriot economy, can be summarised and 
possibly resolved with a head count; how much of the Turkish-Cypriot population 
was confined to the enclaves and the more hermetic enclaves at that?65 The four-
year period that followed December 1963 was undoubtedly the worst period for 
Turkish-Cypriots, when a forceful and consistent element of Government policy was 
economic warfare against the enclaved66. Essential materials sometimes ran 
desperately short when increased inter-communal tension led to the Checkpoints 
being closed at a point where supplies were already low67. The Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership responded by stock-piling and, according to Attalides made things worse 
by maintaining a "buy Turkish [Cypriot] campaign"68. This suggests that there was 
something to buy that was of Turkish-Cypriot origin and therefore something of a 
Turkish-Cypriot economy. 
Düring the whole period, gainful employment and thus productivity in the Turkish-
Cypriot community plummeted, due to the pressure of the embargo, the lack of 
65 This is more complieated than it sounds. Patrick, 1976. op. cit., a politicai geographer, refrains 
from aggregating numbers in his authoritative 500 page text on the "Politicai Geography of the 
Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971". 
6 60n the 29/6/1966, the Cyprus Mail reported that the International Confédération of Free Trade 
Unions had sent a message to Cypriot President Makarios, expressing their concern with the 
restrictions of movement imposed on Turkish Cypriots. 
67For example, it was reported in the Cyprus Mail from the beginning of 1965 to the end of 1966 
that the Turkish Cypriot "quarter" of Nicosia was sealed off between 16 April 1965 and the 3 May 
1965, checks onpersons intensified 18 March 1966. The Turkish Cypriot "quarter" of Nicosia was 
sealed off again between 1 June 1966 and 4 June 1966, re-imposed 20 June 1966, lifted again 29 
June 1966. 
68Attalides 1977. op. cit., p. 88. 
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spare parts and maintenance material and the demands of military service69. Each 
able-bodied citizen was required to perform military duties along with their civilian 
service. Periodic shortages of fresh vegetables led to an element of intensified 
production (a form of Geertzian "involution"70) which of necessity encouraged 
domestic cultivation of market garden crops. In British terms, the political and 
économie crisis of 1963 saw the création of a Turkish-Cypriot Home Guard (the 
Turkish Fighters), a Grow for Victory campaign and a Blitz spirit amongst the 
Turkish-Cypriot community. 
In Nicosia, (the largest enclave both spatially and in terms of population) between 
1964-8, more than half of ail able bodied maie time was spent in military 
activities71. A typical day would commence with civilian work absorbing the hours 
from eight in the morning until eleven when instructions would arrive for volunteers 
to join units. Ail able bodied maies would then close-up shop, change into military 
attire and go to their posts. Although things were more relaxed after 1968, the clash 
between the Makarios government and various extreme right terrorist organisations, 
the National Front and subsequently EOKA B, had dangerous implications for the 
Turkish-Cypriot community. Though the worst situation after 1968, occurred just 
prior to what the community generally perceives as their libération, during and 
69Despite the fact that military service masked unemployment and under-employment, the North 
Cyprus Almanac put Turkish Cypriot unemployment in 1964 at 25%, Rustem K. (ed.) 1987. North 
Cvprus Almanar.. London: Rustem K. & Bro., p. 81. In terms of military service die divergence in 
productivity and / or underemployment has been outlined by Patrick (1976. op. cit., p. 181, footnote 
33): "In 1971, a [Turkish Cypriot] Fighter private received about £30 per month. In many areas Iiis 
duty left him plenty of time to work his fields or carry on another job. In other centres, Fighters 
seemed to spend most of their time in coffee shops. By comparison, a [Greek Cypriot] National 
Guardsman was employed much more fully by his military duties and was paid £4.50 per month, or 
£15 if he had children." 
70Geertz, C. 1963. Agricultural Involution. The Process of Ecolo gical Change in Indonesia. 
Berkeley. 
71Turkish Cypriot sources confirmed the introduction of conscription 6/8/1970, Cyprus Mail. The 
Turkish Fighters were set up in 1963 and, apparently, previously manned entirely by volunteers. The 
move, passed by the Turkish Communal Chamber, attempted to mobilise the young to fili the places 
vacated by departing volunteers. It was stressed that the move should not be perceived as 
mobilisation. 
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immediately after the coup of 1974. Then the male able-bodied Turkish-Cypriot 
population were permanently with their respective units. 
The easing of tension, 1968-74; a politicai background 
The Kophinou incident, at a Turkish village on the junction of the Limassol / 
Larnaca, Limassol / Nicosia roads, accelerated new international tension, though it 
subsequently resulted in the easing of constraints imposed on the enclaved Turkish-
Cypriots. On 15 November 1967 the Greek-Cypriot National Guard had launched a 
large-scale assault on the villages of Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros, ostensibly 
because of a long standing dispute over access by Republic of Cyprus (therefore 
Greek Cypriot) police patrols. The strategie location of the villages was perhaps 
more to the point, though more of a threat to Greek pride than security. Twenty 
Turkish-Cypriots were killed and there were allégations of Greek-Cypriot atrocities. 
Turkish pressure, particularly focused on Greece, caused Grivas and his National 
Guard to withdraw. Subsequent shuttle diplomacy by Lyndon Johnson's special 
envoy Cyrus Vance, persuaded the Greek Junta and the Makarios Government to 
make further concessions which effectively reduced tension. Grivas was withdrawn 
from Cyprus altogether. Greek and Turkish Army personnel, over and above the 
level permitted by the constitution, were required to leave Cyprus (a withdrawal of 
some 12,000 Greek troops72). In March 1968, ali remaining check-points and 
economic restrictions were removed from Turkish enclaves, most importantly those 
affecting the main enclave around northern Nicosia. The incident also stimulated the 
beginning of inter-communal talks. 
72Kyle 1984. op. cit., p. 13. 
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Emphasising the growing divisions between Makarios and Grivas73, the Cypriot 
President had already acted to cut the National Guard's budget and was building up 
his own paramilitary force. Makarios had previously responded to UN pressure by 
lifting the road blocks in Limassol and Paphos, allowing those residents to buy 
products formerly proscribed as "strategie goods". Patrick has argued that during 
the period from August 1964 to November 1967, Grivas and Makarios had différent 
views on the methods of achieving the same goal. After Kophinou their goals 
diverged; for Makarios to what was feasible (independence) rather than what was 
desirable (Enosis).74 There were also economic reasons behind the officiai moves 
towards lifting the sanctions and encouraging détente with Turkish-Cypriots. One of 
the biggest barriers preventing the implementation of the Second Five Year Plan was 
a shortage of labour. 
Whilst representing a timely réduction in inter-communal violence, divergent goals 
within the Greek-Cypriot community opened the way to an upsurge in intra-
communal violence. Violence escalated in the Greek-Cypriot community between 
those who supported independence (either pragmatically, as a way of preventing 
Turkish Military intervention or whole-heartedly as AKEL, the Greek-Cypriot 
Communist Party, did) and those who continued to favour Enosis by force. 
"The years between 1969 and 1974 were a civil war in miniature 
between two sets of Greek-Cypriot men about who would govern 
Cyprus, and particularly, how the Cyprus problem was to be 
managed. "75 
73There had beeil a long running media debate as to who controls the (Greek) Cypriot armed forces, 
and by implication, tactics and strategy concerning the "national issue", beginning in 1966; see 
Cyprus Mail 27/2/1966, 4/3/1966, 25/3/1966... etc. 
74Announcing his décision to seek a renewed mandate (Cyprus Mail, 12/1/1968) President Makarios 
stated that the failure of Greco-Turkish talks and the withdrawal of Greek troops had brought the 
Cyprus question to a criticai stage. In a subsequently much quoted phrase, used to underline the 
significance of this as a turning point, from a policy of "self-determination" (Enosis) to a policy of 
non-aligned independence, President Makarios stated that: "a solution, by necessity, must be sought 
within the limits of what is feasible, which does not always coincide with what is desirable". 
75LoizosP. (Spring) 1994. "Understanding 1974, Understanding 1994", The Cyprus Review. Vol. 
6, no. 1, p.11. 
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Despite the hiccup of the déclaration of a Turkish-Cypriot "provisionai 
administration" (when the Makarios Government briefly re-instated sanctions), from 
April 1968 all remaining controls on Turkish-Cypriot movement in and out of the 
enclaves were lifted, though Turkish-Cypriots retained restrictions on Greek-Cypriot 
entry into the areas they controlied. As a minority, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership 
felt it needed to prevent access by the majority community, to retain security. The 
rise of terrorism in this period did not help matters, despite the fact that most acts of 
violence after 1968 were perpetrated by Greek-Cypriots against (the now almost 
exclusively Greek Cypriot) Government76. The recently returned from exile, of the 
Leader of the Communal Chamber, Rauf Denktash, used the lifting of restrictions to 
permit him to tour the island's Turkish-Cypriot communities, to build up morale. 
In December 1970, 2000 Greek-Cypriots blocked the Nicosia / Kyrenia road 
declaring that "seven years" was long enough77. Foreigners and Turks could use the 
16-mile trunk road from Nicosia to Kyrenia freely, but Greek-Cypriots had to use 
one of the two daily UN convoys. Turkish-Cypriots saw their continued control of 
key stretches of the road as vital to their strategie interests (as it in fact proved to be 
during the first phase of Turkish military intervention in 1974). An alternative route 
was announced at the end of December 1970; however, this alternative increased 
the journey to 30 miles or by 47%. The new road was opened on 12 July 197378, 
almost exactly a year before it was to prove obsolete. 
On constraints imposed on free movement, in areas under the control of the 
Turkish-Cypriot "Provisionai Administration", the then Leader of the Communal 
76Though the ultimate objectives of the terrorists organisations (the National Front and EOKA B) 
active in the late 1960's and early 70's would not have been compatible with the continued presence 
of a Turkish Cypriot community. 
17Cyprus Mail 11/12/1970. 
lsCyprus Mail 13/7/1973. 
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Chamber, Rauf Denktash, said people had to "abide by certain rules" if they were 
to take advantage of certain things which are now within this de facto position79. 
Denktash continued that the temporary existence of two separate administrations in a 
virtually partitioned Cyprus should be considered a "de facto" situation until a 
politicai solution is achieved. 
After the establishment of the "Provisionai Administration" in 1968, the (Turkish 
Cypriot) "State" Planning Organisation was established. With the easing of 
restrictions, it began attempting corporate planning for the whole Turkish-Cypriot 
community. Its primary objectives were to increase intra-communal economic 
interconnections, to improve efficiency and profitability across a whole range of 
economic activities within which the dispersed community were engaged. Another 
key aim was to attract investment for Turkish-Cypriot enterprises. And crucial to 
these objectives was the establishment of a Development Budget, which was 
financed separately from Turkey. The Development Budget covered the 
development and maintenance of the infrastructure within the area under Turkish-
Cypriot control and the opening of new roads both for military and commercial 
purposes. Turkey needed to know what proportion of its financial assistance was to 
be allocated to current expenditure, salaries, transfer payments etc. and what 
proportion would be allocated for development and infrastructural work. These 
budgetary conditions remained in place until they were replaced by combined 
financing under current budgets, outlined in Annual Plans from 197680. 
In so much as the Government of Cyprus attempted to prevent the establishment of 
a separate Turkish-Cypriot economic and politicai entity, "a state within a state", it 
failed. Its policies, first of attempting to enforce the Government writ through the 
use of officially and unofficially sanctioned violence, and then through the use of 
19Cyprus Mail 17/6/1969. 
80Interview with Ozalp Sarica, op. cit. 
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economic sanctions, only acted to accelerate the extent to which Turkish-Cypriots 
created and developed their own institutions. By the time both Government policies 
were abandoned, any Turkish-Cypriots who believed in the expediency of economic 
co-operation with Greek-Cypriots, were increasingly marginalised. The relaxation 
of the sanctions allowed the Turkish-Cypriot leadership to co-ordinate the 
development of their separate economy, re-enforcing links with the "mainland" and 
integrating the separate economy which the force of circumstances had helped to 
create. 
Some analysis of the only available early economic statistics 
Progress in the Turkish-Cypriot community in the short period when the 1960 
Constitution was functioning was dramatic, according to one of the few surviving 
"officiai" records81. The economic performance of the infant economy in general 
was successful but, for the Turkish-Cypriot community, coming from a lower base, 
it was their most successful period of sustained growth in terms of per capita 
income. 
8l"Provisional Turkish Administration". 1970. The Economy of Cvprus and the Turkish Cvpriot 
Community Nicosia: Turkish Planning Organisation, pp.7-10, (written by Ozalp Sarica). 
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Figure 3.2 Thepossible economic effects of the 1963politicai crisis on Turkish-
Cyprìots: est. T. Cyprìot GNP in 1991 US $ m. 1960-73. 
As is evident in the statistics above, a sudden drop in Turkish-Cypriot income 
followed the politicai failures of the Republic of Cyprus to establish an independent 
national identity. Economic activity in the enclaves regressed, with a meagre 
subsistence provided largely by Turkish aid. 
"...since 1963 the Turkish sector has failed to share in the rising 
prosperity of the rest of the island. Turkish unemployment is high, and 
average incomes have fallen by at least one half. "82 
The data above was largely derived from estimates and assumptions generated for 
politicai purposes: to outline the "debts of the Greek-Cypriot Community" as a 
bargaining chip in the protracted discussions over the terms and the relative benefits 
of the (UN sponsored) Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). However, they are 
82Hald 1968. op. cit.y p. 48. A UN economist cited above, estimated tiiat wliilst Turkish Cyprìot per 
capita was 20% lower than Greek Cyprìot's before the catastrophe of December 1963, by 1971 the 
gap was considerably wider with a 50% respective difference. Rudolph N. 1973. "Economic 
Integration on Cyprus", paper presented at "An Enquiry into the Resolution of the Cyprus Problem" 
seminar, held at the Centre for Mediterranean Studies, Rome, 19-24/11/1973, quoted in Attalides 
1977. op. cit., p. 88. 
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useful here mostly because they are the only statistics that exist. The statistics are 
also useful because they illustrate something of the economic growth experienced by 
the Turkish-Cypriot community before the breakdown of the constitution, at the end 
of December 1963. The data used to generate the chart above is a partial extract 
from data used in table 3 of Bicak's paper83. It visually demonstrates something of 
the economic impact of the breakdown of the constitution in terms of the collapse of 
Turkish-Cypriot income and the very slow recovery that followed. The figures for 
1960-3 derive from survey data84, whilst the 1964-72 data is based on Bicak's 
educated guesses and the 1973 data dérivés from 1977 "Federated Republic of 
Northern Cyprus" estimâtes. 
If the object of Bicak's figures is to estimate Greek-Cypriot debt, and therefore 
minimise Turkish-Cypriot contributions to proposed politicai compromises, it is 
unlikely that the estimâtes of income during the period 1964-72 will be overly 
exaggerated. Regardless of the reasons for the move into fortified enclaves, clearly 
income must have collapsed for the Turkish-Cypriot community at a time when 
Greek-Cypriot income rose sharply. Bicak's figures were designed to conform, in 
quantitative terms, to contemporaneous reports by Turkish-Cypriot "authorities", 
although these reports can no longer be located. What the figures also do, 
ironically, is support the economic rationale of inter-communal co-operation, at 
least for Turkish-Cypriots. Although contrary to the dominant Turkish-Cypriot 
picture of communal life in post independence Cyprus, the 1960-63 data tends to 
support a more positive view of economic co-operation prior to the constitutional 
crisis. Whilst the Turkish-Cypriot population declined85, the proportion of GNP 
83Bicak H.A. 1993. "An Evaluation of the Turkish Cypriot Position: Debts of the Greek Cypriot 
Community", article submitted to the UN Resident Représentative of the Secretary General. 
^This data seems to be more reliably based on survey data, quoted by Ozalp Sarica ("Provisionai 
Turkish Administration". 1970. op. cit., p. 15.) 
85In seven out of eight successive censuses between 1881 and 1960, the Turkish Cypriot population 
declined as a proportion of the total Cypriot population, from nearly 25% in the former census, to 
18% in the latter. 
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produced by them rises significantly, peaking at 15% of the GNP of the whole 
island in 1963, a figure that has never been surpassed (in 1990, the GNP of the 
"TRNC" was only 9% of the Republic's). 
For the period 1964-72, the contribution of the Turkish-Cypriot community has 
been assumed to be7%, 4.8%, 4.9%, 5.0%, 5.2%, 5.3%, 5.4% and 5.5% of total 
Cypriot GNP respectively. There are a number of problems with these figures: 
particularly the inexplicably high contribution in 1964 (when things should have 
been at their worse) and the (perhaps) too graduai growth after the relaxation of 
restrictions on the free movement of Turkish-Cypriots after 1968. More generally, 
the spurious accuracy of the figures, e.g. unless there are sound reasons why growth 
may have occurred, as specified, why not leave the estimâtes at 5%? But as Bicak 
states, "it is almost impossible to compute the GNP of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community for the years of 1964-1972"86. For these years the figures above 
represent the combined Turkish-Cypriot contributions to the GNP of the Republic of 
Cyprus, income generated both in the enclaves but not counted as national income, 
and in the small integrated economy. Much like the Cambridge economist Pigou, 
marrying his housekeeper (who subsequently carries on, unpaid, with the same daily 
functions), another weakness of the 1964-72 data is inherent to national income 
accounting generally. Like a large black-economy, much of the economic activity 
that continued in the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves did not find its way into national 
income accounts. Düring the period Turkish-Cypriot income may well have been 
approximately 5 % of the GNP of the Republic, but the GNP of the Republic did not 
include any officiai record of economic activity within the enclaves. 
For some reason the "State" Planning Office calculated the estimated GNP for the 
Turkish-Cypriot community for 1973 in 1977, when it calculated estimated income 
S6Bicak 1993. op. cit., p.4. 
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for the early years of hermetic regionally separate development that followed 1974. 
This is ironie because, as the estimated figures above imply (and the preceding 
narrative argues) some re-integration of Turkish-Cypriots into the economy of the 
Republic of Cyprus had taken place, with the relatively prolonged inter-communal 
peace after 1968. An early reference to these new estimâtes is in both the 1978 
Statistical Yearbook and in the "First Five Year Development Plan" (both published 
in 1979 by the "State" Planning Organisation). There is however no guide as to the 
methodology applied. 
While the specific figures might be disputed, the trend is generally consistent with 
what has been more generally recorded: after December 1963 Turkish-Cypriot 
income collapsed and only recovered very slowly, if at all. Economic development 
only returned to the community after 1974. As they are the only figures available, 
they will be used here as a guide to Turkish-Cypriot income in the period. 
The Development of a separate Turkish-Cypriot administrative organisation 
The Administrative organisation, until 1968, was primitive and fragmented due to 
the spatial séparation of the régions under Turkish control and the constraints 
imposed on them by the, now exclusively, Greek-Cypriot controlied Government of 
the Republic. The principal politicai organ was made up of the Turkish-Cypriot 
members of the Government of the Republic acting separately. The Vice President 
and his three Turkish-Cypriot Ministers came together with the Turkish-Cypriot 
members of the House of Représentatives and the Turkish Communal Chamber to 
form a cabinet or "General Committee". This "General Committee", headed by the 
Vice President Dr F. Kuchuk, exercised the legislative, judicial and the executive 
powers in the areas under Turkish-Cypriot control. Also part of the "General 
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Committee" was the area military commander (until 24 February 1967 a Turkish 
colonel named Kemal Coskun) who was, in policy terms, ultimately responsible to 
the cabinet87, though he carried more weight in terms of executive function88. 
Because of the difficulties associated with communication between the spatially 
separate enclaves, each had something of its own local administration, headed by a 
military commander89. Muktars and locai Committees had responsibility and 
therefore local accountability for certain de jure functions. However, depending on 
the location, military considérations invariably dominated administrative agendas, 
particularly between 1964-8. Due to their precarious security and their 
détermination not to become a minority in a Greek state, military affairs were 
paramount. Thus military Commanders, who were ali Turkish (rather than Turkish 
Cypriot) had ultimate, de facto executive powers after 1963. Lower down the scale 
of military command, at a non-commissioned officer level, Turkish-Cypriots played 
a part90. 
On 28 December 1967, at a special meeting convened by the Vice President and 
after much public debate, the establishment of a "Provisional Turkish Cypriot 
Administration" was approved, which, with its separate administrative organisation, 
87Interview with Ozalp Sarica, op. cit. 
88In February 1967 the Turkish Cypriot weekly Zafer admitted that colonel Kemal Coskun was the 
commander of the Turkish Fighters and also alleged that he was the "real" leader of the Turkish 
Cypriot community (reported in the Cyprus Mail 25/2/1967). Zafer also Iiinted that Dr Kuchuk had 
asked for the colonel's removal. A day later it was reported that Kemal Coskun was removed to 
prevent a rift between the Turkish Cypriot politicai structures and the military organisation (die 
Turkish Fighters). 
89"The structure of goverament in the Turkish-Cypriot community should not be equated solely with 
the various legislative and executive organisations outlined above. In many cases, the de facto 
leadership at the level of the village and quarter, of the district, and of the community as a whole, 
was assumed by the Fighters. Therefore, the community's goverament structure was in fact a civil-
military synthesis." Patrick 1976. op. cit., p. 84. 
90This general argument (based on a sériés of interviews with Ozalp Sarica, op. cit.) is confîrmed by 
Denktash: "Everyone thought that I was the leader [of TMT - the Turkish (Cypriot) Fighters] but I 
was not. I was politicai advisor. Immediately after forming it I handed it over (to a former army 
officer from Turkey). It was a good mask because even the British and the American intelligence 
thought I was the man who ran and decided everything. I was not. Thomas C. 20/1/1978. "The 
Politics of resistance that divided Greek from Türk", The Times, quoted by McDonald, 1989. op. 
cit., note 14, p.82. Tliis point was also made by Patrick (1976. op. cit., p.159) in 1976, who said 
that the senior Turkish military figure on the island was referred to as the "pasha". 
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was the roots of separate Turkish-Cypriot governance. This was done in response to 
the changes in the stance of the (Greek Cypriot) Government, to strengthen the 
Turkish-Cypriots' de facto and de jure position, in préparation for renewed inter-
communal talks on the future of Cyprus. However as previously noted, this initially 
soured relations further and caused the (brief) reinstatement of economic sanctions 
by the Makarios Government. The reorganisation of the Turkish-Cypriot 
administrative structure also reflected acknowledged inefficiencies in the 
administration of the community's affairs through the most difficult period in its 
history. 
The Basic Law of the "Provisionai Administration" stated that until the provisions 
of the 1960 constitution were implemented, ail Turkish-Cypriots living in areas 
under the control of Turkish-Cypriots were to be administered by the "Provisionai 
Administration". The Basic Law also provided for the establishment of a 
"Legislative Assembly", made up of the Turkish-Cypriot members of the House of 
Représentatives and the Communal Chamber, to enact the necessary législation to 
administer the Turkish areas. Section 7, of the Basic Law, provided that the 
executive function would be enacted by an "Executive Council". The first general 
élection in July 1970, elected 30 members to the Assembly (15 members of the 
House of Représentatives and 15 members of the Turkish Communal Chamber), 
shadowing élections in the Republic. Following a décision by the "Executive 
Council" on 5 July 1971, the "Legislative Assembly" of the "Provisionai Turkish 
Cypriot Administration" elected to drop the "provisional" prefix from its title. 
Things carried on largely unchanged until after the "Peace Operation" in the 
summer of 1974, when the Legislative Assembly elected to change its name again, 
becoming the "Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot 
Administration". On 13 February 1975 the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" was 
proclaimed, which meant another name change: the "Executive Council" and the 
"Legislative Assembly" of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus". On the 18 
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February 1975 the latter bodies set up a "Constituent Assembly", to draw up the 
"Constitution" of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus"; this was approved by 
referendum on the 8 June 1975 and published in the Officiai Gazette 17 June 
1975.91 
The new "constitution" institutionalised planning early after its nominal 
establishment in 1975. The transition to planned economic development was far 
from immediate, due to the organisational problems involved in the immediate 
aftermath of large-scale Turkish military intervention. Planning was, however, both 
easier and more politically urgent than during the enclave era (1964-74), when the 
spatially separate enclaves suffered from serious communication constraints. The 
initial problems surrounding Statistical gathering and "state" planning after de facto 
partition, was due to the continued movement of people. Turkish-Cypriot sources 
claim92 "half of the population of the Turkish Federated State of Northern Cyprus 
had to be re-settled in the northern part [of the island from the south], and the 
frequent movements of people rendered difficult the compilation of the required 
Statistical data." Hence a "transitional programme" was prepared and implemented, 
based on estimâtes. All data prior to 1977 is based on these estimâtes which were 
compiled and backdated. Only after 1977 did systematic civilian Statistical gathering 
get underway in earnest. Before 1977, more immediate and pressing priorities were 
on the minds of administrators. Décision making at the time (1974-77) was probably 
dominated by military and strategie objectives, securing ethnie homogeneity behind 
the newly established UN Buffer Zone. Turkish, rather than Turkish-Cypriot 
planners, dominated the initial phase of expansion of the Turkish-Cypriot economy. 
Turkish economic policy has continued to play a key role in the economic policies 
adopted by the "authorities " in the north, though the level to which the economy 
91Rustem 1987. op. cit., p.20-21. 
92"Turkish Federated State of Kibris", February 1979, Extracts From tlie First Five Year 
Development Plan (1978-82). , "State" Planning Organisation, north Nicosia, p.2. 
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remained a highly controlied, war economy is yet to be fully explored (see next 
chapter). 
Until 1976, however, the essential organisational structure of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community did not change much. Executive power lay with the local military 
Commanders and the "Executive Committee" (and subsequently, with the 
"Executive Council of the Provisionai Administration"). The military command 
dérivés from three separate forces: the Local Defence Force (previously the Turkish 
Fighters), headed by a Turkish Major General, the Turkish Contingent provided for 
under the Zurich and London agreements, commanded by a Turkish Colonel, and 
since 1974 the "Peace Force" headed by a Turkish General. Ultimately the power 
hierarchy works in reverse order with, since 1974, the "Peace Force" acting as the 
command centre. Before 1974 the Turkish military contingent, with its Nicosia 
command, represented the ultimate source of executive authority93. 
A limited reorganisation of the administration began immediately after the "Peace 
Operation". As Turkish-Cypriots, with Turkish military assistance, gained control 
of a more extensive area of Cyprus, new mayors were appointed in 1974 by the 
"Provisionai Administration" for newly acquired areas under their control. The 
élections in 1976 filled local and regional administrative positions. Except for the 
police force in northern Cyprus (which still remains, for strategie reasons, directly 
under Turkish military command94), démocratie and accountable institutions took 
over much of the functions formally assumed by military structures. 
93The Turkish Cypriot weekly Zafer admitted that Colonel Cemal Coskun (known as "Bozkurt" or 
"Grey W o l f ) the Turkish Military Attaché, was "the commander of the Turkish Cypriot Fighters", 
also alleging that he was "the real leader of the Turkish Cypriot community", reported in the Cyprus 
Mail 25/2/1967. Patrick (1976. op. cit., p. 86) has generally confirmed tliis, adding that: "This 
commander was attached to the Turkish embassy, but the relationship between him and the 
ambassador was unclear; most certainly it could not be assumed that Bozkurt was subordinate to the 
ambassador. " 
94Although under Turkish military command, accountability at an individuai level (meaningful in a 
small scale society), is ensured by recruiting the police force in northern Cyprus locally. 
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The first five-year pian, published in 1979, set out economic policy objectives. 
Planning was central to the création and maintenance of a separate Turkish-Cypriot 
economy and was to be "imperative for the public sector and indicative for the 
private sector"95, the objective being an "open" and "competitive" economy. As the 
private sector played a very limited role during the period of the implementation of 
the First Five-Year Development plan, so imperative planning for the public sector 
meant imperative planning for almost the whole economy. To assist planners, input 
/ output tables were created. 
In democratic politicai terms, the right has dominated the Turkish-Cypriot 
community since the création of a national identity. The National Unity Party, 
(NUP) was founded by the Iong-term leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community and 
"président" of the self proclaimed republic, Rauf Denktash. Most subséquent 
changes in the identity of a Turkish-Cypriot politicai entity in Cyprus, owe their 
origin to his, and the NUP's, leadership. By his admission Denktash stands for self-
determination, regional and ethnie ségrégation and will not compromise the security 
guarantee of a strong and prevalent Turkish military presence in northern Cyprus96. 
For the purpose of more long-term security, the party advocates further integration 
with Turkey. The main focus of opposition has been Turkish-Cypriots who feel that 
northern Cyprus is being swamped by Turkish immigrants, an integral feature of 
post '74 developments, undermining their unique cultural identity and which they 
fought Greek-Cypriots to preserve. 
95"Turkish Federated State of Kibris", February 1979, Extracts From tlie First Five Year 
Development Plan (1978-82). "State" Planning Organisation, north Nicosia, p.2. 
96 Interview with Rauf Denktash, in his office, 28/7/95. 
Conclusion 
With the conclusion of the events of 1974, and the population transfers of 1975, 
Turkish-Cypriot policy makers would seem to have been successful beyond their 
wildest dreams. After some 11 years of hardship and intimidation, they had secured 
a fully separate and autonomous (at least from the Greeks) area in which to 
administer their own affairs. The area they had secured was not only some of the 
most productive and developed parts of the island, but also proportionally almost 
exactly twice their share of the island. After occupying some 2 to 3 % of the island 
during the enclaved period, after the summer of 1974, the 18% Turkish-Cypriot 
minority occupied 37% of the island; ali this behind the seemingly secure and 
unqualified security guarantee that had seemed so near, and yet so far, for so long. 
How would ali this good fortune, this politicai success be Consolidated? In the next 
chapter, the economie developments behind the new, far extended, and 
uninterrupted UN Buffer Zone will be examined. How was the transition from a 
war-torn, military dominated and ethnically cleansed région to a seemingly locally 
run and re-settled economy administered, particularly in the absence of secure 
property rights and international récognition? 
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CHAPTER 4. The construction of a Turkish-Cypriot economy in the 
north. 
Introduction 
This chapter looks at the institutional developments that have helped to create a 
functioning economy for Turkish-Cypriots north of the UN Buffer Zone. The 
economy had to work within the, arguably, powerful constraint of a lack of 
international récognition. Statistical data reveals the rôle and inter-play of domestic 
and international politics on its direction. Wliat is also apparent from available 
statistics, is the rôle of changing macro-economic paradigms; the conséquences of 
selecting public and private sector development on a small transitional economy. 
Regardless of the limited availability and quality of data, an interesting story begins 
to unfold, in some ways mirroring developments elsewhere, beginning with a 
modem, politicised Gerschenkronian1 story of institutional innovation in lieu of 
modem free market activity. New and existing state and quasi-state institutions were 
created and adapted to provide, direct and concentrate resources in an attempi to 
build an autonomous economy in an area largely de-populated, as a conséquence of 
military activity. In the absence of indigenous entrepreneurs and know-how, a 
shortage of investment funds, limited manpower and the need to adjust to a new 
politicai reality, existing institutions relocated and adapted to provide the medium 
for development, whilst ensuring some continuity with the past. New public sector 
institutions were created to manage large abandoned assets. Public and quasi-public 
sector Substitutes evolved economic leadership rôles in response to short term 
expediency, though many seem to have become permanent key features on the 
economic landscape, despite a declared preference for private sector solutions by the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership. Increasingly the private sector was encouraged to take a 
greater rôle in the economic development of the north. After a brief hiatus however, 
1 Gerschenkron A. 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
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the private sector remained a marginai producer in the Turkish-Cypriot economy. 
Ali of this is worth studying in greater depth and yet mostly it has been ignored by 
researchers working on the C.ypriot economy. It is hoped that these preliminary 
enquiries will inspire more interest, triggering further research which may provide 
answers to some of the many questions raised here. By ignoring developments in the 
Turkish-Cypriot economy, research on the Cypriot economy is distorted, forcing it 
to conform with the never-never world of contemporary Cypriot politicai rhetoric. 
The economy in transition and the role of state enterprise 
In every sector of the economy, every area of economic activity, a public sector or 
quasi public sector organisation was created or adapted to reactivate and run things 
north of the UN Buffer Zone. Prior to 1974, the three main economic activities in 
the región were agriculture, mining and tourism, all overwhelmingly private sector 
industries. After Turkish military intervention in 1974, mining sector activity ceased 
with the exit of the Cyprus Mines Corporation2 and agriculture became dependent 
on four main state and quasi-state sector organisations, actively engaged at all levels 
of production. In November 1974 a new public sector company, the Cyprus Turkish 
Tourism Enterprises Ltd, was formed to manage the other key economic feature 
north of the UN Buffer Zone. State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) were created to 
run any remaining industry located in the north, after it was abandoned by its 
Greek-Cypriot management. Essentially, an extra market organisation with direct 
political links to the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, was adapted or established to 
manage and exploit assets located behind Turkish lines, following the August 1974 
cease-fire. 
2 The Cyprus Mines Corporation withdrew from Cyprus following Turkish military intervention and 
is now part of the Cyprus Amax Minerals Company, with assets in 1997 of US$6 Billion, (source: 
www.cyprusamax.com/about/historv.htm ). 
163 
Whilst the Turkish-Cypriot leadership have historically been pro-market, private 
sector advocates, the lack of sufficient and adequately developed human capital, a 
choice in the sources of development finance, the mainland Turkish predilection for 
planning and State Economic Enterprises and clear and secure property rights3, have 
forced their hand4. The north rapidly became one of Western Europe's most state 
controlled economies. Increasingly however, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership 
attempted to release whatever seemed sustainable to the private sector. Even in its 
early extremes5, the leadership could be said to have complied with the classical 
maxim of only allowing the state to provide what the market failed to provide 
efficiently. In the summer of 1974 the private sector had withdrawn from almost all 
economic activity in the north. Most Turkish-Cypriots had spent the previous ten 
years in fortified refugee camps and were neither experienced nor confident in the 
future of running assets north of the UN Buffer Zone. Where the market failed to 
provide, which, given the speed of necessary adjustment and the political context, 
was almost everywhere, the state and quasi-state moved in. In an economy which 
peaked in 1990 with a GNP of under $600 million (in 1990 US dollars) and a 
population estimated to be around one hundred and seventy five thousand6, there 
were at least ten major state companies, encompassing most major economic 
activity. For example the Cyprus Turkish Airlines Ltd. was one of only two airlines 
providing air transport and passenger services in northern Cyprus; Cyprus Turkish 
Industrial Enterprises Holding Co. Ltd., used mostly formerly Greek-Cypriot assets 
3 See Scott J. "Property Values; Ownership, Legitimacy and Land Markets in Northern Cyprus", in 
HannC.M. 1998. Property Relations: Renewing the Anthropological Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp 147-159. 
4 Wilson, R. 1992. Cyprus and the International Economy. Basingstoke: Macmillan, P. 122; Olgun, 
M.E. "Economic Overview", in Dodd C.H. (ed.) 1993. The Political. Social and Economic 
Development of Northern Cyprus. Huntingdon: Eothen Press, p. 272. 
5 "President" Denktash described the economy in the north, in the first four years following Turkish 
intervention, as having been centrally planned: Interview with Rauf Denktash, carried out in his 
office, 28/7/95. 
6 Morvaridi, B. "Demographic Change, Resettlement and Resource Use", in Dodd 1993. op. cit., p. 
219. 
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to manufacture textiles, plastics and foodstuffs; the Cyprus Turkish Maritime Co. 
Ltd. provided maritime transport, cargo and passenger services; while the Cyprus 
Turkish Petroleum Co. Ltd. was responsible for importing and distributing 
petroleum and petroleum producís; Cyprus Turkish Tobacco Industries Ltd. 
manufactured, distributed and exported tobáceo and tobáceo producís; while Cyprus 
Turkish Tourism Management Co. Lid. directly managed hôtels and tourisi 
development in northern Cyprus; Cypruvex Ltd. marketed and exported citrus and 
other agricultural producís; EFIK Ltd. provided banking and insurance services; Eti 
Ltd. was responsible for imporiing and disíribuíing essential foodstuffs; and 
T.A.S.E.L. Ltd. manufacíured alcoholic beverages7. This economic aciivity by the 
state is on top of what ihe Cyprus Turkish Co-operaiive Central Bank provided 
through its banking, commercial and industrial divisions and what the religious and 
cultural foundaíion, Evkaf, funds and manages. There is also the contribution of the 
independent co-operaiives in ihe spheres of banking, reíail and indusirial 
produciion. 
Due to its key role in reactivating the economy, agriculture will be dealt with in 
deplh in the following chapter. However, it is worth noting here thaï in the 
agricultural sector there was a significant overlap between the various state sector 
organisations which provided crédit and inputs and also bought and marketed the 
output: TÜK (Toprak Ürünleri Kurumu: - Agricultural Products Organisation), the 
State Production Farms8, Cypruvex, the Cyprus Turkish Co-operalive Ceniral Bank 
(CTCCB), local independent co-operatives, and the Ministry of Settlement and 
Rehabilitaiion. The CTCCB provided crédit to local independent co-operatives, who 
in turn made crédit available to their members. The CTCCB also had the monopoly 
7 Rustem, K. (ed.) 1987. North Cyprus Almanac. London: Rustem K. & Bro, pp.223-224. 
8Comes directly under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture and runs three to four chicken farms 
which produce for the poultry counter (eggs and meat). They also provide seeds to cereal producers 
and the équivalent to poultry producers (chicks imported from England). 
of supply, and/or marketing, in key areas of the economy (and not just agriculture). 
Until about 1986 the CTCCB's Agricultural Supplies División used to import seeds 
for producers, but after that the main marketing bodies took over supplying seeds to 
their producers. For example, TÜK functions as the Grain Commission used to; it 
provided (imported) cereal and potato seeds for producers, purchased the crop and 
(where appropriate, e.g. potatoes) exported the crop9. Cypruvex, another state 
company, was formed to market and manage the considerable citrus fruit industry 
located in the north, acting as a marketing board and much more. At the same time 
the Ministry of Settlement and Rehabilitation made land and grants available for 
start-up farmers in the north10. 
There is limited access and little publicly available data on the development, scale 
and performance of the state sector in northern Cyprus. A case study based on a 
series of interviews with the founder and former director of one such company is 
therefore instructive11. The interview material provides an insight, not only into the 
development of institutional innovations designed to alleviate strategic market 
inadequacies, but also, at a more general level, the role of the public sector, 
9Their method of payment appears to be standard, a practice followed by TÜK, State Production 
Farms, Cypruvex and the CTCCB: they pay the producers a fixed price on or soon after delivery of 
the crop, after the déductions of credit (in kind or cash, for seeds and inputs) have been made. Just 
prior to the designated settlement date for accounts (31 July for the CTCCB's Carob Division, 30 
September for grain) a premium is paid to the farmers on the basis of the respective P&L (reflecting, 
amongst other tliings, fluctuating domestic and world market prices). For certain crops such as 
potatoes and carobs there is usually a surplus, so a premium is regularly paid to the farmers, for 
other crops, such as cereals which can not be produced economically in northern Cyprus, a certain 
amount of pooling through the states monopoly buying capacity and budgetary transfers means that 
the state body simply pays a fixed price for the crop after delivery, and that price includes a price 
support subsidy, so no premium is paid on settlement of accounts. 
10 Grants were mostly in kind, eg. redistributing assets abandoned by Greek Cypriots, such as 
livestock, seeds, fertilizers, tractors etc., with distributed at the local level being done by Village Co-
opératives: Morvaridi, B. "Demographic Change, Resettlement and Resource Use", in Dodd 1993. 
op. cit., p. 224. 
11 This is an approach taken by other researchers working in northern Cyprus, see particularly 
Behrooz Morvaridi: "Demographic Change, Resettlement and Resource Use", "Agriculture and the 
Environment" and "Social Structure and Social Change", in Dodd 1993. op. cit., pp. 219-268. My 
interviews with Ozalp Sarica, were carried out in his office, at the EMU, on the 17/3/95, 21/3/95, 
24/3/95. 
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dominated by a nationalistic Turkish-Cypriot elite, in the establishment and 
management of a de facto separate economy concentrated in northern Cyprus. 
One of the first public sector companies to be created and a key development of the 
enclaved period (1964-74), was the establishment by the "State" Planning 
Organisation of an Import / Export company, Eti Ltd.12, with the principal objective 
of maximising economic co-operation between the Turkish-Cypriot community and 
Turkey13. A measure of its perceived significance can be gauged by the fact that the 
Director General of the "State" Planning Organisation, Ozalp Sarica, retired as a 
matter of public policy to head Eti in 1972. Although the company was set up by 
the public sector, from the outset it had aimed to attract private sector Ievels of 
control and efficiency by making shares available to the général public. Initially 
however, Eti was set up like a co-operative, with its traditional quasi public sector 
rôle in the Cypriot market place. Like earlier co-operative organisations, Eti was set 
up to provide a service not adequately provided by the private sector. 
The value of creating a company like Eti for the small regionally dispersed, 
enclaved Turkish-Cypriot community, was significant, particularly if it wished to 
remain autonomous. Two years after its création, during and after Turkish military 
intervention in 1974, Eti's rôle became central. The head of the company, Ozalp 
Sarica, was in Ankara during the first stage of the military opération, launched on 
20 July 197414. This first stage secured a beachhead effectively linking the Nicosia 
enclave, with its St Hilarion ramparts, and the sea. The head of Eti was summoned 
to the Foreign Ministry and requested to arrange and co-ordinate re-supplying the 
Turkish-Cypriot community, during and after military opérations. The first 
12The business activities of Eti Ltd. are described in the 1987 Ahnanac as being the import and 
distribution of essential foodstuffs. Rustem 1987. op. cit., p. 224. 
13 Interview with Ozalp Sarica, op. cit. 
l4As the head of Eti, Ozalp Sarica spent most of his first two years in Turkey, from 1972 to mid 
'74, establishing links between Turkish manufacturing interests and the Turkish Cypriot community. 
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shipment of 2000 tons of foodstuffs was arranged using two civilian ships, with 
transhipment to the shore around the Kyrenia beachhead, via military landing craft. 
Prior to the second stage of the Turkish military opération, which commenced on 14 
August 1974, this process was repeated 3 times; however, on the third occasion, 
just prior to the second stage, the landing crafts used the Kyrenia port area, which 
had been secured. Düring the military opérations of 1974, private Turkish cargo 
shipping was used to re-supply the Turkish-Cypriot population. The shipping 
companies charged unusually high rates reflecting the risks involved by operating in 
a war zone. By September, however, prevailing conditions were secure enough for 
the main port of Cyprus, Famagusta, to become operational again. As it was now 
behind Turkish lines, Famagusta harbour became accessible to Turkish approved 
traffic only. So Eti now used it for the regulär docking of commercial, 1000 ton 
cargo vessels, bringing in regulär shipments of goods via the port of Mersin in 
southern Turkey. 
After the war, however, external and internai constraints persisted, so the opérations 
of Eti were expanded, allowing it to trade in more markets, not just Turkey. In the 
immediate post "Peace Operation" phase, Eti began trading directly with the UK, 
purchasing medicines, spare parts and special food stuffs that were unavailable or 
difficult to obtain in Turkey. Some of the same ships travelling between the UK and 
Famagusta, in the following few winters, carried citrus fruit out after bringing in 
some of the more sophisticated essential supplies direct from the UK market. Trade 
was so significant that Eti set up a subsidiary in London specifically to manage 
citrus exports from northern Cyprus and specialised imports from the UK. 
1976 saw another significant expansion of Eti's opérations. In that year, it organised 
a direct trucking service from London to Famagusta via Mersin, purchasing two 30 
ton trucks to ply the route twice a month. In the same year Eti bought its own ship, 
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a 600 ton vessel, to operate between the port of Mersin and Famagusta. Originally it 
flew a Danish flag then it opted for lower costs associated with flying the 
Panamanian flag. Düring peak periods, even this vessel was employed to carry a 
cargo of citrus, this time to Trieste in Italy, particularly if the producís were 
destined for European desíinaíions oíher that íhe UK, such as Romania (which 
imporíed íhe lower qualiíy citrus producís of íhe noríhern Cyprioí ciírus groves). 
For a íime Eti's small ship also found ií profiíable io operaie beíween Triesíe, 
Famagusía and Haifa. The objecí however of the continued operaíion of Eíi, was io 
make sure noíhing was lacking in íhe noríhern Cyprioí markeí, raíher lhan finding 
new and profiíable areas of business ío exploií. Increasingly, oíher specialised síaíe 
and quasi-síaíe companies were formed lo manage specific areas of íhe economy, 
and íake íhe iniíiaíive in íheir respeclive areas of interest In íhe imporíaní citrus 
industry, Cypruvex was formed in 1975 as a governmení agency responsible for íhe 
markeíing of ciírus producís. After 1978 Eíi's 600 ion freighler and iís íwo írucks 
were handed over io a new public company, Cyprus Turkish Marilime Co. Lid., 
specifically crealed ío handle íhe unique Iransport requirements of íhe unrecognised 
"Turkish Federated State". 
Eti is overwhelmingly a public company. As Director General, Ozalp Sarica argued 
for a greater proportion of the company's shares ío be made available ío íhe public, 
wilh inceníives (such as making dividends non-iaxable) applied lo make íhose that 
were available more attractive. None of this was to happen, so the private sector's 
stake in Eti remained low, at around 25%. However, Ihis is siili a significaní 
personal success on íhe parí of the company's founder, Ozalp Sarica, who batlled 
against íhe insislence of (mainland) Turkish advisors, to al low some private sector 
involvement in Eti. His success proved to be unique, Eti remained the only public 
company permitted to open its ownership ío íhe privaíe sector, in the form of 
registered shares. 
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Eti still operateci out of Nicosia, Famagusta and Kyrenia (in 1995), fulfilling its 
basic objective of supplying the people of northern Cyprus with what the market 
fails to provide, and more generally as a wholesale purchaser and retail outlet for a 
diversity of products, from medicines to motorcars. It was founded as a Substitute 
for market enterprise in a period of market failure. The failure to open more of its 
opération to the market is perhaps a conséquence of the perceived likely failure of 
the market to move into more of its area of opérations. Seemingly the concerns of 
the Turkish advisors were similar to previous Turkish-Cypriot préoccupations; 
strategie security interests. However, the création and development of Eti is another 
example of short run expediency, carried through into the long run. As a public 
sector Substitute for free market activity, the role of Eti was criticai at certain points 
in Turkish-Cypriot economic history, particularly during the transition to the 
establishment of a de facto Turkish-Cypriot economy in the north. Whether a public 
sector trading company such as Eti was entirely necessary in the 1990s and whether 
the public sector should have retained such a level of control, in terms of shares, is 
open to debate. However, in its centrai role in supporting and maintaining a 
Turkish-Cypriot economy in the north and in its disbursement of activities, Eti has 
directly and indirectly spawned much state sector activity. Much of this activity has 
continued to play a leading role, well after the conditions which justified its 
existence have diminished or disappeared. 
170 
The rôle of Turkish-Cypriot co-operative institutions15 
Agricultural development16 or utilisation was criticai to the economic and politicai 
success, and even survival of a Turkish-Cypriot (as opposed to a Turkish) entity 
north of the UN Buffer Zone. In the absence of sufficient labour, private investment 
funds, clear and secure property rights, co-operative institutions in general and the 
Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central Bank (the CTCCB) in particular, played a 
criticai role in the re-development of agriculture in the north. The role of the 
CTCCB, and the scale of its opérations, can partly be gauged by the fact that in 
1993 the CTCCB employed 436 permanent and 283 temporary staff17. In the same 
year independent co-operatives, including the Dept. of Co-operative Development, 
employed a total 515 full time staff18. Altogether, employment in co-operative 
l5The material in this section is based on a series of interviews witli senior members of the Turkish 
Cypriot Co-operative movement, both at die level of the Co-operative Central Bank and the 
Independent Co-operatives. The writer alone is responsible for any erroneous assumptions and 
conclusions drawn from making connections between diverse interview material and data. Interviews 
began with Mr Suleyman Kiryagdi, General Co-ordinator & Acting Secretary and General Manager 
of the Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central Bank, carried out on the 20-21//4/95 in his office; and 
Mr Gulhan Alp, Chief Accountant at the CTCCB, carried out on the 21/4/95, 02/5/95, 09/6/95, 
28/7/95, 8/8/95 and 11/8/95 in his office. They were followed by a series of interviews with Mr 
Cafer Arseven, the Chief Registrar at the Department of Co-operative Development, the Prime 
Ministry, which took place on the 3/8/95, 8/8/95 10/8/95 & 16/8/95 in his office; and with Mr 
Ertugrul Uzun, the Chief Auditor, at the Department of Co-operative Development, the Prime 
Ministry, on the 3/8/95 & 18/8/95 in his and the Chief Registrar's office. There followed a series of 
interviews and tours of independent co-operatives: Beginning with an interview with Mrs Emel 
Uzun, the Manager of the Government Employees Savings Bank, Nicosia, (established in 1958) 
between 12.00 & 2.00 p.m., 8/8/95 in her office. This was followed by an interview with Mr Ergün 
Sever, the Secretary of the Famagusta Turkish Co-operative Bank (founded in 1944), between 10.00 
& ll.OOam, on 10/8/95, in the Chief Auditor's office and in the presence of Mr Uzun. Followed 
again by an interview with Mrs Sadiye Onculay, Manager, The (Elementary School) Teachers Co-
operative Savings Bank, Nicosia, in her office between 10.30am - 12.00pm, 16/8/95 and a guided 
tour of PAYAK Ltd., Multi-Purpose Co-operative, Nicosia, with Chief Registrar, Mr Cafer 
Arseven, between 12.15 & 1.15pm, 16/8/95. This in turn was followed by an interview and a tour of 
the plant with Mehmet Vechi, the Manager of the Karpas Co-operative Tobacco Sales Co. Ltd, Yeni 
Erenkoy (Yialousa, established in 1964), between 10.30am and 1.30pm 29/8/95, & between 2.00pm 
and 4.00pm, 12/9/95. 
16 As mentioned earlier, due to its central role, in the economic development of a Turkish Cypriot 
economy in northera Cyprus, agriculture will be dealt with in depth in die following chapter. 
17 Interview with Mr Gulhan Alp, op. cit. 
18 Interview with Mr Cafer Arseven, op. cit. 
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institutions in northern Cyprus amounted to 9% of total employment in 199319. In 
1998, the CTCCB alone was the second largest employer in northern Cyprus, 
second only to the government20. 
Since the 1940s, every village in Cyprus had at least 1 co-operative society. Every 
member of a village who worked in the village and who was over eighteen, was a 
member of the village co-operative; this is still largely the case in northern Cyprus, 
despite the upheavals of the recent past. Until 1959, the Turkish-Cypriot co-
operative movement shared the same history as Greek-Cypriot co-operation; until 
then the co-operative movement in Cyprus was bi-communal. Co-operation was also 
the pervasive organisational structure in the indigenous Cypriot economy at the 
time. Much of its original inspiration lay in the British administration of the island. 
However, on 9 September 1959, under the Zurich agreement, the departing British 
Colonial Administration separated the Greek and Turkish Co-operative Central 
Banks and independent co-operatives from their single, bi-communal organisations. 
Like religion and éducation, these key economic institutions were to come under the 
authority of the separate communal chambers which the departing British 
Administration had set up. Turkish-Cypriot village co-operatives came under the 
authority of the Turkish-Cypriot Communal Chamber, just as the Greek ones came 
under the control of their own Communal Chamber (until it was dissolved following 
the 1963 constitutional crisis). Co-operatives in mixed villages were generally 
separated on communal grounds, with the British issuing financial sweeteners to 
ease the transition. 
19 "Turkisli Republic of Northern Cyprus", 1994. Statistical Yearbooks 1993. northern Nicosia: 
"State" Planning Organisation, Prime Ministry, p. 133. 
20 http://www.coopcb.com, Sept. 1998. 
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Of the Co-operative Central Banks, both the Greek and Turkish subsequently 
provided long term credit and development loans through their locai Credit 
Societies, present in almost every village. The Development Fund provided finance 
to both Co-operative Organisations. After December 1963, cut off largely from the 
Republic's Central Bank, the Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central Bank (CTCCB) 
received long term credit facilities from Turkey, both from the public and the 
private sector. Isbank21 provided the private sector support backed by aid from the 
Turkish Central Bank. 
Following the events of December 1963, many locai independent co-operative 
societies ceased to function (becoming inactive - see Table 4.1). Düring and 
immediately after the communal fighting, 90 villages had been displaced. In them 
were 56 credit societies, 15 consumer co-operatives, and 2 multi-purpose co-
opératives, a total of 73 independent co-operatives which became immediately 
inactive. By 1965, continued sporadic violence and unbroken economic sanctions 
meant that a total of 81 independent co-operatives were inactive: 61 credit Societies, 
16 consumer societies and 4 multi-purpose societies22. Düring the years that 
followed, particularly the difficult years of embargo and the flaring up of periodic 
communal violence, further displacement and economic difficulties caused other co-
operatives to cease opérations. It must be noted, however, that the real blow to 
Turkish-Cypriot co-operatives, as to their economy generally, occurred during and 
immediately after the fighting of December 1963. Things only gradually began to 
improve for independent co-operatives after 1970. Some new societies were created 
and the first moves were made to rationalise the provision of independent co-
operatives by replacing or merging poorly performing, specialised, co-operatives 
21Tliis was only partly a private sector organisation the state owned a sizeable share holding 
(minority holding) but the major share holding was held by the Turkish Republican Party. Interview 
with Suleyman Kiryagdi, op. cit. 
22 Interview with Mr Cafer Arseven, op. cit. 
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with multipurpose co-operatives, a form that particularly suited the economic 
situation of the enclaved, dispersed and spatially segregated Turkish-Cypriot 
community between 1964-74. 
After 1959 and even 1963, there remained some bi-communal local and particularly 
crop and production related co-operatives. Partly because of the population structure 
and local communal divisions of labour, inter-communal co-operation continued in 
areas spared the worst violence, being a necessary element of some local 
économies. Again (arguably) reflecting the population structure, the controlling 
share of bi-communal co-operatives was usually Greek Cypriot, meaning that they 
would exclus ively use the Greek-Cypriot Co-operative Central Bank's clearing 
facilities. Until 1974 Greek and Turkish-Cypriots shared such key sub-sectoral co-
operatives as: Wine, Tobacco and Carob (ail of which were the leading Cypriot 
producers), ail were controlled by Greek-Cypriots. From 1963 to '74 there was 
some collaboration between separate independent local Greek and Turkish-Cypriot 
co-operatives in the purchasing of imports, such as fertilisers (to benefit from bulk 
purchasing discounts) and between the CTCCB and Greek-Cypriot controlled 
parastatals. This was to end with the massive upheavals of the summer of 1974. 
With the ethnie ségrégation that followed, some of the Turkish-Cypriot refugees 
from 1974 (well over half the Turkish-Cypriot population) brought their co-
operatives with them (for example the Turkish-Cypriot Limassol Co-operative Bank 
still exists and is now a thriving Kyrenia based bank), some created new ones and 
others joined existing Turkish-Cypriot co-operatives located in the north. 
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Table 4 .1 The number and status of Turkish-Cypriot independent co-operatives 
21/12/63 15/12/65 31/08/73 late 1974 31/12/87 3/8/95 
Credit 
Societies 
Active 173 114 130 140 87 88 
Non-active 61 47 
Consumer 
Societies 
Active 97 81 58 58 31 15 
Non-active 16 41 
Savings 
Banks 




Active 29 23 18 18 101 85 









236 242 212 
Noie: data afler 1973 is for active co-operatives only. 
Source: Interview with Mr Cafer Arseven, Chief RcgUtrar at the Department of Co-operative Development, Uic Prime Ministry, 3/8/95, 8/8/95 10/8/95 & 16/8/95. 
Local independent Turkish-Cypriot co-operatives suffered particularly during the 
1964-68 period. Some co-operatives were dissolved, others lay dormant only to be 
revived after 1974, and particularly after 1976 which was a period of rapid change 
and growth in co-operation in northern Cyprus when the new Turkish-Cypriot 
Department of Agriculture began to décentralise the organisation of the agricultural 
economy. In 1973 there were 337 independent individual Turkish-Cypriot co-
operatives, of which only 226 were still active. By late 1974 the total number had 
been reduced to simply 236 active independent co-operatives. After the 
rationalisation which began in 1976, the total number of independent co-operatives 
increased slightly, while the composition changed dramatically. In 1973 7% of 
active co-operatives were multipurpose co-operatives; after the rationalisation begun 
in 1976, that had risen to 41%. So the co-operatives that arose from the economic 
chaos of the i960's, mostly after 1976, were différent from the ones that had ceased 
operating. The new societies would no longer merely provide rural crédit or retail 
services, but a range of services and products which included encouraging and even 
specialising in development financing, with indirect and even direct involvement in 
other industrial sectors (though usually sectors with strong backward and forward 
linkages with agriculture). 
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A few new co-operatives were formed in 1974, while many existing co-operatives 
were merged or dissolved as members of various dormant co-operatives, from 
villages that no longer had a Turkish-Cypriot population, were dispersed and re-
settled north of the UN Buffer Zone. Until 1976, when the Turkish-Cypriot co-
operative movement experienced its major re-organisation, co-operatives that were 
active in 1973 remained in business north of the UN Buffer Zone, while inactive co-
operatives largely remained so also. By 1976 it was considered that there were too 
many of the wrong sort of co-operatives, many of which were no longer 
functioning. Many members of formerly southern located co-operatives were 
dispersed throughout the north or had migrated, so this period of rationalisation was 
necessary. The trend towards the expansion of multi-purpose co-operatives, a trend 
that was begun before 1974, was put into opération, as multi-purpose co-operatives 
performed a criticai function of distributing agricultural and subsistence 
prerequisites in the now sparsely populated north. The number of Credit Societies 
and Consumer Societies was cut dramatically (see Table 4.1), the number of 
Savings Banks remained faìrly static, while the number of multi-purpose co-
operatives increased more than four-fold. 83 new co-operatives were created to 
replace co-operatives formerly located in the Paphos, Limassol and Larnaca régions. 
These new co-operatives were ali multi-purpose co-operatives, created to rationalise 
provision so that Turkish settlers and Turkish-Cypriots in abandoned Greek-Cypriot 
villages would have only one co-operative, but one that offered a full range of 
services, from agricultural credit to retail services. Multi-purpose co-operatives 
were seen as the new panacea, providing vital services to the many recently 
abandoned villages of north Cyprus. Villages in the north that had always been 
Turkish Cypriot, generally retained their existing co-operatives and if they were 
functioning successfully, a plurality of them was permitted to continue operating. 
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In some senses the functioning of Turkish-Cypriot co-operatives in the north, 
particularly the agricultural co-operatives, has conformed more with the concept of 
pseudo co-operation, fulfilling quasi-state functions, rather than with concepts of 
locai, independent co-operation. The Ministry of Resettlement re-distributed food, 
agricultural inputs and machinery through locai co-operatives societies23. The 
CTCCB gave credit to locai Credit and Multi-purpose Societies and they in turn 
passed it on to their members. This formed 90% of ali credit issued by independent 
Credit Societies, who had formerly issued credit from their own reserves, (hence 
their independence). Much of this agricultural credit came originally from the state 
Central Bank, in the form of subsidised credit for agricultural purposes. Thus the 
CTCCB and other agencies re-cycled assets and public funds through locai 
independent co-operatives as part of government economic policy. At a pragmatic 
level, it is more expensive for individuai co-operatives to act alone (importing etc.). 
Because of the special rates it can demand (due to bulk purchasing) the CTCCB has 
supplied many of the products dispensed by the locai co-operatives. This is 
particularly with regard to agricultural imports, for which the CTCCB has remained 
the key supplier. However, a few locai independent co-operatives, such as PEYAK 
Ltd (a large urban multi-purpose co-operative), have, through their large retail 
sector, directly imported many goods themselves (mostly from Turkey). 
Most Turkish-Cypriots have remained members of co-operatives, especially lower 
income groups and, automatically, government employees (which, together, covers 
almost every Turkish-Cypriot in northern Cyprus). Personal lending cornes from 
local co-operatives' own resources, but this is almost exclusively an urban and a 
Turkish-Cypriot - rather than Turkish - phenomenon. The credit from Savings 
Banks (also a mostly urban form of co-operative) is only in the form of personal 
23 Morvaridi, B. "Demographic Change, Resettlement and Resource Use", in Dodd 1993. op. cit., 
p. 224. 
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loans. Savings Banks do have access to CTCCB funds but mostly provide their 
loans from their own reserves. If they have their own reserves, personal loans are 
approved by the local committee, but if they need access to CTCCB funds, credit 
needs to be approved by the CTCCB Board of Directors. 
There has reportedly been equal access to the credit facilities of local co-operatives 
though, when it cornes to personal loans, there has been a distinct urban bias in 
terms of the resources and the co-operative's main function. Access to credit 
facilities are also strictly controlied and highly centralised. Any credit deriving from 
the CTCCB has to be approved by the elected Board of Directors. Any credit 
provided by an independent co-operative, from its own reserves and over a certain 
limit, has had to be approved by the office of the Registrar of Co-operative 
Societies, in the Prime Ministry. That independent credit limit has always been 
relatively low. In 1994, the largest single individuai credit that an independent co-
operative society could make from its own reserves, before referring it to the 
Registrar for approvai, was 4 million Turkish Lira (approx. US $114). The 
Registrar of Co-operative Societies also has other far reaching powers, being 
theoretically free to discharge the elected council of the CTCCB, and appoint a new 
one, if it is believed that the CTCCB is not carrying out its duties efficiently. 
Originally designed to facilitate the provision of agricultural credit, the functions of 
the CTCCB widened considerably after 1974. With its increased scope, the power 
of the CTCCB within the co-operative movement in northern Cyprus and the 
economy generally, has increased considerably. For a time it was the main importer 
of food, groceries and construction materials, working alongside Eti through two of 
its commercial divisions and maintaining over a 60% gross share24. From around 
1983, after the immediate disruptions which followed war and de facto division had 
24 Interview with Mr Gulhan Alp, op. cit. 
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been overcome to the extent that northern Cyprus declared itself independent, that 
share of strategie commodities and materials gradually fell to below 30%, though 
the CTCCB remained the sole importer of key agricultural inputs, such as fertilisers 
and fodder composites. 
Whilst it may have contracted in the depth of its opérations, the CTCCB has not 
done likewise in terms of breadth. The organisation continued to expand the scope 
of its economic opérations in the north, a sign of its relative economic strength, or 
the continued weakness of alternatives. The main aim of the Co-operative Central 
Bank and independent co-operatives generally, was to provide liquidity to their 
members. All subséquent diversifications, such as the CTCCB into the Dairy 
Products and Animal Fodder industries, allegedly followed these objectives; 
however, the role of the co-operative movement is generally pereeived as more 
strategie than that. Both the dominance of agriculture in the economy of the north 
and the unique problems facing the région after Turkish military intervention in 
1974, have led to those requirements being interpreted fairly liberally. Underlining 
its dominant role in the economy of the north, there are currently 17 divisions of the 
Co-operative Central Bank, 11 of which are in non-banking activities. All divisions 
are directly under the authority and management of the Co-operative Central Bank 
head quarters in Nicosia. A key aim of the CTCCB appears to be maintaining 
industries that have a key supply or employment role in the "TRNC", particularly 
those with direct and strategie links with agriculture. However, the continued 
presence of such a large, centralised co-operative organisation in such a small 
economy, appears to be another example of how short term expediency has been 
carried into the long term. 
Of the 6 Banking divisions in 1995, 5 are domestic branches and they all stem from 
the Nicosia Banking Division which was established in 1959. Guzelyurt (Morphou) 
and Iskele (Trikomo) are both relocated branches from Paphos and Larnaca 
179 
respectively. The Famagusta branch was estabiished in 1972 and established a 
University (EMU25) sub branch in 1988. The Girne (Kyrenia) branch was 
established in 1980. In 1978 a separate Foreign Banking Division was set up; 
formerly foreign services (letters of credit for the Industriai and Commercial 
Divisions etc.) were provided by the Nicosia Branch. In 1962 the CTCCB set up an 
insurance agency which was established as an agent of the Seker Insurance Co. of 
Istanbul. 
The opérations of the 11 non-banking divisions have been subdivided into 
commercial and industriai divisions, both directly managed by the CTCCB in 
Nicosia. Of the commercial division the oldest is the Nicosia Cold Stores, 
Foodstuffs & Supplies Department, which was established in 1960, just after the 
séparation of the co-operative movement by ethnicity. Before 1974 the Nicosia Cold 
Stores, Foodstuffs & Supplies Department had stores in Limassol and Famagusta. 
After the move north, the Limassol stores were replaced by stores in Karaoglanoglu 
(Ayios Yeorgios, near Kyrenia). This gave the CTCCB stores in the main urban 
centres, the two seaports and the airport in the north. The main function of this 
division of the CTCCB has been to import groceries and other products but 
especially vital products: Sugar, Grain, Salt. Eti and the Supplies Department of the 
CTCCB have been the only importers of sugar and grain (for the recent26 
proportions imported by the latter, see Table 4.2 below). As one of these state or 
quasi-state importerà proportion has dropped, the other's has increased27. Whilst 
sugar was still officially a restricted trade even in 1995, grain was de-restricted in 
1990. Despite the nominai existence of a free market, the import and distribution of 
grain was essentially still controlled by Eti and the CTCCB who, alone with the 
state Grain Commission, controlied the entire grain supply of northern Cyprus in 
25Eastern Mediterranean University, Famagusta. 
26 Earlier data was unavailable, (interview with Mr Cafer Arseven, op. cit.). 
27 Interview with Mr Gulhan Alp, op. cit. 
180 
1995. The existence of the Cold Stores, Foodstuffs & Supplies Department of the 
CTCCB makes the purely economic justification for the foundation of Eti less 
secure. 
Table 4.2 Percentage oftwo vital basic foods imported by the Cyprus Turkish 
Co-operative Central Bank 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Sugar 62% - 24% 46% 30% 
Grain 18% 11% 14% 45% -
Source: Series of interviews with Gulhan Alp, Chief Accountant at tlie CTCCB, 21/4/95 - 11/8/95. 
The Nicosia Cold Stores, Foodstuffs & Supplies Department began as the solé 
CTCCB supply department. In 1974 it was referred to as the "Trading and 
Wholesale Supply" Dept.28. The first structural re-organisation occurred in 1978 
when the Building Materials and Agricultural Requisites divisions were hived off. In 
1985 Famagusta Cold Stores, Foodstuffs and Supplies became a separately managed 
división of the CTCCB. The Famagusta Cold Stores, Foodstuffs and Supplies Dept. 
has the same function as in Nicosia, only it buys from the Nicosia división (rather 
than from abroad) and distributes them to its clients in the región. The Famagusta 
división is also the main regional agent of the Dairy Products Industry, another 
división of the Co-operative Central Bank (the CTCCB) and the main supplier of 
dairy producís in northern Cyprus. The Famagusta Cold Stores, Foodstuffs and 
Supplies Dept. acts effectively as a wholesale distribution agent for the Dairy 
Products Industry, for which it receives a commission. 
The Building Materials Marketing Department is based in Nicosia, with stores in 
Famagusta and Guzelyurt (Morphou); its key imports are: cement (from Turkey), 
wood (from Sweden), iron, motor pumps (for irrigation) and galvanised tubing. Eti 
and (more recently) private companies also import these producís. Because many of 
these producís were perceived sírategic and therefore proscribed by the (Greek 
28 See CTCCB Amiual Report for 1974, p. 12. 
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Cypriot) Government in the 1960s, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership has had a 
traditional interest in their procurement and distribution. 
Table 4.3 Proportion of construction steel imported, profit and loss and the no. 
of employees ofthe Building Materials Marketing Dept. ofthe Cyprus Turkish 
Co-operative Central Bank29 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Market share in con. iron % 10% - 13% 17% 11% 
Net P&L in current US$ -$86,935 -$387,555 -$366,934 -$463,005 -$710,363 
Number of employees 18 19 18 17 18 
Source: Series of interviews with Gulhan Alp, Chief Accountant at the CTCCB, 21/4/95 - 1112195. 
The Agricultural Requisites & Supplies, Machinery & L.P. Gas Filling Station 
Division was formerly another part of the original supply department. The three 
main agricultural supplies co-ordinated and purchased by this division of the 
CTCCB are: fertilisers (for which it remained the sole importer), seeds and 
agricultural machinery. This division also manages a liquid petroleum (LP) gas 
station (KOOPGAS) in Gonyeli, 5 miles Northwest of Nicosia. (LP gas is the main 
cooking and heating fuel in northern Cyprus.) There is also now a private LP gas 
supplier in northern Cyprus (Agap) and together they supply the total LP gas 
requirements of the north30. 
The CTCCB established a shipping agency, Denko, in 1976 in Famagusta to help 
with the customs and shipping requirements of the industriai and commercial units 
of the CTCCB, the independent co-operatives and the economy of the "TRNC" 
more generally. This was done in view the north's lack of recognition and the 
strength and hostility of Greek interests in the international shipping industry. 
29When the facilities, profit and loss and particularly the number of employees of the CTCCB are 
read in the abstract, their significance is easily lost. It is worth constantly being reminded of the size 
of northern Cyprus. With a population below two hundred thousand, GNP peaked in 1990 at under 
$600 million (in 1990 US dollars). Again, earlier data was unavailable (interview with Mr Cafer 
Arseven, op. cit.). 
Until 1990, wholesale LP gas supplies came from the south, supplied by Mobil in a complicated 
routine which involved changing drivers and number plates before proceeding through the Ledra 
Palace, UN check-point. Since then supply facilities bave been constructed on the Karpas Peninsula. 
Liquid Petroleum is imported from Turkey and delivered via the Karpas, to one of the two filling 
stations mentioned above to be bottled. 
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However, at the same time Eti off-loaded its transport equipment and 
responsibilities to the newly founded public concern: Cyprus Turkish Maritime 
Company Ltd. So the création of Denko is another example of the overlapping 
functions of state and quasi-state sector organisations in what is a tiny economy. 
The Industriai Divisions of the Co-operative Central Bank are like Britain's old 
nationalised industries; an amalgam of poorly performing, formerly failed private 
businesses (in the case of the independent co-operatives taken over by the CTCCB). 
The Dairy Products Industry (Division) was established in 1958 as an independent 
co-operative, "Dairy Products Co-op Ltd", but because of financial problems it was 
absorbed by the CTCCB in 1969, after which its activities were enlarged from 
pasteurised milk and Hellim (Cypriot - Halloumi) cheese production, to UHT milk 
in 1970. In 1985, there was a further diversification into orange and grapefruit juice 
production. 
Table 4.4 Cyprus Turkish Co-operative 






Note: northern Cyprus is self-sufficient in cows milk, so 
what the CTCCB produces also represents market share. 
Source: Sériés of interviews with Gulhan Alp, Chief Accountant at the CTCCB, 
21/4/95- 11/8/95. 
Overall the Dairy Products Industry produces around 70% of the local dairy 
requirements of yoghurt, cheese and milk and has provided considérable exports, 
mostly to the Middle East. Due to transport problems, and consequently compétition 
from other producers (particularly the Republic of Cyprus), these markets are said 
to have declined, as goods have been theoretically required to go through Turkey, 
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increasing costs31. This is perhaps reflected in the considerable Iosses reported by 
the division throughout the 1980's (see Table 4.4 below). 
Table 4.5 Dairy Products Ind. (Division ofthe Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central 
Bank), profit & loss &. no. of employees, 1984-93 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Net P&L in ths US$ - $ 8 0 - $ 3 0 - $ 3 6 0 - $ 1 9 0 - $ 4 0 - $ 6 0 $ 1 4 0 $ 1 1 0 $ 1 4 0 - $ 2 0 
Employees* 1 1 5 1 0 1 9 9 4 5 3 5 9 2 9 5 9 3 1 0 4 1 0 5 
»Employment ßgures include lemporary staff. 
Source: Series of Interviews witli Gulhan Alp, Chief Accountant at the CTCCB, 21/4/95 - 11/8/95. 
For most of the 1980s, there had also been substantial exports to London, mostly 
through the (CTCCB1 s) KOPEX subsidiary. Like Eti, the CTCCB had set up a 
wholly owned subsidiary in its main overseas market. KOPEX's speciality was 
imported Hellim (Halloumi) cheese for the London Cypriot market, but it also 
marketed other products such as Sun Flower Oil. KOPEX set up as a UK registered, 
limited liability company in 1983. It ceased Operations however in 1989 because of 
mounting debts (see Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6 Kopeks Ltd., final net 
P &L in thousands of current US$ 
1987 1988 
Net P&L in ths US$ - $ 2 0 - $ 2 0 
Scurce: Series of interviews with Gulhan Alp, Chief Accountant at the 
CTCCB, 21/4/95 - 11/8/95. 
Another business failure, this time absorbed by the CTCCB, was Ayko (Shoes). As 
production expanded, so its performance deteriorated further (see Table 4.7). 
Established in Nicosia in 1972 as an individuai co-operative society, mounting 
financial problems forced Ayko into being taken over by the CTCCB on 1 Aprii 
1990. Its plant has not been upgraded since it was installed in the early 1970s, 
which is partly why Ayko's products are restricted to the domestic and particularly 
the locai (Turkish Cypriot) military market. In civilian production, competition 
31 Interview with Gulhan Alp, op. cit. 
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cornes from cobblers; very small production units, using traditional non-unionised 
labour, and who can produce at very low costs. Also foreign, mostly Turkish 
production, which has advantages in terms of greater économies of scale and greater 
access to style innovations, out perform Ayko in the domestic market. There has 
also been increasing compétition from Turkey in the important domestic military 
boot market, where économies of scale play a decisive rôle. So despite increasing 
productivity, Ayko's recent performance has still been very poor (see Table 4.7 
below). 
Table 4.7 AYKO, profit & loss, output & the number of employees, 1990-93 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
Net P&L in current US$ -$14,662 $7,143 -$142,976 -$169,173 
Output in pairs 25,868 57,621 63,144 55,736 
Employées 42 51 57 62 
Source: Series of interviews witli Gulhan Alp, Chief Accountant at the CTCCB, 21/4/95 - 11/8/95. 
Some of the other industrial divisions of the CTCCB are a more obvious extension 
of the opérations of an agricultural co-operative organisation, particularly in the 
context of the market irregularities and impurities still facing the Turkish-Cypriot 
community. 
The Animal Fodder Industry's factory was, however, established in the Nicosia 
enclave in 1973. Subsequently, the Ministry Of Agriculture also ran a fodder 
factory (Animal and Farm Producing Enterprise) concentrating on livestock feed, 
effectively producing the balance over what the co-operative enterprise produces. 
Since the late 1980s there have been some private fodder producers, mostly in the 
poultry feed market. 
The Oil and Margarine Industry Division of the CTCCB (Zenko) was established in 
1974 in Karakum (Karakoumi) 4 miles east of Kyrenia, taking over a formerly 
Greek owned margarine production unit. Zenko has concentrated on producing 
sunflower oil producís but also trades in olives and olive oil. The plant essentially 
packages imported raffinate, supplying around 40% of the domestic oil and 
margarine market32 with imports, mostly from Turkey. Zenko also buys producers' 
olives, which it packages and exports or sells locally. Olives and olive oil 
production is yet to be fully commercialised (as is true in the south). Zenko merely 
buys and markets excess production. There are however other exporters, packagers 
and distributors of olive products in the north. 
The Turkish-Cypriot community had their own carob kibbling plant which was lost 
as a result of the war in 1974. It was established in 1974 in Yalova, near Limassol, 
but after Turkish military intervention, production was relocated to a formerly 
Greek owned coastal plant between Salamis and Iskele (Trikomo). The plant buys 
carobs from local producers, breaks them, extracts the seeds (which are used in the 
cosmetics industry), classifies both products and exports them to markets in Western 
Europe, particularly the United Kingdom. 
The operations of the Co-operative Central Bank (the CTCCB) have expanded for 
two reasons: first, as a substitute for free market activity in a sparsely populated 
small unrecognised economy, and second, when a co-operative sector company is in 
trouble the Co-operative Central Bank absorbs it. Such a commitment is seen as 
providing for the credit requirements of agriculture (or at least its members). When 
the Dairy Products Industry (Co-operative) got into trouble it was taken-over by the 
Co-operative Central Bank and so, more recently, was AYKO Shoes. However, 
when the wholly owned London subsidiary, KOPEX, got into trouble in 1988, it 
did not do the same. This was partly because Eti had its own London subsidiary and 
also because the activities of London based Polly Peck were at their height (see 
below) and the benefits to the north Cyprus economy of continued access to the 
London market via KOPEX were limited. The benefits to the north Cyprus 
31ibid. 
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economy of AYKO Shoes, another cooperative doing badly, also look limited. The 
Co-operative Central Bank did not, however, envisage having to pull the plug on 
one of its locally evolved members (though it has largely gradually withdrawn from 
retailing in the north, as the private sector expanded). It sends in its managers to 
troubled co-operatives to ensure that trading is conducted with propriety and relative 
efficiency, but rationalisation that entails mass redundancies of "members" (ail 
employées of co-operatives are automatically members) is beyond its effective 
remit. The state sector on the other hand has introduced some such rationalisations 
in some industries under its control, but despite the fact the right have always 
dominated Turkish-Cypriot politics, direct privatisation is neither populär nor 
pervasive. 
Figure 4.1 Profit <& loss accounts ofthe varions activities ofthe Cyprus Turkish Co-
operative Central Bank, 1984-1993. 
1 Banking sector 
UHIIIIIIIIIII Insurance & shippmg 
• Commercial division* 
0 Industriai divisions 
*exdudei Shippiiig and 1m. Depis l u i jncjncfes aviiiible (ina fo i Kopeki Ltd 
(London trading inh i rha iy ) . 
$2,000 --
-$2,000 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
S a u c e ; Selies i l iiilctvicw wjlh OuBuii A]p. Clliei AccoimHnl. CTCCB. 21M/95,02/S/S5. 09/6/95. 28/7/95, S/8/95. 11/8/95. 
What seems clear from observing the recent accounts of the various economic 
activities that the CTCCB has been involved in (see Figure 4.1), is that only its core 
activities (banking along with insurance and shipping) is CTCCB management 
efficient. A few closely related and historically linked industries, such as carob 
kibbling and animal fodder production are also profitable concerns. In both 
industries, however, the CTCCB opération has acted as either a marketing board or 
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a monopoly respectively. Where there is competition in all but the financial services 
and international trade sectors, CTCCB management finds it difficult to compete 
successfully. 
Despite the breadth of scope of the Co-operative Central Bank, its declared largest 
single service was (in 1995) still the provisión of short term credit to agriculture, 
mostly credits in kind and in the form of agricultural inputs33. Long term credit is 
provided by the Central Bank which may use the Co-operative Central Bank as a 
vehicle for development, though this is no longer common. The latter form of credit 
runs from 3 - 6 years, though increasingly since its establishment in 1993, the 
Development Bank has taken responsibility for all long term credit facilities. Long 
term strategic investment in specific sectors, for reasons of long term economic 
planning have been made by the Central Bank or, in the case of the government's 
more recent priorities, by the Ministry Of Tourism. These institutions will subsidise 
loans made to specific sectors by the banking sector, of which the CTCCB is a key 
player. Its individual members, however, have rarely requested capital for business 
expansión or diversification34. Most borrowing approved by the board of the 
CTCCB is for the purchase of variable inputs or, increasingly, consumption 
spending, cultural hospitality: weddings and circumcisions. In the north, the 
application of co-operative credit from the CTCCB has not diversified much in 
terms of its lending to individuáis and independent co-operatives. The organisation's 
size and financial strength has meant that it has been exploited as a tool of wider 
government policy, and as a substitute for public borrowing and expenditure35 (see 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2). 
33Interview with Suleyman Kiryagdi, op. cit. 
34 ibid. 
35Interview with Ozalp Sanca, op. cit. 
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The co-operative movement in general, and the Co-operative Central Bank in 
particular, were highly strategie institutions during the transition to a separate 
Turkish-Cypriot economy. In the aftermath of 1974, co-operative institutions co-
ordinated by The Ministry of Resettlement, the CTCCB and lubricated by Turkish 
finances, channelled Turkish-Cypriot development along a designated path, re-
populating an ethnically cleansed région at the same time as it re-commenced 
economic activity in one of the régions three main sectors, agriculture. The 
continued pervasiveness of both central and locai co-operative institutions, suggests 
that these Substitutes for free market activity have sueeeeded in providing for the 
transition of a constrained, primitive economy based in fortified refugee camps into 
something vastly more complex and superior. They have done this while also 
providing an element of continuity. If the recent performance of the industrial and 
commercial divisions of the CTCCB is représentative of something more 
widespread, then there were costs involved in confining an economy within an 
improvised institutional framework, essentially designed and expanded to fulfil short 
term necessities and politicai objectives. 
The economic role of organised religión 
New state sector companies were created to re-establish economic activity in the 
north, abandoned by most of its workforce and managers. The co-operative 
movement assisted this process, concentrating on the key agricultural sector. The 
co-operative movement also provided continuity with the past. Another important 
economic institution which could likewise assist in the economic adjustment 
process, aiding re-development with management skills and financial capital, whilst 
also providing some continuity, was the religious foundation, Evkaf. 
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Evkaf is an Islamic organisation founded in Cyprus in 1571, when the island came 
under Ottoman rule. The aims of the organisation are religious, communal and 
cultural: the advancement of Islam, the relief of poverty, éducation and the 
protection of the community and community interests, such as religious property. 
After 1905, Britain increasingly took over the responsibility of éducation from 
Evkaf. With the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 and the entry of Turkey 
on the side of the Central European powers, Britain also took responsibility for 
appointing the delegates of Evkaf, a situation which continued until four years 
before independence in 1956 (at the beginning of Britain's war with Greek-Cypriot 
nationalist guerrillas) when it was handed back to the Turkish-Cypriot community. 
Under British rule, the Evkaf Office was absorbed by the colonial administration 
and administered as a part of the Colonial Office. In 1944 the Immovable Property 
Law converted large areas of Evkaf leasehold property to freehold, in many cases 
transferring ownership to Greek-Cypriot tenants, particularly in the Varosha and 
Morphou area36. 
The Evkaf and Vakfs Law of 1955 began a process of devolving power from the 
executive to the Turkish-Cypriot people, ruling that Evkaf was to be administered 
by a council elected by the Turkish Community. At the same time, Governor John 
Harding returned ail Evkaf properties that had been put to other uses, granting £1 
million compensation to the Turkish-Cypriot community37. The first élection to the 
Evkaf Council took place on 15 April 1956, when the seven member governing 
Supreme Council was elected, with the Turkish-Cypriot delegate to the colonial 
executive committee and the Mufti being appointed as ex-officio members. Special 
members were appointed to look after the administration of mosques and other 
religious buildings, but who were also responsible to the supreme council. With 
36 Interview with Ozalp Sarica, op. cit., also Rustem 1987. op. cit., p.121. 
37 Morvaridi, B. "Social Structure and Social Change", in Dodd 1993. op. cit., p. 264. 
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Cypriot independence in 1960, the administration of Evkaf came under the 
jurisdiction of the Vakfs and Religious Affairs Office of the Turkish Communal 
Chamber. After the establishment of a "Provisional Administration" in 1968, Evkaf 
Was administered as a sepárate Ministry in the "Administration", ending a brief 
period of relative political independence. 
Evkaf was responsible for the first large scale Turkish-Cypriot foray into the tourist 
industry, sponsoring the building of the 72 room Saray Hotel in the centre of 
Nicosia in 1958. Evkaf began operating it after the withdrawal of foreign 
management in 1969. Since then, and particularly after 1974, it has diversified its 
économie interests further. 1974 was a blow to the Evkaf foundation, as most of the 
properties it owned and managed were in the south38. It has compensated for that by 
taking over abandoned property in the north. Since 1974, the Evkaf foundation has 
branched into banking, with the establishment in 1983 of the Cyprus Vakiflar 
Bank39, into agricultural estáte management, and has extended its real estáte40 and 
tourism interests to the management of shopping centres, apartments, land 
development, casinos41, as well as to further hotel management such as Kyrenia's 
oldest and most famous hotel, the Dome42. In 1987, one explicitly conservative 
estimate put the value of Evkaf property, excluding mosques and ancient 
monuments, at around £800 million sterling43, approximately four times greater 
than the 1987 GDP in northern Cyprus. 
38 Rustem 1987. op. cit., p. 121. 
39"The Acdvities of Modera-day Evkaf", Cyprus Today, 30/ 7/1994. 
40 A small business survey, conducted in 1993 by students at the Girne American University, found 
that out of the 71 small businesses in Kyrenia High Street that responded, 18 % rented their premises 
from Evkaf. Management 402, Small Business Seminar, "Kyrenia Survey", Tutor, Ufuk Ozaktanlar, 
the Girne American University. 
41 Morvaridi, B. "Social Structure and Social Change", in Dodd 1993. op. cit., p. 265. 
42 See Scott 1998. op. cit., p. 149. 
43 Rustem 1987. op. cit., p. 121. 
191 
Evkaf had a largely obscure economic role following the disruption caused by the 
breakdown of the constitution in December 1963. Initially it concentrated on 
damage limitation, managing current expenditure to reduce the need for subsidy 
from highly limited central funds, repairing fixed capital assets: mostly mosques 
and other religious buildings. The period accentuated the need for change, from a 
period of direct subsidy from the central budget, to the maintenance of a self 
sustaining separate budget and, because of the demands of military service, this had 
to be accomplished with a skeleton staff. The Director General of Evkaf between 
1964-68, Ozalp Sarica, set up a unit to reorganise Evkaf property management. It 
also fell to him to implement a new law that had been prepared prior to 1963 and 
which removed the supreme council of Evkaf from the rigors of day to day politics, 
by transferring responsibility from elected members, to members appointed by the 
Turkish-Cypriot administration for a fixed term (5 years, with the possibility of re-
appointment). Once it had recovered from the wider violence and political traumas 
of the mid 60's and within the exogenous constraints facing the community, Evkaf 
provided management and capital for development, proving a valuable substitute for 
private investment and entrepreneurial skills, very scarce resources in the Turkish-
Cypriot community. 
Vakf has been defined as "the principle of tying up property for the sake of Good 
and to earn Divine Mercy. Evkaf is the plural of Vakf."44 As the economic role and 
power of the Evkaf Foundation has grown, so it has courted controversy. There 
have been reports that Evkaf has failed to maintain investment in religious works 
while it increased its temporal portfolio45. The allegation is that Evkaf has 
concentrated on profit making and empire building rather than the spread of Islam 
and the relief of poverty. However, given the context, much of any such criticism is 
44 ibid., p.119. 
45 Morvaridi, B. "Social Structure and Social Change", in Dodd 1993. op. cit., pp. 265-6. 
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inevitable. In the post-74 sphere, Evkaf was obliged to play an increasingly 
important economic role in the reconstruction and re-development of assets north of 
the UN Buffer Zone, having lost many traditional real estate assets both in the latter 
part of British rule and during defacto partition. In many ways, Evkaf was merely 
regaining the economic strength it had lost during British rule, though in the 
absence of other major economic institutions and in the context of a modem 
economy, its role was far more visible. 
Three pre-existing institutions were criticai to the politicai and economic objectives 
of a newly established population north of the UN Buffer Zone: The co-operative 
organisation, Eti and Evkaf. If the vestiges of an independent economy were to be 
created behind Turkish military fortifications, particularly an economy with a 
Turkish Cypriot, rather than a Turkish identity, then in the absence of significant 
human and financial capital, clear and secure property rights, an expanded role for 
Eti, the co-operative organisation and Evkaf was essential. It is a fine distinction, 
but the State Economic Enterprises, and the other public sector organisations that 
were modelled on them, were ad hoc Turkish measures, created to talee the place of 
Turkish-Cypriot entrepreneurs. Whilst Eti, the co-operative organisation and Evkaf, 
began in some ways, to look like State Economic Enterprises, they had more 
politicai importance because their roots were in Cyprus (admittedly for Eti, not very 
long) before defacto partition. 
Tourism in the north; beginning again 
Despite the founding in November 1974 of Cyprus Turkish Tourism Enterprises 
Ltd., most public initiatives were aimed at re-establishing an agricultural economy. 
Particular emphasis was focused on the lucrative export sector (citrus and potatoes). 
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Meanwhile a little noticed phenomenon was taking place; tourism in northern 
Cyprus was rapidly eclipsing export agriculture as the dominant foreign exchange 
earner. Chaotic and disorganised as it was in the immediate aftermath of 1974, yet a 
partly private sector miracle was nevertheless taking place. In the ten years before 
the Turkish-Cypriot administration made a concerted effort to develop tourism in 
the north, 1977-1986, tourism on average generated over 90% as much revenue as 
all the north's visible exports put together46, not just agriculture. 
One reason for this may be that Turkish-Cypriot involvement in tourism prior to 
1974 was extremely limited. Out of 116 hôtels Turkish-Cypriots owned two47, one 
of which was the Saray in Nicosia, built and managed by the Evkaf Foundation48. 
This situation is perhaps a direct conséquence of the breakdown of the constitution 
in 1963, which saw Turkish-Cypriots concentrated in mainly urban, fortified 
enclaves. Before 1963 coastal tourism in Cyprus (where, following global trends, 
rapid growth subsequently occurred) was at a very primitive stage. By 1963 the 
number of visitors to Cyprus was rising rapidly, tourist arrivais having risen by 
34% on the previous year, however, they had just taken four years to recover from 
the effects of the violence that preceded independence. After fighting broke out in 
December 1963, tourist arrivais tumbled again, taking another four years to 
recover49. Because Turkish-Cypriots were marginalized (whether involuntarily or 
not) by the upsurge of violence, they were excluded from subséquent development, 
46Figures derive from a written response to corresponderse by Ahmet Zeki Bulunc, Under Secretary, 
State Planning Organisation, Prime Ministry, Nicosia and also: "Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus" 1979-1991 Statistical Yearbooks 1978-90. northern Nicosia: "State" Planning Organisation, 
Prime Ministry. 
47 Lockhart, D. G. 1997. "Tourism to Malta and Cyprus" in Lockhart, D. G. and Drakakis-Smith 
D- (eds.) Island. Tourism: Trends and Prospects. London: Pinter, p.163. 
48Built from 1958 by Evkaf, opened in May 1964 and operated by a foreign owned company until 
1969 when Evkaf took over the management. 
49Using the Dept. of Statistics and Research's definition of "tourists" wliich includes temporary 
visitors plus visitors staying more than 24 hours and requiring a transit visa but excluding 
"excursionists" staying less than 24 hours. Republic of Cyprus, 1995. Statistical Abstract 1993. 
Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, Dept. of Statistics and Research, pp. 58, 62. 
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which was concentrateci in Greek-Cypriot areas (and either Greek-Cypriot or foreign 
0wned establishments). Tourism increasingly centred around Varosha50 and Kyrenia 
with most rapid growth occurring in the late I960's and early 1970's. Before 1970 
there was a total of one 4 star and three 3 star hotels in the Famagusta région. 
Between 1970-4 twenty two hotels in these catégories, half of them 4 star, were 
completed and a total of 31 new hotels with a star rating were added to the seven 
that had existed before 1970. In Kyrenia 16 new hotels with a star rating were 
added to the 8 that existed there before 197051. 
Turkish-Cypriots were involved in some tourist sector employment in Greek areas, 
though this tended to be at the menial end of the spectrum52. Indirectly, in the old 
city of Famagusta (where the Turkish-Cypriot population of that area was 
concentrated) and in the more dispersed Nicosia enclave, they may have benefited 
from some small increases in revenue directly and indirectly from tourism after 
tension eased in 1967/8. Most of the Turkish-Cypriot population of Kyrenia had 
migrated a few miles south into the Nicosia-Geunyeli enclave, so few benefited 
from increasing volumes of tourists there. Generally the Turkish-Cypriot economy 
was excluded from tourism, being either urban and enclaved or rural and away from 
tourist areas. 
50The Golden Sands area (of Varosha) was formerly a British Military Leave Centre. In 1961 
development on site amounted to concrete bases laid to accommodate some 800 tents, along with 
various auxiliary British military buildings. Even then the UN (1961. UN Programme of Technical 
Assistance; the Thorp Report. NY., UN, P. 55, paragraph 32) was still suggesting possible uses for 
the site: "if continued as a tent camp, it might attraet local tourists, but such facilities would not 
satisfy most of the tourists whom Cyprus wishes to attract. " It advocated a holiday bungalow site 
wliicli would utilise the old mess-hut and military rest-room as the central buildings. Within 10 years 
the site became a Cypriot Costa, giving its name to the largest Hotel built in Cyprus. Ironically two 
key buildings on this site, the Golden Sands and neighbouring Sandy Beach Hotels, have reverted 
part of the area back to its original function, a military récréation and administrative centre, this time 
for the Turkish Military. Lockhart 1997, op. cit. 
51Republic of Cyprus. 1973. Cyprus Hotels Guide 1974. Nicosia: Cyprus Tourism Organisation. 
52MartinJ. 1993. "TheHistory and Development of Tourism", inDodd 1993. op. cit., pp. 341-342. 
Martin mentions the name of five Turkish Cypriot entrepreneurs, including the Evkaf Foundation, 
involved in tourism before 1974. 
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After the summer of 1974, the Turkish-Cypriot administration gained control of 
55% of the island's coast line, "the most valuable naturai resource of Cyprus"53, an 
alleged 82% of tourist accommodation and 96% of hotels under construction54. The 
new Turkish-Cypriot administration took steps to re-establish the industry in the 
région by expropriating abandoned Greek-Cypriot property. In the first week of 
February 1975, Ercan airport began operating propeller aircraft (Fokker 28's)55 to 
destinations in Turkey. That year Ministry of Tourism statistics indicate that 28% of 
the 1973 bed capacity was available to the industry. By 1980 bed capacity had risen 
to 34% of the 1973 capacity56. The relatively small Turkish-Cypriot population 
lacked both the skills and the capital to utilise the naturai resources and the tourist 
infrastructure that generated income in the north of Cyprus prior to the summer of 
1974. Cyprus Turkish Tourism Enterprises Ltd. (CTTE) was set up to manage the 
former Greelc and foreign tourist infrastructure, using Turkish capital and know-
how and concentrating its resources on the larger hotels, such as the Salamis Bay 
and the Kyrenia Marina, which minimised transitional costs, while it maximised bed 
capacity. Two joint ventures with the private sector were also embarked upon, 
whilst appropriately skilled London Turkish-Cypriots were encouraged to return to 
lease smaller hotels and boarding houses from Turkish-Cypriot authorities and 
Evkaf. In 1986, the state's CTTE stili controlied over two thirds of ali open tourist 
facilities in the north57, although by 1992 only 17 of the 132 star rated hotels and 
hotel apartments, abandoned by Greek-Cypriots in 1974, were being used for 
purposes of tourism. The vast majority of the newest and most developed tourist 
53UN Security Council, 21 August 1992. "Report of Secretary General on the Mission of Good 
Offices in Cyprus", New York, S/24472, paragraph 25, p.5. 
54 Lockhart, D. G. 1993. "Tourism and Politics: the example of Cyprus", in Lockhart D.G., D. 
Drakakis-Smith and Schembri J. (eds.) The Development Process in Small Island States. London: 
Rouledge, p.236. 
55Subsequently these were upgraded to DC9 jets, then Boeing 727's and currently they are operating 
the latter with A310 Airbuses. 
56 Martin J. 1993. "The History and Development of Tourism", in Dodd 1993. op. cit., pp. 345-
346. 
5701gun M.E. 1993. "Economic Overview", in Dodd 1993. op. cit., p.322. 
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área, Varosha, was fenced off by the Turkish Army in 1974 and remains derelict 
today58. A total of 47 hotels remain in closed military areas, 40 in the Famagusta 
district and 7 in the Kyrenia district. Of the rest, one has become a hotel school, 
another is used by United Nations Forces, three have become Turkish Security 
Forces Officer's Clubs, another two are used by the Turkish Retired Officers' 
Association (TESUD). Two hotels on the fringes of the fenced area have become 
student halls of residence and at least another two are used by the military as 
accommodation blocks. Another hotel, formerly the Dolphin in Kyrenia, is 
currently (1995) used as a Military Hospital.59 
Seemingly the Turkish-Cypriot authorities and their Turkish advisors had other 
priorities when planning the development of a región with an extensive abandoned 
tourist infrastructure. Initially tourism seemed to have a low priority, though 
external constraints may have played a part in the formation of public and private 
strategies. Transport problems, shortages of capital and skill shortages may have 
played a part in the regime's decisión to concéntrate on agriculture. Property rights 
again remained a problem, with even newer incentives constrained by the issue of 
renewable annual leases on "state" land rented to hotel operators. Bottle necks 
affecting international communications, information and the marketing of the 
región, mostly deriving from its lack of diplomatic recognition and the power of the 
Greek lobby within the wholesale travel market, have increased costs and limited 
the availability and diversity of access routes for international tourists. The Republic 
of Cyprus has declared all points of access to the región other than the UN 
580ther than four hotels on the fringes of the area, one of wliich, the Palm Beach, was taken over by 
Polly Peck, two were converted into EMU student halls of residence and another became a Turkish 
Army Officer's Club. Within the fenced area, as mentioned in a footnote above, the Golden Sands 
and the Sandy Beach Hotels are being used by the Turkish military. 
59Much of the details relating to current uses of tourist infrastructure relies on information deriving 
from a conference on tourism, "Don't Kill the Goose: Tourist Destination Development" 
Conference, 30/5 to 1/4/ 1995, Girne American University, Kyrenia, particularly a table presented 
by Douglas Lockhart which subsequently appeared as Table 9.2, p.164 in Lockhart 1997, op. cit. 
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monitored Ledra Place check-point, illegal points of entry60. No visitors can enter 
the Republic from the north and visitors are discouraged (though not prevented) 
from visiting the north from the Republic61. Due to ICCA62 rules about dealing with 
non-states, there are still no direct flights to the region, aircraft having to touch 
down in Turkey first, increasing fuel costs by an estimated 25%. There are also 
reports of limited availability on flights during peak season, and difficulties in 
reaching the region from countries other than Turkey, Britain and to a lesser extent 
Germany63. Major wholesalers do not tend to sell holidays to northern Cyprus, 
leaving marketing to small independent retailers, particularly those specialising in 
selling holidays to Turkey. Exposure seems to be partly dependent on the level of 
Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot presence in a third country, perhaps accounting for the 
relatively high levels of tourists from the UK and Germany, almost to the exclusion 
of other third countries. 
The foundation of five universities in the region, four of which use English as the 
medium of instruction, has brought in large numbers of relatively wealthy foreign 
students (mostly from Turkey) to the resorts of Famagusta and Kyrenia, and created 
new employment for the more remote former mining town of Lefka. The service 
sector in these areas is given a constant supply of customers to make up for the low 
volumes and / or high seasonality of international tourist flows. Demand in 
60 "From the Greek Cypriot point of view, pre-1974 Greek property still belongs to its original 
owners, and tourists visiting Northern Cyprus at the end of the 1970s were threatened with 
prosecution in the British courts for use of stolen goods and trespass." Scott 1998. op. cit., p. 143. 
61Tourists in the Republic are permitted to visit the north once per visit but only during daylight 
hours. They must apply to enter in person after 8.00am and before 1.00, purchase nothing in die 
north and retimi by 5.00pm. Tourist information given out both by the CTO and independent travel 
agents such as Thomson, describe the region as "inaccessible due to Turkish Occupation" (map of 
Cyprus in the Thomson Holiday Representatives' Guide to Cyprus, April 1993, Thomson Tour 
Operators Ltd). 
^International Civil Aviation Organisation. Travel in which the passengers stay on the same aircraft 
throughout the whole trip from a third country are available only from the UK, and these only 
became available in the 1980's. 
63"Don't Kill the Goose: Tourist Destination Development" Conference, 30th March to 1st April 
1995, Girne American University. 
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Famagusta particularly seems to have received a greater stimulus from EMU64 
students than from international tourists, occupying in subsidiary buildings alone 
25% of open pre'74 tourist hôtels most of the year round. 
The figures however, on the contribution of tourism to the wider economy, are still 
impressive (see Figure 4.2 below). Despite the view of other researchers65, tourism 
has made a significant contribution to income in northern Cyprus. 
Figure 4.2 Revenue from tourism in northern Cyprus as a % of GNP and export 
earnings (at producer prices). 
Source: Ex. revenue, Slat. Yearbooks 1982-90; tourism rev. & GNP, personal communication with Under-Sec. Ahmet Zeki Dulunc, SPO. 
Düring the 1970s, 90% of tourists to northern Cyprus came from Turkey66. 
Lockhart and Ashton67 revealed that this lack of diversification led to the slump of 
64Eastern Mediterranean University, originally a Higher Technical Institute offering diplomas 
équivalent to British Higher National Diplomas in electrical, mechanical and civil engineering, the 
institute reopened in 1979 and became the first university in Cyprus 1986. Student numbers in 1991 
were approx. 4000, with a total staff of 500 including over 200 academics. 
65"I was struck by the contrast between the obvious (recent) significance attached to tourism in the 
media, public pronouncements and the plans of individuáis, and its insignificance in terms of GDP 
and numbers of tourists." Scott J. 1995. "Identity, Visibility and Legitimacy in Turkish Cypriot 
Tourism Development." University of Kent, Dept. of Social Anthropology, PhD Thesis, p. 1. 
66 "The figures published by the Turkish Cypriot State [sic] Planning Office for tourism present a 
number of problems. All foreign passport holders entering North Cyprus by air or by sea are counted 
as visitors, including permanent residents, foreigners legally working in the country, and (illegally) 
Turkish migrant workers... The net resuit of these qualifications is to overstate the number of tourists 
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the early eighties, when Turkish arrivals dropped significantly. As they point out 
however, "many Turkish tourists visit for short periods, often to shop for lower 
priced goods [due to lower rates of taxation on some imported durables] and tend to 
stay in cheaper accommodation or with friends." In 1986 tourism was, seemingly 
belatedly (see Figure 4.2 above), identified as "the driving force of the economy"68. 
An agreement with Turkey provided additional financial assistance. The Five Year 
Development plan of 1987 aimed at reducing seasonality, increasing the average 
length of stay and diversifying the sources of tourism. Some of this, it was hoped, 
would be accomplished with the help of incentives provided in the Tourism 
Promotion Bill (1987) offering low rents, tax and duty exemptions, and the right for 
foreign investors to repatriate profits. 
Table 4.8 Direct financial incentives to the tourist industry 
'000's of current US$'s 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Waivers of import duties <jj j g fi 
Charter flight support 
Marketing subsidies 











TOTALS $ 1 9 L 6 $2,928.7 $12,370.4 $24,189.3 $3,457.9 $3,421.9 $1,689.7 
Note: The other major subsidy to the tourist industry has been preferential credit facilities. 
Source: Mehmet Baha Karan & French R. 1995. "The Structure & Financing of a New NTO for Northern Cyprus", paper presented 
at "Don't Kill the Goose: Tourist Destination Development" conference, 30/5 to 1/4/95, Gime American University, Kyrenia. 
As a consequence development did occur, most notably with Polly Peck's six 
prestige projects (only three of which were completed before its demise) and more 
prosaically, with the expansion of small new tourist facilities. In revenue terms the 
effects seem to be spectacular (see Figure 4.2 above) though in some senses this 
must be seen as testament to the failure of other sectors, particularly visible exports. 
(The drop in revenue in 1991 represents the effect of the Gulf War, an effect 
by a considerable margin. " Akin S. & Warner J. 1994. " A Descriptive Analysis of North Cyprus 
Tourism", p.379, in Tourism Management. Vol. 15, No. 5, pp. 379-388. 
67Lockhart D. & Ashton S. 1990, "Tourism in Northern Cyprus", Geographv, Vol. 75, No. 3 pp. 
255-58. 
68 Solsten, E. 1993. Cyprus: A country study. Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress (Area Handbook Series) p.144. 
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fliirrored in the south.) In terms of employment the effects of expansion in tourism 
have been less marked. Between 1983 and 1990, employment in tourism increased 
by just over 1 % as a percentage of total employment69. Some diversification of the 
originating countries of tourist arrivais did progress, albeit slowly (see Figure 4.3 
below). By the late 80 rs the proportion of tourists from Turkey, compared with 
other arrivais from other (third) countries, had dropped to approximately 75%. 
In December 1990, the President of the Board of Directors of the "state's" Cyprus 
Turkish Tourism Enterprises said: "The reconstruction in the true sense of the word 
happened in 1986... [because] first the average 10% increase [in arrivais] prior to 
1986 has suddenly leaped to the range of more than 20%. More significant than 
that, the number of visitors from countries other than Turkey, which were stagnant 
prior to 1986, suddenly began to rise by 40%."70 
69Between 1983 and 1990 employment in tourism increased by 930 people or by 1.1 % as a 
percentage of total employment: personal communication with Ahmet Zeki Bulunc, Under Secretary, 
State Planning Organisation, Prime Ministry, Nicosia. 
Mr Husrev Cagin, President of the Board of Directors of Cyprus Turkish Tourism Enterprises, 
speaking at "Structural Change in the Economy of the TRNC", conference, EMU, 3-4 December 
1990. 
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Figure 4.3 Number of tourists from countries other than Turkey visiting northern 
Cyprus, 1976 -1990. 
Figure 4.3 above shows the total number of recorded foreign tourists from third 
countries (i.e. from countries other than Turkey) visiting northern Cyprus71. Over 
the entire period this adds up to 391,099 foreign tourists (from countries other than 
Turkey), though this almost certainly includes many Turkish-Cypriot expatriâtes 
holding foreign (particularly British) passports. (This assumption is based on the 
fact that in 1992, 58% of those counted as foreign tourists did not use tour ist 
accommodation72.) With these figures comparisons with the south are too tempting 
to resist. In the same year, the south attracted nearly two million foreign tourists73 
and in the last four years for which there are published records (1987-1990) 72% of 
71 "Given the nature of tourism patterns, it is convenient to divide the holiday-makers into two 
groups: those from Turkey, and those from other countries. We shall refer to the latter group as 
'foreign' tourists". AkinS. & Warner J. 1994. op. cit. p.379. 
72UN Security Council, 17 December 1993. (Unpublished) "Report of the team of experts on the 
economic benefits of the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package", p. 10, section 13. 
731.99 million, ibid., p. 16, section 21d, paragraph 2. (Between 1989 and 1991 the average number 
of foreign tourists visiting the south was 1,414,400, calculated from, Statistical Abstract 1991. 
Republic of Cyprus, 1993 ). 
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them stayed in Hotel accommodation74. Of the two million arrivais in 1992, 39% 
stayed in Ayia Napa and Paralimni75 alone, exceeding (in that year, and in the 
"Government controlied" part of the Famagusta région alone) the total number of 
(third country) foreign tourists who have ever visited northern Cyprus since the de 
facto partition of 1974. The beaches and historié sights around Famagusta, what the 
UN described as "destination-rich environs" revealing "major potential in terms of 
its sites of historical interest, its excellent beaches and an environment that has 
largely been spared over-development"76, lay within easy reach of this huge 
potential market. Underlying the discrepancy between potentials and actual 
utilisation of assets, tourist accommodation in the south had a capacity of 70,000 
beds in 1992, whilst in the north the figure was 7,500 and the occupancy rate was 
57% and 31% respectively77. 
While the Turkish-Cypriot leadership may have grasped the potential, tourism stili 
seems to have attracted considerably less emphasis than agriculture. Yet tourism has 
been by far the most important sector in terms of foreign exchange earnings (see 
Figure 4.2), while it remained peripheral, at least until the mid to late 1980s, in 
terms of officiai attention. The establishment by the state of Cyprus Turkish 
Tourism Enterprises Ltd. meant it was able to utilise a small proportion of existing 
tourist infrastructure to generate revenue, though subséquent development has been 
slow. In the mid to late 1980s, the new found state enthusiasm, along with the 
growing strength of Poliy Peck International, gave foreign tourism, particularly 
third country tourism (i.e. non Turkish), a big boost; however, both compared with 
74RepubIic of Cyprus, 1994. Statistical Abstract 1992. Dept. of Statistics & Research, Ministry of 
Finance, Nicosia. Average hôtel occupancy of ail foreign tourist, 1987 to 1990, calculated from 
information given in table 6, p.69 (hôtel occupancy includes accommodation at "hôtel apartments" 
which amounts to approx. a third of ail hôtel occupancy). 
75Central Bank of Cyprus, 1994. Thirteenth Animal Report of the Board of Directors. 1993. Nicosia: 
Central Bank, p.22. 
76UN Security Council, 17 December 1993. op. cit. p. 16, section 21 d & p. 19 section 31 
respectively. 
71ibid., p. 10, paragraph 13. 
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the situation that had existed prior to Turkish military intervention, and with the 
situation in the south, subsequent achievements were modest. Granted, security 
concerns and the presence of some international sanctions were a constraint, and yet 
the boost the industry received in 1986, following pro-active state action, could 
have been attempted ten years earlier. Other than five (mainland) Turkish owned 
hotels in Kyrenia78, the large scale, up-market, private sector initiative of the late 
1980s, fizzled out with the demise of Polly Peck. The Turkish-Cypriot private 
sector largely remained on the fringes, managing smaller boarding houses, gift 
shops, food and entertainment establishments. However, much tourism and much 
private sector activity in the 1970s and 1980s were dépendent on just this, 
particularly the gift shops which, for tax reasons, attracted much of the mainland 
Turkish tourism, which accounted for the vast majority of foreign visitors. 
The trend of private entrepreneurial activity in the north 
Like most small économies, northern Cyprus has a visible trade deficit. The scale of 
the trade deficit however, undermines the significance of exports, visible or 
otherwise (see Figure 4.4 below) and of treating northern Cyprus as anything other 
than a separately administered province of Turkey. The bald figures are however 
officially qualified with the argument that much of the imbalance is due to the 
conséquences of the "gift fair" trade79, a key private sector activity that emerged 
after 1974. This trade détermines that most imports are registered as such, whilst re-
exports are truly invisible. The problem occurs as a result of the imbalance of 
bureaucracy affecting the parties to a transaction. The importer deposits locai 
currency with a Bank in exchange for a letter of credit, or foreign currency, with 
78 Scott 1998. op. cit., pp. 148-9. 
79Interview with Suleyman Kiryagdi, General Co-ordinator & Acting Secretary and General Manager 
of the Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central Bank, 20-21//04/95. 
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which the goods are imported. Most of these will arrive in the customs shed at 
Famagusta where the items are registered as imports. The same goods are sold to 
individuai travellers from Turkey, who pay less tax in northern Cyprus for the 
same goods, in the same currency and who have no équivalent bureaucracy to deal 
with. They have not needed to provide foreign currency, and will usually export the 
goods without declaring them. Goods sold in the "gift fair" trade are thus registered 
as imports consumed Iocally, but are really re-exported in exchange for "local" 
Turkish currency. The scale of (mainland) Turkish arrivais, over 60,000 in 1975, 
over 100,000 in 1978, most of whom stayed less than five days, and visited 
northern Cyprus primarily to shop, tends to suggest that "gift fair" was significant 
and may lead to distorted interprétations of trade statistics. 
Figure 4.4 The value of trade in the "TRNC" represented as a percentage ofGDP. 
Source: "Statistical Yearbooks", 1982-1990. "State" Planning Organisation, north Nicosia. 
The problem with this officiai assessment, is that the scale of imports and the scale 
° f i ts i m b a l a n c e w i t h reœrded exports does not rise with the level of Turkish short 
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stay arrivais or diminish with the reported decline in the rôle of "gift fair" (see 
Figure 4.4). "Gift Fair" may play some rôle in the level of trade imbalance, though 
its significance is debatable. The tiny size of the economy must not, however, be 
forgotten before this is dismissed out of.hand. 
In the early post '74 phase, the underdeveloped Turkish-Cypriot private sector 
concentrated on this "gift fair" trade for the Turkish visitor market. This was the 
sum, non-agricultural, role of the private sector, according to sources in the 
CTCCB80, whilst the state sector, supported by co-operative institutions and the 
Evkaf foundation, re-organised agriculture, industry, transport and communications, 
and the tour ist sector. The concentration of private entrepreneur ial talent in such a 
limited field is perhaps evidence of its under developed character, at the time of the 
de facto division; it is also revealing of politicai constraints and disincentives 
affecting potential private sector investment. 
According to the same sources81, trade in the "gift fair" market has since declined, 
as Turkish visitors have more recently been purchasing less in northern Cyprus, on 
account of economic developments in Turkey. However, according to other 
sources82, because of the shopping (and gambling) element of the Turkish visitor 
trade, tourists from Turkey stili had the highest multiplier effect on the Turkish-
Cypriot economy between 1986-1990. This statement, however, is difficult to verify 
as disaggregated tourism data was not available, and given the nature of the trade 
and the economy, data on Turkish Lira expenditure by foreign visitors is difficult to 
estimate. 
80Interview with Gulhan Alp, op. cit. and interview with Suleyman Kiryagdi, op. cit. 
&libid. 
ÄO OlgunM.E. 1991 Socio-Economic Profile of the Turkish Cvpriot Community and the Main Issues 
to be Addressed in Preparine for a Politicai Solution to the Cvprus Problem, northern Nicosia: Olgun 
Consultancy Services for the UNDP under the Development Support Services, p.2. 
206 
Having gained some capital and experience in the "gift fair" market, many 
entrepreneurs subsequently moved from supplying foreign demand to supplying 
domestic demand, importing foodstuffs and construction materials, competing with 
Eti and the co-operative organisation. Trade in domestic supply implies increased 
commitment and faith by locai capital in the locai market. Returns on new 
investment depends on local consumption spending and stock requires more fixed 
capital commitment (imported electronic goods do not require réfrigération and are 
more portable and potentially liquid than a similar value of perishables or 
construction materials). As the private sector increased its share of this new market, 
the Co-operative Central Bank's and Eti's share fell. It was, however, a declining 
share of a growing market, suggesting that the private sector was responding to 
continued shortages. 
Despite the preferences of the dominant politicians in the north, many sectors of the 
economy have not encouraged private entrepreneurial activity. In the dairy industry 
prices have been controlied, as they were, largely, in the fodder industry; this 
makes the prospects of a profitable return for a local entrepreneur less likely. The 
co-operative and the "state" sector dominate these markets. Fixed prices stili exist in 
sheep and cattle fodder, so the "state" and the CTCCB provide for almost 100% of 
the industrially produced fodder market. In the parts of the market not regulated, 
where prices are not fixed, private sector activity has taken off. In the late 1980s, 
the private sector moved into poultry fodder production, to the extent that the 
largest single producer of poultry fodder is now a local entrepreneur, Mastafa Hadji 
Ali Enterprises, who began production in 1988, originally to satisfy his own 
demand (he is also the largest fresh chicken producer in the "TRNC"). Seemingly, 
where profits are not constrained by price controls, the private sector has developed 
capital and managerial resources to exploit locai market opportunities, successfully 
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competing with the longer established position of the "state" and the quasi "state" 
sector in the market place. 
The sectors which are open to the market and deregulated are the sectors in which 
the co-operative organisation has lost market share. As in the south, both before and 
after 1974, each village had a co-operative grocer (as the population did not have 
enough capital for the invisible hand to necessarily provide one). Consumers co-
opératives (retailers) were set up, buying goods from co-operative wholesale 
markets (in the Turkish-Cypriot community they have always been divisions of the 
Co-operative Central Bank). While co-operative wholesale markets still exist, 
increasingly village co-operative stores have closed in the north (as in the south), 
because compétition from the private sector has recently proved irrésistible. Some 
of the population has had enough capital to provide retail services more efficiently 
than co-operative institutions, and more of the population have more disposable 
income to sustain compétition in the wholesale and retail sectors. ïn the domestic 
shoe industry too, co-operative production cannot compete with antiquated but de-
regulated private domestic production. Here quasi-public enterprise is battered by 
both sides: greater économies of scale from overseas producers and the de-regulated 
labour market of small domestic cobblers' workshops. Ultimately when controls 
have been removed, the private sector has been attracted by simple profits, and has 
recently consistently out performed co-operative organisations in retailing, supply 
and even production83. Seemingly, despite the lack of a political settlement, where 
once there were missing markets, which had to be regulated and controlled by state 
and quasi-state institutions, markets have arisen. Whether as a conséquence of 
excessive bureaucracy, crowding out or of security and political considérations, the 
private sector has played a small but increasing rôle in the development of a 
83Interview with Suleyman Kiryagdi, General Co-ordinator & Acting Secretary and General Manager 
of the Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central Bank, 20-21//04/95. 
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Turkish-Cypriot economy. For most of its history however, that role has been 
mostly limited to a few niche markets in the retail sector. 
Attempts to re-establish a manufacturing sector 
Much of the fixed capital assets in the industrial sector, taken over by Turkish-
Cypriots in the summer of 1974, proved to be more of a burden than an asset. The 
fixed capital was, allegedly, mostly oíd technology84, formerly utilised by family 
run businesses that were very small by modern standards, and perhaps only likely to 
be efficiently run by those families. In these circumstances, however, human capital 
had been developed, managerial and entrepreneurial skills refined. When they were 
relocated, the Greek-Cypriot refugee former businessmen had already learnt 
potentially expensive lessons. They had established markets and marketing skills, 
built up supply chains and co-ordination skills, so with new capital and plant they 
could more efficiently exploit new and existing markets. (At least this was the logic 
behind the distribution of government sponsored reconstruction initiatives in the 
south.) When the Turkish-Cypriot State industrial enterprises took over their oíd 
assets in the north, they had to re-learn the lessons without the cost advantages and 
84Interview with Ozalp Sarica, 17/3/95, 21/3/95, 24/3/95. 
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flexibility of family business structures. Former managers argued that much of the 
industrial capital assets proved to be hardly that, without the human capital that 
went with them85. Without the acquired skills and organisational patterns, ail they 
had taken over was a lot of antiquated (and by the time they got round to utilising 
it) rusting technology, that was both difficult and expensive to run86. 
Figure 4.5 Manufacturing employment & output as a % of total employment & 




Contribution to GDP 
Source: Aknet Zela Butano, UnderJec . . Pome M W i K j , S P O . T R N C . 199*. 
Stili, while the manufacturing sector was small and fairly static (in terms of 
employment generation) it proved to be relatively productive. Manufacturing in the 
85 
Interview with Suleyman Kiryagdi, formerly a manager of two state industriai enterprises and 
currently General Co-ordinator & Acting Secretary and General Manager of the Cyprus Turkish Co-
operative Central Bank, 20-21//04/95. 
There is a Greek Cypriot proverb which translates as: "Give a man cucumber and he'll teli you it's 
bent". 
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north consistently contribuiteci proportionately more in output than it absorbed in 
labour inputs, which is more than can be said for the manufacturing sector in the 
south (see Figures 4.5 and 4.6). With a manufacturing sector between a third and a 
half the size of the sector in the south (in terms of the respective shares of the 
workforce) the north looks (on the basis of "officiai" statistics) to have considerably 
higher productivity. Manufacturing in the north is generally beset with many of the 
same problems as the south, its politicai history has also provided some unique 
ones: a small domestic market; a limited resource base; small-scale, artisan based 
production systems with low productivity; high transport costs due to the politicai 
situation and the low volume of trade; cheap imports from Turkey; and a difficulty 
attracting and raising new investment. 
Figure 4.6 Manufacturing employment & output as a % of total employment & 




1 I Contribution to GDP 
Scure«: 1993 Sntiltrcal Ab iH>« .p . l58 . p.22S, Uùlorical D i u an the Eecmxny oiCypnl» 1960-1591, p.4ä 
Hence revitalising industry was a much slower process in the north, but under the 
stewardship of the "state*s" Cyprus Turkish Industriai Enterprises Holding Co. 
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Ltd., Turkish-Cypriots eventually got some industry up and running after only about 
two years of neglect, the priority sector having been agriculture. Much of this 
industry was geared around the utilisation of existing infrastructure, manufacturing 
petrochemical products: plastic goods, detergents, and steel pipes. Between 1976 
and 1980, Turkey was the key market for manufactured goods, which would 
purchase anything and everything that could be produced in Cyprus at the time, as 
much because of its own economie problems, as with the need to make its recent 
conquest pay. Most manufactured goods were made specifically for export to 
Turkey, inputs for which (Polypropylene and PVC granules etc.) were imported 
from third countries, in this case mostly West Germany. In the petrochemical 
market: plastic products, cables, polythene and polypropylene bags, paint, 
detergents, where northern Cyprus acted only as a finisher, two years of production 
were pre-booked by Turkish importers in the late '70s. Turkey's foreign exchange 
problems at the time were the root cause of these industriai initiatives. Using 
Turkish Lira, northern Cyprus thus acted as an extension of Turkey's import 
substitution policies, admittedly a small one, but one that was also beyond the 
scrutiny of international lenders (who may have encouraged other adjustment 
criteria). 
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Figure 4.7 Manufacturing exports as % of total exportsfrom the northern Cyprus. 
O <-1 ON O\ 
CT\ 0 \ 
0\ 0\ CT\ 0\ 
Source: Statistical Yearbooks (1978, 1982,1988, 1993). 
However, this unique market for Turkish-Cypriot manufaetured goods did not last. 
Once the economic crisis of the late 1970s was over, Turkish-Cypriot production 
could not compete with production costs in Turkey. Therefore the composition and 
the direction of Turkish-Cypriot manufaetured goods changed. Early key export 
items, such as steel pipes, which represented 36% of manufaetured exports between 
1977-1980, (85% in 1977) disappeared from the list of export items87. However, 
manufacturing exports recovered and as they grew more indigenously Turkish-
Cypriot (rather than being the activity that had taken place there before 1974, or 
Turkish advisor inspired), they grew in importance. By the late 1980s, 
manufacturing exports from northern Cyprus made a significant contribution to 
visible exports (see Figure 4.7 above), whilst their basic composition and direction 
look surprisingly similar to those from the south. Exports from the north were 
87By 1981 steel pipes had disappeared from the list of export items, having gone from an 85 % 
dominance of manufacturing exports to nothing within four years. They reappearing for one year in 
1982 with less than a percentage share of manufaetured exports and again in 1985 and '86, 
completely disappearing from the officiai list of important export items published the State Planning 
Organisation subsequently, "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" 1979-1994 Statistical Yearbooks 
1978^1993. northern Nicosia: "State" Planning Organisation, Prime Ministry. 
213 
dominateci by: textiles, footwear and processed agricultural products and by 1990, a 
very high proportion were going to the United Kingdom (67.2 %)88. However, other 
than the activities of Polly Peck in the period, most manufacturing enterprises were 
conducted by either state or co-operative enterprises. It is then perhaps ironie, that 
the Turkish-Cypriot leadership talked in terms of the free market when its market 
was so constrained. In the south, while the Greek-Cypriot leadership talked in terms 
of safety nets, subsidies and regulation, its market seemed to flourish. 
Change in economic direction; rhetoric or reality? 
In 1979 a major politicai split occurred over economic direction. Five years after 
the war, the economy of the Republic of Cyprus was again growing rapidly, by 
contrast the north was lagging. Even the "President" (Denktash) is recorded as 
having ädmitted in his much quoted statement that: "we are in the middle of a crisis 
both in our commercial and economic life"89. Two former Prime Ministers (Necat 
Konuk and Osman Orek) broke from the ruling Party of "President" Denktash 
(National Unity Party - NUP) and formed a new party (Démocratie Peoples Party) 
favouring the re-establishment of a working relationship with the south (in an 
"independent, non-aligned, bi-regional and bi-communal, sovereign, federai, 
Cyprus Republic, purged of all foreign bases"). This, they hoped, would encourage 
economic growth and development in the north for Turkish-Cypriots. Arguably this 
encouraged the rump of the ruling party to look for an alternative route to economic 
growth that did not necessitate politicai compromise. Tim Hindle has argued that 
880lgun 1991. op. cit., p.16. 
9 Halkin Sesi, 16/12/78, quoted by Dodd, 1993. op. cit., p. 177. 
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this was the point at which Denktash's NUP began to look abroad for friendly 
capitalists, or latterly for successful Turkish-Cypriots, who could apply new capital 
and acquired entrepreneurial skills to restructuring the economy of the north^. 
Turkey did not seem to offer much hope of providing the necessary capital stimulus. 
In March that year, the Ecevit Government fell and the military took over. The 
Economist described Turkey as the "sick man of Europe again". At this point the 
spot-light, in the form of a Turkish-Cypriot representative in London, fell on Asil 
Nadir, a successful London Cypriot who already had some very small economic 
interests in northern Cyprus. 
When the Military took over in Turkey in 1980, Turgut Ozal (the former World 
Bank economist) was put at the heim of economic policy ana began to introduce 
open market reforms. In Aprii 1980 the first new commercial regime was drawn up 
in northern Cyprus, with help from Turkish experts. The immediate impact of the 
changes on the economy of northern Cyprus, was a significant rise in the cost of 
living which was followed by a new wave of strikes and wage disputes as 
disgruntled workers attempted to maintain real wages. By the June 1981 élections 
for the President and the Legislative Assembly, "the left-wing parties could openly 
campaign on the slogans of the 'down-trodden worker'...[which] owed a good deal 
to the severe economic troubles..."91 
Unlike the south, northern Cyprus did not benefit from a period of reduced 
industriai conflict. The immediate post war period, characterised in the Republic as 
having historically a very low number of man-days lost in industriai disputes (see 
Figure 2.23), did not seem to be followed in the north92. Whilst the war had for a 
while homogenised preferences in the south, the threat from Turkey acting as a 
90Hindle T. 1991. The Sultan of Berkeley Square: Asil Nadir and the Thatcher Years. London: 
Macmillan, p . l l . 
91Dodd 1993. op. cit., p. 119. 
92ibid., pp. 108, 111. 
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force of national cohésion, changes in the north were of necessity, socially divisive 
(put crudely, how were the spoils of war to be divided)93. Suddenly a bourgeoisie 
had to be created and cemented with the re-distribution of those spoils94. Early 
difficulties in establishing and maintaining the efficient utilisation of assets and the 
early reversai of economic policy, heavy dependence on the Turkish economy, itself 
going through a prolonged period of structural adjustment, created macro economic 
problems (inflation but according to officiai figures, not significant unemployment) 
which contributed to industriai tension. Despite the fact that the "state" clamped 
down hard on militant workers, (an eleven day electricity workers dispute was 
banned by the "Government" in Sept. 1981) as prices rose, workers withdrew their 
labour to maintain real incomes. This almost inévitable sequence of events, very 
much a symbol of the period world-wide, was not however, followed in the south. 
Although real per capita GNP declined there by 15% in 1975, between 1975 and 
1979 man-days lost in industriai disputes were 80% lower than in the previous five 
years95. 
Whilst debate took place in the north about the role of the state as the key economic 
player, following the politicai changes in Turkey, so the story of recovery becomes 
more complex. If the rise of Polly Peck was seen as the most decisive act of 
privatisation, there is (perhaps as elsewhere) little evidence of the success of this 
significant change in the ownership and control of key economy sectors (export 
agriculture and increasingly third country hotel tourism). Below and on the 
following pages, the graduai rise of PPI as the dominant force in the région's key 
93 Scott 1998. op. cit., pp. 143-59. 
94 "It is a common complaint that the points (land distribution) system and land distribution has 
favoured only a politicai elite and those with powerful torpil (connections). People say that it has 
resulted in a class of nouveaux riches, often referred to as '1974 millionaires', and the relative 
ùnpoverishment of a significant portion of the Turkish Cypriot population. " ibid., p. 153. 
95Republic of Cyprus, 1992. 1960-1990 Time Series Data. Dept. of Statistics and Research, Ministry 
of Finance, Nicosia, p.12. Republic of Cyprus, 1994. Labour Statistics 1993. Nicosia: Ministry of 
Finance, Dept. of Statistics and Research, pp. 117-118. 
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export seetor (the citrus industry) and its subséquent décliné is mapped out (Figures 
4.3 to 4.12). 
Figure 4.8 Composition of Turkish-Cypriot citrus exporting companies in the 
1974/75 season. 
Initially trading under the name of Nadir's original public company (Wearwell) and 
the recently acquired vehicle for northern Cypriot "development", Uni-Pac (a 
northern Cypriot subsidiary of Polly Peck), Asil Nadir owned companies made their 
first appearance in the citrus export market in 1981 (Figure 4.9). His impact on the 
composition of citrus exporting companies was rapid. Concentrating citrus exports 
under the brand name Sunzest, in the following season (Figure 4.10), Polly Peck 
completely dominated the north's most important export by 1989 (Figure 4.11). 
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Source: Annual Reports of the Agriculture! Inspection Office, Port of Famagusta. 
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Source: Annual Reports of the Agriculture! Inspection Office, Port of Famagusta. 
The impact in terms of the trade balance, the change in GDP, per capita income and 
the composition of employment is far less obvions, which is relevant considering 
both the importance of the sector (see next chapter) and the small size of the 
economy. After 1983 Asil Nadir's enterprises quickly assumed the dominant 
position formerly occupied by the "state's" Cypruvex (Figure 4.8). The key export 
sector (if not, for most of the early period, the key sector of the economy) moved 
from a "state" monopoly to effectively a private monopoly with little, so far, visible 
signs of improved efficiency from the front end (total volume of sales). This story 
comes to an abrupt end in December 1994, when a seriously disabled Sunzest was 
taken over by the "state's" Cypruvex. Considering the circumstances, this can not 
be viewed as re-nationalisation from a public policy perspective, but seemingly just 
the state again providing goods and services not supplied efficiently by private 
enterprise. 
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Figure 4.10 Main Citrus Exporters in the 1983/84 Season. 
Sunzest 
18% 
Source: Annual Reports of Ihe Agricultural Inspection Office. Port of Famagmta. 
Figure 4.11 Main Citrus Exporters in the 1989/90 Season. 
75% 
Source: Annual Reporta of the Agricultural Inspection Office, Port of Famagusta. 
To complément this story, and the extravagant Claims in Polly Peck company 
accounts, the change that had taken place in the economy was significant enough to 
have turned politicai rhetoric around. By the late 1980's the dominant critique was 
no longer concerned with inefficiency and under-utilisation but with monopolistic 
control and hegemony. The major challenger in the 1989 presidential campaign, 
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Ismail Bozkurt (who secured 32.1% of the vote) warned that if Denktash won "this 
country will be known as Nadirland9 6 
Figure 4.12 Main Citrus Exporters in the 1993/94 Season. 
Source: Animai Reporls of the Agricultural Inspeclion Office, Port of Famagusta. 
However, whilst the Nadir experiment seemed to represent a key element of the 
export sector and foreign exchange earnings more generally, even in its hiatus Polly 
Peek was an experimental enclave sector in an economy still dominated by the 
public and quasi public sector. The politicians seemed to say that the policies of the 
new right, where they caused social discontent, were forced on them by changes on 
the mainland. (And of course the ever present "embargo" prevented them being 
successfully implemented.) Privately, policy makers concede that the new right 
policies have failed, or failed even to be adopted, because of the preferences of 
Turkish advisors97. Some of the divergence between rhetoric and reality is in the 
depth of the new right policies, however, external constraints on policy initiatives 
seem to be acknowledged, whilst the effects of internal constraints persist as the 
96Dodd 1993. op. di . , p.150. 
97Interviews witk Ozalp Sarica, Suleyman Kiryagdi and Gulhan Alp, op. cit. 
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unspoken spectre behind policy initiatives and the failure to adopt the new macro 
economic orthodoxy, despite the preferences of politicians and policy makers. 
"...there was general agreement that the authorities would have to play a 
major rôle in organising, managing and stimulating development. This 
consensus was more pragmatic than ideological, indeed many favoured 
free markets and private initiative. The problem was, however, that the 
market imperfections and rigidities were such that efficient outcomes 
would not ensue without state intervention. This was also the view of 
mainland Turks..."98 
The key changes in the distribution of exporters that have been highlighted above 
(Figures 4.8 to 4.12), derive from the data set below (Table 4.9). The large swings 
between the public and private sectors, which have been the subject of this section, 
have been relatively easily explained; however, the constant rise and fall of a 
plurality of small and not so small exporters, is more difficult to understand. Some 
of them are state and quasi state sector companies, such as Eti and the Guzelyurt 
Narenciyeciler Koop. They, and the other transitory exporters, seem to be 
exploiting alternative markets with lo wer grade produce. The large private and 
public concerns, Sunzest and Cypruvex, concentrated on the lucrative UK market 
(see Chapter 5). What is curious about the data is the rapid turn over of such 
companies. If there is such a prolifération of interest in exploiting more challenging 
markets, with cheaper produce providing lower profit margins, by small private 
sector opérations, why has the state continued to take the lead in the industry, (both 
with and without Sunzest as a unique, revenue raising proxy, with access to the 
London money markets)? 
98Wilson 1992. op. cit., p. 122. 
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Table 4.9 Citrus exports from northern Cyprus in metric tonnes, by main exporting 
company. 
Soorce' Aimaai Report» , A g r i c a l t n a l I m p e d í a n O f f k e , Port o f R u n a g u s t a . M u ù j t r y o f E c o n o m y & B m n c e , T r a d e Sect ion Data , "C i t rus Ext ra c i" , 
rAnomal] •Sominaiy O f Agr i cu l tu re s t a t u t i » * , Min i s t iy o f Agr icu l tu re , Na tura l Resou rces & E n e r g y , n o r t h N i c o s h . 
season 1974-7 5 1 9 7 5 - 7 6 1976-77 1977 -78 1978 -79 1 9 7 9 - 8 0 1980-81 1981-8?. 1 9 8 2 - 8 3 1 9 8 3 - 8 4 
Cypruvex 1 9 9 3 3 3 4 3 7 2 5 6 2 9 6 missing missing missing missing 6 1 6 3 6 5 3 9 9 7 6 7 7 6 4 
Sunzest 0 0 0 data data data data 0 0 2 6 0 9 9 
Weanvell 0 0 0 X X X X 13251 0 0 
Uni-Pac 0 0 0 X X X X 2 6 2 9 2 0 9 4 6 0 
KTN Pazarlama 6 0 9 7 7441 0 X X X X 0 0 0 
0 Shevet &Son 1 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X 0 0 0 
Teos 0 0 0 X X X X 0 1 2 1 1 7 10931 
Bahcivan 0 0 0 X X X X 3 1 5 7 0 3 7 6 6 
ETI igin 0 3 5 9 2 0 X X X X 0 0 0 
ETI Ud 0 2 5 1 0 2081 X X X X 0 0 0 
Devsan 0 0 2 9 9 8 X X X X 0 0 0 
Ailetn 0 0 3 9 4 9 X X X X 0 0 0 
Sel Marketing 0 0 0 X X X X 0 0 1 1 5 6 4 
Narin 0 0 0 X X X X 11761 1 6 1 6 2 1 9 6 1 3 
Othets 92 1 1 9 2 8 3 9 3 X X X X 1 7 2 4 7 3 8 5 6 9 3 4 
TOTAL 2 7 1 2 2 4 9 1 0 7 7 3 7 1 7 X X X X 9 4 1 5 8 1 1 0 6 0 7 146671 
season 1984 -85 1985-8S 1986-87 1 9 8 7 - 8 8 1 9 8 8 - 8 9 1989 -90 1990-91 1991-9?. 1 9 9 2 - 9 3 1 9 9 3 - 9 4 
Cypruvex 4 8 8 9 6 5 0 5 3 0 5 0 0 0 0 37531 3 1 3 1 4 2 1 1 0 6 4 0 5 4 4 4 1 1 7 1 3 9 0 0 0 3 5 5 0 9 
Sunzest 3 3 8 9 8 3 9 4 9 9 5 9 7 7 3 6 9 6 9 8 6 3 6 3 7 8 1 1 2 0 5 1 3 7 9 5 0 0 2 8 3 4 0 0 7 3 0 4 1 7 
Wearwell 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Narin 11231 6 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Teos 5 8 9 0 9 0 4 6 2 4 8 9 1 9 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 2 0 
Bahcivan 72 6 1 9 7 4 4 7 7 0 0 0 0 1 6 2 2 7 1 3 0 
Sei Marketing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cyp rosei 1 2 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sunrise Marking 0 9 2 7 5 10241 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yorcx 0 3241 1488 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taro m 0 6 2 3 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aspendos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1641 2 7 3 0 
New Fruit Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 7 3 198 0 
Leraser Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 8 1 7 3 6 3 6 0 
Narenciye ve Sebze. Birligi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 4 7 1 3 0 
O/yurt Narenciyeciier Koop 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 4 9 707 0 
Love Rent A Car Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 6 539 0 
Ulucam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 8 2 5 7 8 0 
Otheis 3 7 2 6 3811 1 0 1 3 0 7 0 3 4 8 4 8 8 5 3 0 6 1 9 5 9 4 8 0 6 6 2 6 9 8 1 7 3 1 9 
TOTAL 1 1 6 1 8 0 1 3 4 4 6 7 1 3 8 5 9 8 1 1 6 1 7 5 1 0 3 4 3 9 1 0 7 5 3 2 1 1 1 5 1 7 1 1 4 7 8 5 8 8 3 9 4 8 3 2 4 5 
Conclusion 
In 1987 there were 10 large public enterprises operating in the "TRNC", in ail 
economic fields, from banking and insurance, manufacturing and to a virtual 
monopoly of the distribution of petrol and petroleum. Ostensibly a "State" Planning 
Office objective has been to increase the private sector's stake in public sector 
organisations. This has not happened, partly because government is loath to shed 
itself of the control and patronage that ownership bestows. In manufacturing 
particularly, but even in tourism and agriculture, the state and quasi state 
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organisations (the CTCCB and Evkaf are almost as dominant) have had substantial 
control. Regulation and price controls remained pervasive in many sectors of the 
economy, well into the 1990s. 
The leadership's priorities in the matter of public ownership and control reflects not 
only the constraints facing the economy of northern Cyprus, but also the views of 
Turkish advisors". It is said that Turkish-Cypriots knew what public ownership 
meant in Turkey, costly inefficiency, so they wanted to avoid these problems in 
Cyprus. According to Ozalp Sarica100, the tax exemptions in the co-operative sector 
provide one reason for their continued relative success and widespread existence. 
He has argued that if such tax exemptions were offered to encourage the purchase of 
shares in public sector companies, share offers would have wider appeal, ultimately 
providing greater accountability and greater efficiency. Traditional public ownership 
in northern Cyprus is only half the story. In Sarica's view the benefits of full public 
ownership, during future possible periods of instability, are wholly outweighed by 
the costs associated with inefficient and bulky public organisations, top heavy with 
inappropriate political appointments. However, the other institutions which seem to 
provide the same functions are, in the case of the CTCCB no more efficient (see 
Tables 4.3, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 & Figure 4.1) or, in the case of the post reform Evkaf, no 
more accountable. The lack of enthusiasm for wider private ownership and 
privatisation may stem from a shortage of long term incentives. Whether tax breaks 
can overcome the underdeveloped nature of the market, the international constraints 
imposed by the lack of political recognition and the ever present problem with 
property rights, is a matter for conjecture. The recent Nadir experiment also casts 
doubt on the efficiency and accountability of large scale, private sector solutions. 
"interview with Ozalp Sarica, op. cit. 
mibid. 
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Ultimately the failure to act on privatisation policy cornes down to a lack of politicai 
will, and a seeming lack of economic priorities. (The Polly Peck episode was 
unique and also derived from public sector initiatives101.) For too long, strategie 
concerns have dominated Turkish-Cypriot policy makers and their Turkish advisors. 
For as long as the latter carry with them a letter of indemnity from the Turkish 
Treasury, under-writing the status quo, it will be a brave politician who challenges a 
system that has proved both successful and generally populär (particularly if past 
troughs - i.e. 1964 - are considered, as they generally are in the media and the 
officiai rhetoric). The economy of the Turkish-Cypriot community has improved 
dramatically in the past thirty years, (though this statement depends crucially on the 
indicators, the weighting and the base year used). No matter that the argument 
suggests that it is unfortunate for the Turkish-Cypriot community, that history has 
bestowed on Cyprus two différent processes of economic development102. Skewed 
economic development and barriers to growth on both sides, seem to point to 
significant complementarities from economic unification. More important than that, 
international isolation and a settlement of the wider politicai problem, seems to be a 
necessary prelude to increased efficiency and accountability. As elsewhere, rational 
economic arguments may hold little sway with politicai elites who seem committed 
to ensure that two différent and unequal economic realities survive. A separate 
Turkish-Cypriot economy managed to survive as a resuit of sacrifice and, since 
1974, improvised institutional innovation. However, short to medium term solutions 
have continued into the long term, proving better at delivering initial results in the 
reconstruction process, than sustaining or selecting quality investment over the 
longer term. Ironically, a total commitment to separate communal development may 
ultimately undermine the existence of a separate Turkish-Cypriot identity. The 
continued widespread use of improvised public and quasi-public sector Substitutes 
101Hindle 1991. op. cit. p . l l . 
102Olgun 1991. op. cit. and UN Security Council, 17 December 1993. op. cit. 
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for free market activity, appears to challenge the sustainability of a unique and 
separate Turkish-Cypriot economy in northern Cyprus, forcing it to rely heavily on 
niainland Turkish subsidies. 
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CHAFTER 5: Re-establishing economic growth after war; a short 
run story. 
Related issues 
It is important to consider the interplay of politics on the economie direction taken 
by the two communities as they began their regionally distinct economic life. The 
choices and direction of economic development, both contrasted and reflected 
politicai realities. In the short run, large numbers of Turkish-Cypriots displaced 
from the south were resettled in rural areas in the north and in agriculture, 
seemingly to consolidate Turkish military advances. Many rural Greek-Cypriots 
displaced from their farms in the north, were temporally settled in and around urban 
areas, where they increasingly found work in factories or on building sites, 
reflecting the desired impermanence of de facto changes. 
After the events of 1974, the Turkish-Cypriot leaderships' long term politicai 
aspirations had been achieved. Their main outstanding politicai objective was to 
consolidate; develop de jure from de facto status, for the separate and newly 
continuous région under their control. Effectively, the island's minority community 
now had access to abundant land and fixed capital resources1. Its subsequent policy 
of assimilating its displaced population to land and labour applications was as much 
to do with politicai as economic objectives. After 1974, politicai motives converged 
with attempts to stimulate economic growth in the areas under Turkish-Cypriot 
1 Scott J. "Property Values; Ownership, Legitimacy and Land Markets in Northern Cyprus", in 
HannC.M. 1998. Property Relations: Renewing the Anthropological Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 147. 
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control2. By contrast, the newly land and resource scarce (Greek Cypriot) Republic, 
did not have the same options. Politicai objectives had failed; Cyprus was neither 
part of Greece, nor unitary and independent. Economic regeneration in the région 
still under Government control, conflicted with its avowed primary politicai priority 
of re-establishing control over the whole island. Building new sea ports, airports, 
road systems and, above ali, re-housing vast numbers of displaced people to take 
account of de facto changes, seemed to contribute to their permanence. The 
economy looked on the verge of collapse, with a large proportion of its population 
without income or shelter. Their higher politicai ambitions were, however, 
sacrificed for economic expediency (a step that the Turkish-Cypriot leadership did 
not take in the 1960's). In the Greek-Cypriot community, long run politicai 
objectives and policies that encouraged long run economic growth, diverged after 
1974, while in the Turkish-Cypriot community they converged3. 
This chapter deals with an analysis of the key sectors and mechanisms generating 
renewed economic activity in the newly ethnically homogenous, non-communicating 
régions of Cyprus that followed de facto division in 1974; first by analysing one of 
the dominant theories which explains the recovery in the south, and then by 
analysing the sector in the north which attracted the most officiai attention, created 
the most employment, generated the most income and coincided with politicai 
priorities (a policy of permanent settlement). Concentrating a comparative 
framework on two incongruous sectors, the construction industry in the south and 
agriculture in the north, does not leave much room for direct comparisons. Both 
sectors were, however, effective in large-scale labour absorption in the immediate 
post '74 period, and both were associated officially with the short-term recovery 
2 It was reported on 30* August 1974, that the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Rauf 
Denktash, said that Turkish Cypriot fighters had moved in large numbers to support the agricultural 
economy of north Cyprus. He added that it was impossible to cope with the economic problems 
facing the community unless large numbers of workers were co-opted from fighting units, Cyprus 
Mail, 30/8/1974. 
3 Scott 1998. op. cit., p. 148. 
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prospects of their respective de facto regions4. Despite the economie irregularity in 
choosing such an approach, in historical terms the choice is far less asymmetrical. 
The theory analysed below, argues that much of the displaced rural population from 
the north was absorbed by the construction industry in the south. Gonversely, much 
of the population displaced to the north were initially resettled in the areas vacated 
by new entrants in the construction and manufacturing industries in the urban 
sector. It does not stretch imagination too far to conceive the transfer of population 
at two levels, geographical and to a lesser extent sectorally. In this sense Turkish-
Cypriots were again constrained economically by politicai objectives, whilst 
displaced Greek-Cypriots were effectively urbanised, the population under Turkish-
Cypriot control became more rural. 
This chapter also allows for a fuller exploration of a major inspiration for this 
thesis. In re-appraising the economic role of refugees, Roger Zetter has argued that 
war and de facto division have made a positive contribution to economic growth in 
Cyprus5. Whilst initially attempting to disprove his work, this thesis may end up 
supporting it (see Chapter 6). However, whether it was a Government led recovery 
in the south, through the medium of the construction industry, as Zetter proposes, 
forms the basis for half of the analysis below. 
4"Within the framework of its efforts to achieve the réactivation of the economy in the three areas of 
the island, the Government gave special emphasis to the construction sector, because this sector, 
apart from its contribution to investment and employaient, effects both directly and indirectly many 
other sectors of the economy. " Republic of Cyprus. Second Emergencv Economic Action Pian 1977-
1978. Nicosia: Planning Bureau, p.101. 
And "The economy of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus is largely dépendent on 
agriculture...The agricultural sector as in GDP has the iargest share of exports." "Turkish Federated 
State ofKibris" 1979. The First Five Year Development Plan (1978-1982 ì. Nicosia. "State" 
Planning Organisation, p. 5. By 1987 things had changed little: "Historically, North Cyprus has been 
predominantly an agricultural country. Today, this tradition continues. The North is in fact primarily 
rural, and some three quarters of its area is used for agriculture, the return from which contributes 
about a quarter of the national income and over a third of the country's exports. More than a half of 
the [north of the] island's [sic] labour force is employed in agriculture." Rustem K. (ed.) 1987. 
North Cyprus Almanac. London: Rustem K. & Bro., p. 83. See also: Morvaridi, B. "Agriculture 
and the Environment", inDodd, C.H. (ed.) 1993. The Politicai Social and Economic Development 
ofNortfaernCvpnis. Huntingdon: EothenPress, p. 235. 
Zetter R. 1992 "Refugees and Forced Migration as Development Resources", Cyprus Review, 
Vol.4, No. l , pp.7-39. 
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Comparative troughs 
In many ways the Greek-Cypriots were the (little acknowledged) direct economic 
beneficiaries of the 1963/4 civil war, which effectively removed Turkish-Cypriot 
compétition. Of the Republic "it can be said that for Cyprus, trouble became also its 
salvation."6 What Ozal Sarica meant by this was that as a conséquence of the 
1963/4 violence, the economy benefited from the military multiplier deriving from 
the permanent presence of over 2000 well paid UN troops, up to 12,000 less well 
paid Greek troops, up to a few thousand even less well paid Turkish troops and the 
new invisible receipt of Turkish financial assistance (which entered Cyprus via the 
Central Bank). To that could be added the fact that Greek-Cypriots also benefited 
from the Turkish-Cypriot retreat (as Turkish-Cypriots subsequently did in 1974/5 
from the Greek-Cypriot retreat) by exploiting and over-riding property rights, when 
they drove the Turkish-Cypriot community out of areas of weakness.7 Greek-
Cypriots also benefited by monopolising public sector employment (30% of which 
had been reserved for Turkish-Cypriots) and other sectors of the economy where 
Turkish-Cypriot compétition could have been significane As a resuit of the events 
of December 1963, the growth and development of tourism on the island almost 
completely passed Turkish-Cypriots by8. 
6"Provisional Turkish Administration" 1970. The Economy of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot 
Community Nicosia: Turkish Planning Organisation, p . l l . 
7See Patrick R. A. 1976. A Political Geographv of the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971. Ontario: 
University of Waterloo, Dept. of Geography Publication Series No. 4, pp. 110-111. 
8 Martin J. "The History and Development of Tourism", pp.340-342, in Dodd 1993. op. cit. 
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Figure 5.1 Change in Cypriot GDP as a conséquence of the 1963/4 civil war 
(in constant 1963 US $). 
I Greek Cyp. per cap. GDP 
I Turkish Cyp. per cap. GDP 
GDP 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Source: Patrick R.A. 1976, p.109 & Rep. of Cyprus. 1994. "Historical Data on the Economy of Cyprus 1960-1991", p. 34. 
Officiai sources claim that average Cypriot per capita income feil by 9.5% in 1964 
(in constant market prices) and recovered again in 1965, growing by 10.6% from 
the 1963 figure9. According to Patrick's sources, whilst average Greek-Cypriot per 
capita income feil by only 1.4% in 1964 and grew by 20.6% on the 1963 figure in 
1965, Turkish-Cypriot average per capita income feil by 73% and was still 67% 
below the 1963 average in 196510. Turkish-Cypriots experienced the majority of the 
effects of the politicai upheavals and the subséquent economic disruption. Greek-
Cypriots seemed to be able to capitalise on the Turkish-Cypriot withdrawal. It must 
be said however that Patrick's figures are based on current factor prices, though the 
average rise in the retail price index over the period 1963-5 averaged just 0.4%11, 
so the possibility of inflation distorting the general trends can be largely discounted. 
9Republic of Cyprus, 1994. Historical Data on the Economy of Cyprus 1960-1991. Nicosia: Dept. of 
Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance, p. 34. 
10 Patrick 1976. op. cit., pp. 109. 
nibid., p. 19. 
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Figure 5.2 Ethnie distribution of changes in (real) Cypriot GNP after the 1974 
hostilities. 
7 0 % y 
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Figure for early 1974 (until July) refers to the whole island, olber than the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. 
Source: Rep. of Cyp. 1994. Historical Data on IheEconomy ofCyprus 1960-91, pp. 19-20, & Bicak H,A. 1993. "An Evaluation o f the 
Turkish Cypriot Position. Debts of theCrek Cypriot Community, p.7. 
In some ways the différence between 1963/4 and 1974 is a matter of scale for the 
island as a whole, though perhaps, similarly catastrophic for each respective 
community. In terms of their recoveries, both the stratégies and the results were 
very différent. In a way the Turkish-Cypriots (perhaps of necessity) pursued 
politicai objectives at the expense of economic ones, a kind of Palestinian approach, 
which proved in the long run to be politically successful for them because a 
powerful regional ally was eventually willing and able to support the community's 
bluff. By comparison, Greek-Cypriots failed in their politicai objectives; however, 
whilst pursuing (failed and failing) politicai objectives they successfully exploited 
economic ones, even when they were contrary to their stated politicai objectives. 
The events of 1974 concentrated the economic resolve, having removed the 
possibility of imminent success in high politics which had periodically disrupted the 
development process in the past. 
For the Greek-Cypriots after 1974 the options were limited. Newly land scarce re-
settlement stratégies not only conflicted with a loud politicai rhetoric (which refused 
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{0 perceive the de facto situation as permanent) but also lacked the option of 
immediately relocating a mostly rural and service-skilled population in the sectors of 
former economic activity. There was simply not the land or (as yet) the 
infrastructure although, as previously mentioned, there were potential productivity 
gains (not generally perceived at the time12) to be had from relocating a 
predominantly small-scale13, owner-occupier, rural work-force in the urban sector. 
With abundant land, fixed capital and a more predominantly urban population, 
Turkish-Cypriot planners seemingly had a choice as to where to concentrate human 
capital resources. However, with a US ban on military exports to Turkey following 
Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, large tracts of unpopulated land may have 
been more easily negotiated away. The Turkish-Cypriot leadership concentrated 
economic development in the north on land settlement and agriculture, even when 
subséquent national income accounts tended to suggest other areas of the economy 
were more likely to provide greater growth prospects14. Put simply, the 
conséquences of the 1974 watershed saw forced urbanisation within the Greek-
Cypriot population and increased rural settlement of the population under Turkish-
Cypriot \ Turkish control. 
Confidence and the context of reconstruction in the Republic of Cyprus 
On 15th July 1974, the democratically elected President of Cyprus was removed by 
a foreign sponsored military coup. Within 5 days this was followed by Turkish 
military intervention which came in two stages. The first stage was a beachhead and 
12Republic of Cyprus, Aprii 1975. (Unpublished - i.e. "Restricted") "Economic Conséquences of the 
Turkish Invasion and Future Prospects of the Cyprus Economy. " Nicosia: The Planning Bureau. 
Republic of Cyprus, 1975. Emergencv Action Pian 1975-76. Nicosia: The Planning Bureau. 
13The 1960 Agricultural Census estimated that the average size of agricultural land holdings was 47 
donums (approx. 15.6 acres), coupled by the fact that most individual agricultural land ownership 
was composed of several scattered holdings. 
14 Scott 1998. op. cit., p. 148. 
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airborne assault which linked the Nicosia-Geunyeli enclave with the sea. This period 
was characterised by intense fighting and ended with a shaky UN sponsored cease-
fire on the 22nd July and five day tripartite talks in Geneva (Britain, Turkey and the 
newly démocratie Greece). Foreign ministers agreed on the 30th July that the areas 
controlied by opposing forces should not be extended and that a phased withdrawal 
of military forces should be encouraged. These déclarations of intentions did little to 
stop the fighting. Despite the presence of UN peace-keeping troops and a 
unanimous Security Council resolution creating a buffer zone between the Turkish 
army and Greek and Greek-Cypriot forces, the UN was unable to implement it. 
Turkey continued to re-enforce and re-supply its extended beachhead and Greek, 
Greek Cypriot, Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot forces persistently broke the cease fire. 
The Second Geneva Conference included représentatives of the Cypriot 
communities and formally commenced on the lOth August. Turkey demanded a bi-
zonal fédération with 34% of the island to be ceded to the Turkish minority15. 
Essentially this was what was on the negotiating table and a décision had to be made 
then and there. Acting President and chief Greek-Cypriot negotiator, Glafkos 
Clerides, said he was Willing to consider the proposais conditional on the 
withdrawal of ail Turkish forces. However, Clerides said he would first have to 
consult with colleagues, hoping that a smaller proportion of the island could be 
considered. At this impasse, the Turkish foreign minister Turan Gunes withdrew 
from the talks on the morning of 14th August and simultaneously Turkish forces 
advanced16. Within 48 hours Turkish forces had increased the area under their 
control to exceed the 34% of the island requested in negotiations (perhaps allowing 
for a negotiating margin). On 16 August Turkey's offer of a cease fire and a return 
to the negotiating table was accepted. 
15 Callaghan, J. 1987. Time and Chance. London: Collins, p. 355. 
16 ibid., pp. 354-355. 
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Turkey maintains that her objectives were solely the protection of Turkish-Cypriots 
and not territorial or strategie ambitions or a desire to see Cyprus partitioned, 
though no attempts were made by the Turkish "Peace Force" to re-establish the 
constitution (in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee which, they argue, gave 
them the right to intervene). 
Subsequently taking stock, the government of the Republic of Cyprus had lost 
control of 37% of territory. As personal security could not be guaranteed, the 
Greek-Cypriot population had largely withdrawn before the shifting ground of 
military advance. Similarly 8000 of the 50,000 Turkish-Cypriots living to the south 
of Turkish front-line positions had withdrawn to the security of the British 
Sovereign Base Areas. 
Greek-Cypriot property rights were no longer secure in the areas under Turkish 
military control. (It is debatable how secure Turkish-Cypriot assets were in the 
south, particularly in the immediate aftermath of Turkish military intervention, 
many Turkish-Cypriots themselves were not)17. Greek-Cypriot investors and tax 
payers Ieft behind considérable assets and major infrastructural investment (as noted 
above) ail of which was highly interconnected with the rump economy they 
maintained control of. Much of this loss was in the form of fixed capital which, 
when not destroyed was no longer under the control of owners and / or managers. 
The losses of territory included most of the cereal producing Messaoria plain, the 
citrus groves of Morphou, the tobacco région of Karpasia, the new industriai areas 
of Famagusta and of north-eastern Nicosia and the island's most important tourist 
developments and international transport links. 
17 Many Turkish Cypriots had already been displaced so are (retrospectively?) generally in favour of 
the process which caused the subséquent dislocation of 1974. 
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An important side effeet of these losses (and what is of interest here), was the 
potential undermining of business confidence as a conséquence of military action. 
Business confidence was undermined by the wiping out of collatéral on which loans 
and investment finance had been secured: 
Moreover, the loss of valuable land or the diminution of its value will 
deprive a considerable number of owners from their financial basis on 
which they relied so much for the securing of loans for industrial, 
commercial or other activities. This is going to be - and already is - a 
major constraint in the effort for the réactivation of the economy.18 
Even more important, the confidence necessary to supply new fixed capital 
investment was also undermined by the recent loss of access to investment assets 
and by the persistent threat of further losses. 
In 1999 the UN. still referred to the boundary of the "TRNC" as the "current 
cease-fire line" which has been "successfully" policed by a UN. military presence 
(UNFICYP) for a quarter of a Century. Whilst Turkish military tactics may seem 
clear to military analysts now, the limits of their implementation were far from clear 
to the people of Cyprus at the time (Turkish-Cypriots included). Although this 
ethnie boundary became increasingly rigid, the région to the south seemed less 
secure in 197419. In April 1975 a confidential Govt. report still talked of the 
possibility of having to surrender a further 11% of housing stock in vulnerable 
areas20. An agreed and UN administered cease-fire had failed to hold before, there 
was no guarantee that it would do so again. There was no military reason (whilst 
there may have been international politicai ones) preventing Turkish forces from 
gaining control of the entire island. This option was allegedly debated in the Turkish 
18Republic of Cyprus, April 1975. (Unpublished) "Economic Conséquences of the Turkish Invasion 
and Future Prospects of the Cyprus Economy. " Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, p.22. 
19The front page of the Cyprus Mail, 15 September 1974, reported that Turkish military aircraft were 
again seen over the southern part of Cyprus: "Military sources said another plane made a low swoop 
over Lamica and gave fresh ímpetus to rumours of renewed fighting." 
20Republic of Cyprus, April 1975. (Unpublished) "Economic Conséquences of the Turkish Invasion 
and Future Prospects of the Cyprus Economy." Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, p. 17. 
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parliament during the unstable period between the fall of Ecevit and the 
establishment of a new government under Demirel21. Whatever the geo-political 
constraints the threats were very real. In describing the differing politicai 
manoeuvres after the cessation of hostilities on 16th August 1974, McDonald said 
that: "...threats of further Turkish advance to rescue their compatriots, finally 
resulted in agreement [over 'population transfers', what the Turkish-Cypriot 
administration refers to as the 'population exchange'] in August 1975"22. The 83% 
of the population forced into the remaining 60% of the (less productive part of the) 
island, feit understandably vulnerable, much as the Turkish-Cypriot population, 
forced into fortified enclaves, had done after December 1963. Neither period 
seemed to be particularly conducive to investment confidence. 
At a human level, the initial attitude of many of the refugees referred to in Peter 
Loizos' account of the social conséquences of the conflict, provides an example of 
how confidence was undermined23. Seemingly the effect on the economic choices of 
refugees was two fold: first there was the constraint of optimism, the expectation of 
return to former homes and business activity which discouraged the active 
participation in public or private attempts to re-deploy economic resources (in this 
case human capital resources) to other economic activities south of the UN buffer 
zone. Equally important, is the negative constraint (powerful at least in the short 
run) of the fear of further losses of territory and future investment. 
21Birand M A . 1985. 30 Hot Davs. London: K. Rustem & Bro, p. 10. 
22"The Turkish-Cypriots were intent on segregating the communities while the Greek-Cypriots 
sought to restore the heterogeneous distribution of population by preventing the movement of settled 
communities and pressing for the safe return of refugees to their homes." McDonald, 1989, p.20. 
2 3 Loizos, P. 1981. The Heart Grown Bitter. Cambridge: CUP, p. 123, 159. 
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The role of government in re-establishing confídence in the Republic 
The events of December 1963 had seen Turkish-Cypriot economic activity 
collapse24 and remain practically stagnant for ten years; how did the Republic's 
(now exclusively Greek Cypriot) economy respond to the events of 1974? Perhaps 
the circumstances of the war provided a perfect case for a Keynesian demand 
stimulation strategy. Long run output had dropped significantly, domestic 
confídence had collapsed, unemployment had risen by 30% (clearly above the 
"natural rate") and national income had fallen by an average of over 18% in real 
terms, in both 1974 and 197525. Cypriot use of demand management would be a 
case of Keynes without Friedman, government spending restoring investment 
confídence without the threat of "crowding out". This may be true of the Turkish-
Cypriot economy also, though with the unique distortion of property rights and poor 
international links, further weakening investment confídence. How true is this 
example of a Keynesian recovery mechanism, even in the Republic? Some have 
argued that the government of the Republic of Cyprus successfully provided an 
appropriate Keynesian response to the shock of defeat in war26. More, the recovery 
was the result of strategic investment by government in a key industry at a time 
when confídence had collapsed. That investment was strategic because, whilst it had 
short run political benefits (dissipating anger and discontent as refugee communities 
were divided, dispersed and provided with welfare), it was also seen as an engine of 
long term economic recovery. 
Roger Zetter challenges the common conception of refugees as a burden to host 
economies. Using the Greek-Cypriot economy following the upheavals of 1974 as a 
2 4UN Security Council, 8 Dec. 1966. "Report on UNFICYP and the Cyprus Situation for the period 
11 June to 5 December 1966. " NY. S/7611, paragraph 122, reported that an estimated one third of 
the entire Turkish Cypriot population needed some form of welfare. 
25Republic of Cyprus. 1992. 1960-1990 Time Series Data. Nicosia: Dept. of Statistics and Research, 
Ministry of Finance, p. 11. 
26Zetter 1992. op. cit., pp.7-39. 
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case study, he argues that given enlightened public intervention, refugees can 
become a positive economic force27. He maintains that his study, uniquely, uses 
National Income Accounts to assess the impact of the (Republic of Cyprus) 
Government's re-housing strategy, and that these prove the centrai role played by 
the following policy in the recovery. Government provided funds for refugee 
housing schemes which stimulated the construction industry and simultaneously 
provided homes, jobs, income and new demand. 
Highly Interventionist economic development policy, it is argued, with its 
emphasis on housing for refugees, stimulated a demand led recovery. 28 
Indisputably, the role of the Government of the Republic expanded dramatically 
after the de facto division of the island. However the debate here is whether it 
expanded to provide the necessary humanitarian and politicai response to a massive 
humanitarian and politicai disaster or whether it combined that response with a 
systematic reconstruction policy, aimed at restoring investment confidence, 
providing an income multiplier to boost demand and ultimately restoring economic 
viability in a severely dislocated, truncated economy. Clearly both policies enacted 
simultaneously do not Stretch credibility to unreasonable lengths. However, the 
government's concerns must have mirrored those of the population at large (both the 
optimistic and pessimistic interprétations referred to above). The Government could 
not be seen to implement policy which seemed to perceive the territorial changes as 
being permanent. Such a policy would have conflicted with both its own rhetoric 
and the démocratie constraint (40% of the increasingly most politicised part of the 
electorate wished to return to their homes and businesses north of the UN cease fire 
line). 
27 ibid. 
28 ibid., p.10. 
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Seeraingly the main rôle of the government of the Republic of Cyprus in the 
economy was securing and directing investment by utilising external loans, grants 
and foreign exchange reserves. It is the expansion, scale and direction of that 
investment that is controversial. 
The need to intensify efforts for the reconstruction of the economy on the 
basis of a comprehensive action plan instead of undertaking various ad hoc 
measures as up to now, is imperative. The whole effort must be put on a 
planned and co-ordinated basis; hence the need for an Emergency Action 
Plan....29 
The public sector is expected to play a leading rôle in the boosting of 
investment activity instead of a supplementary or ancillary rôle as was the 
case so far.30 
The introduction of public works after exogenous economie shocks is not a new 
method of applying disaster relief. Such policies were, for example, used by the 
Government of Cyprus long before Keynes published31. Zetter's basic premise is 
more sophisticated and more closely Keynesian32: government spending did act to 
alleviate a humanitarian disaster but in doing so tapped under-utilised resources, 
restoring confidence in a key domestic investment sector and, through an income 
multiplier stimulated domestic manufacturing, thus rapidly shifting output and 
employment back to pre-war levels. Fiscal policy and deficit financing facilitated 
government investment in the construction industry, created homes and incomes for 
refugees, work and income in the construction industry, distributed income and thus 
stimulated demand as the newly re-housed, newly urban work-force replaced 
possessions left behind in the scramble south. 
29Republic of Cyprus. 1975. Emergencv Action Plan 1975-76. Nicosia: Planning Bureau, p. 11. 
30 ibid., p. 14. 
31During the drought of 1901 and 1902, the British District commissioner of the Famagusta District, 
after making a tour of the région promised to cali on the Government to continue with public works 
to help alleviate the problem. Weeldy newspaper, Kyprios, 23/02/1902, Nicosia. 
32Zetter 1992. op. cit., pp.7-39. 
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Specifically, it is analysis of national level economic data and policy which 
provides the missing link... Amongst a wide range of policy initiatives, a 
large scale housing programme for 150,000 of the refugees [30% of the 
post-74 population] was established which, it is contended, was the leading 
proponent for the economic reconstruction... the programme for re-housing 
the refugees.. was the catalyst [which] stimulated a demand led recovery.33 
Zetter uses the figures below to demonstrate the key rôle of the construction 
industry in the recovery of the Republic. 
Figure 5.3 Sectoral distribution ofGDP usingfactor costs (Zetter's data set). 




- — trade & tourism 
Source: Zetter's 1992 data set, plotted from table 3 , p . 15. 
Citing the Fourth Emergency Economic Action Plan34, Zetter concentrâtes on the 
period to 1982 when the Planning Bureau estimated that the economy had been 
largely reactivated. The graph above (plotted from Zetter's data laid out in his third 
table - see reference above) purportedly demonstrates the "twin pillars" of recovery: 
the construction industry "largely comprised of [government sponsored] housing 
construction" and the manufacturing sector35. It also reveals "the pre-emptive 
33ibid., pp.8,10, 25-26. 
34Republic of Cypras. Fourth Emergency Economic Action Plan 1982-1986. Nicosia: Planning 
Bureau. 
35Zetter 1992. op. cit., p. 14. 
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growth of the urban based manufacturing sector achieved through [the] rapid 
expansion of both domestic and export markets"36, which to some extent (and in 
Zetter's own words) challenges the basic assumptions of his model. An earlier 
recovery in the manufacturing sector could undermine the economie (though not the 
politicai and social) raison d'être of pervasive, expansionist government policy. 
Figure 5.4 Manufacturing exports 1970-1982. 
Source: Rep. ofCypnis. 1994. "Industriai Statiatics 1992." Nicosia: Dept of Statisti es & Research, p .7I . 
Although Zetter offers both a cohesive and appealing answer to the question of the 
Republic's rapid economic recovery, in the face of a potential loss of investor 
confidence it is relevant to question the basis of such a proposition. To what extent 
did government crowd out private investment and initiative, even in extreme 
conditions such as those prevailing after the summer of 1974 in Cyprus. To some 
extent private initiative, in the guise of a growing, export oriented manufacturing 
sector (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5) had, as Zetter himself seems to acknowledge, 
already "pre-empted" government investment in the construction industry. Some of 
the importance of the export performance must be seen in the light of a réduction in 
36ibid. 
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imports (Figure 5.5). The extent to which manufacturies boosted exports however, 
making up for the loss of a high proportion of export agriculture and momentarily 
reversing previously negative trends, could have provided a boost to investor 
confidence. 
Figure 5.5 Total exports (f.o.b.) as a % of total imports (c.i.f), 1970-1982. 
60% -r 
Source: Rep. of Cyprus. 1994. "Historical Data on the Econoxny of Cyprus." DepL of Stat's & Research, p.155. 
Add to this the possibility that there may well have been investors other than 
government, with vested interests in maintaining a presence in the Republic of 
Cyprus; interests which superseded short term profit maximisation and short term 
risk analysis and the justification for state action becomes less obvious on purely 
economie grounds. In 1974, the largest landowner was the Greek-Cypriot Orthodox 
Church. At the same time the largest exporter of processed agricultural products and 
the largest provider of domestic credit, was the Greek-Cypriot co-operative 
movement. 
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The indicatore of the 'catalyst' 
Zetter's data set (used in Figure 5.3 above) uses constant factor costs (except for 
1982). However, when the effect of net taxation is taken into account the story 
looks a little différent (see Figure 5.6 below). 
Figure 5.6 Sectoral distribution of GDP in marketprìces, 1973 to 1982. 





Source: Econ. Report 1981, p.41, Stat. Abstract 1987 & 1988, p. 218 and 1989 & 1990, p.200 
Because Zetter's argument is essentially a fiscal one, knowing the effect of net 
taxation is important in gaining an understanding of the wider effect of government 
policy. Using market prices for the whole data series 1973 to 1982, the relative 
sectoral distribution of GDP is sufficiently différent for the Zetter story to warrant 
closer analysis. Particularly significant is the distortion of the trends after 1980 
using Zetter's figures (Figure 5.3). With market prices (Figure 5.6, above) the 
trend in agriculture is less terminal than Zetter's data set suggested. Market prices 
recognise the delayed impact of the loss of agricultural resources on national income 
(due to favourable climatic and global price conditions), revealing the sector's 
declining significance and then its stabilisation at around 10% of GDP. Trade 
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(which includes the increasingly important tourist sector) continues to rise in relative 
importance if market prices are used, whereas it shows signs of decline if factor 
prices are used (as in the Zetter data set). Taxation and grants were highly 
favourable to tourism following the loss to the Greek-Cypriot economy of the two 
most important Cypriot destinations, Famagusta and Kyrenia. Essentially the 
inclusion of 1982 data at market prices in Zetter's data set, distorts the impression 
of the effect of both the war, and the governments recovery programme, on the 
structure of the economy. Admittedly his inclusion of data for 1986 (not included 
above) helps to correct some false impressions of the direction of economic change. 
However, the damage (in terms of the under-emphasis of the earlier impact of the 
manufacturing sector) has already been done. The implication from the market price 
data, Figure 5.6, could be that a manufacturing, export led recovery had already 
taken place before government housing schemes had begun to have the wider 
economic effect attributed to them by Roger Zetter. 
Even by late 1977 there was an increasing number of complaints about the speed of 
the government's housing programme. Questions raised in the Cypriot House of 
Représentatives about the amount of time refugees had spent in emergency 
housing37 tend to suggest that refugee expenditure on new household goods played 
much less of a rôle in the recovery38. Seemingly the recovery was in place before 
most of the refugees were out of emergency accommodation. At the end of the year 
in 1977, the government released a statement in answer to a parliamentary question 
saying: 
The delay in the building of houses is due to the inability of the 
construction companies to deal with the workload within certain time 
limits. The government has taken some measures to make the works 
quicker and new methods may be imported to increase performance.39 
37Parliamentary questions: 28/4/77, 12/5/77, 19/5/77, 20/10/77, Parliamentary Papers for T 
Parliamentary Period, Sessions A & B. 
38Zetter 1992. op. cit., p.26. 
39Parliamentary Papers for T Parliamentary Period, Sessions B, 24/11/1977. 
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Source: Rep. of Cyptus. 1994. "Historical Data on the Bconomy of Cyprus 1960-1991." Nicosia: Dept of Statistica & Research, pp. 182-83. 
Using either market or factor prices (Figures 5.3 and 5.6), manufacturing seems to 
have a more profound impact in the immediate post war period 1974-75, before the 
construction industry's contribution to GDP has finished its post-war decline and 
long before the multiplier and demand stimulus of new refugee housing has had any 
impact. Using market prices (Figure 5.6), the impact of the manufacturing sector is 
more pronounced in that year and continues to grow even faster in its contribution 
to national income between 1975 and '76. The contrast between the role of 
manufacturing and the role of the construction industry in the recovery of the 
Cypriot economy, is even more startiing when employment figures are examined. 
Employment in the manufacturing sector recovered earlier and continued to grow 
after employment in the construction industry had peaked below its pre-(74)-war 
level. Particularly significant for the recovery was that employment growth in 
manufacturing after 1974 was stimulated by export growth, generating cruciai 
foreign exchange which the domestic construction needed to fund imported inputs40. 
40"Worst hit [by the invasion] is the production of construction materials because about 11% of the 
total capacity and production has fallen into Turkish hands. " Republic of Cyprus. Aprii 1975. 
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If "a leading sector in the process [of recovery] is to be presented... [then] the rôle 
of housing" and the construction industry more generally, does not leap out from 
the "data on the performance of the national economy"41. 
Ultimately the trend in manufacturing, in terms of its contribution to national 
income, is reversed. Rather than an increasingly growing contribution to national 
income, as implied by Zetter's statistics (Figure 5.3), manufacturing^ relative 
contribution to GDP very gradually déclinés after 1978. The impact of the income 
multiplier and the demand stimulus of the jobs and products of the construction 
industry (that Zetter argues was so important to the recovery) should have been 
most effective by then, given the lag between proposai and provision. By this time 
however, confidence had largely been restored42. 
Figure 5.8 Income generateci by manufacturing and construction (in Constant 
1980prices and US$), 1970-1982. 
manufacturing 
construction 
0\ C\ Q\ <3\ 0 \ O* 
Source: Rep. of Cypras. 1994. "Historical Data on Ihe Economy of Cyprus, 1960-91Nicos ia : Dept. of Statistics and Research, pp.79-80. 
(Unpublished - i.e. "Restricted") "Economie Conséquences of the Turkish Invasion and Future 
Prospects of the Cyprus Economy." Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, p.7. 
41 Zetter 1992. op. cit., pp. 7,10. 
A2The Economist, 27 August 1977. "Miracle inhalf an Island.", pp. 50-51. ' 
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Whilst this argument may seem excessively pedantic, if the effect of government 
spending in providing refugee housing was cruciai to the recovery, that claim may 
be less powerful if a recovery was already in place. Following the implementation 
of the Emergency Action Plan 1975-76, the Planning Bureau estimated that public 
housing schemes had managed to accommodate 9,500 displaced families, though 
7,500 of them had been re-housed in vacated and "repaired" Turkish-Cypriot 
properties. Only 2,000 families had been provided with new public housing. 
Given that the number of displaced families is about 50,000... it could be 
said that the situation still remains very difficult, even though a number of 
these families succeeded in the meantime in making other more satisfactory 
housing arrangements.43 
Perhaps the best that can be said of the government's housing programme during the 
crucial period of the implementation of the [first] Emergency Action Plan44, was 
that it helped to alleviate human suffering and a societal breakdown. This means the 
actions of the state still conformed to classical rather than Keynesian precepts. The 
implication is that the market and not planning or intervention, was the route of 
recovery. Some government incentives were directed toward the manufacturing 
sector though these tended to take effect after the period of most rapid relative 
growth had already taken place. The best that could be said is that public policies 
helped to sustain and expand a recovery that was already well underway. The extent 
to which public investment in the construction industry stimulated recovery, as 
Zetter suggests, is still unproven. Essentially, increased government intervention in 
the economy of Cyprus after 1974 seems politically inspired, and was politically, 
rather than economically, successful (on both sides of the UN Buffer Zone). 
43Republic of Cyprus. Second Emergencv Economie Action Plan 1977-1978. Nicosia: Planning 
Bureau, p. 153. 
44Republic of Cyprus. 1975. First Emergencv Action Plan 1975-76. Nicosia: Planning Bureau. 
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Just to put minds at rest that manufacturing, like the construction industry, is not 
entirely the wrong horse; in 1976 visitors to Cyprus for more than one day were 
stili only 70% of their 1973 level. They were only as high as this because 43.2% of 
those registered as tourists were Lebanese Christian refugees who briefly stopped 
over in Cyprus on their way to other destinations45. 
Figure 5.9 Percentage change in employment on previous year, by broad 
sector: manufacturing & tourism, 1971-1982. 
-30% -
1971 1972 1973 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
= manufacturing 
EU Tracie & tourism* 
+As no superate catagory for tourism exista in officiai historical data, the 
1968 ISIC catagory: wholesale & retai! trade, restaurants & hôtels, is 
used as a proxy. 
Source: Rep. of Cyprus. "Historical Data on the Economy of Cyprus, 1960-91." Nicosia: Dept. of Statistica & Research, pp. 182-83. 
As a conséquence of 1974 however, employment in tourism had plummeted. From 
the deeper trough of 1975, average growth of 10% followed the influx of wealthy 
Lebanese escapees, bringing with them valuable foreign exchange. As argued 
earlier, the growth from a higher base in manufacturing employment is considérable 
at 17%. Over the next three cruciai years before the second oil shock, growth in 
employment in manufacturing, a sector already accounting for 18% of employment 
(compared to 7% in the construction industry and 5% in hôtels and restaurants) is 
more significant than tourism despite the saving grace of the Lebanese influx. 
According to another (essentially Keynesian) argument, employment generation was 
45Republic of Cyprus. 1978. Economie Report 1976. Nicosia: Dept. of Statistics and Research, 
Ministry of Finance, p. 8. 
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the crucial factor in generating and sustaining a recovery46. By the time of the 1979 
oil shock, the economy had witnessed a consistent rise in employment and income 
from tourism which was beginning to have an increasingly important contribution to 
the external balance, having finally surpassed its 1973 income level (in constant 
prices). Manufacturing however, retained its position as a more important sector in 
terms of income and particularly employment until at least the mid 1980's. 
Figure 5.10 The contribution of tourism & manufacturing to GDP in the 
Republic ofCyprus (in constant 1980 US$) 1970-1982. 
manufacturing 
Trade & tourism 
a\ o\ o\ o\ 
Source: Rep. of Cypras. 1994. "Historical Data on the Economy of Cyprus, 1960-91." Nicosia: Dept. o fSta lis tics & Research, pp.79-80. 
Seemingly, because of the loss of fixed capital, a revival of the construction 
industry was crucial to the recovery of tourism. Despite its considérable 
significance, there are problems drawing too wide ranging conclusions about the 
economic rôle of the construction industry, and more specifically the rôle of the 
public sector in providing permanent emergency housing in the immediate aftermath 
of the war. The point is that direct government investment was not that significant. 
Government spending was more important in terms of targeting incentives which 
46Andreou E. "The Economy of Cyprus during the Last Three Decades" (an econometrie study), 
Conference on "The Development of the Cypriot Economy", Nicosia: Bank of Cyprus, 28-
29/4/1995. Andreou argues that fiscal stimulus only worked because it created employment rather 
than consumer demand (in a tiny open economy like Cyprus). 
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encouraged private sector action, thus restoring confidence implicitly rather than 
explicitly in raising aggregate demand. 
Figure 5.11 The changing proportion of public sector investment in new 




Republic of Cyprus. 1994. Statistical Abstract Nicosia: Dept. of Stat'3 & Research, p. 444. 
By looking directly at quantitative data on government investment in housing (or the 
construction industry generally, see Figures 5.11 & 5.12) the conclusion which 
Zetter reaches is less convincing; the proportion of public sector involvement is 
surprisingly small considering the context. In qualitative terms however, the 
argument stands up much better to empirical examination. Taking into account the 
institutional structure (which Zetter does not), the nature of the private sector, the 
policies pursued and the incentives deployed, the argument that government policies 
were strategically important in reinforcing confidence in the Greek-Cypriot 
economy is perhaps more powerful. At this point however, the theoretical 
perspective within which the debate can be bracketed appears to have shifted from 
pure Keynes (Keynes without Friedman) to something broadly in line with the 
hodgepodge of theories vaguely described as neo-Keynesian (Keynes post 
Friedman). 
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Figure 5.12 Housing as a proportion of total new building construction, 1973-
1993. 
Source: Rep. of Cyp. 1994: "Stat. Abstract", p. 445 & "Construction & Housing Stat's 1993", p. 61. Nicosia: Dept. ofStat 's & Reseaxcli. 
A persistently active private sector 
The interesting phenomenon in the south is not the rise in public sector economie 
activity after 1974 (as happened in the Turkish-Cypriot economy and to a lesser 
extent in the Greek-Cypriot economy) but the level at which private investment was 
maintained. Declining from a peak in the early 1970's and at its lowest ebb in the 
immediate post '74 period, the private sector stili represented around 66% of total 
gross capital formation (see Figure 5.13 below). Without the benefit of hindsight, 
the simple question of why is difficult to answer in terms of risk analysis and 
rational expectations. 
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Figure 5.13 Gross domestic fixed capital formation (GCF): distribution of 
public and private sector investment, 1973 -1991. 
Source: Republic of Cypius. "Economie Report[s]". Nicosia. Dept ofStatistics & Research, 1981: p. 69, 1985: p. 84. 
At a time when confidence in the economy Iooked misplaced, continued private 
sector investment leads to questions as to the nature of private capital in the 
Republic. After the loss of nearly 40% of territory, which accounted for an alleged 
70% of GDP47, the Government's share of investment was not dramatically 
différent in the immediate post war period than in 1981, 1984 or 1989. There does 
however appear to have been a ratcheting-up of public sector investment. This 
suggests the dominance of the politicai rather than the economic rationale for 
government intervention; the création of a welfare-state, rather than the restoration 
of confidence, although what proportion of private investment was represented by 
the combination of co-operative organisations, or the church funds is still obscure. 
The Orthodox Church for example, has traditionally been a large land owner, 
though during the Makarios period much church-owned agricultural land was 
transferred to state ownership (in exchange for a state funded stipend for the 
clergy). Perhaps of necessity the Church has diversified its investment portfolio. 
Clearly, a considérable proportion of its fixed assets were lost following Turkish 
47Republic of Cyprus. 1983. Economic Report 1981. Nicosia: Dept. of Statistics and Research, 
Ministry of Finance, p. 9, amongst many other officiai sources. 
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military intervention48. Before the defacto division of the island in 1974 the Church 
owned the largest chain of hôtels, with at least a hotel in each town. In 1995 it 
reportedly represented a mere 5% of hotel beds as, since 1990, the church has been 
withdrawing from direct management of tourist facilities recently managed under 
the ñame of Ledra Palace Hotels Ltd. It stili, however, controlied 75% of the 
cernent industry (a key export sector in the aftermath of 1974), 5% banking along 
with a controlling stake in the largest brewing and distiliing company in Cyprus 
(Keo) and more general portfolio investment through the Cypriot stock exchange. 
Similarly the Church owns a TV station, Logos, founded in 1992 and the 
performance rights for Hollywood films in Cyprus. 
The Church, perhaps the largest single private investor, was not allowed to invest 
outside Cyprus after 1974 and so had a vested interest in maintaining investment in 
the island when more independent private investors may have eut their losses. It is 
however difficult to substantiate both the level and the diversity of Church 
investment in the immediate post-(74)-war period; nevertheless, five significant 
investment / diversifications were made in 1975: the huge (in Cypriot terms) Zygi 
cernent factory was opened with a large docking facility that was completed in 1980 
(criticai for this then key export); the Hellenic bank, in which the Hellenic mining 
company (100% Church owned) had a large stake, began trading; a plastics factory 
and a metal pipe factory (industries lost behind Turkish lines) were established in 
the depressed Paphos région (where Makarios came from). Also Keo, in which the 
Hellenic mining company had a controlling stake, expanded its opérations in 1975. 
Ali this evidence suggests that the church is not only a major politicai force but a 
48The Church producers but does not publish accounts, (for fear, it is alleged, that they will be 
exploited for politicai reasons), it was revealed that amongst the 185 churches and land assets lost 
following the Turkish invasion were 3 hôtels, one The Aspelia Hotel in Faraagusta, which had 500 
rooms, and another The Evagoras Court, which had 250 rooms. These were large hôtels by early 
1970s Cypriot standards. Earlier, in 1964, the Church had lost another large hotel, The Ledra 
Palace, in the Nicosia Buffer Zone, which has since been exclusively used by UNICYP, and for 
which it has received no rent. Interview with Elias Pantelides, the Director of the Church of Cyprus 
Audit Dept., and Executive Chairman of Ledra Palace Hotels Ltd, (26/9/95). 
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major economic force, one that was criticai to the post-(74)-war recovery of the 
Greek-Cypriot economy49. 
It is interesting that no one has yet dissected private investment in the period 
following the de facto division of the island. The problem seems interesting enough, 
however to justify some preliminary analysis pertinent to the current debate. In 
terms of investment décisions and economie behaviour, the Church and/or the co-
operative movement are neither a public nor, strictly, private institutions. It is 
argued here that in instances such as the shocks of 1974, both acted more like the 
state than as the large, private, institutional investors that they are categorised as. 
The nature, structure and strategie implications of the Church's and the Co-
operative movement's investment made it far less mobile; in neo-classical terms the 
discount rate it faced was more like that facing the state. 
Figure 5.14 Looking for "crowdìng out"; the share of public and private gross 
fixed capital formation (GCF) in current prices, 1973-1982. 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Source: Rep. of Cypius. Economic Reports. Nicosia: Dept. of Statistics and Research, 1981: p.69, 1995: p.84. 
49The material on the Church's economic rôle dérivés from an interview with Elias Pantelides, the 
Director of the Church of Cyprus Audit Dept., and Executive Chairman of Ledra Palace Hotels Ltd, 
( 2 6 / 9 / 9 5 ) . 
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Despite the continued levels of prívate investment, if there was crowding out in the 
economy of the Republic, the signs are not obvious, at least until after the economic 
crisis of 1974 was over (see Figure 5.14 above)50. In every year after 1976 private 
investment (as seen in gross fixed capital formation - GCF) was rising faster than 
public investment. Only in 1974 did private investment fall whilst public investment 
began to rise, but there are perhaps unique circumstances for that, unconnected with 
the displacement of investment by the public sector. Only in 1976 is there some 
evidence of possible crowding out, though it is difficult to know how much private 
gross fixed capital formation (GFC) failed to enter government statistics (see 
argument below). What seems more likely is that the quasi-state sector, Church and 
co-operatives, worked in conjunction with the state, boosting investment when more 
independent private investors may have shunned Cyprus. The argument is that the 
state co-opted the large institutional investors into maintaining investment levels. 
Conversely, the recovery programme worked as planned, marrying some 
government finance, extended credit facilities and other direct and indirect 
incentives, with the management of the private sector; a quasi-private finance 
initiative. 
Both the nature of the majority of Cypriot business (small family oriented firms) 
and the legal basis of Co-operative Credit Societies, also do not allow these 
suppositions to be fully explored. Consequently, official figures on domestic 
investment may lead to misrepresentations of economic reality by under 
representing the private sector (and the quasi-public sector) in domestic fixed capital 
formation. Co-operatives have been legally constrained from offering credit to 
companies and individuáis for commercial (other than agricultural) purposes. As 
50Ideally tliis sliould have entailed an econometrie exercise, though data limitations prevent the 
pursuance of such an approach. The data presented above, however, suggests that there was no 
obvious, significant crowding in the immediate aftermath of 1974. 
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they account for around a third of credit facilities51 and as agricultural employment 
dropped by 60% in 1974/5, the credit facilities they offered and extended could 
have been crucial in bolstering confidence. However, most borrowing from local 
credit societies is registered as consumption (i.e. personal loans) or loans for 
extending domestic private property for non-commercial purposes. The latter may 
be registered as private fixed capital formation (when funding dérivés from a quasi-
public body - underwritten by the state in times of duress) and also register as a 
boost to the 1968 ISIC "ownership of dwelling" category when the credit may have 
more productive purposes in terms of: employment, value added and foreign 
exchange. The borrower may even tell the secretary of the local credit society on 
application, what the loan is really for but, because of legal obligations, the 
secretary may advise how best to register the purpose of the loan52. This kind of 
investment could have been significant, perhaps crucial, in the post '74 era when 
much collatéral had been written off. It does not, however, register in officiai 
statistics as commercial investment, let alone assisting in the recaiibration of the 
private / public investment scales of the time. Not only does this form of credit 
appear officially as a negative economic phenomenon but, at the time, it may have 
appeared to substantiate a crowding out effect, when it may have been an integral 
feature of a wider Keynesian demand strategy (as ultimately the Government would 
underwrite a major failure in the co-operative sector). 
51Interview with Leslie G. Manison, Advisor to the Minister of Finance, carried out on the 15/9/95 
in his office in the Ministry of Finance. 
52Interview with Andreas Hadjixenphontas, Principal Auditor at the Co-operative Auditing Service 
(which replaced the Registrar), carried out on the 24/9/95, at his home. 
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Figure 5.15 Personal and building loans as a proportion ofbank* and credit 
society** lending, 1968-1991. 
•Dank lending includes ali Ioana, advances and bills disco un led 
by Deposito Money Banks. 
• •Lending by "Other Financial Institutions". 
* - H * — I * H » — t » — Ì . - H . — l » - < i — ( » - < ? - < 
Source: Central Bank ofCypms Bulletin, Nicosia, Decemeber 1982,pp. 33, 41, March 1994, pp. 39. 46. 
Broad catégories have been used above (Figure 5.15) to illustrate something of the 
scale of credit societies' potentially unperceived role in any recovery. What is also 
visible is the increasing encroachment of the commercial banking sector upon the 
market of personal loans after 1981. This is not perhaps the same market though, as 
there are no institutional reasons why bank lending should be systematically 
classified falsely. It is more likely that this gauges something of the real rise in 
consumption lending. 
There were therefore two forms of private domestic investment financing that may 
have assisted in boosting confidence in the economy of the Republic after the losses 
and insecurity following Turkish action. Along with co-operative investment (which 
goes beyond the provision of agricultural credit) and the investments of the church, 
private remittances have played a role in re-establishing economic stability with full 
employment. Whilst other invisibles (other than aid) declined, remittances, both 
from the Diaspora and from émigré workers, rose by 58% in 1974 and remained 
relatively stable until 1977 after which they rose sharply again. Aid, however, 
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dominates international transfer payments from 1974 for a füll decade though, in 
terms of its contribution to GNP (see Figure 2.18), it was only really significant 
until 1977. 
Figure 5.16 Contributions from abroad; the rise in officiai aid and remittances, 
1970-1991. 
Clearly remittances, co-operative and church investment existed before 1974. The 
argument here is that they were not so much stepped up as not reduced, as other 
forms of private investment may have been, given the considérable losses and 
Potential risks. Ail these forms of private investment (church, co-operative and 
remittances) were inherently conservative, helping to maintain anachronistic 
(particularly rural) lifestyles and inefficient production systems. Had the war not 
intervened, they may have continued to subsidise rural families with scattered 
holdings, with money and gifts from relatives in London, cheap credit and long 
leases. Remittances, agricultural credit and church landowning may have helped 
maintain marginal village économies for longer, had Turkish military intervention 
not removed a high proportion of them from the Greek-Cypriot economy. In the 
reallocation of resources from a largely rural sector to an increasingly urban, 
modera sector, the state was assisted by the major domestic economic institutions, 
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the former pillars of the rural economy: the church, the agricultural co-operative 
and remittances of rural migrants. Though, even ignoring the human factor, there 
were some teething problems. For example the Co-operative movement attempted to 
adjust from rural to urban sector interests by transforming itself into an industriai 
holding company. In this it failed dismally, as scandal broke over debt and 
corruption in 1980. The co-operatives that succeeded in making the transition into 
the urban sector, did so by doing what they were good at, providing credit, 
becoming primarily an organisation of local building societies, providing credit and 
financial services for an increasingly urban baséd work-force. 
The value of Zetter's model in the search for an economie catalyst 
Ultimately Zetter's proposition that the recovery in the south emanated from the 
construction industry (and thus from the main thrust of government intervention) 
could be reversed. Employment growth in manufacturing created the income and 
confidence that encouraged new homemaking in refugees; to start, in the words of 
the Planning Bureau, "making other more satisfactory housing arrangements"53 and 
/ or to encourage or allow more participants in the self help, private sector oriented 
housing schemes rather than the public sector schemes. Nevertheless, whilst in the 
spécifiés of the Cyprus case Zetter's argument may prove not wholly sustainable, 
the generality of his conclusions are both courageous and inspirational. The Greek-
Cypriot economy did appear to be able to turn a politicai disaster into an economie 
success. Greek-Cypriot "refugees and forced migration" in the south appeared to be 
53Republic of Cyprus. 1977. Second Emergencv Economie Action Plan 1977-1978. Nicosia: 
Planning Bureau, p. 153. (Previously quoted). 
a "development resource"54, rather than having the "retarding effect on the further 
development of the economy"55 that the Government seemed to believe. 
However, an important lesson from further analysis of Cypriot data, is the futility 
of looking for the seeds of recovery and growth in any one sector or policy, 
particularly without considering the wider institutional context. The construction 
industry, tourism and manufacturing (and even agriculture56) recovered remarkably 
quickly after the trough of 1974. Government incentives, a relocated refugee work-
force, new export markets, increased aid and the positive effects of exogenous 
factors: climate, the Lebanese war, oil dollars, helped to support that recovery. It is 
argued here that the recovery was first visible in the manufacturing sector in the 
year following hostilities; visible because of the sector's resilience in retaining 
employment and output and in the growing proportion exported. Certain important 
institutional factors, the church, the co-operative movement and private remittances 
helped underwrite and sustain the transition of the Greek-Cypriot economy, 
following the rupture of 1974. Because of this pattern of recovery, the economic 
role of government has proved less decisive in the south than in the north. 
However, coupled with the response of other key economic institutions, government 
policy and a manufacturing boom encouraged and assisted the rapidly widening 
urbanisation and modernisation of the Greek-Cypriot economy which could have 
taken decades and absorbed huge subsidies had politicai circumstances not forced 
the pace. Zetter came very close to understanding and acknowledging this, and for 
5 4 Zetter 1992. op. cit. 
5 5 Republic of Cyprus. 1979. Third Emergencv Economic Action Plan 1979-1981. Nicosia: Planning 
Bureau, p.3. 
56Tlie years 1974, '75 and 76 were particularly good years (climatically) for agricultural production. 
Despite the loss of citrus production, other crops performed spectacularly well, providing increased 
export earnings. Potato output, prices and export volumes were at record levels, the latter because of 
crop failures in the key UK market. As a resuit, the export of potatoes alone in 1976 accounted for 
17% of exports earnings (Republic of Cyprus. 1978. Economic Report 1976. Nicosia: Dept. of 
Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance, pp. 2-3, 66). . 
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this reason his argument is criticai to understanding the Greek-Cypriot economy 
following defacto division. 
Unlike the Turkish-Cypriot experience however, the public sector was not the only 
mechanism of recovery. Perhaps like the north, politicai objectives were after ali 
paramount but, unlike the north, economic reconstruction (assisted by perhaps 
politically inspired government policy57) largely took care of itself. Obviously 
appealing to its instincts, the Economist reported that in mid 1975 President 
Makarios declared that even if government were to initiate an enterprise and finance 
it completely, it should be left to the private sector to run it because "personal 
interests would be the motive and incentive" to guarantee efficiency58. 
Twisting Christodoulou's59 argument that the attribution of an "economic miracle" 
should be backdated to the I960's, it could also be argued that the roots of the 
recovery are deeply embedded in that period, particularly the Greek-Cypriot 
recovery from the communal fighting of 1963. Business development, its 
institutions and frameworks, were both in place and exclusively controlied by 
Greek-Cypriots. Unlike the Turkish-Cypriot case, entrepreneurial development had 
occurred and provided the necessary background to exploit new opportunities in 
manufacturing, the Lebanese influx, the construction industry. Also unlike the 
Turkish-Cypriot case, particularly in the early period, the Republic remained a 
relatively open economy. The recovery owes its development not to a single policy 
or a single sector but to the relative maturity of private business development and 
the flexibility and dynamism of local financial and economic institutions that were 
57ParticuIarly because of the coup which proceeded the de facto division of the island, the right had 
been wholly discredited amongst the Greek Cypriot community. The left (the communist party, 
AKEL - which regularly poled 30% of the vote) was likely to be the beneficiary of mass 
unemployment, homelessness, and rising social discontent (an argument outlined earlier), henee the 
rapid move towards welfare socialism. 
ssThe Economist, 27 August 1977. "Miracle in half an Island.", pp. 50-51. 
59Christodoulou D. (November) 1992. Inside the Cyprus Miracle. Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota, Modern Greek Studies Yearbook Supplement, Vol. 2. 
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able to spearhead a revival aided, (rather than dominated) by government. Even if 
aid was significarli, as is argued by Turkish-Cypriot scholars, it does not appear to 
have been entirely squandered. Government and the activities of quasi-public sector 
institutions (the Co-operative sector, the Church and in the Turkish-Cypriot case, 
Evkaf) may have also acted to restore confidence, but confidence in the relative 
security of investment is worth little if there is no private sector to invest in. 
Perhaps the sole "analysis of national level economic data and policy" will not 
satisfactorily "provide the missing link" in the search for "the catalyst [which] 
stimulated a demand led recovery" as Zetter suggests.60 Understanding the 
mechanism by which economic activity was reactivated after the hostilities of 1974, 
needs to be deeper if dues as to which policies were successful, and why, are to be 
understood. Essentially the single catalyst will always be elusive; not the 
construction industry, manufacturing or tourism, but a combination of events which 
were seized upon, consciously or unconsciously, and turned into modernisation and 
the concentration of more resources on higher value added occupations. This latter 
Zetter saw, understood and was brave enough to share; this, his contribution in the 
context of Cyprus, is immense. 
The location of a Turkish-Cypriot revival 
Zetter argued that the Greek-Cypriot economy recovered due to the state's support 
of the construction industry. This has been questioned above with some evidence 
seeming to indicate that employment and exports from the manufacturing sector 
were more important to the recovery there. Meanwhile Turkish-Cypriot planners 
concentrated their attention on agriculture, and export agriculture in particular. 
60Zetter 1992. op. cit., pp.8,10. 
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Increasingly however, tourism dominateci Turkish-Cypriot foreign exchange 
earnings, though it was not high on the state's agenda in the cruciai period before 
1986. Concentrating on the most productive economic activities was not likely to be 
the only, or even dominant priority of the leadership in the north immediately 
following the war of 1974, even if it were possible in terms of financial and human 
capital resources. Much as has been argued above about the south, other priorities 
prevailed for policy makers in the newly ethnically homogenous north Cyprus 
economy. 
The Turkish-Cypriot community had experienced a long and slow recovery from the 
economic collapse of 1963/4 before 197461. That very graduai recovery must be 
seen in the context of the rapid growth of the Greek-Cypriot economy which 
averaged 9.8% GDP growth (at constant market prices) after the recovery of 1965, 
until 197462. Until the exogenous shocks of the Greek coup and Turkish invasion, 
little changed in the separate economy of the enclaves, making it, if nothing else, 
easier for the minority community to uproot itself once again; prior to which, 
considerably lower than average Cypriot living standards prevailed along with low 
growth, high unemployment and pervasive under-employment. After the 1967/8 
relaxation of the embargo, things did improve (mostly due to increased co-operation 
with both other Turkish-Cypriot enclaves, the Greek-Cypriot economy and the 
possibility of increased co-operation with the Turkish mainland economy). It was 
not until Turkish military success brought about de facto partition, that real 
improvements in income, living standards, economic potentials and economic 
diversification in the community really began to take effect. Seemingly, once the 
politicai direction of the community corresponded with the leadership's optimum 
61Bicak H.A. 1993. "An Evaluation of the Turkish Cypriot Position. Debts of Greek Cypriot 
Community". Paper submitted to the U.N. Représentative in Cyprus, table 3, P.8. Patrick 1976. op. 
cit., pp. 109. 
62Republic of Cyprus, 1992. 1960-1990 Time Series Data. Nicosia: Dept. of Statistics and Research, 
Ministry of Finance, p. 65. 
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path, policy objectives moved to concentrate more on economic growth, which 
simultaneously helped to legitimise the new status quo. For as much as economic 
objectives coincided with the process of ethnie séparation, and did not sacrifice the 
security and the politicai integrity of the ethnically segregated, developmental 
objectives became important goals for the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. Economic 
growth, full-employment, establishing the economic viability of a wide and general 
settlement over the new (and large) région under Turkish control, establishing and 
diversifying trading links for its produce, were some of the key fundamental 
objectives. 
Turkish military intervention brought with it the possibility of establishing 
something more of a functioning economy for the Turkish-Cypriot community. 
Before 1974, the separate Turkish-Cypriot economy was more a collection of 
refugee camps, a combination of the force of circumstances and politicai gesture63. 
Undoubtedly, the fact that violence periodically flared, retarded economic 
development, making security considérations paramount in the community's choice 
of polices. The Turkish-Cypriot leadership nevertheless seemed to carry out 
something of an all or nothing approach (they would argue, of necessity) to its 
politicai ambitions, encouraging (and even enforcing) continued séparation when 
such a route meant more and continued economic hardship for much of the enclaved 
community64. So for various reasons, some of them relating to internai politics, the 
Turkish-Cypriot community did not recover from the fighting of 1963/4 until after 
the fighting of 1974 which solved the Turkish-Cypriot leadership's politicai 
ambitions. Therefore any examination of recovery programmes must begin after 
1974. 
63 Patrick 1976. op. cit. , pp. 158. 
64Field Marshall Lord Carver. "Peacekeeping in Cyprus. " in Koumoulides, John T.A. (ed.) 1986. 
Cvprus in Transition 1960-1985. London: Trigraph, p.31. 
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With the aid of Turkish troops, the recovery of the Turkish-Cypriot economy began 
with the creation of a considerably expanded economic realm behind UN Buffer 
Zones. Although things may seem to, and have been reported to have been 
relatively stagnant65, that is only in the context of comparisons with the region 
before and after Turkish / Turkish-Cypriot control. On a community level 
(particularly the enclaved community) things rapidly improved, despite the 
constraints of a lack of political settlement, diplomatic isolation and vague and 
ambiguous property rights66. At least initially, economic recovery was mostly an 
inevitable consequence of access to windfall gains, increased Turkish aid and 
military spending. 
There were of course structural disadvantages which delayed recovery. The 
demands on the region's resources were much less67, reduced consumption by 
western visitors, more soldiers (with much less disposable income than the UN 
Peace Keepers who were there before) but a much smaller population and no desire 
or possibility of supplying the relatively resource poor, formerly highly inter-
dependent south. There were no gains through inter-regional trade, north and south, 
and no longer any complementarities. This perhaps has proved a key disadvantage; 
denying the region any gains through trade, or exchanging inter-dependence with 
the south (and gains through trade with a dynamic, open, global economy) with 
65The Economist, 27 August 1977. "Miracle in half an I s land .pp . 50-51; Kyle K. 1984. Cvprus. 
London: Minority Rights Group Ltd, p.16, (quoting a UNDP report); McDonald R. 1989. The 
Cvprus Problem. Adephi Papers, No. 234, London: International Institute of Strategie Studies, 
pp.75-76; Lockhart D. and AshtonS. 1990, "Tourism in Northern Cyprus", in Geographv. Vol. 75, 
part2, p. 163; Christodoulou 1992. op. cit., p.xlvi; Theophanous A. 1995. "Cyprus and the 
European Union; From Customs Union to Membership." Paper presented at a conference in Tel Aviv 
on 26/4/95, organised by Jerusalem's Hebrew University, within the framework of the Med-Campus 
Program, Jerborghenni Economic Co-operation Law Program, p.6... etc. 
66Theophanous A. 1996. The Political Economv of a Federal Cvprus. Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 
p.16. 
67A confidential contemporary government report estimated population density in the island as a 
whole as 177.4 per Square mile. After 1974 the population density in the region under Turkish 
control dropped by 50%, having previously had a 5% higher population density "indicating a 
resource advantage". Republic of Cyprus, April 1975. (Unpublished - i.e. "Restricted") "Economic 
Consequences of the Turkish Invasion and Future Prospects of the Cyprus Economy." Nicosia: The 
Planning Bureau, p.16. 
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overwhelming dependence on a generally sluggish Turkish economy. Ultimately, a 
relatively rich resource endowment has proved a disadvantage in developmental 
terms by perpetuating the rural or the traditional sector's dominance of the 
economy. 
A small population moved into a relatively resource rich region68 formerly devoted 
to agriculture, mining, tourism and a small but growing manufacturing sector 
(particularly concentrated in the suburbs of Famagusta and the northern suburbs of 
Nicosia) between the late summer of 1974 and 1975. Though apparently spoilt for 
choice, the new population had to exploit the resources that were available in the 
context of international isolation. The mining industry largely collapsed due to the 
immediate withdrawal of the US corporation (Cyprus Mines) which had formerly 
operated the major extractive installations of the region. International tourism from 
countries other than Turkey, seemed to offer few possibilities for growth in the 
immediate aftermath of the war, partly because of continued transport difficulties 
and skill shortages. That left agriculture and industry. With three times the 
cultivated land available to Greek-Cypriots69, agriculture offered the most rapid 
population and employment absorption prospects and demanded the least short term 
capital investment, though it did not prove necessarily a perfect resource match 
(skills match) or offer the most dynamic prospects for long term economic revival. 
68In terms of the immediate economic requirements of food and shelter: the 37 % of the territory that 
came under Turkish administration contained 41 % of non-irrigated and 44.4% of irrigated land, 
partly because most ground water resources are located in the north (while most surface water 
resources are located in the Troodos mountains in the south). Greek Cypriots surrendered 50,000 
housing units in the north, whilst Turkish Cypriot vacated 15,000 in the south. 95% of quarries for 
sand, gravel, road aggregate, building stone, marble, the lime producing industry and the island's 
brick making capacity; in all representing 77 % of the total capacity of the construction materials 
industry. Rep. of Cyprus. 1975. (Unpublished). "Economic Consequences of the Turkish Invasion 
and Future Prospects of the Cyprus Economy." Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, pp.5-7, 17-19, 21. 
69(on a per capita basis) Rep. of Cyprus. 1975. (Unpublished). "Economic Consequences of the 
Turkish Invasion and Future Prospects of the Cyprus Economy. " Nicosia: The Planning Bureau, 
p. 18. 
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However the spoils of war needed to be occupied and rapidly transformed into a 
working economy, harnessing the support of the people and re-enforcing the fait 
accompli of recent political events. With Turkish support, the proto-state set up a 
public company (Cypruvex) to manage an agricultural and export sector revival, 
harnessing the resources and connections of the Turkish-Cypriot section of the co-
operative movement, most importantly the Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central 
Bank (CTCCB). Another public company, Eti assisted the CTCCB in ensuring the 
provision of agricultural inputs and (particularly in the initial stage) assisting in the 
transport and marketing of produce (both Eti and the CTCCB had London 
subsidiarles and Londón was the main market for Turkish-Cypriot produce). 
If the recent lending and debt of the CTCCB are a guide to earlier experiences, the 
leadership in the north would have fully exploited any liquidity available to the 
CTCCB (see Tables 5.1 & 5.2 below, which are the only records of this kind 
available70): 
TabJe 5. 1 Loans by the CTCCB to different categories ofborrowers 
Millions of 
TL 
1989 % SHARE 1990 % SHARE 1991 % SHARE 1992 % SHARE 1993 % SHARE 
Co-ops 11,163 36% 24,639 31% 39,168 32% 63,076 20% 112,430 17% 
Individuals 7,668 25% 20,702 26% 44,932 37% 91,728 29% 157,072 24% 
Gov't bodies 12,272 39% 33,893 43% 38,197 31% 164,802 52% 386,662 59% 
TOTAL 31,103 79,234 122,297 319,606 656,164 
Table 5.2 Overdue CTCCB credit by category ofborrowers 
Millions of 
TL 
1989 % SHARE 1990 % SHARE 1991 % SHARE 1992 % SHARE 1993 % SHARE 
Co-ops 3,128 45% 4,608 48% 8,742 45% 9,790 15% 9,888 5% 
Individuals 986 14% 1,858 19% 5,072 26% 9,941 16% 20,527 11% 
Gov't bodies 2,783 40% 3,160 33% 5,584 29% 43,975 69% 161,365 84% 
TOTAL 6,897 9,626 19,398 63,706 191,780 
7 0 Interviews with Gulhan Alp, Chief Accountant at the Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central Bank 
Ltd (CTCCB), carried out on the 21/4/95, 02/5/95, 09/6/95, 28/7/95, 8 & 11/8/95, in his office at 
the CTCCB, in Nicosia. 
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In the difficult times that followed the collapse of the Polly Peck empire, the 
Turkish-Cypriot state sector borrowed heavily from the CTCCB and also 
increasingly delayed repayments. If the CTCCB had access to the significant 
iiquidity of the 227 abandoned Greek-Cypriot Co-operatives in the north71, then it 
can be assumed that some would have been used to subsidise the rebuilding of 
Turkish-Cypriot Agricultural Co-operatives in the north, agriculture and the 
economy in the north more générally. 
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With the dispersai of the population in the north to labour intensive agricultural 
employment, (see Figure 5.17) the most visible signs of the utilisation of naturai 
resources were achieved. The leadership essentially tapped existing markets through 
71 The Principal Auditor of the Co-operative Auditing Service (interview with Andreas 
Hadjixenphontas op. cit.) allégés that large liquid assets existed in some of the richer Co-operative 
Savings Banks and Credit Societies in the north and the biggest branch of the Greek Cypriot Co-
operative Central Bank (then based in Famagusta, which carne under Turkish control). Also, despite 
the disruption of war, the CTCCB Annua! Reports and Accounts reveal a 34% rise in total deposits 
of Cyprus Pounds between 1973-74 and another 73 % rise in total deposits between 1975-76. See 
also, Dept. of Co-operative Development. Annual Report. 1978-1981. Nicosia: Commissioner for 
Co-operative Development, p.2. 
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the channels of newly established public or existing quasi-public sector networks, 
utilising existing investment infrastructures (see chapter 4). The development of the 
private sector in the period was largely confined to the activities of duty-free sales 
("gift fair") to short stay Turkish visitors. Directly and indirectly the state controlled 
the key employment sector of agriculture, controlling, directly and indirectly: 
prices, inputs, marketing, distribution, crédit and the allocation and terms of leases 
and land titles. With employment in agricultural, government and the co-operative 
organisation accounting for such a large proportion of employment in the north 
(Figure 5.18), sectors generally offering few prospects for much growth in 
productivity, the economy looked destined to lag behind the south after the initial 
recovery brought about by windfall gains. 
Figure 5.18 Agricultural & public service employment as a % of total Turkish-
Cypriot employment, 1977-1992. 
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Because of previous long term investment levels in the région however, agriculture 
seemed to offer the fastest prospect of foreign exchange earnings, offering the 
Turkish-Cypriot administration the first real prospect of direct exports and some 
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independence from total Turkish financial control. Pursuing a policy of agriculture 
first, the region's key export sector rapidly recovered (see figure 5.19 below). 
Figure 5.19 Proportion of exports from northern Cyprus (by value) made up by 
fresh citrus products, 1977-1990. 
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Source: "Statistical Yearbooks", 1982-1990 (Externa! Trade Section) "State" Pkuining Organisation, north Nicosia. 
Other sectors of the economy were slower to follow, though this may have as much 
to do with wider constraints as it does with planning and economic policy. Tourism, 
whilst offering little employment and low utilisation of existing infrastructure, 
rapidly overshadows export agriculture in generating foreign exchange and income 
(in 1977 and '78 revenue from tourism amounted to 121% and 109% respectively72 
of total exports from northern Cyprus - see Figure 4.2) which seems to make the 
delayed recognition of the sector (1986 - see previous chapter), the neglect and 
alternative use of tourist infrastructure, that much more mysterious73. 
72Written correspondence with Under-Secretary Ahmet Zeki Bulunc, State Planning Organisation, 
Prime Ministry, Nicosia, 15/12/1993. 
73The First Five Year Development Plan (1978-1982 - "Turkish Federated State of Kibris" TFSK) 
states that "The economy of the TFSK is largely dependent on agriculture." It stated that in the 1975-
77 period the agricultural sector was the sole primary sector activity, producing over a third of GDP 
and four fifths of exports, whilst the "tourism trade" contributed and average of 13.5 % to GDP in 
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A leading sector, an export & the rôle of a Turkish-Cypriot "state". 
When the de facto division of the island took place, what became the north was by 
far the most developed région agriculturally, due mostly to environmental factors 
and previous long-term investment in irrigation. Prior to Turkish intervention, 
agriculture was still the island's largest employer, the key export sector and the 
largest source of foreign exchange (see Figures 2.5, 2.9 & 2.16). Since 1974 this 
comparative advantage in the north has been further demonstrated by one of the few 
large scale economic, inter-communal co-operative ventures: the exchange of water 
from the north (arguably) for electricity from the south74. Clearly significant assets 
existed for further development in northern Cyprus following the events of 1974, 
and agriculture looked as if it was the leading sector. 
The first steps toward recovery were therefore taken in the agricultural sector, 
where factor requirements married more easily with the resources available to 
economic planners. Some of the people coming in from the south had some 
experience in agriculture, if not specifically in citrus farming though Turkish-
Cypriots had generally been more urban than Greek-Cypriots75. The first economic 
objective of the Turkish-Cypriot administration was to sponsor recovery in the citrus 
industry which, in the absence of a minerai industry, represented the region's 
visible exports almost entirely. Revitalised citrus production provided the immediate 
possibility of foreign exchange earnings. 
1976 and '77. In the single paragraph devoted to the sector it summarises the problem of relatively 
high general tourist statistics: "The expected growth in capacity usage has not been realised owing to 
the fact that the majority of the tourists were visitors and were accommodated by their families. " 
7 4 Solsten, E. 1993. Cvprus: A country study. Washington: Federai Research Division, Library of 
Congress (Area Handbook Sériés) p. 153. Also Cyprus Mail, 15/9/1974: "the water supply to Nicosia 
from Morphou has been restored to normal, a UN spokesman said". By the 1980's, Christodoulou 
Claims that the north consumed between 20% and 25 % of electricity produced in the south, and for 
which no payment was made, Christodoulou 1992. op. cit., p. 113. 
7 5 Kitromilides, P.M. "From Coexistence to Confrontation: The Dynamics of Ethnie Conflict in 
Cyprus", p.61, in Attalides M.A. 1977. (ed.) Cvprus Reviewed. Nicosia: The Jus Cypri Association 
with the Co-ordinating C'tee of Scientific and Cultural Organisations. 
271 








0 \ 0 \ 0 \ C T \ 0 \ C N O \ O S O N O \ O N O > 
Source: "Statistical Yearbooks", 1978-1990 (Agriculture Section) "State" Planning Organisation, north Nicosia. 
Düring the transition to proto-statehood a new government department, the Turkish-
Cypriot Department of Agriculture, provided services to protect agricultural 
investment in the northern région of Cyprus, to utilise some of that investment for 
foreign exchange purposes and to alleviate the monetary problems associated with 
continued linkage to the Cyprus Pound. A new public company, Cypruvex, moved 
in to directly manage citrus orchards. Between mid 1975 and 1976, vine producers 
from the Paphos and Limassol région were resettled in the island's main citrus 
growing area around Morphou. Despite the fact that by late 1974 the area was 
largely cleared of its originai population, a new population was slow to be resettled, 
partly as a conséquence of continued wrangling which prevented the remaining 
40,000 Turkish-Cypriots from moving north until August 1975 (76); prior to this 
there were largely no people to harvest or even irrigate and maintain the vast citrus 
groves around Morphou (Giizelyurt). Between October and December 1974, 
workers were imported on mass by the state (Turkey) from the Mersin area of 
Turkey (where there were also orchards). Because of the season, these workers were 
mainly employed as citrus pickers to salvage some foreign exchange earnings from 
76McDonald 1989. op. cit., p.20. 
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the région, though maintenance and irrigation work was also required; the 
implication is however, that little of the latter was undertaken. Only by the late 
summer of 1975 did the re-settlement of Turkish-Cypriot farmers begin in earnest 
and as it did, so the Turkish workers were either settled elsewhere (in less desirable 
agricultural areas) or returned to Turkey. By 1976 the citrus sector was active again 
as the transfer of people was practically complete; however, skill shortages 
persisted.77 
The initial process of resettling the Turkish-Cypriot population in the north was 
geared around maintaining economic activity there78. The mostly rural population 
was dispersed and settled to manage and exploit existing agricultural resources. 
Economic and social continuity was maintained by, as far as possible, keeping rural 
communities and urban communities together79, the reverse of policy carried out in 
the south, where, either through necessity or policy, rural communities were split 
up and accommodated in peripheral urban refugee camps and subsequently refugee 
housing estâtes. In 1976 the Ministry of Resettlement was created which 
implemented a unilateral system of compensation for assets left behind in the south, 
to set against assets abandoned by Greek-Cypriots in the north. This system was 
devised to underline the permanence of the de facto division, removing individuai 
Claims to property in the south. Again, this was the reverse of policy carried out in 
the south where the division was seen as temporary and where emergency 
reconstruction législation allowed property abandoned in the north to be used as 
collatéral80. Turkish-Cypriots from the south were then allocated points representing 
the estimated value of the properties they had left behind. These points could then 
77Interviews with Ozalp Sarica (the former Assistant Governor of the Republic's Central Bank, the 
former Director General of Evkaf and the "State" Planning Organisation, the founder and first 
Director General of Eti) 17, 21, 24/3/1995. 
7 8 Scott 1998. op. cit., p. 148. 
79 ibid., p. 147. 
80"Mortgaging of Real Property (temporary provision) Act 1977". Y ' Parliamentary Period - Session 
B' Minutes from Parliamentary Debates in the House of Représentatives (in Greek) 3/11/1977. 
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be exchanged for new "TRNC" (or, as it was then, Turkish Federated State of 
Cyprus) title deeds on formerly Greek-Cypriot property in the north. Farmers from 
the south were transferred to farms in the north and their size, location and level of 
infrastructural development depended on how many points were awarded for the 
property left behind in the south, and how many points the property they could be 
allocated was thought to be worth. Not only are the deeds (or leases) so acquired 
subsequently tradable but points are also tradable and traded. If the required number 
of points for the property in the north are not allocated for the surrendered title 
deed, points can be purchased from someone else who had acquired a property 
without parting with all the points they had been allocated. Because the valuation of 
property in the north and south (which cannot be visited) is a bureaucratic and not a 
market exercise, the system of property allocation has been the source of much 
grievance81. Seemingly, whilst property valúes are perceived to have risen in the 
north, point allocations to title deeds pertaining to property in the south do not take 
into consideration post-1974 developments82 (where property prices have risen far 
more dramatically). 
As has already been outlined, in the years leading up to de facto partition citrus 
products had been the single most important export item and most of them were 
grown in the north. Many newly relocated farmers had a new public company to 
deal with, Cypruvex, a company founded to facilitate the continued export of the 
regions most important crop. Cypruvex Ltd., was set up in 1974 to take over and 
exploit Greek assets in the citrus industry. Increasingly the company concentrated 
on the export and marketing of citrus products from northern Cyprus (rather than on 
production), but in the immediate aftermath of the "Peace Operation", its activities 
were more widespread. Cypruvex is a standard public company, the growers who 
used its services had no say in its policies. Some advocated that growers should be 
81 Scott 1998. op. cit., pp. 149-154. 
&2ibid., p.151. 
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made share holders in this the dominant citrus exporter83, however, although at least 
one growers' association has been an active exporter from the northern Cypriot 
market (Guzelyurt Narenciyeciler Koop - which exported relatively significant 
quantities in the 91/92 and 92/93 season) this is not the dominant organisation at the 
marketing end of the citrus industry and was non-existent in the immediate 
aftermath of 1974. Some Turkish-Cypriot farmers were used to dealing with public 
sector organisations for marketing purposes (the Grain Commission), though most 
of the re-settled farmers in the citrus industry would have been part of an integrated 
co-operative marketing and production network. Producing oranges rather than 
grapes (a key Turkish-Cypriot economic activity before 1974), marketing through 
the public rather than the co-operative sector, made the transition less smooth than it 
first appeared84. 
Figure 5.21 Output per Hectare in northern Cyprus of orange & total citrus 
production in metric tornes, 1975-1990. 
1975 
Source: "Statistical Yearbooks", 1978-90 (Agriculture Section) "State" Planning Organisation, north Ntcosia. 
83Interview with Ozalp Sarica, op. cit. 
uibid. 
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Unlike the vineyards where most of the new farmers carne from, working citrus 
orchards is more labour intensive. Vineyards have long dead periods, such as 
immediately after winter pruning; the vine's roots are deep, so many varieties 
cultivated in Cyprus did not need regular irrigation, if any. The two heavy work 
periods for the vineyard keeper are pruning and, above all, picking in August. 
Although some of the Turkish-Cypriot resettled labour carne from the Paphos hill 
regions which traditionally grew table grapes, demanding a fuller working year, the 
citrus orchards needed to be constantly tended, particularly after a period of neglect 
(summer of 1974 until late 1975, early '76). So even when the Morphou area had 
been re-populated there was much re-skilling necessary both to bring yields and 
particularly quality back to pre 1974 levels. Throughout the entire period quality 
suffered tremendously until at least 1977, the proportion of the crop falling into 
industrial class was rising and out-weighing that proportion of the crop destined for 
export though, as quality remained a problem, new markets were found for 
industrial class oranges85. Yields however did gradually improve (see Figure 5.21), 
though at the expense of the acreage under cultivation (see Figure 5.22). 
In the early stages, citrus growers sold at fixed prices mostly to the public sector 
company Cypruvex though periodically prívate sector companies, such as Sunzest, 
marketed a proportion of the crop. Prívate sector contractors collected the crop and 
delivered it to the exporter (Cypruvex or Sunzest) who packed it, marketed it and 
organised insurance and transport of the produce to the market, usually an export 
market. Citrus growers did however need cash advances to pay for inputs which 
they purchased either from local co-operatives or prívate merchants. So, acting 
much like a co-operative or marketing board, Cypruvex provided its growers with 
part of the valué of the current crop in advance, in which case the grower is 
contracted to sell a set quantity of a particular quality citrus product to Cypruvex. 
S5ibid. 
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The CTCCB, through locai credit societies, administered much of this short term 
financing, advances and payments in kind (agricultural inputs). 
More recently the Turkish-Cypriot leadership tended to sponsor citrus production in 
other ways and for différent reasons, through subsidy and the continued control of 
exporters. Tawney has said that "in a society of peasants [the centrai problem] is 
prices, credit and tenure."86 These are the main concerns of northern Cypriot 
farmers, as of farmers elsewhere. The long term problem of tenure is perhaps 
beyond the scope of the Cypriot leadership, though in the short run it has tended to 
disrupt agriculture by only granting short term leases and shifting people around, 
sometimes for reasons of patronage and favour87. In terms of prices and credit, the 
administration in the north intervenes by ultimately underwriting the availability of 
credit and by providing price support. A Turkish-Cypriot Grain Commission 
continued to operate, fixing prices and having monopoly buying power, as cereal 
crops could not be grown economically in the north88. It acts as a public company 
and also operates a flour mill (originally Greek-Cypriot but later operated by 
Cyprus Turkish Industriai Enterprises Holding Co. Ltd., another state company, 
who passed it on to the Grain Commission to operate). Perhaps like other parts of 
Europe, northern Cypriot farmers are hooked on subsidies and, instead of 
developmental subsidies, the majority of this funding is in the form of price 
supports89 for staple crop production, but where at the same time the state has been 
effectively the main supplier of credit and inputs and is the monopoly purchaser of 
most produce. 
86Tawney R.H. 1931. Land and Labour in China. London: Alien & Unwin, p. 54. 
87 Morvaridi 1993. op. cit., pp. 233-234. Scott 1998. op. cit., pp. 149, 153, 157. 
88Interview with Gulhan Alp, op. cit. 
89In 1994 the government paid citrus and cereal growers 100% above world market prices for their 
crop. Direct subsidies to agriculture in that year amounted to TL500 billion (1994 TL), around 3 % 
of GDP. Interview with Ozalp Sarica, 17/3/95, 21/3/95, 24/3/95. 
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Although not important in the initial phase, other structural factors have 
predetermined agriculture's limited potential in the development of the région. 
Citrus production in Cyprus is wholly dépendent on irrigation, so over planting was 
already a problem and perceived as such in the 1960s90 when the government of the 
Republic imposed heavy restrictions on planting and pumping in coastal areas, 
particularly around Morphou and Famagusta. Since then subséquent water 
development projects in the Troodos région, may have reduced further the 
availability of water in the main citrus growing, Morphou area. After 1974 
however, the seasonal flow of two rivers was diverted in an attempt to refill 
depleted aquifers, though this was not nearly enough to sustain the acreage under 
production. To little avail; the signs of water shortages and soil contamination from 
sea water intrusion are obvious to anyone who Visits the area. Adverse price 
movements in the early 1990s made much citrus production marginal, heightening 
the perception of decay. However, price supports insulated farmers from realising 
more productive, profitable and water conserving possibilities. 
The région's ecological interdependence with the south is possibly another 
exogenous factor limiting development. The Coming to fruition of much investment 
in the south91, the rétention and consumption of more run off there, particularly 
from Troodos (where most rain and snow falls), left the north with severe water 
shortages if existing production of export agriculture was to be maintained. Over-
pumping of aquifers since de facto partition and a decade of low rainfall have made 
a bad situation worse. As a conséquence the formerly lush citrus groves around 
9 0 UN. Programme of Technical Assistance, 1961. Cyprus - Suggestions for a Development 
Programme, (the 'Thorp Report'). Prepared by Willard L. Thorp. NY: UN, pp.32-33; Haid, M.W. 
1968. A Study of the Cyprus Economv. Nicosia: Printing Office of the Republic of Cyprus, pp.59-
60. 
91 The Southern Conveyor Project relays surface water from Troodos to Nicosia, some of which 
would have previously refilled ground water supplies in the north. In 1986, the pipes for the project 
alone accounted for 3 % of total imports, costing the équivalent of 1 % of GDP, Republic of Cyprus, 
1992. Economic Report 1991. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, Dept. of Statistics and Research, pp. 
99, 263-264. 
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Morphou look dry and neglected92. Most of the water projects undertaken in the 
north (e.g. reforestation in the Kyrenia range - destroyed during Turkish military 
intervention and again in a large fire in 1995 - eight new dams including the one at 
Gecitkoy [Pangra] on the Western end of the Kyrenia range) depend on local 
rainfall. Recent low prices may have made further development less attractive, 
although the prospect of piped water from Turkey has for years been rumoured to 
be tantalisingly close. 
Over-planting and over-pumping of ground water has already had disastrous 
environmental effects in Cyprus. One of the first areas of large scale citrus 
production was in the Varosha and Ayios Memnon areas in the south east. Between 
1946 and 1960 the area planted with citrus groves increased by 70 %(93). Over 
planting and subsequent over-pumping of ground water led to the seepage of sea 
water into ground water supplies, soil salinization and the total destruction of the 
orchards in the south east. Fortunately tourist development subsequently took the 
place of the agriculture economy which had been destroyed there (though most of 
this was lost to the area following the events of 1974, when it became a closed 
military zone). Arguably, farmers in the north west needed incentives to diversify, 
at least into less water intensive production, but a policy of price supports, and what 
were effectively water subsidies, was maintained, sending the wrong signais. There 
are similar subsidies to hôteliers and the criticism is that this form of subsidy is used 
for politicai rather than economic motives, perpetuating waste and inefficiency 
rather than stimulating growth and development94. 
9 2 UN Security Council, 21st August 1992. "Report of the Secretary General on his Mission of Good 
Offices in Cyprus", NY, p. 5, paragraph 25: "I noted that the economic significance of the Morphou 
area had diminished with the decline in value of citrus growing and ... pointed out that the water 
situation in general, and in the Morphou area in particular was reaching a criticai point... " 
93Republic of Cyprus. 1960. Census of Population and Agriculture. Nicosia: Ministry of Finance, 
Dept. of Statistics and Research, Vol. VI, P. 26. 
9 4 Morvaridi 1993. op. cit., pp. 235-251. 
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Having said this, constant improvements in the productivity of land do seem to have 
occurred within the all important export agriculture sub-sectors. Increases in output 
within the sub-sector of citrus production and within the most important sub-
category of oranges were solely due to intensification and to a certain extent the 
concentration of production, rather than the extension of production (see Figure 
5.21 and Figure 5.22). However, this may have consisted of more water intensive 
production methods95. Intensification of existing production is the obverse of what 
followed in the south after 1974, where production was of necessity extended and 
diversified. This is true both at the level of the sub-sector and at a more general 
level. 
What the improvements in export production in the north may have meant is still 
unclear. Because productivity increases were more in terms of land than labour, 
they could point to serious under-utilisation before the 1980's, alternatively they 
could suggest a period of rationalisation with the boom years of the i960's seeing 
the extension of citrus production into increasingly marginal land. New factor 
endowments and costs (shortage of labour and different time horizons in terms of 
land fertility) made the cultivation of crops at the margin less cost effective. Price 
movements in the 1980s seemed to increase this tendency. Undoubtedly there was a 
period of institutional change, the redistribution of tenancies, which may have led to 
a change in the rationale of the utilisation of land resources. Clearly the increases in 
the productivity of land says something about technical and/or institutional changes 
within the sub-sector, following the war of 1974. 
95 ibid., p.237. 
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Figure 5.22 Orange output and area under orange cultivation 
Cyprus, 1975-90. 
in the northern 
! Orange area (ht's) 
' Oranges output (mt's) 
Source: "Statìstica! Yearbooks", 1978-90 (Agriculture Section) "Slate" Planning Organisation, norlh Nicosia. 
Perhaps perversely, and because of the problem of water shortages, improvements 
in agricultural productivity could be seen in terms of a wasting asset. Undoubtedly, 
in geo-political terms, parts of the citrus growing area around Morphou have often 
been cited as part of a possible territorial adjustment96, which is a disincentive to 
long term investment in the région. For both politicai and ecological reasons, a 
theory of exhaustible resources may be relevant for the intensification of citrus 
production if, like growing tobacco, this means current production levels could 
damage the future productivity of soil; if so, are we looking at différent discount 
rates facing Greek-Cypriot and Turkish [Cypriot?] farmers? and/or différent input 
cost structures over the use of water, soil resources and soil and chemical additives? 
Perhaps there were différent time horizons in the post 1974 northern Cypriot 
economy? Was one community looking to maximise income in the short run whilst 
the other community has or had longer term horizons? Clearly, unilatéral 
96The Economista 28/3/98. 
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compensation arrangements in the north were geared to avoid such problems (the 
points system); whether they have worked however, and how effectively is another 
matter97. Perhaps the economic data included here provides some answers. 
It could be argued that the public sector response has always been politically 
motivated, though that implies as much the force of circumstances as it does the 
existence of foresight. Even so, the response in the citrus industry, at least in the 
first few years after defacto division, was highly pragmatic and short term whilst it 
offered many politicai complementarities: something for the refugees from the 
south, settler votes for dominant politicai forces and some foreign exchange 
independence from the Turkish treasury in Ankara. Re-settlement was never going 
to be easy and in many ways proved easier than expected, easier than in the south. 
Defacto division seemed to create longer term problems of economic sustainability, 
both in terms of continued dependence on export agriculture as a leading sector and, 
more generally, the sustainability of an independent Turkish Cypriot economy, 
north of the UN Buffer Zone. 
Recovery in a relocated economy & the continued dominance of public 
enterprise 
Suddenly the enclaved had secured the long-term politicai objectives of their 
leadership, objectives which they had not dared believe would be fulfilled. Within a 
year of the "peace operation" the Turkish community had been re-settled in an 
almost completely ethnically homogenous region, by some estimates twenty times 
the size of the strategie collection of villages and fortified enclaves they had left98. 
9 7 Scott 1998. op. cit., pp 158-159. 
98President Makarios acknowledged, in an interview with a corespondent from Eleftheros Kosmos 
(Free World), that Turkish Cypriots controlied an area not exceeding 2% of the island. Front page 
report, Cyprus Mail, 20/8/69. 
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GNP had suddenly jumped by 62.2% in real terms as a result of windfall gains. 
Now Turkish-Cypriots had a real economy to manage, however, they still faced 
severe institutional and political constraints. Exogenous constraints derived from 
diplomatic isolation and endogenous constraints derived from ambiguous property 
rights, and strategic and political priorities which may still have clashed with 
rational economic objectives; for example, the need for a dispersed rural settlement 
policy. The Turkish-Cypriot community developed institutional innovations to 
compénsate for the underdeveloped nature of the private sector. In the light of 
newly established external constraints in an expanded economy, Eti, Evkaf and the 
co-operative movement provided the essential mechanism for economic revival, in 
the absence of some of the basic pre-requisites of a market economy. To these, 
Turkish-Cypriots, following Turkish advice, added new institutions. Ad hoc state 
enterprises were set up to deal with the problems of utilising an expanded resource 
base, such as Cypruvex, and were designed to overcome endogenous and exogenous 
constraints affecting the marketing and distribution of citrus producís. 
The problem facing the regime in the late 1970's as it established itself north of the 
UN Buffer Zone, was the dislocation of transport, processing, packaging, marketing 
and distribution from production which had largely lost its human capital and the 
means of mobilising resources (with the continuing insecurity over property rights 
incentives have remained something of a taboo problem"). Diplomatic isolation and 
persistent political insecurity meant that necessary new investment was difficult to 
attract from countries other than Turkey which had its own major economic 
problems. It was allegedly on this basis that an expatríate Turkish-Cypriot 
businessman, Asil Nadir, was approached and for this reason: to exploit and 
develop assets in northern Cyprus. Before 1980 the Nadir family had only a very 
minor stake in the economy of northern Cyprus, using home-based workers for 
9 9 Scott 1998. op. cit., pp. 156-157, 159. 
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some of the labour intensive stages of a typical East End (of London) based, 
immigrant rag trade opération (Wearwell). Thus Asil Nadir, the Chairman of 
Wearwell, was encouraged by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership to purchase Polly 
Peck (an ailing East-End textile manufacturer) privately in 1980100. Because of its 
public quotation on the London Stock Exchange, Polly Peck opened the door to 
major new investment possibilities for northern Cyprus. Polly Peck International 
(PPI) became the northern Cyprus' PFI (private finance initiative). 
In the early stages of post '74 development, however, the région's key export was 
organised by the new "administration", using Cypruvex (see Figure 4.8). From the 
limited data available, in the first few years of a separate economic entity in 
northern Cyprus the "state" dominated export production, as it did (directly and 
indirectly) in most other areas of economic activity. Smaller, seemingly independent 
companies101 appear one year, generally exporting small quantities of citrus, and 
disappear entirely a few years later (see Table 4.9). The extent to which existing 
markets were maintained and production and distribution networks re-established, 
prior to the entry of Nadir, is surprising considering the rhetoric102. Despite 
apparent early dips in production, output, and particularly quality, export levels to 
the région's most important markets were quickly restored and maintained. 
100Hindle T. 1991. The Sultan of Berkeley Square: Asil Nadir and the Thatcher Years. London: 
Macmillan, p. 11. 
101 Morvaridi 1993. op. cit., argued that until Sunzest was established in 1982, Cypruvex maintained 
85% of citrus exports, p. 243. 
102"It was to take three to four years before production got going again under new management, and 
usually with a different work-force. In the meantime the citrus groves and other productive assets 
were neglected, the fruit being left to rot on the ground." (Wilson R. 1992. Cyprus and the 
International Economy. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 120.) And "towards the end of 1980 the 
government came under severe fire for its handling of the citrus fruit industry." Dodd 1993. op. cit., 
p.118. 
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Figure 5.23 Anglo-Cypriot trade in oranges, 1970-92. 
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Source: "Overseas Trade Stat's of the UK", HMSO, "Stat's of Imports & Exports", Dept, of Stat's & Research, Nicosia. 
By 1980, the marketing of the north's key export, oranges, to the dominant market, 
the UK, had surpassed its pre-war peak of 1973 (Figure 5.24 above, for an 
explanation of the data behind the graph, see footnote 102), with an overwhelming 
majority of orange production deriving from the re-organised (but pre-Nadir) groves 
of northern Cyprus. 
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Figure 5.24 Proportion of citrus exports from northern Cyprus destined for the 
UK (by value), 1975-1993 . 
Source: [Annual] Import & Export Statistics, "Ministry" of Economy & Finaiice, north Nicosia. 
As before the région again exported most Cypriot oranges, the overwhelming 
majority of which still went to the UK. If anything, however, the role of the UK as 
the main market for the produce of northern Cyprus accelerated after the régions de 
facto change in administration. 
It is however difficult to say just how dépendent the région was on the UK market 
prior to 1974, not having been administered separately. With the preponderance of 
British tourists and the most populär destinations being in what is now the north, 
and with the north being the origin for most export agriculture, in which Britain was 
a key market, it would appear however, that Britain was the most important trading 
partner with the région prior to 1974. The subsequent role of Britain in maintaining 
a separate Turkish-Cypriot entity after 1974 seems significant, particularly after 
1978. The early loss of the region's mining sector, transitional problems in the 
tobacco industry and the diminished role of both international tourism and 
manufacturing in the initial phase of development, thrust the région back to relying 
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on traditional products and traditional markets. Agriculturai exports were dominated 
by orange production, though lemons, potatoes and hellim (halloumi) cheese were 
also important exports, again finding a ready market with the former colonial 
power. This is in stark contrast with developments in the Greek-Cypriot economy 
where, following the war, increasing export volumes found new markets (see 
Figure 2.12). 
Figure 5.25 Main destinations of exports from northern Cyprus by value, 1976-
1990. 
Source: "Statistical Yearbooks", 1978-1990 (Extemal Trade Section), "State" Planning Organisation, north Nicosia. 
A major barrier to overseas trade was overcome in 1978 when the British upper 
Chamber, the House of Lord's, decided that British courts could not rule on the 
issue of trespass in Cyprus. The (then) "Turkish Federated State of Northern 
Cyprus" continued to be free to export produce from Greek-Cypriot owned orchards 
of Morphou to its biggest market (before and after)103. Britain's décision to continue 
103 H.M. Customs and Excise did not differentiated between imports from the interaationally 
recognised state and those deriving directly from north of the UN Buffer Zone. As a resuit, U.K. 
trade statistics did not provide information on the level of exports destined for the UK from northern 
Cyprus. Transparent trade statistics were not readily available inside northern Cyprus, though 
empirical work reveals that patient and persistent investigation can provide disaggregated trade 
statistics. (e.g. By subtracting Cypriot orange exports to Britain from British orange imports form 
Cyprus, the balance is assumed to come form northern Cyprus.) Knowledge of these quantifies may 
have helped to prevent what the BBC's Money Programme called "the biggest corruption scandal in 
the history of British business"(24/11/93, "Unusual Transactions" The Money Programme. BBC, 
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to treat exports from the whole of Cyprus with preferential status, represented a 
significant trade concession by the north's main EU trading partner, but one that is 
not considered as significant by leading economists in the north104. 
The early relative successes in the export market were however achieved (and never 
surpassed) before the entry of Polly Peck. As seen below (Figure 5.26) 1980 is the 
point at which the trade balance commenced its almost relentless negative slide, 
after a period of improving trade balances. 
Figure 5.26 Looking for the hand of Polly Peck; exports from northern Cyprus 











13 Exports as a % of imports 1 
Source: "Statistical Yearbooks", 1982-1990, "State" Planning Organisation, north Nicosia. 
Seemingly despite unfavourable comparisons with the south, the transition 
mechanism, the use of "state" and quasi "state" sector organisations to reinvigorate 
the economy, utilising export agriculture as the leading sector, proved successful. 
Channel 2). Evidence seems to suggest that if Britain had determined a clear, consistent, 
unambiguous policy on Cyprus, or at least let its own economic interests prevail over foreign policy 
objectives, then British investors in Polly Peck would not have been so easily mislead about Output, 
profitability, and growth performance. Foliowing a 1995 European Court Ruling, Customs and 
Excise have been forced to differentiate between exports from the two de facto régions. 
104Bicak argues that trade between north Cyprus and the EC has made a negligible contribution to the 
its economy. Bicak, H.A. (June) 1990. "The Impact of the EEC on the Economic Structure of the 
TRNC. " Leicester University, Department of Economies, PhD thesis. 
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Nevertheless, many Turkish-Cypriots maintain that the "embargo" remained their 
main barrier to growth, adding additional eosts to products originating in the région. 
The rôle of the "embargo", its pervasiveness, is however partly undermined by the 
rapid restoration and importance of foreign markets, particularly the United 
Kingdom. 
Conclusion 
Despite the obvious différences in the rate and scale of economic development north 
and south, there are some surprising similarities in certain elements of the recovery. 
For much of the time the private sector and the individuai entrepreneur played a 
more important rôle in the Greek-Cypriot recovery, although similar key institutions 
(and in one case a key institution with a shared history) played an important rôle; in 
one case as a Supplement to and in the other as a Substitute for private 
entreprenuerialship. The converse relationship between the politicai situation and the 
economic one is a twist which makes the two politicai économies appear as mirror 
images, inversely related. The Turkish-Cypriot leadership actively campaigned in 
favour of the post-74 status quo, aiming to replace a de facto position with de jure 
partition. For them, economic policy was geared to consolidate the achievements of 
the Turkish Army. The Greek-Cypriots were anti the status quo, whilst economic 
policy and performance seemed to confer more of a sense of permanence to the 
division they rejected. Greek-Cypriots only reluctantly concentrated and rebuilt their 
economy south of the UN Buffer Zone. Ironically the politicai solution in the north 
is used to compensate for greater economic progress, the two being perceived in 
some senses, and in politicai circles, as mutually exclusive. In the south, economic 
progress tacitly compensâtes for failures on the politicai front. However, 
intervention by the state, north and south reveals some surprising similarities: both 
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seem more politically motivateci and more politically successful than economically 
so, both attempted with considérable success to tap private sector resources, 
channelling investment in desired directions. 
Time will tell how soon this analysis proves obsolete, when more data and 
comparative analysis of the économies of Cyprus is published. This chapter, Iike 
those that preceded it, asks more questions than it has been able to answer. Many of 
the questions seem to imply that since 1974 and even 1964 Cyprus has functioned 
below par. Ethnie confiict may have caused the island's economy to be below its 
production possibility frontier simply because resources could not be utilised in the 
most efficient way possible. Politicai divisions have prevented natural 
interdependencies, complementarities from taking place. In the context of the 
supposed economic benefits of economic co-operation north and south105, and both 
communities' perceptions of the costs of division106, the next chapter uses a 
dynamic model to attempt to benchmark the costs and conséquences of ethnie 
division in Cyprus. 
1 0 5UN Security Council, 17 December 1993. (Unpublished) "Report of the team of experts on the 
economic benefits of the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package". 
106Bicak, H.A. 1993. "An Evaluation of the Turkish Cypriot Position. Debts of Greek Cypriot 
Community", paper submitted to the U.N. Représentative in Cyprus; Republic of Cyprus 1975. 
"Economic Conséquences of the Turkish Invasion and Future Prospects of the Cyprus Economy. " 
Nicosia: The Planning Bureau. 
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CHAPTER 6. More than the sum of its parts? Estimating the long-
run costs of division, 1963 and 1974. 
Introduction 
Having generally adopted a tone which, contrary to the literature, has perceived de 
facto division in Cyprus as a constructive conséquence of politicai failings, 
considération must be given to what the Cypriot economy could have looked like 
had it remained integrated and unitary. Although there have been estimâtes of the 
losses each community has suffered (referred to above), none has considered the 
problem using a long run dynamic framework. This chapter attempts to estimate 
national income in an idealised integrated Cypriot economy in 1990, and roughly 
predict relative communal shares of that income. To arrive at these yardsticks, a 
sériés of alternative growth trends to the ones actually experienced by the two 
disjuncted Cypriot économies will be used, and compared with the sum of the two 
économies outputs. The object is to discount for four unusual income movements 
(Figure 6.1 below), the politicai implications of which have dominated the 
literature, the static accumulative value of which has become a point of reference in 
cost analysis to date, and the economie conséquences of which have been the subject 
of this thesis so far. 
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Figure 6.1 Percentage change in GNP on previous year (in constant prìces/. 
Source: Grcek Cypriot (GC) data: Time Serici Data, Min. of Finance; Turkiali Cypriot (TC) data: Bicak. H.A., 1993. 
Here, the objective is to ascertain what income could have been expected to be by 
1990 if civil war and effective inter-communal re-distribution had not occurred. The 
main problem to be addressed first will be to determine what is an appropriate 
alternative growth trend, and see how it compares with real income growth in the 
period. Put another way, how do the island's two économies appear to have 
performed against the best guess of what could have been expected of them before 
the de facto split? After différent methods of estimation have been explored, the 
average performance of a group of similar économies will be used as a proxy for 
peaceful Cypriot economic performance. The combined performance of the two 
Cypriot économies will then be measured against these average trends, to see the 
extent to which Cyprus appears to have under performed following the upheavals of 
1963 and 1974. 
Although many possible outcomes could have occurred had extremists not seized the 
initiative in 1963 and 1974, the alternatives to be tested here will be optimistic ones 
of necessity, skewed to provide a unitary outcome: the continuance of a bi-
^urkish Cypriot income data for the '60s and early '70s does not exist, these figures are based on 
the only available estimâtes, which should be considered with caution. Source: Bicak, H.A. 1993. 
"An Evaluation of the Turkish Cypriot Position. Debts of the Greek Cypriot Community". Report 
sent to the UN Secretary General's Special Représentative for Cyprus, Joe Clark, 16 July 1993, p. 8 
communal state after 1963, and the récréation of one following inter communal 
talks in 19732. In a sense this is politically correct social science, as each historical 
juncture represents the politicai watershed in the rhetoric of both communities, 1963 
for Turkish-Cypriots, 1974 for Greek-Cypriots, and the re-establishment of a 
unitary state is the declared objective of the UN Security Council (though most 
economists would probably also agree that the most efficient outcome would be 
achieved in a unitary Cyprus3). It is however also useful to begin from more than 
one historical juncture, not only to address the concerns of both communities but to 
allow the possibility of comparing results both with reality and alternative 
projections, offering some basic sensitivity analysis of the hypothesis raised by this 
debate: would a single, integrated, Cypriot economy have maximised income? At 
the same time however the present research follows the contours of politicai debate 
and historiography. As each community has some notion of the costs of division, 
attempts to demonstrate what could have reasonably been expected from a single 
and integrated island economy seem to be valid. 
Estimâtes from initial yardsticks 
First attempts to construct a model for pan-Cypriot development are based on 
simple extrapolations of existing trends; do they say something about where the 
economy appeared to be going before falling into the trough of civil war? Running a 
régression to extend an existing growth trend into the future after 1963 and 1974 
may provide a guide, albeit a rough and ready one, as to what a unified Cypriot 
economy could have looked like. The main questions concerning the soundness of 
this heroic leap, assuming existing growth trends persist, will be side-stepped 
2 "The inter-communal talks which started in 1968, fours years after the breakdown of the Zurich 
Constitution, had virtually arrived at full agreement by late 1973" Attalides, M.A. 1977. Cyprus 
Reviewed. Nicosia: Jus Cypri Ass., p.xi. 
3Because it would minimise duplication (one public sector rather than two and one island-wide 
infrastructure) and maximise the possibility of the efficient and rational exploitation of resources 
(rather than recourse to second best, non-market and quasi-market alternatives justified by the 
politicai circumstances). 
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initially. The more immediate problem is the availability and applicability of data 
for the purpose of extrapolating a trend line. Data limitations (explained over the 
next few pages) mean that initial tests must be restricted to projections of pan-
Cypriot income in 1980; there are insufficient recorded observations to allow 
projections beyond 1980 having much meaning. 
An initial proximation of all island economic development is based on the only bi-
communal macro-economic data that exists: 1950 to 1963 national income accounts. 
As the constitution broke down on 23 December 1963, data in that year is probably 
stili représentative enough of an integrated economy for it to be of use. The early 
independence years (after 1960) begin to set the tone for subséquent development. 
Unfortunately earlier data (before 1960) is imbued with the effects of exogenous 
shocks, encompassing the peaks of a military build up and the troughs of subsequent 
withdrawal. Between 1950-57 British military expenditure on the island increased 
by over 600%4, boosting demand for goods and services produced locally and 
creating a multiplier which rippled out through the domestic construction industry. 
This is the period of the construction of the large scale service personnel résidences 
within bases around Dhekelia and Akrotiri, when the output of the domestic 
construction industry increased by 85%5. Once this activity was completed, British 
Military expenditure on the island declined. For this and other exogenous reasons6, 
overall Cypriot GNP feil by 10% between 1957 and I960 whilst on a per capita 
basis the fall was even greater at 15 %7. The 1950 to 1960 period also encapsulâtes 
the rise of communal tension (the EOKA period, 1955-59) which also saw the 
beginnings of organised violent ethnie tension and politically inspired population 
shifts; consequently the period 1950-63 cannot be viewed as the ideal model of a 
unitary Cypriot economy. However, between 1950 and 1955 and 1959 to 1963, for 
4Hald, M.W. 1968. A Study of the Cvprus Economy. Nicosia: Printing Office of the Republic of 
Cyprus, footnote 50, p.34. 
5Between 1950 and 1957 the output of the domestic construction industry increased by 84.6% in 
constant factor costs of 1950. UN. Programme of Technical Assistance,,. 1961, Cyprus. Suggestions 
for a Development Programme, (the Thorp Report). UN. New York. 1961. Table 1B, p.3. 
sThe decline in copper and citrus prices (major Cypriot exports at the time) and bad harvest. 
7In constant factor prices of 1950. Republic of Cyprus Statistical Abstract 1961. Dept. of Statistics 
and Research, Ministry of Finance, Nicosia, p.180. 
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a majority of Cypriots the economy worked as it had for centuries, as one rather 
than in the interests of two competing nationalisms8. 
The problem with choosing an earlier period when the island was at peace and the 
economy more integrated, is that the data does not exist. There were no national 
income accounts published before 1950. Another problem is the speed of 
development. Before 1950 and particularly before the Second World War9, the 
structure of the Cypriot economy was différent. Modern property rights had only 
been created with the land reforms of 1939 and 194410. What the 1950-63 data does 
have in its favour is that it is a fairly long and relatively unbroken time sériés, 
encompassing the economic activities of both communities (but alas also that of the 
colonial power's), the peaks and troughs of economic activity, some the resuit of 
endogenous phenomena, many exogenous (British military expenditure, the rise and 
then collapse of citrus and copper prices in the 1950's, the bad harvest in 1957). 
Paradoxically, this is probably as good a selection of random shocks as any, unique 
though the period was. A small economy is bound to be continuously affected by 
major exogenous shocks even if the main exercise here is to discount for the ones 
originating from ethno-national conflict. Essentially, with a disordinately distorted 
economy, cross-checking is necessary. The 1950-63 national income data provides a 
reference point for slightly more sophisticated yardstick projections attempted later. 
The object of these alternative yardsticks is to avoid dependence on data derived 
exclusively from Cyprus in this period which, because of the unusual nature of the 
8Between 1955-59 there was a Greek boycott of British goods and a Turkish boycott of the dominant 
Greek Cypriot economy. 
9The Second World War had been good for the Cypriot Economy. The first time it had looked like 
having any strategic significance to the British meant large scale investment in fixed capital 
formation, admittedly for military purposes but employing Cypriot labour and providing significant 
additional Cypriot income. 
10The 1939 "Law to consolidate and amend the law relating to land tenure", simplified and 
modernised immovable property rights on the island. Govt, of Cyprus, 28 February 1939, The 
Cyprus Gazette, pp 149-194, legislation no, 161. Nicosia: Govt. Printing Office. In 1944 "A law to 
Provide the conversion of the categories of immovable Property hitherto known as Vakf Idjaretein 
and Arazi Mevkoufe Takhsisat into Mulk and Arazi Mirie respectively and for matters incidental 
thereto", transformed large areas of land formerly leased from Evkaf (a legacy of Ottoman rule) to 
freehold property in the name of the leaseholder, who became liable to a Land Registration Fee of 
3 % of the value of the property. Govt, of Cyprus, 6 April 1944, The Cyprus Gazette, pp 80-86, 
legislation no. 231. Nicosia: Govt. Printing Office. 
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historical phenomena (large externally financed military spending, civil unrest, de-
colonisation), may distort subséquent trend projections. 
The initial reference point assumes that Cypriot growth continues along the existing 
1951-63 trajectory (blank columns in Figure 6.2 below)11 and that both communities 
grew at an equal pace after 1963 from their existing share of national income12. The 
trend implies that Greek-Cypriots have performed better than could have been 
expected, given the economy's previous rate of growth having matched the 
performance of the entire economy by 1980. Turkish-Cypriots, meanwhile, did not 
matched the performance based on this trend. Their share of Cypriot income 
declined from 14.5% in 1963 to 9% in 1980. Seemingly, even with the significant 
redistributive effects of the politicai upheavals of 1974 (see Figure 6.1) Turkish-
Cypriots had not recovered from the breakdown of power sharing and economie 
integration in 1963. 
Figure 6.2 Projected Cypriot GNP compared with Greek & Turkish-Cypriot 
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Source: OC data: "Statistica! Abstrats" (various), TC data: Bicak, H.A. 1993. 
Cypriot GNP 
I Projection 
Greek Cypriot (GC) GNP 
Turkish Cypriot (TC) GNP 
' ~ ~~ Projected TC share cet. par. 
nSemi-log value of growth in GNP over time from 1950-63 was 0.04766 with a standard error of 
0.0029301. 
12Bicak 1993. op. di . , p. 4. 
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Put graphically the relative shares of GNP in 1980 in a hypothetical, integrated 
economy, compared with how they were with de facto division, look something like 
the following (Figure 6.3 below): 
Figure 6.3 Actual & projected income in 1980, assuming 1951-63 growth trends 
persisi. 
C£900 -r 
Total Çypriot Greek Cypriot Turkish Çypriot 
Sourct: GC (fata: "Staili tìcal Abatncl i" (vanoui), "T imeSt r i t i I>ata I 9 6 0 - W . T C data. B i o k . H.A. 1993. 
The first column shows the combined income of the island as a whole in 1980 
(C£863 million 1980 Cyprus Pounds) with the projected income of C£788 million 
adjacent to it. The third column shows Greek-Cypriot income in 1980 (C£787 
million) adjacent to its projected share (C£674 million). The fifth column shows the 
actual income of the (then) "Turkish Federated State of Northern Cyprus" in 1980 
(C£76 million) next to its projected share (C£114 million). The first point to note is 
that the actual combined income of the two de facto économies is greater than the 
projected income from the no war, no division assumption. However, in 1980 
(when Turkish-Cypriot exports peaked as a proportion of imports) they appear to be 
50% worse off than they would have been had growth trends persisted, whilst 
Greek-Cypriots appear to be 14% better off with de facto division. 
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It has been argued that if politics had not intervened, by 1966 Turkish-Cypriots 
would have received income proportionate to their population size13. Given similar 
natural reproduction rates prevailing between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots14, it then 
could be assumed that the Turkish-Cypriot share of Cypriot income would be 
around 18% (the Turkish-Cypriot share of the population at the time of the last all 
island census in 1960). Perhaps this argument implicitly follows the logie of 
classical growth theory and the logie of diminishing returns. Rather than retain 
some 14.5% of national income and experience growth at a similar rate as Greek-
Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots, starting from a lower base experience faster growth. If 
then by 1980 Turkish-Cypriot income was equal in share to its projected population, 
the model predicts that they were 87% worse off than they would have been in an 
integrated economy in 1980. Meanwhile, and on the same basis, Greek-Cypriots 
were 18% better off in the divided island in 1980. Either way the problem remains, 
would the growth rate of 4.8%, predicted by this rough projection, have been 
sustainable over the decade and a half from the end of December 1963 until 1980? 
The evidence from other similar économies (see below) suggests it would have 
been, though this will be discussed in detail below. First a similar estimate needs to 
be made from the 1974 watershed. 
Estimâtes from the 1974 watershed 
In some ways it is easier to set up a second extrapolation, to project all island 
Cypriot economic growth had the de facto north / south division of the island not 
taken place in 1974. The advantage here is that the local direct economic 
conséquences of the British withdrawal from the Indian Sub-continent and partial 
withdrawal from Cyprus itself are largely excluded, whilst the shocks of 1963 and 
1967 are partly accounted for, as are the conséquences of some of the major global 
economic shocks that occurred in the early 1970's. Using the data from the latter 
period the modem structure of the economy is, to a greater extent, built in, making 
uibid., p. 8. 
14Cuco, A. (Spain, Socialist) 27 April 1992. " Report on the Demographie structure of the Cypriot 
Communities". Council of Europe, ADOC 6589 1043-23/4/92-4-E. 
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the problems of distortion a little less serious than projections based on earlier data. 
The projection is also statistically more secure, as it means extrapolating a mere 
seven years (rather than seventeen) from fourteen good (rather than thirteen slightly 
more disparate15) observations. The island was however already divided, not 
hermetically and not generally regionally, but fairly rigidly on ethnie grounds. On 
the basis of a less secure historical model (i.e. the economy was already largely 
divided ethnically), this second projection provides a more secure economic and 
statistica! one. 
Thus Figure 6.4 (below) extrapolâtes a growth trend from 1973. The projection 
assumes a level of reintegration had occurred to the extent that Turkish-Cypriots had 
regained their 1963 share of National Income. This is a more reasonable assumption 
than it at first seems. Much of the Turkish-Cypriot loss of income in 1964 derived 
from a loss of earnings from government and public sector employment16. 
Reintegration assumes that there was agreement on the fundamental issues, a return 
to abandoned property and that the public sector again became bi-communal. The 
assumption is that the Turkish-Cypriot share of public sector employment again 
exceeds its proportionate share of the population, as it had in 1963. A return to 
public sector employment and abandoned property would bring the Turkish-Cypriot 
15Pre 1960 data had to be extrapolated using earlier growth trends from incompatible National 
Income data. The first reliable National Income Accounts for Cyprus were published in 1951 and 
referred back to the year 1950 only. They were based on estimâtes calculated using the 1950 Census 
of Employment and Production (Statistical Abstract 1956, p.178). From then until 1956 estimâtes of 
Cypriot National Income were based on the 1950 Census of Employment and Production, Annual 
Censuses of Agriculture and subsequently the 1954 Census of Production. These estimâtes generated 
an aggregate income figure called "Net National Income", at current and constant factor costs. In the 
1959 to 1962 Statistical Abstracts, GDP and GNP figures are given in current and constant factor 
prices back to 1950 for the first time. After 1963, the 1958 UN System of National Accounts (SNA) 
is used and recalculated back to 1958. These figures are quoted in constant and current market prices. 
After 1983, the new 1968 SNA system was used and ali National Income Accounts are recalculated 
back to 1976 using this new system. However, basic data such as GDP, GNP etc. have been 
recompiled back to 1960. These différent metliods of calculation are not compatible. What has been 
done here is simply to use the most up to date estimâtes where possible. So the 1960-1963 figures in 
constant 1980 market prices are based on the 1968 SNA quoted in the 1993 Statistica! Abstract, 
p.213 (published in 1995). Percentage growth rates for GNP at constant market prices, 1958-1960, 
and at constant factor prices, 1950-1957, have then been used to recompile GNP figures in 1980 
market prices using the 1968 SNA figures as the basis from which the earlier fluctuating growth rate 
diminishes. 
16A factor that contributed to the breakdown of the Constitution itself, as Greek Cypriots were not 
Willing to honour, or at least not speedily enough, their Constitutional commitments to raise the ratio 
of Turkish Cypriot public sector employment to 30%. 
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share of National Income to something approaching the 1963 figure17. The further 
assumption is that income subsequently grows at an equal rate. The calculation 
using 1960-73 data and again determining a trend by using an ordinary least squares 
approach on a semi-log scale, gives the considerably higher annual growth rate of 
7.15% (with a standard error of 0.0031). 
Figure 6.4 Projected all-Cypriot GNP compared with actual Greek and Turkish-
Cypriot income after 1973. 
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Source: GC data: "Statiatical Abstract»" 1993, TC data: Bicak, H.A. 1993. 
17By 1963, 33% of the highest grade Civil Servant, 27%, 26%, 23%, 18% and 27% of other grades 
were Turkish Cypriot (Attalides 1977. op. cit., p. 82). Turkish Cypriot share of public sector 
employment stili fell short of the Constitutional requirement of 30% at ail levels (H.M.S.O. 1960. 
The Cyprus Constitution: Part VII, Chp. 1, Article 123). It is assumed here that much of their loss of 
income in 1964 reflects the loss of employment in the public sector and that had an agreement been 
reached in the inter-communal talks in late 1973 (Attalides 1977. op. cit., p. xi.), income from 
public sector employment would have considerably boosted the Turkish Cypriot share of National 
Income, considering that they represented 18% of the population. 
% c h a n g e i n e m p l o y m e n t b y s e c t o r o n 
1 1 9 6 3 1 1 9 6 4 1 1 9 6 5 
p r i m a r y \ % - \ % - 1 % 
s e c o n d a r y 4 % - 5 % 2 % 
t e r t i a r y 1 % | - 1 2 % | 8 % 
Source: Rep. o fCyp . 1993. "Labour Statistics 
1991". Nicosia, p.31. 
The table above shows the immediate conséquences on employment of the breakdown of the 
constitution in 1963. It is generally acknowledged that most employment losses were Turkish Cypriot 
and, as is indicated above, 69% of those losses were in the tertiary sector. It was the public sector 
(government and the utilities) which provided the majority of Turkish Cypriot tertiary sector 
employment. And if income from employment, rather than numbers employed, were used as the 
criteria, evidence suggests that losses would have been even more heavily concentrated in the tertiary 
sector. 
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In this case the estimateci all-island income in 1980 would be 28% higher than the 
combined income of the (Greek Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus and the (then) 
"Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" (Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 compared with 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3). If income had continued to grow along the 1960-73 trajectory, 
Greek-Cypriots would have been 20% better off whilst Turkish-Cypriots would 
have been 110% better off in a unified economy (Figure 6.5). 
Figure 6.5 Actual & projected income in 1980, assuming 1960-73 growth trends 








B Actual ONP 
Ë3 Projected GNP 
Total Cypriot Grcck Cypriot Turkish Cypriot 
Source: GC data: "Stat. AbV (various), "fime Series Data 1960-90", TC data, Btcak, H .A. 1993. 
The only available estimate of Turkish-Cypriot income in 1973, however, gives it as 
approximately 5.7% of Greek-Cypriot income (rather than the 14.5% of 1963). If 
significant reintegration had not taken place, but the island remained politically as it 
was in 1973 until 198018 and the economy in the two communities grew at an equal 
rate, the projection of the distribution of Cypriot income after 1973 would see 
Turkish-Cypriots looking worse off and Greek-Cypriots even better off (see Figure 
6.6 below) in this projection of the unified economy. Thus it would appear that, 
only if Turkish-Cypriots' income share had grown at a significantly faster rate than 
Greek-Cypriots' in the 1964-74 period, would Turkish-Cypriots have been better off 
in 1980 than they were. 
18 Essentially assuming that the Greek sponsored coup against Makarios did not take place. 
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Figure 6.6 Communal income in 1980, assuming growth continues along the 
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Source: GCdata: "Stat. A b V (varions), "Time Seri« Data 1960-90", TC data, Bicak, H.A. 1993. 
Further distributional problems will be dealt with later, however, Table 6.1 (below) 
summarises the conséquences of using either 1963 or 1973 ethnie income 
distribution estimâtes. The implication is that, if it is assumed that the 1963 income 
distribution was retained or re-established, then Turkish-Cypriots would be better 
off in a unitary economy in 1980 (using either the first projection from 1963 or the 
second projection from 1973). Conversely, if Turkish-Cypriot income grew at the 
same pace as Greek-Cypriot income, following the 1960-73 trend line after 1973, 
and income distribution remained roughly the same, then Turkish-Cypriots were 
better off on their own. 
Table 6.1 Actual & projected income distribution in 1980 using 1960-73 trend to 







Actual incoine C£787 C£76 C£863 
Projected income on the basis of 1963 share C£944 C£160 C£1,104 
Projected income on the basis of 1973 share C£l,041 C£63 C£1,104 
First projection (1950-63 data to extend trend from 64-80) C£674 C£114 C£788 
Source: GC data, Statistical Abstract (various). Time Series Data 1960-90; TC dato, Bicak, H.A. 1993. 
In terms of the Cypriot economy as a whole, the results of these basic speculative 
adventures are inconclusive. The second projection seems to demonstrate that the 
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income of the island as a whole, and the income of both communities could have 
been better (Figure 6.4 and Table 6.1) in ali but one case (Turkish-Cypriot income 
in 1980, assuming 1973 income shares remain), had war and ethnie division not 
interrupted development. Results from the first projection, from the 1963 
watershed, imply however that total output on the island is greater than it would 
have been (last row and column, Table 6.1). These preliminary contradictory 
conclusions lend some support to the politicai positions of both communities. If 
1963 is seen as the important watershed in Cypriot history (the Turkish-Cypriot 
view), then the economic cost of the status quo in 1980 largely disappears (Figures 
6.2 and 6.3). Measured from the watershed of 1974 (the one emphasised by Greek-
Cypriots), the possible costs to the island as a whole and Greek-Cypriots in 
particular, are considérable (Figures 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6). Only when wholly 
pessimistic about the possible effeets on bi-communal income distribution of the 
reintegration of the economy after 1973, does division look economically preferable 
to Turkish-Cypriots (Figures 6.6), a position not inconsistent with officiai Turkish-
Cypriot attitudes. 
At the level of the island as a whole, these divergent results hinge on projected 
growth rates. Is there any reason to suppose that the Cypriot economy would have 
continued to grow at an average rate of over 1% per annum throughout the 1970' s, 
as predicted by the second projection, rather than at the slower rate of nearly 5 %, 
predicted by the first projection? It is now worth cross-referencing these results with 
the record of similar économies, to compare their performance over the same 
period. This may discount for some of the global phenomena (the breakdown of 
Bretton Woods, increased global inflation and the sharp oil price rises) along with 
some of the more unique exogenous phenomena. It may also help to indicate a more 
consistent general conclusion before attention is again dra.wn back to the thorny 
issue of inter-communal economic performance records, relative to what might have 
been in a unified economy. 
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Selecting peers as proxies for pan-Cypriot economic growth 
The work of development economists provides the methodology for an alternative, 
and arguably more useful benchmark for income in a unitary economy beyond the 
1963 / 1974 watersheds. Chenery and Syrquin19 have argued that development 
follows patterns depending on structure and background. So a group of similar 
économies could provide a proxy for Cyprus if it performed close to the mean 
across a range of key indicators and if the divergence around the mean, for 
important characteristics, was not too great. After briefly discussing the process of 
selecting some peer économies, 3 groups have been proposed as sharing enough 
(though différent) key attributes to be said to have had, at least at the mean, similar 
growth potential to Cyprus in 1960. These groups of économies are based on a 
regional group with similar per capita income (background) in 1960 (the World 
Bank's "More Developed Mediterranean" category - MDM)20, a Regional Sub-
Group21, and a group of "small primary oriented", Micro-Economies22, similarly 
sized and possessing a similar structure to Cyprus in 1960. 
Before reaching this stage however, the initial problem was to locate économies 
with significant similarities with the Cypriot economy before it became économies 
plural. What would a Cypriot peer group be expected to look like? Seemingly a peer 
group would be a group of économies with similar opportunities for economic 
growth and development as Cyprus. These opportunities could be a similar resource 
base, a similar starting income and / or a similar structure. These factors are largely 
predetermined, but whether similar opportunities are exploited may depend partly 
on policy (the degree of openness to international trade) and partly on other 
19Chernery, H. & Syrquin, M. 1975. Patterns of Development 1950-1970. Washington. OUP. 
20IBRD. 1982/3 World Debt Report. Washington D.C. World Bank Publications, included the 
category "More Developed Mediterranean": Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Malta, Portugal, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia. 
21 As above but excluding the two persistent outliers, Israel and Turkey. 
22Chernery & Syrquin (1975. op. cit.), use this category, here a much abbreviated group includes 
only the économies with populations below 1 million in 1960 and available data: Barbados, Fiji, 
Malta, Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago. 
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background factors (the level of human capital development, the level of market 
development and, most basically the level and distribution of per capita income). 
Essentially there may be certain measurable criteria which make more explicit, 
characteristic links, implying similar economic potential. 
Perhaps the most important measurable similarity between economies is per capita 
income. This is the criteria by which the World Bank ranks countries in its annual 
"World Development Report". If Cyprus23 was included in the 1995 World 
Development Report's "World Development Indicators", it would have found itself 
above Puerto Rico, Argentina, Greece, South Korea and Portugal and below New 
Zealand, Ireland, Spain, Israel and Australia respectively24. If the World 
Development Report had been published in 1960 and Cyprus had been included, it 
would have been above Spain, Lebanon, Greece, South Africa and Singapore and 
below Uruguay, Japan, Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina and Ireland respectively25. 
As is clear from the diversity of these two groups of economies, per capita income 
is a crude indication of economic potential though it is clearly one way of isolating 
potential peers. Whilst resisting the more general equations used to create regression 
predictions26, more variables need to be considered when selecting peers on the 
basis of potential development opportunities, rather than simply an economy's level 
of income divided by the population size. 
Inspired by Chenery and Syrquin and more recently by Sachs and Warner27, the key 
variables that have tended to be associated with growth are: investment rates, 
savings rates, human capital development, openness and government consumption 
rates; these have been used to help isolate other economies with more similar 
23Republic of Cyprus only. 
24 IBRD, World Development Report 1995. New York: OUP. Countries ranked in ascending order 
by per capita income, p. 162 & p.228 (no per capita income data given for Saudi Arabia). 
25Ranking per capita income for all economies listed in the first "World Development Report", 
published in 1978, plus Cyprus, but excluding the centrally planned economies. Data for per capita 
income in 1960 derived from "World Tables 1971", table 4, IBRD. 
26 
As reviewed by Levine, R. & Renelt, D. "A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth 
Regressions". American Economic Review. Sept. 1992, Vol. 82, No.4, pp.942-963. 
27Sachs, J.D. & Warner, A. 1995. "Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration." 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1. 1995. 
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growth potential to Cyprus in 1960, but are all these variables exogenous? 
Investment rates depend on economic opportunities which may in turn depend on 
access to resources. Echoing the themes of new growth theory, savings are related 
to income which, feeding into investment rates, may affect future economic growth. 
Also size may be an important factor, either increasing or limiting the possibilities 
of growth. Kuznets has acknowledged, in a negative way, the importance of 
smallness28. Even then structure is still important but so too is location29, 
particularly when dealing with small économies. 
Within these différent frameworks and constraints, three groups surfaced as possibly 
shedding some more light on future Cypriot economic potential, had politicai 
circumstances not intervened to divide the island, its people and its economy. The 
search for peers increasingly focused on the analysis of économies either similar in 
size and structure in 1960 or sharing a similar location, broadly sharing both a 
similar income and a similar economic structure in 1960. Within these criteria two 
particular alternatives presented themselves as the most tenable peer groups, a 
similarly structured group of very small micro économies and a medium income 
regional group sharing similar income profiles and growth rates. The latter group 
(or groups) derived from an existing World Bank category: "More Developed 
Mediterranean", which includes Cyprus. Without war and civil strife it seems even 
more likely that Cyprus would experience (as it did anyway) the tourist boom. Its 
location and its investment in human capital may have also led to the establishment 
28Justifying the lack of inclusion of small économies in his analysis of the components of economic 
growth, Kuznets states that "I omitted ail countries with population of less than one million. This 
seemed warranted because of the erratic character of the production structure of the heavily 
dépendent splinter countries." Kuznets S. 1971. Economic Growth of Nations. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, p. 108. 
29Reiterating many of the points listed above Jeffrey Sachs has said (in the Economist 29/7/96) that 
"Studies of cross-country growth show that per capita growth is related to: 
...the géographie and resource structure of the economy, with landlocked and resource-abundant 
économies tending to lag behind coastal and resource-scarce ones. " as well as: 
"the initial income level of the country with poorer countries tending to grow faster than richer 
countries; 
the extent of overall market orientation, including openness to trade, domestic market 
libéralisation, private rather than state ownership, protection of private property rights, and low 
marginal tax rates; 
the national savings rate, which in turn is strongly affected by the government's own savings 
rate..." 
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of mercantile and commercial centres and to agriculture and manufactories tapping 
new and important regional markets. In terms of the former criteria (size and 
structure), though heavily influenced by Chenery and Syrquin30, a small sub-group 
had to be created because most "small primarily oriented économies" highlighted by 
them31, were not nearly small enough to make direct comparisons with Cyprus 
meaningful (if size is taken to be another key factor affecting economic growth 
Potential). Ultimately when considering a very small, open, island economy in a 
prime modem entrepôt location, any potential peer group should reflect many of 
these regional and geo-political characteristics, most of which will not be captured 
by a more generalised régression procedure. 
Comparîng other Micro-Economies with Cyprus in 1960 
In the 1950's and early 60's Cyprus was a "small primary oriented"32 economy. If 
data from a group of similarly sized and structured économies with similar 
background and conditioning factors could be found, their subséquent performance 
could give an indication of the Iikely direction of a no war, non-divided Cypriot 
economy. It was thought therefore that a "small primary oriented" economy must 
have a population of one million or less in 1960 to be similar to Cyprus and that it 
must be primarily non-industriai; in 1960 industry accounted for 23% of the work-
force and 17% of Cypriot GDP. Potential peers should also be both investment and 
market oriented with average Gross Domestic Investment rates of at least 15% of 
GDP between 1951-60 and, particularly given that they are similarly sized 
économies, they should be similarly open to international trade with an average 
international trading rate of 30% and over of GDP33. The involuntary final catch-all 
30 
Chernery & Syrquin 1975. op. cit., note to table 2, p. 15. 31 ibid. 
32Chernery & Syrquin 1975. op. cit., Table 1, p.9. 
33 Imports as a % of GDP 4- exports as a % of GDP / 2. 
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was that compatible data should be available for a thirty year period extending from 
around 1950. 
Figure 6.7 Structure of production; % ofGDP derivingfrom agriculture and 
industry in the Micro Economies in 1960. 
E Industiy 
Œ Agriculture 
Trin. & Tob Cyprus Malta Mauritius Barbados 
Soura: UN Ycarbooks of Nat. Account! Stat's 1980 (IBRD "World Tablei 1983" for the contribution of Utilities in Baibados). 
Fiji* •Fijian data is for 19(55. 
Due to both the historical fact that most small nations, now members of the UN, 
were not independent in 1960 and to a subsequent cost bias, early comparable data 
from small economies is rare. Of 32 "small [mostly] primary oriented" economies 
taken from Chenery and Syrquin34 and highlighted as having populations of roughly 
one million or less in 1960, only eleven had anything like sufficient comparable 
data. Of these eleven, only five looked vaguely compatible with Cyprus (in terms of 
the above criteria): Barbados, Fiji, Malta, Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Table 6.2 Population in '000s in 1960. 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Mauritius Cyprus Fiji Malta Barbados 
776 660 573 394 329 231 
Source; Penn-World Tables Version 5.6 (http://nber.harvard.edu/pwt56.html). 
34Chernery & Syrquin 1975. op. cit. 
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Figure 6.8 Micro Economies per capita income in 1960 
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Trinidad Barbados Mauritius Fiji Cyprus Malta 
&Tobago 
Soiree: Summen & i leüon, Dec, 1991,I'eim WariiiTablci (FWT) venian 5.6., <hllp;/AiberJuivuiLed»^iwt5diimil> 
Clearly these are again divergent economies with very different economic 
backgrounds (Figures 6.7 and 6.8). Many members of the group still had very high 
natural rates of population growth in the 1950's and I960', with Fiji having a 
CBR35 nearly 100% higher than Malta and 50% higher than Cyprus in 1968. This 
partly explains why per capita performances diverge so dramatically (Figure 6.9). 
Using market exchange rate data, average per capita income feil by nearly 20% 
between 1951 and 1965 in Fiji and Mauritius whilst it grew by almost 100% in 
Trinidad and Tobago in the same period36. The fortunes of the former two and to a 
lesser extent that of Barbados, were then overwhelmingly tied to the fortunes of one 
primary product: sugar. And the more rapid growth associated with Trinidad and 
Tobago, another economy sharing a high CBR, was mostly because its fortunes 
were tied to the export of another primary product, oil. 
35 
Crude Birth Rate, (average annual no. of live births per thousand). 36IBRD 1971. World Tables 1971. World Bank Publications, Baltimore: John Hopkins University. 
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Figure 6.9 Micro Economies; average annual percentage growth in real per 









Sachs and Warner have said "very few developing countries remained relatively 
open since World War II or since independence" and named only seven of which 
Barbados, Cyprus and Mauritius were three37. (There was no mention of Fiji in 
their analysis, but of Malta they said there was insufficient data38 and of Trinidad 
and Tobago, the fastest growing small economy in the period 1950 to 1965, they 
say it was "never open"39, which may go some way to explain its subséquent 
performance). Generally, openness to international trade reveals the level of 
integration into the world economy, which says something about productivity, levels 
of market distortion, monetary conditions40 and rent seeking (or the lack of it). 
Below, in Figure 6.10, Cyprus is seen as the least open of the Micro Economies, 
suggesting that ail other things being equal, Cyprus was likely to grow more slowly 
than the other économies. 
37Sachs & Warner 1995. op. cit., p.4. 
38ibid., p.86. 
39 • • 
Trinidad and Tobago fails to be classified as open by Sachs and Warner (1995. op. cit.) because of 
exchange controls which meant that an average black market exchange rate premium existed in the 
1970s of 22% and in the 1980's of 45%. op. cit., pp.23, 25 & 92. About another country that failed 
on similar grounds they wrote: Botswana failed to qualify on the basis of its black market premium 
for the 1970's, but did qualify for the 1980's. It passed ail other criteria. Overall, therefore, the 
policies have been relatively open... " ibid., p.45. 40 Boltho, A. 1996. "The Assessment: International Competitiveness", Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, Vol. 12, No. 3, (Autumn), pp. 1-16. 
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Trinidad Barbados Cyprus Malta Fiji Mauritius 
& 
Tobago 
Source.whete poMtbk: Summen Sl Heilen, "Penn WorklTablet (PWT) vfcriion 5.6 (corubiu 1985 pr i r r i . cltain index): cxceptiom: Baibadoi ÄPi j imarke t x m e chi 
1951-60 a j idpppth t» 1961-63, Malleie growth n i e frem 1955-63. 
Figure 6.10 Degree ofopenness in the Micro Economies; Imports & exports as 
a percentage of GDP, 1951-60. 
Malta Trinidad Barbados Fiji* Mauritius Cyprus 
& *I ' i j i an da t a from 1 9 3 1 - 3 on ly 
Tobago 
Sauree: IBRD, "World Tables 1971". 
Of the policy indicators, investment rates have long been pereeived in varying 
degrees to be strongly correlated with economic growth41. In Figure 6.11 below, 
which as far as possible uses Summers and Heston's "Penn World Tables", Cyprus 
is seen to have the highest investment Ievels of ali the Micro Economies analysed 
here. Much of this investment may have had less direct economic potential than 
investment elsewhere, as this was the period when Britain built two large bases in 
Cyprus to conform with its policy reversai of a "base in Cyprus rather than Cyprus 
as a base". However all things being equal, the higher the level of investment, the 
higher future growth and, given the fact that some of the investment during the 
period contributed to Cypriot economic development, and that Cyprus had 
investment levels that compare favourably with this group of peers, future growth 
should be as fast as the group's mean growth rate. 
41 The World Bank's cross-economy regression results showed investment in physical capital to be the 
single strongest policy indicator effecting growth. For every 10% points of GDP of increased 
investment, the economy grew by 0.5 %, compared with the second highest single factor, primary 
and secondary enrolment rates, where the increase was 0.3 % on the same basis. ("Evidence from 
Cross-Economy Regressions of per capita income growth", IBRD. 1993. The Ëast Asian Miracle: 
Economic Growth and Public Policv. NY: OUP. pp. 48-54). 
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Figure 6.11 Micro Economies; average investment levels as a percentage of 
GDP, 1950-63. 
"Data b e i are L960 far B u t s d o Se. Fiji had to be Rcautroctcd rning the trend of the différent» between PWT Se IBRD chta. where both data icts weie a Villi ble. 
Cyprus Fiji* Malta** Trinidad Mauritius Barbados* 
&Tobago 
Scurce: Summen & Heatou P o m Wocld Table« 5.6, IBRD "WorVl TitJc»" (vuiom), UN Ycaibook» of National Acconnl» Statistici (vuiout). 
More recently, levels of human capital development have increasingly gained 
significance in studies of economic growth. It is widely acknowledged that human 
capital development is difficult to define, difficult to measure and even more 
difficult with which to make cross country comparison. Here (Figure 6.12) the 
World Bank's precedence is followed again42, with the total gross primary and 
secondary school enrolment ratio taken to indicate some roughly comparable inter-
country levels of economically significant investment in people43. 
42ibid. 
43In "Evidence from Cross-Economy Regressions of per capita income growth", (ibid., p. 48) the 
authors argue that: "Our measure of educational attainment are primary and secondary enrolment 
rates in 1960, the area of human capital accumulation in which the HPAE's (Hi'gh-performing Asian 
économies) showed a substantial différence from other low- and middle-income économies. " 
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Figure 6.12 Human capital development in the Micro Economies; primary & 
secondary school enrolment in 1960. 
S o u » : IBRD. "WoridTablu 197!". 
The direct rôle of government in the economy is partly reflected by government's 
share of national income, represented below (Figure 6.13) as government 
consumption as a percentage of GDP in 1955, 1960 and 1965. Along with the level 
of openness (Figure 6.10), the government's share of national income says 
something about macro economic stability. High levels of direct government 
involvement in the economy could reflect a lack of competitiveness, inefficient 
allocation of resources, high borrowing, monetary expansion, inflation, exchange 
rate instability, ail of which feed into an economy's trade and ultimately growth 
performance. In statistics analysed below (Figure 6.13), Cyprus appears to have 
average government consumption levels relative to its income suggesting that, ail 
things being equal, subséquent Cypriot economic performance should have been on 
a par with the Micro Economies' average performance. 
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Figure 6.13 The level of government consumption in the Micro Economies as a 
% ofGDP in 1955, '60 & '65. 
Trin. & 
Tobago 
"World Tables 1980 
Cyprus# Average 
ÎPrimarUy Grcck Cypriot economy after 1963. 
The appropriateness of the selection of a diverse group of small island économies 
(the Micro Economies Group) as peers is partly undermined by some members' 
continued dependence on a few volatile primary exports. This however is also one 
of the group's strengths, as Cyprus was then dépendent on the export of a few 
primary products. This lack of diversity in export earnings for small open 
économies, is reflected in heterogeneous macro-economic growth rates, which have 
a particularly high coefficient of variation at 0.894 in the 1950-63 period (see Table 
6.3), and continue to remain high at 0.572 between 1964-80 (see Table 6.4); this is 
compared with coefficients of variation 0.273 and 0.328 (Table 6.3 & 6.4) 
respectively for the "More Developed Mediterranean" group of économies or 0.292 
and 0.226 (Table 6.3 & 6.4) respectively for the Régional Sub-Group (discussed 
below). The Kuznets logie, that countries with populations below a million be 
excluded from growth analysis because of their erratic production structure44, cornes 
back to haunt contemporary researchers because size seems to necessitate that 
performance in small primary oriented économies appears to shadow a combination 
of prices of a few key primary products and their relative stage in the démographie 
transition. Hence average growth rates in the Micro Economies may seem to offer a 
44Kuznets 1971. op. cit., p. 108. 
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less useful yardstick for accessing Cypriot performance, a yardstick nonetheless, as 
their inclusion in the analysis at least reduces the criticism of a bias of hindsight, 
seeing Cyprus as more like a "More Developed Mediterranean" economy than a 
small primary oriented one because that is what the Republic subsequently became. 
In 1960 and without the important artificial constraint or Stimuli of war, Cyprus 
may have broadly followed the path indicated by the background, conditioning and 
performance indicators of the other Micro Economies, countries with which Cyprus 
actively and successively politically associated itself 45. The present approach aims 
to avoid the problems associated with the effects of the terms of trade on a small 
economy by both concentrating on aggregate mean growth rates and by 
substantiating the argument with a range of proxy measures, some from other 
potential peer group économies. 
Comparing other similar regional économies with Cyprus in 1960 
Primary producing économies with populations below 1 million in 1960, though 
more like Cyprus in theory, do not compare as well in terms of key background, 
conditioning and performance factors. This may be influenced as much by the 
availability of evidence, given the need for relatively long time sériés reflecting a 
wide range of economic and social indicators, as by more structural différences. 
Ultimately, in the case of Cyprus, a hand picked regional group with similar per 
capita incomes46 (Figure 6.14) may prove to be more similar to the Cypriot 
economy and more likely to reflect an alternative performance than size and 
structure taken in abstract. 
45 "It is well known that Cyprus since independence has been a consistent and active founding member 
of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The first President of the Republic... was one of the 
originators of the Movement, who in parallel founded Cyprus' non-aligned foreign policy. " The 
Almanan nf Cyprus 1992. Nicosia. Press and Information Office (PIO), p.55. 
46The World Bank, in "Evidence from Cross-Economy Regressions of per capita income growth" 
(IBRD. 1993. The East Asian Miracle..., op. cit., pp. 48-54) reported that "Beyond accumulation of 
physical and human capital, initial income also has a significant relationship with per capita income 
growth. Economies that were relatively poor in 1960 grew significantly faster 'than relatively rieh 
ones, Controlling for levels of éducation and investment. " 
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The mostly larger économies included in the World Bank's "More Developed 
Mediterranean" (MDM) category had, ignoring Israël, similar per capita incomes in 
1960 (see Figure 6.14). 
Figure 6.15 Structure of production; % ofGDP derivingfrom agriculture and 
industry in the "MDM" économies in 1960. 
B lndusliy 
¡31 Agriculture 
Yugoslavia Portugal Israel Cyprus Malta Greece Turicey 
Source: UN Yeafbooki of Nat. Account* Stai's 1980; IBRD "World Tables 1983" for Yugoslavia. 
They also did not have any more dissimilar economic structures than the Micro 
Economies (see Figures 6.7 and 6.15). In such ways these économies, sharing the 
same région, could have more in common with Cyprus in 1960 and be more likely 
to share a common growth path subsequently than did a very diverse group of very 
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small économies that simply shared size, broad structure (non-industrial) and the 
availability of data-
Figure 6.16 Human capital development in the "More Developed 
Mediterranean " économies; primary & secondary school enrolment in 1960. 
Average 73.6% 
l l i i i 
mmwm 
ì > m 
Malta Israel Yugoslavia Cyprus Greece 
Source: IBRD, "World Tables 1971". 
Portugal T u d c e y 
The "More Developed Mediterranean" category includes Malta, Portugal, Israel, 
Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. These are mostly mixed, medium income 
économies like Cyprus, on the periphery of Western Europe. Whilst some group 
members may diverge significantly in terms of their size and structure, this category 
seemed conveniently to capture some of the most significant elements of post 1963 
regional economic growth: the rôle of mass tourism, an increasingly integrated 
European market, the decline of agriculture (in terms of employment and foreign 
exchange earnings) and the rise of services. Différences however existed in 1960, in 
the structure of the économies (Figures 6.15) and their recent economic 
performance (Figures 6.17), but not as great as the différences in the Micro 
Economies. To remove Cyprus from the group in 1964, and use the average 
performance of the remaining économies as the no war, growth proxy seemed to 
deserve further close analysis. 
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Figure 6.17 "More DevelopedMediterranean"; 
growth in real per capita GDP1951-63. 
average annual percentage 
As Figures 6.14 to 6.20 demonstrate, Cypriot performance closely correlates with 
the regional "More Developed Mediterranean" mean in terms of background data: 
(per capita income in 1960, Figure 6.14), human capital development (school 
enrolment ratios, Figure 6.16); and conditioning factors: openness (Figure 6.19), 
government consumption as a proportion of national income (Figure 6.20), and 
even, though less closely, investment levels (Gross Domestic Investment Rates, 
Figure 6.18). 
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Figure 6.18 "More Developed Mediterranean"; average investment levels as a 
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Figure 6.19 Degree ofopenness in the "More Developed Mediterranean " 
économies; Imports & exports as a percentage of GDP, 1951-60. 
KS Exports 
B Imports 
Source: IBRD, "World Tables" 1971 &1980. 
The higher than average investment levels (Figure 6.18) and level of openness to 
international trade (Figure 6.19) suggest higher than average growth, all other 
things being equal, as does the lower than average government consumption levels 
(Figure 6.20). Generally where Cyprus is not close to the mean it either performs at 
a level that indicates more rapid than average growth or its performance is close to 
the mode average. Any use of group mean growth rates as a proxy for a single 
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Cypriot growth rate, should not dismiss this World Bank selection of similar 
economies. 
Figure 6.20 The level of government consumption in the "More Developed 








Source: IBRD, "World Tables 1980". 
Given a similar performance in terms of background and conditioning factors in 
1960, (or at least appropriate divergence from the mean, for example higher than 
average investment rates, Figure 6.18), it could be assumed that a unified Cypriot 
economy would (ali other things being equal) continue to perform around the "More 
Developed Mediterranean" group of economies mean when it carne to subsequent 
economie growth. However, whilst Cypriot background and conditioning factors 
conform quite closely to the average of "More Developed Mediterranean" 
economies, by simply removing the two outliers, Israel and Turkey47, the fit may be 
even closer. The graphs below compare Cypriot performance with that of the "More 
Developed Mediterranean" economies other than Israel and Turkey, a group that 
will be referred to as the Regional Sub-Group. 
47Israel being a belligerent, heavily externally finaneed, migrant economy and'Turkey a much larger, 
more structurally diverse economy than other members of the group. 
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Comparing background, performance and conditioning factors in the Regional 
Sub-Group: 
Figures 6.21 to 6.26 compare the same background, performance and conditioning 
factors as have been used in comparing the two groups of peer economies above. This 
time, these six key growth indicators compare Cyprus before 1964 with only four of 
the most similar regional economies. Again, Cyprus tends to perform at least as well as 
the mean average performance, suggesting that subsequent economie growth should be 
at least as good as the group's average growth rate. 
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Figure 6.22 Structure of production; % ofGDP derivingfrom agriculture and 
industry in the Régional Sub-Group in 1960. 
Yugoslavia Portugal Cyprus Malta 1 
Source: UN Yeartooks of Nat. Account* Slafs 1980; IBRD "World Tubici 1983' for Yugoslavia. 
Figure 6.23 Régional Sub-Group; average annual percentage growth in realper 
capita GDP 1951-63. 
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Figure 6.25 Human capital development in the Regional Sub-Group; primary & 
secondary school enrolment in 1960. 
Malta Yugoslavia Cyprus Greeoe Portugal 
S a n « : IBRD. "World T j b k i 1971". 
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Figure 6.26 Degree of openness in the Regional Sub-Group; Imports & exports 
as a percentage of GDP, 1951-60. 
Malta* Cyprus Portugal Yugoslavia Greece Average 
• 1951-60 Source: IBRD, "World Tables" 1971 &1980. 
Figure 6.27 The level ofgovernment consumption in the Regional Sub-Group, 
asa% of GDP in 1955, '60 & '65 
Yugoslavia Malta Greece Portugal Cyprus Average 
Source: IBRD, "World Tables 1980". 
If the above economic indicators (Figures 6.21 to 6.26) are accepted as key growth 
criteria, Cyprus Iooks fairly typical in a group of fairly similar economies. 
Performance close to the mean of the Regional Sub-Group is particularly relevant if 
there are certain shared features which may not be captured by more general 
regression predictions, (such as predominantly demand led factors like the growth of 
mass tourism). 
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Statistical comparisons with the peer économies across a range of economic 
indicat ors. 
Having seen Cyprus presented as something of an average performer across a range 
of key indicators in three différent potential peer groups, it is useful to see how 
much variation there was around that average performance; so this section compares 
the coefficients of variation for the différent peer groups across the range of 
economic indicators introduced earlier, before and after 1964. Before 1964 the 
groups include the unitary Cypriot economy (Table 6.3), after 1964 the group 
statistics exclude data from that increasingly divided economy (Tables 6.4 and 6.5). 
Table 6.3 underlines the eligibility tests of the groups' mean growth rates to act as a 
proxy for Cypriot growth after 1963. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 examine coefficients of 
variation after 1964 to test the robustness of the proposed alternative development 
paths: the peer groups' mean growth rates 1964-90 (which excludes Cypriot data). 
In the World Bank's recent analysis of development in 18 developing countries 
during the period48, the 1960s and '70s were considered to be a period of "boom" 
for the developing world and the 1980's a period of "crisis and adjustment", so the 
analysis after 1964 was split again into pre and post 1980 sections. If a wide 
divergence in the performance of these économies occurs after 1964 across the 
range of key indicators, then the associated growth rate is less useful as a proxy for 
pan-Cypriot economic growth. However, if despite the removal of a near mean 
performer after 1964 and the turmoil of the 1980s, no pervasive divergence occurs, 
then the peer groups may offer a yardstick for how Cyprus could have done, had 
war and ethnie division not interrupted development. 
In Table 6.3 the key background indicators presented earlier such as per capita 
income in 1960 (variable 1), the structure of production in the same year (variables 
2-4) and the key performance indicator, namely growth in per capita income 1951-
63 (variable 5), have been contrasted with some of the proxy measures of what the 
World Bank considers to be criticai policy instruments associated with sustained 
48 Little, I.M.D., Cooper, R.N., Corden, W.M., Rajapatirana, S. 1993. Boom. Crisis. and 
Adjustment: the Macroeconomic Expériences of Developing Countries, Washington, OUP. 
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economic growth49 (variables 6-9: investment rates, the level of human capital 
development, the openness of the economy and the government share of national 
income). In the next tables (6.4 and 6.5) the same variables are selected but 
background and structural data derive from 1980 and 1990, and growth experience 
from 1964-80 and 1981-90 respectively in the peer groups which then exclude the 
divided Cyprus. 
Table 6.3 shows the coefficients of variation for the three proposed peer group 
économies (the Micro-Economies, the "More Developed Mediterranean" économies 
and the Régional Sub-Group), for the basic background, performance and policy 
indicators up to breakdown of the Cypriot constitution at the end of 1963. 
Table 6.3 Group comparisons with a united Cyprus; coefficients of variation 








1/. GDP per capita in 1960 0 0 11% O 104 
2/. Agriculture as a % of GDP in 1960# 0.486 0.517 0.398 
3/. Industry as a % of GDP in 1960# 0.456 0.254 0.274 
4L Services as a % of GDP in 1960# 0.168 0.240 0.260 
5/. % growth in per capita GDP 1951-63* 0.894 0.273 0.292 
61. Average investment as a % of GDP 1950-63 ** 0.516 0.363 0.313 
7/. Total gross primary & secondary enrolment ratio in 1960. 0.139 0.273 0.162 
8/. Openness; X & M as a % of GDP 51-60## 0.265 0.814 0.742 
9/. Govt share of GDP ( %) in 1960 0.531 0.378 0.371 
M i c r o E c o n o m i e s : Cyprus , Barbados , Fiji, Malta, Mauritius, Trinidad & T o b a g o . 
M o r e D e v e l o p e d M e d i t e r r a n e a n : Cyprus , Greece , Israel, Malta, Portugal, Turkey , Yugos lav ia . 
R e g i o n a l S u b - G r o u p : Cyprus , Greece , Malta, Portugal, Yugos lav ia . 
Notes: 
#Data for Fiji is for 1965 , Value added from utilities in Barbados is included with transport and communications in 1960 (UN Yearbooks 
of National Income Accounts, various) so the proportion of GDP derived from the former in 1970 (first available disaggregated year -
IBRD. World Tables 1983) has been subtracted from Transport and Communications in 1960, a relatively insignificant 1.8% of GDP and 
used as a rough estimate for the contribution of utilities to GDP in 1960. 
*lsraeli and Maltese average growth rate derived from 1954-63 and 1955-63 average respectively, and the Barbadian & Fijian figures from 
market exchange rate data 1950-60 & PPP data 1961-63. 
**data before 1960 for Barbados, Fiji & Yugoslavia had to be reconstructed using the trend of the différence between PWT & IBRD data, 
where both data sets were available, and discounting earlier World Bank estimâtes by the value ofthat trend. Israeli data is from 1953-63 
and Maltese data from 1954-63. 
##Data for Fiji is from 1951-53, though 1963-67 (the next available data-set) is not very différent. 
Sources: 
Variables 1,5,6 & 9, Summers & Heston, "Penn World Tables (PWT) version 5.6"; Variables 2-4, UN, 1980 Yearbook of National 
Income Accounts. NY; Variables 7, 8, the value of utilities in Barbados (& other market x rate data), IBRD, World Tables (various). 
The Micro Economies were expected to have the most similar production structures, 
and by some définitions they do (more on that later). In 1960 however, they have 
49 IBRD. 1991. World Development-Report 1991. NY: OUP, pp. 1-164; IBRD. 1993. The East 
Asian Miracle: .... op. cit., pp. 48-54. 
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only the closest correlating human capital development profiles, at least in terms of 
the important primary and secondary enrolment ratios (variable 7), and the most 
similarities in terms of their trade regime (variable 8), being the most open group of 
économies. Almost by définition the "More Developed Mediterranean" group of 
économies were more closely correlated than the Micro Economies in terms of their 
starting income, per capita income in 1960, a key background indicator. Once the 
two outliers Israël and Turkey are removed however, the corrélation in starting 
income is even closer in the Régional Sub-Group. In terms of their 1951-63 growth 
record (variable 5), the Micro Economies diverge dramatically, as outlined earlier. 
With average investment rates, as a percentage of GDP (variable 6), the World 
Bank's régional grouping (MDM) had the closest correlating experiences between 
1950-63. More countries have more similar, and similarly high, investment rates in 
the period encompassing Marshall Aid and US régional military assistance (Greece, 
Turkey, Israël, Portugal), colonial developmental and / or military expenditure by a 
departing colonial power (Israël, Malta, Cyprus). Either way the "More Developed 
Mediterranean" group of économies had average investment rates of 24% compared 
with the Micro Economies mean rate of 17% and the Cypriot average rate of 33% 
of GDP between 1951-60. 
It is ironie that a group chosen partly on the basis of its supposed similarity in 
economic structure (Small and Primary Oriented ), is so dissimilar in ail but the 
contribution of services (possibly another function of smallness, particularly at the 
time). The structural différences appear to be greatest within the group when the 
contribution of agriculture in these "primary oriented économies" is considered. 
When it cornes to the contribution of industry, the Micro Economies are the most 
divergent group (variable 3, Tables 6.3, 6.4 & 6.5). So what justification is there, 
other than their size, to treat these micro économies as a group? One justification is 
that much of their recorded structural différences are the conséquences of recording 
and data compatibility problems which exaggerate real structural, and by 
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implication, developmental différences50. Other justifications stem from the fact that 
in 1960 the Micro Economies were, like Cyprus, ail very small, open, service 
oriented island économies, with similar levels of human capital development. 
Table 6.4 Subséquent convergence or divergence within the groups (excluding 








1/. GDP per capita in 1980 0.584 0.308 0.124 
2/ . Agriculture as a % of GDP in 1980 0.796 0.645 0.502 
3/ . Industry as a % of GDP in 1980 0.559 0.227 0.176 
4/ . Services as a % of GDP in 1980 0.230 0.144 0.116 
5/ . % growth in per capita GDP 1964-80 0.572 0.328 0.226 
6/ . Average investment as a % of GDP 1964-80 0.411 0.136 0.131 
7/ . Total gross primary & secondary enrolment ratio in 1980. 0.103 0.131 0.072 
8/ . Openness; X & M as a % of GDP 64-80 0.254 0.770 0.761 
9 / . Govt share of GDP (%) in 1980 0.296 0.496 0.190 
Micro Economies: Barbados, Fiji, Malta, Mauritius, Trinidad & Tobago. 
More Developed Mediterranean: Greece, Israel, Malta, Portugal, Turkey, Yugoslavia. 
Regional Sub-Group: Greece, Malta, Portugal, Yugoslavia. 
Sources: 
Variables 1,5,6,8 & 9, Summers & Heston, "Penn World Tables (PWT) version 5.6"; Variables 2-4, UN, 1992 Yearbook of National 
Income Accounts, NY ; Variable 7, UNESCO, World Education Report. 1991, 1993, 1995. Paris. 
The logical counterpoint to the relative dissimilarity of the economic structures of 
the Micro Economies is that, by this measure, the regional économies were 
remarkably similar in structure in ail but the contribution of agriculture, or at least 
50In 1960 only 10% of Trinidad and Tobago's GDP derived from agriculture, whilst 40% derived 
from the primary sector. Depending on whether income generated from the extractive industry is 
allocated to industry of the primary sector, industry represents 50% of GDP in 1960 or 20% 
respectively. Unfortunately there are problems with grouping the extractive industry along with 
hunting, forestry and fishing in a "Primary Sector", problems wliich gather pace the further back a 
historical enquiry goes. This is why the World Bank has opted for the sectorial divisions: 
Agriculture, Industry and Services (Agriculture includes the UN catégories: agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing; Industry includes: mining, quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas, water and 
construction; Services include: whole and retail trade, restaurants and hôtels, transport and 
communications, finance, insurance, real estate and business services, community, social and 
Personal services, producers of government services and other - including statistical discrepancies). 
The World Bank, in its "World Development Reports", has attempted to avoid problems of 
interprétation by disaggregating manufacturing from industry, "because manufacturing is generally 
the most dynamic part of the industrial sector, its share of GDP is shown separately" IBRD. 1991. 
World Development Report 1991. p.209. Here, problems with data from Israël (manufacturing 
included mining and quarrying), Portugal (manufacturing included mining and quarrying) and Malta 
(mining and quarrying included in construction), mean that the same structural classifications have 
had to be used, though it is worth considering that estimâtes for coefficient of variation for the 
structure of production in the Micro Economies could be far closer if the extractive industry was 
included in a primary sector rather than being dumped in a more général "industry" category. When 
considering the primary sector in 1960 the Micro Economies look like they would be the closest 
correlating group if this strategy could be followed, and for the industrial sector they would be very 
close to the regionally related économies. Having said that, other than Trinidad and Tobago, and to a 
much lesser extent Malta, the above structural classifications do give a meaningful reflection of the 
structure and stage of development of most of the individual économies chosen here. 
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more similar than the group of économies initially picked on the basis of their 
structural similarity (see Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5). Generally ali of the peer 
économies had, like Cyprus, large but declining agricultural sectors in 1960, small 
but growing industriai sectors and large but still rapidly expanding service sectors. 
The Micro-Economies are however, unsurprisingly, the most similarly open to 
international trade, measuring total imports and exports as a percentage of national 
income (variable 8). Simply because of their limited resource base, they would be 
expected to be very open to international trade as they are wholly dépendent on 
trade for their survival. A low coefficient of variation for the eighth variable must 
therefore reflect structure, and in this case size rather than policy, a factor which 
also contributes to the even closer corrélations in the contribution of the service 
sector, partly a function of size and perhaps increasingly location rather than simply 
policy or stage of development. Cyprus finds itself exactly in the middle of all 
eleven économies in terms of openness to international trade in the 1951-60 period. 
Essentially it is located at the bottom of the Micro Economies scale and at the top 
end of the MDM économies (see Figures 6.10 and 6.19). 
The divergence in the government share of national income in 1960 (Table 6.3, 
variable 9) is greatest for the Micro Economies and lowest for the Regional Sub-
group, though the différence between the latter and the World Bank's MDM is far 
from being statistically significant. A significant convergence in this indicator for 
the Micro Economies and the Regional Sub-Group (Table 6.4) would imply that 
both groups were likely to benefit or suffer from similar policy influences. The 
Regional Sub-Group converges from an average government share of GDP in 1960 
of 19% to 16% in 1980. With the Micro Economies, however, convergence is in 
the other direction, more rather than less government with the average government 
share of GDP rising from 14% in 1960 to 16% in 1980. As expected, Israel and 
Turkey's divergence from the norm contributes to the divergence of the "More 
Developed Mediterranean" économies between 1960 and 1980 (Table 6.3 and 6.4) . 
Again as expected, Israel's government share of GDP is at the far end of the 
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spectrum in 1980 at 38%. Perhaps less expected though, is that Turkey's 
government share of GDP is at the low end of the spectrum51. 
Corrélations with Cyprus in the key growth related background, policy and 
performance indicators up to the time of the breakdown of the Cypriot Constitution 
at the end of December 1963 (Table 6.3), implies similar growth potential that 
subséquent events may have undermined. Generally what happens between Table 
6.3 and Table 6.4 (after 1964 and after removing Cypriot data from the 
comparison) is that divergence narrows considerably. This is particularly significant 
considering the very act of removing a close to mean performer around 1960 
(Cyprus) from the 1964-80 statistics could generate the possibility of greater 
divergence in the later statistics. Overall the coefficients of variation declined in 
around 60% of cases in the 1964-80 period (Table 6.4), and in 92% of selected 
policy indicators (variables 6-9), revealing a statistically and economically 
significant level of convergence within the separate peer groups. This ail broadly 
51 Govt share of national income, here derived from Summers, R. and Heston, A. 1991. The Penn 
World Tables, version 5.6, the National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA 
http://nber.harvard.edu/pwt56.html) inconstant international prices. These statistics do not seem to 
fully reflect, more, compatibly reflect, the economic role of government. Summers and Heston put 
the average Turkish Govt's share of GDP in the 1980's at 12% (this time in current prices) making 
Turkey the economy with the third lowest Govt share of GDP out of the 11 peer economies (the same 
ranking as at constant prices), and less than a single percentage point above the economy with the 
lowest Govt share. In 1980 Anne Krueger & Okan Aktan claim (1992. Swimming against the Tide: 
Turkish Trade Reform in the 1980's. San Francisco: ICS Press, p.57) that the deficits in the State 
Economic Enterprises (SEEs) alone would represent nearly 6 % of GNP. In a World Bank publication 
(Onis, Z. & Riede, J. 1993. Economic Crisis and Long-Term Growth in Turkey. Washington: 
IBRD, Table 7.3, p.42.) the financial deficits of the SEEs in 1980 were equivalent to 95% ofthat 
year's PSBR and 137% in the following year (between 1980-87 SEE deficits averaged 80% of the 
annual PSBRs when, on average, the PSBR represented about 6% of GNP. Seemingly if SEE deficits 
alone represented almost all of Turkey's PSBR throughout much of the 1980's, whilst Turkey also, 
for much of the time, waged a war in the South East at an estimated to cost 20% of the state budget 
(Preliminary Draft Report of the Defence Committee of the Assembly of Western European Union -
40th session - on The Eastern Mediterranean. Paris, 19 May 1995, A/WEU/DEF (95) 2, p. 11) the 
measures of Turkish Govt share of GDP appear to understate its economic role. In the IMF's 
International Financial Statistics (various) Turkey is also ranked very low in terms of Govt 
expenditure, expressed as a % of GDP (in current prices), this time second from bottom out of the 
11, though registering an intuitively more realistic share of national expenditure, twice the Summers 
and Heston derived figure. It is, however, the ranking that is important here, because of what it says 
about the value of inter-country comparisons. The rankings, however, appear most contradictory: 
Summers and Heston's Govt with the lowest share of the eleven's respective GDPs, is the IMF's 
third highest, whilst Turkey is ranked with the governments with the lowest shares of GDP. Both 
data sets fail to offer a compatible inter-country quantitative comparison of the economic role of 
govt, more of a failing in the Summers and Heston data set because that is what they set out to do, 
diluting the power of this highly significant indicator of the economic vitality of a nation. 
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supports the idea of using average peer group growth rates as a bench-mark for a 
unitary Cypriot economy in 1980. 
Between the initial period analysed in Table 6.3 and the following period (Table 
6.4), the Micro Economies' experiences of convergence are located in the 
performance and policy indicators: economic growth between 1964-80 as compared 
to the 1950-63 period (variable 5), investment rates, school enrolment ratios, the 
level of openness to international trade and the government share of GDP (variables 
6-9). The "More Developed Mediterranean" group of économies experience some 
structural convergence (industry and services, variables 3 and 4), convergence in 
investment rates and school enrolment (variables 6 and 7). The Regional Sub-Group 
converges even more closely on all the MDM counts, as well as in its growth 
performance and the government share of GDP. Initially put in as a sanity test, the 
data analysed in Table 6.4 shows that there is no great divergence in the groups' 
performance and policies following the removal of Cyprus. Seemingly the test 
works and a mean growth rate based on the performance of these, admittedly 
diverse, groups of économies seems to have meaning because, after establishing 
similarities with an unusual economy like Cyprus in 1960, growth related data does 
not subsequently diverge dramatically, rather the reverse, at least until 1980. 
On the basis of past performance and in terms of background indicators (ali other 
things being equal, the greatest indicator of subsequent performance52), the Regional 
Sub-group is both the closest match to the Cypriot economy at the end of 1963 (see 
graphs in previous section), and has the closest inter-correlating experiences. In 
terms of the structure of the economy and the second highest single statistically 
located contributor to economic growth, primary and secondary school enrolment53, 
the Micro Economies seem to offer the best guide to subsequent Cypriot 
performance. However, if the single greatest policy indicator affecting growth, 
52,,Evidence from Cross-Economy Regressions of per capita income growth",. (IBRD. 1993. The East 
AsianMiracle.... OD. cit., pp. 48-54). 
53 ibid. 
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namely investment rates54 (in physical capital) are considered paramount, then the 
best parallel performance must be offered by the World Bank's "More Developed 
Mediterranean" group of économies. A single Cypriot economy could have 
experienced an increasing economic rôle of government, like the average Micro 
Economy, in the 1964-80 period, or a shrinking rôle of government like the average 
Regional Sub-Group economy; either way, growth would be likely to have been 
affected. Given the fact that each possible peer group out performs the others in 
some correlating experiences with Cyprus until 1964 (Tables 6.3), or offers policy 
alternatives in the 1964-80 period, each peer group's mean economic performance 
offers a range of potential possibilities for a single Cypriot economy, a range of 
benchmarks for a unified, integrated Cypriot economy in 1980. 
There are three reasons why the earlier bench-marking stopped in 1980. The first is 
that simply extrapolating from past performance does not allow a statistically and / 
or historically relevant resuit to be extended beyond a very few years. Another 
reason is because 1980 offers a useful cut-off point between recovery from the 
effects of war, de facto territorial shifts and separate economic development. 198055 
appears to be the point at which both économies have recovered from their 
respective politicai traumas, so presumably any costs of division can be determined 
then. Another reason to end bench-marking in 1980, is because the proxy for all-
island economic development being developed here, the performance of peer 
économies, appears to offer a less convincing benchmark at the mean after 1980. A 
significantly wider and widening divergence in economic performance occurs 
amongst the peers after 1980, in ail three groups (variable 5, Table 6.5); this tallies 
with the performance of developing countries more generally56. However, the 
proposition that without war Cyprus should have done no worse by 1990 than the 
lowest average peer group performance, remains temptingly available as a tool to 
determine something of the cost of division. 
54ibid. 
55In 1980 Turkish Cypriot exports peaked as a % of GDP, Source: "TRNC", "State" Planning 
Organisation. Unpublished National Accounts Statistics. (Under Secretary Ahmet Zeki Bulunc, 
1993). 
56Little, Cooper, Corden, & Rajapatirana 1993. op. cit. 
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Table 6.5 Subséquent convergence or divergence within the groups (excluding 








1/. GDP per capita in 1989 0.241 0.299 0.133 
2/ . Agriculture as a % of GDP in 1990 0.889 0.670 0.552 
3/. Industry as a % of GDP in 1990 0.456 0.147 0.182 
4/ . Services as a % of GDP in 1990 0.152 0.107 0.084 
5/ . % growth in per capita GDP 1981-90* 1.755 1 . 1 2 2 1.469 
6 / . Average investment as a % of GDP 1981-90* 0.388 0.167 0.181 
7/ . Total gross primary & secondary enrolment ratio in 1990. 0.071 0.074 0.067 
8/. Openness; X & M as a % of GDP 1981-90* 0.287 0.583 0.613 
9/ . Govt share of GDP (%) in 1990** 0.249 0.345 0.192 
Micro Economies: Barbados, Fiji, Malta, Mauritius, Trinidad & Tobago. 
More Developed Mediterranean: Greece, Israel, Malta, Portugal, Turkey, Yugoslavia. 
Regional Sub-Group: Greece, Malta, Portugal, Yugoslavia. 
Notes: 
*1981-90 Maltese and Barbadian averages derived from 1981-89 and their 1990 Govt shares of GDP derive from 1989. 
Sources: 
Variables 1,5,6,8 & 9, Summers & Heston, "Penn World Tables (PWT) version 5.6"; Variables 2-4, UN, 1992 Yearbook of National 
Income Accounts. NY ; Variable 7, UNESCO, World Education Report. 1991, 1993, 1995. Paris. 
Table 6.5 shows the relative economic position of the peer économies (again 
without the inclusion of Cypriot data) in the developmental indicators selected 
earlier. Between the periods of analysis used in Table 6.3 and 6.4 there was 
convergence across the spectrum of indicators, particularly the policy related 
indicators. Whilst most of the selected indicators continue their convergence in the 
1981-90 period, the performance indicator diverges significantly from the 1964-80 
data (Table 6.4) by an average of over 330% for the peer économies as a whole. In 
some ways this may be a necessary divergence, for per capita incomes have 
generally converged significantly: most dramatically from a coefficient of variation 
in 1980 of 0.584 in the Micro Economies, to 0.241 by 1989. Convergence is 
maintained moreover in nearly 70% of the policy related indicators after 1980. If 
"adjustment" to "crisis"57 was occurring in some of these économies, then this was 
convergence in the right direction, with countries attempting more market friendly, 
long-term growth oriented policies. So whilst the main tool for bench-marking a 
single Cypriot economy's performance into the 1990s is likely to contain a greater 
spread of possibilities for économies with similar backgrounds and policy 
51ibid. 
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instruments, the justification for using such a proxy is even greater, because of the 
general convergence in per capita incomes by 1990. 
Given that Cyprus appeared to be an average performer across most of the key 
indicators in ail three groups up to 1960, and that no pervasive divergence occurred 
after 1964 across this range of growth related variables, despite the removal of 
Cyprus as a near mean performer after 1964 and the economic turmoil of the 1980s, 
then the peer groups offer a yardstick for how Cyprus could have done had war and 
ethnie division not interrupted development. Performing somewhere in the middle 
before the constitution broke down, Cyprus should have done at least as well as the 
worst average group performance after 1963; anything significantly less should be 
seen as the economic cost to Cyprus of the "Cyprus problem". 
Some preliminary benchmarks 
Having chosen three peer groups for the Cypriot economy, there are now three 
proxy measures, a range of possible growth rates to compare with the extrapolations 
attempted earlier. With a little less uncertainty, and no longer being dépendent on 
too few observations, a benchmark for ail island integrated Cypriot growth can be 
taken to 1990 and compared with the combined real income of both the de facto 
Cypriot économies, to see whether the island as a whole and the income of each 
respective community meets with expectations thus formed. This work will however 
be split into two parts, the first attempting to hazard another estimate of the cost of 
division by 1980. This section will compare Cypriot economic growth with peer 
group averages to 1980, when most of the divergence could be assumed to be the 
immediate conséquences and costs of war and division. The second part will extend 
the exercise to 1990, comparing Cypriot growth in the 1980's, when two separate 
de facto économies and economic policies could be seen to have emerged. 
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It could be expected that countries with lower per capita income in 1960 (the 
background variable), higher investment and school enrolment rates, a higher 
degree of openness and less government consumption (the conditioning variables), 
would grow faster than Cyprus subsequently and vice versa. If Cyprus however 
seems to perform close to the mean in these key indicators, in 1960, the worst that 
should be expected of Cypriot performance, had war not interrupted development, 
was that its performance would be not much worse than the annual average of the 
group. So the Micro Economies, the "More Developed Mediterranean" group, and 
the Regional Sub-Group's mean offers a continuum, a range of possibilities for what 
should have been expected of the Cypriot economy after 1963 (see Table 6.6). 
Table 6.6 Average annual growth of 
GDP. 
1964-80 1981-90 
Micro Economies 5.2% 2.0% 
More Developed Mediterranean 5.8% 2.9% 
Regional Sub-group 6.0% 2.2% 
Source: UN Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics, (various). 
The average annual growth rates, given in aggregate above (Table 6.6), have been 
used to extend an idealised unitary Cypriot economy to 1980 and then to 1990 from 
the watershed of 1963. If the combined Turkish and Greek-Cypriot income is less 
than that projected using the shortest of these yardsticks, Cyprus could be said to 
have under-performed as a conséquence of war and de facto partition. Both MDM 
and its Sub-group have a similar average annual growth rate of 5.8% and 6.0% 
respectively between 1964-80, whilst the average growth rate for the Micro 
Economies is somewhat slower at 5.2%. The peer group average annual rates of 
growth have been projected onto Cypriot income after 1963, (Figure 6.28 below). 
The slower average growth rate of the Micro Economies gives a GNP estimate 
which matches very closely the actual aggregate income generated in Cyprus in 
1980. Compared with the other peer groups' annual average growth rates however, 
Cyprus does appear to have under-performed by 1980. 
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On the basis of background, conditioning and performance indicators, the Regional 
Sub-group (RSG) is the best parallel for a no war Cypriot growth rate (see earlier 
sections), but as it is perhaps unrepresentatively small, both the slower growth rate 
of the "More Developed Mediterranean" (MDM) and the Micro Economies (ME) 
are projected on Cypriot income after 1963. Consequently, the tables below 
summarise a range of possible answers as to whether Cyprus as a whole, and the 
individuai communities in particular, had gained or lost by 1980, from the 
disruption and division of the economy in 1963 and 1974. 
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Table 6.7 All island, Greek & Turkish-Cypriot GNP in 1980 (in mlns of 1980 
CYP's) assuming the constitution did not breakdown at the end of December 
1963. 
Source: Greek Cyp. data: Stat. Abstracts, Turkish Cyp. data: Bicak, H.A. 1993, Peer Group dala: UN Yearbooks of Nat. Y Accounts. 
A B C 
AU Cypriot GNP Greek Cyp. GNP Turkish Cyp. GNP 
Actual GNP in 1980 C£863 C£787 C£7 6 
58 
Benchmark using Micro Economies average growth rate C£869 C£743 C£126 
59 
Benchmark using the average MDM growth rate C£934 C£799 C£135 
Benchmark using Regional Sub-group's average growth rate C£962 C£823 C£140 
* on the basis that income in both communities grows at a similar rate after 1963 
As there is no obvious way of determining conclusively the performance of the 
Cypriot economy as an integrated whole after 1963, the three above attempts 
(Figure 6.28 and Table 6.7) have the saving grâce of at least not being 
contradictory. These projections from the 1963 watershed ail point in the same 
direction, the implications being that if the Constitution had not broken down and 
the island had not been divided ethnically and subsequently regionally, north and 
south, the average annual growth rate should have been over 5%, giving an ail 
island GNP of between CYP870-960 (in millions of 1980 Cypriot pounds -CYP). 
The first three columns of Figure 6.29 below, show that total income in Cyprus did 
not match these peer group averages. 
58Despite the fact that there was enougli data to compare each economy with Cyprus in and around 
1960, there was still a problem getting hold of real GNP data for some of these countries in the early 
period. Out of 85 possible observations there are only 72, so this growth rate should be considered 
with particular scepticism. Ail missing observations occur before 1969. 59 • More Developed Mediterranean. 
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Figure 6.29 How Cyprusfared in 1980 compared with how the economy could 
have done; how much better or worse off was it? 
•Assuming incoine fa both communio! es in a unilaiy economy grow at ih e same tate af ter 1963. 
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Greek-Cypriots come out of the exercise (Figure 6.29) only marginally better off in 
this idealised projection, if not considerably worse off. On balance, they appear to 
have performed about equal to expectations. What is more dramatic in Figure 6.29, 
is the extent to which Turkish-Cypriots seem to have under-performed, compared 
with what could have been expected in 1963. Turkish-Cypriots were far worse off 
in 1980, seemingly as a conséquence of earlier divisions and irrespective of 
subsequent Turkish military attempts to correct the balance. The economy as a 
whole, on the other hand, could have done better had it not been divided ethnically. 
Less expectedly, the Cypriot economy would seem to have been only marginally 
better off had it remained unified and integrated, following the growth trajectory of 
its peers (Ist 3 columns, Figure 6.29). The island economy in 1980 suffered as a 
conséquence of civil war and de-facto division. The implicit professional 
consensus60 that a single economy in Cyprus could have done better than two 
separate non-communicating ones does not seem to be misplaced. Although losses 
from years of ethnie hostility and conflict, from foreign martial intervention and de 
facto division do not appear to have dramatically affected economic growth on the 
island by 1980, the question remains, how has longer term growth been affected by 
de facto division? 
60UN Security Council, 17 December 1993. (Unpublished) "Report of the team of experts on the 
economic benefits of the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package". 
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Benchmarks of a unitary Cypriot economy in 1990 
Given continued general convergence amongst the peers in most key indicators and 
given that these simple yardsticks have ali pointed in roughly the same direction, it 
is worth extending the model to 1990. The average economie growth rates for ail 
three selected peer groups for the periods 1964 to 1980 is fairly similar, ranging 
from around 5% to around 6%. After 1980 average growth rates drop considerably 
to between 2-3% in the period 1981 to 1990, seemingly a development echoed 
elsewhere61, and presumably one that Cyprus may have been Iikely to follow if 
politicai circumstances had not intervened. With the divergence however in the 
growth performance of the économies in the three suggested peer groups, caution 
should be applied to any meaning ascribed to projections so derived. 
Whilst Cyprus' performance may well have been widely at variance with the group 
averages, she should have equalled that of the slowest growing économies with 
similar characteristics at the beginning of the period looking. Divergence from the 
mean in the 1980's is generally so great as to offer a less distinct line in the sand 
than projections up to 1980, though as a basis for minimum expectations, the 
statista provide a guide to questions concerning the long-term costs of politicai 
upheaval on the island. Estimâtes to 1980 seemed to conclude that the short-term. 
resuit of the politicai upheavals were negative but not significantly so. Do the 
longer-term projections point in the same direction? 
Figure 6.30 (below) plots the average annual growth rates of the three peer group 
économies over aggregate Cypriot income (total Cypriot income, that is Greek and 
Turkish-Cypriot income combined), and which have been used to extend an 
idealised unitary Cypriot economy to 1990, from the watershed of 1963. Also 
plotted, is the earlier extrapolation that extended a benchmark for pan-Cypriot from 
1963 to 1980. 
61 Little, Cooper, Corden, & Rajapatirana 1993. op. cit. 
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Figure 6.30 Total Cypriot income 1964-90 compared with growth projections 
using peer group annual averages. 
H I Total Cypriot Y 
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Soiree: Greek Cyp. data: Stai. Ala tac i« , Tockùh C yp- di ta : Bicak, S . A . 1995, Pe«r Group data: UN Yearixxdo of Nat. Y Accami*. 
The conséquences of the politicai upheavals in 1963 and 1974 are again clearly 
visible. These are the points at which the Cypriot economy significantly under-
performs vis-à-vis the peer économies' mean growth rate. After the smaller overall 
shock of 1963, the Cypriot economy recovered and accelerated considerably faster 
on average than its peers, catching-up and over-taking expectations by 1967. The 
overall recovery from 1974 is far slower as it affected more of the island and the 
majority community adversely. Not until well into the 1980s, when ali the peer 
group mean average growth rates slow significantly, does it meet and then rapidly 
exceed expectations formed by using peer group averages. 
Table 6.8 below shows total Cypriot aggregate income along with Greek and 
Turkish-Cypriot GNP in 1990. These figures are compared with the three 
benchmark estimâtes of Cypriot income in an idealised unitary economy, assuming 
ethnie conflict and war had not interrupted development. Below the row labelled 
"Actual GNPs in 1990", in columns B and C, communal income distributions are 
hazarded, assuming income in both communities grew at the same rate in a unitary 
economy. 
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Table 6.8 Greek & Turkish-Cypriot GNP in 1990 (in mlns of 1980 CYP's) 
estimated using average peer group growth rates 1964-90. 
Source: Greek Cyp. data: Stat. Abstracls, TUrkish Cyp. data: Bicak, H. A. 1993, Peer Group data: UN Yearbooks of Nal. Y Accounts. 
A B C 
Ail Cypriot GNP Greek Cyp. GNP Turkish Cyp. GNP 
Actual GNP in 1990 C£l,554 C£l,427 C£127 
Benchmark using Micro Economies average growth rate C£l,057 C£903 C£153 
Benchmark using the average MDM growth rate C£l,246 C£l,066 C£181 
Benchmark using Régional Sub-group's average growth rate C£l,197 C£l,023 C£174 
* on the basis that income in both communities grows at a similar rate after 1963 
Assuming that Cypriot performance should have been close to the mean of a group 
of économies with similar background, performance and policy instruments, the 
first three columns of Figure 6.31 (below) and column A of Table 6.8 reveal that 
the island as a whole seems to have suffered little over the longer-term period, 
1964-90. Under the control of two mutually antagonistic economic managements the 
island economy as a whole seems to have exceeded expectation. However, as 
columns B & C in Table 6.9 reveal, most of the benefits of that performance seem 
to have accrued to the Greek-Cypriot economy. Even by 1990 when the weight of 
the costs of 1963 should have been counteracted by the relative benefits of 1974, the 
Turkish-Cypriot economy seems to have significantly under-performed. 
Figure 6.31 How Cyprusfared in 1990; how much better or worse off was it? 
-30% -L 
® Average Micro Economy 
n Average Regional Sub-Group 
D Average More Developed Med. 
Total Çypriot Greek Cypriot Tutkish Cypriot 
The benchmarks of all-island economic development in 1980 (Figures 6.2, 6.4 and 
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o.zö; may reveai someimng 01 ine economic enecxs 01 ine politicai cieavages. Jöy iyyu 
(Figure 6.30) more of the effects of différent policy and/or différent economic 
opportunities or constraints faced by two distinct économies, should be observed. 
Seemingly, by 1990 much of any différence in economic performance is the resuit of 
the emergence of two separate economic regimes, rather than the cost of war. 
However, what différence did it make to the economic performance of the island? On 
the basis of their combined growth performance relative to that of their peers, the all-
island economy seems to have fared well vis-à-vis the average peer group performance 
(see Figure 6.30 and the first 3 columns of Figure 6.31). Interestingly, the two Cypriot 
économies' individuai growth performances do not diverge dramatically in the 1980's, 
they also compare well with the individuai growth performances of all the peer 
économies in this volatile period (Table 6.9). 
Table 6.9 (below) shows a breakdown of real growth rates north, south and all-
island growth rates in 1981-90, compared with the individuai peer group members' 
performances. It reveals that Turkish and Greek-Cypriot economic growth was 
highly respectable by international standards. It also reveals that in the 1980's the 
divided Cypriot économies combined performance bucks the trend of its peers, as 
do their performances individually, growth being faster than both that of the 
aggregate mean and that of almost all the individuai peers. Not only does this raise 
questions about why such impressive growth rates should have followed the shocks 
of the recent past but it raises the issue of sustainability and international 
competitiveness. Did the Turkish-Cypriot economy benefit from division by being 
absorbed into the wider Turkish economy, as the growth rates below (Table 6.9) 
suggest? This begs the question whether Turkish-Cypriot growth would have been 
faster had they remained part of the Republic of Cyprus (Table 6.9). Would the 
Republic of Cyprus have experienced such rapid economic growth had not been for 
its recent economic and politicai background? Clearly de facto division for the 
Greek-Cypriot (Republic of Cyprus) did not mean assuming Greek growth rates 
(Table 6.9). 
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Table 6.9 Average real growth in GNP 
in 1981-90 (on previous year). 
Republic of Cyprus 6.2% 











Trinidad & Tobago -2.6% 
»Note: Yugoslavian growth rates are for 1981 to 1989. 
Source: UN Yearbooks of Nat. Income Acc's Stat's., (Cyp. data : Statistical AbstracLs, 
Rep. of Qyp., Stat. Yearbooks, SPO, "TRNC"). 
After the abrupt upheavals of 1974 the population of the now (largely Greek 
Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus had 22% of US per capita income in 1975, whilst the 
Turkish-Cypriot economy had an estimated 14%. At the same time the Micro 
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Economies had the highest mean average per capita income relative to the US at 
almost 35% whilst the Regional Sub-Group, still well above both Cypriot 
communities' per capita performance, had the lowest at nearly 30%. By 1990 the 
peer group average per capita incomes relative to the US had converged at 35%. 
Turkish-Cypriot per capita income rose slightly from 14 % of US per capita income 
in 1975 to 16% in 1990. The Greek-Cypriot economy appeared to move farthest, 
fastest, beginning in 1975 with 22% of US per capita income, rising to over 45% of 
US per capita income in 1990. Starting from a lo wer base and having almost a 1% 
slower average growth rate than the Greek-Cypriot economy throughout the 1980s, 
the Turkish-Cypriot economy continued to diverge from the economic developments 
in the south. 
So in comparing a divided Cyprus again with its peers on a per capita basis, 
impressive Turkish-Cypriot economic growth performance has not kept pace with 
62 Peer groups after 1964 do not include Cypriot data. 
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developments elsewhere. The relative stagnation of Turkish-Cypriot per capita 
incomes, relative to the US, appears in stark contrast both with its own growth rates 
and with developments south of the UN Buffer Zone. Average growth rates in 
Gross National Product (GNP) may conceal much of the economie reality that they 
attempi to illuminate. Whilst aggregate growth rates in national product may appear 
similar in the island's two de facto économies, per capita incomes diverge 
dramatically (Figures 6.32 & 6.33). However, whilst talk of a lower base is 
particularly significant, given the two communities recent politicai history, per 
capita incomes were not vastly différent once de facto géographie séparation had 
taken place and been adjusted for (Figure 6.32). 
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Source:IBRD,World Development Report 1979, : "State" Planning Organisation, "TRNC" 
Between 1977 and 1990 the ranking, on a per capita income basis63, changed in a 
positive direction for both communities. Turkish-Cypriot per capita income moved 
up one, from ninth in 1977 to eighth amongst the peers in 1990. The Republic of 
Cyprus, meanwhile shifted from 7th amongst its peers in 1977, to 2nd place by 1990 
(Figure 6.33). 



















S o u r c e : B R D , World Development Report 1 9 9 2 , "S ta te" Planning Organisation, "TRNC" 
Using the Summers and Heston data set64, adjusted for purchasing power parity at 
the time of independence back in 1960, the Republic of Cyprus had 61% of Israeli 
per capita income. By 1977 the Republic of Cyprus' had dropped back to 60% of 
Israel's. In 198965 the Republic of Cyprus had 83% of Israeli per capita. Although 
it was not until 1982 that the truncated Republic of Cyprus regained and surpassed 
its 1973 relative share of Israeli per capita income, with a per capita income 
equivalent to 68% of Israel's. 
Conclusion 
In some ways the overall picture of the Cypriot economy in 1980 is what would be 
expected; Cyprus could have been more than the sum of its parts through the more 
rational application of the factors of production, the lack of duplication, the gains 
from trade and the avoidance of a costly civil war. However, using the benchmarks 
derived from peer group averages and the more accurately located base year (for a 
64R GDP per capita (Current International Prices) for 1960, 1977 and 1989 (the last year with 
available data for ali eleven countries), Summers & Heston 1991. op. cìt. 
65 The last year with compatible purchasing power parity data for Israel, ibid. 
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unified economy) of 1963, Cyprus is not that much better off. The peer group 
derived benchmarks for 1980 (Figure 6.28 & Table 6.7) give 1% to 10% more 
income to an idealised economy that experienced no civil war and was able to 
resolve its political differences before the military intervention of two NATO 
powers. 
By 1990 the aggregate performance of the Cypriot economies outperform 
expectations based on peer group averages by a considerable margin. The aggregate 
Cypriot economy also outperformed all the peer economies individually throughout 
the 1980s. Similarly, the individual performances of both Cypriot economies stand 
up well to international comparisons in the 1980s. However, whilst rapid economic 
growth may have benefited the Greek-Cypriot economy by feeding directly into 
improvements in per capita income, in relative and absolute terms increases in 
Turkish-Cypriot overall income did not contribute to the same kind of per capita 
income improvements. Relative to the US, Turkish-Cypriot per capita income 
stagnated, and relative to the (Greek Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus, Turkish-Cypriot 
per capita income diverged significantly. 
Clearly the effects of civil war and inter-communal re-distribution in Cyprus were 
not evenly spread, despite the fact that benefits in terms of growth in per capita 
GNP flowed in both directions at the different historical junctures, 1963 and 1974. 
One community (by their own ready admission, the political losers) seemed to 
benefit, or at least not lose out economically. Particularly by 1990, the Greek-
Cypriots seemed to have been able to buck the regional and structural growth trend, 
having done considerably better than could have been expected in a unified 
economy. Given their background, conditioning factors and performance indicators, 
Greek-Cypriots seem to have been able to perform, on average, at least as well as 
could have been expected, even by 1980, had they not lost an officially estimated 
70% of "productive potential" in 197466. The other community (in terms of de facto 
66Republic of Cyprus. 1995. Statistical Abstract 1993. Dept. of Statistics and Research, Min. of 
Finance, p.5. 
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territorial adjustments, regional security and, in the context of the Cyprus dispute, 
the political winners) lost out economically, significantly and consistently. 
Disparities in the conditioning factors north and south seem to offer a partial 
explanation for the relatively poor per capita performance of the Turkish-Cypriot 
economy. However, the main reasons seem to be its de facto absorption into the 
Turkish economy; adopting Turkish currency, monetary policy, therefore inflation 
rates, high inward migration from Turkey and consequently, slow growth in per 
capita income. Seemingly, more research is needed to apply some meat to these 
bare bone conclusions. 
As a policy tool in line with international attempts to find a unitary solution to the 
Cyprus dispute, these results make less than reassuring reading. Whilst they imply 
that Turkish-Cypriots could have gained from making more concessions to achieve a 
unitary outcome (had such attempts been met by reciprocal sincerity), ironically67 
this prospect could be undermined by being unlikely to provide Greek-Cypriots with 
much, if any, economic benefit. The rough projections above however, neither 
confirm nor deny conclusively that a single island economy would perform better 
than the combined performance of two non-communicating ones. Long run 
economic growth in Cyprus as a whole, did not appear to have been adversely 
affected by significant and lasting political upheavals, perhaps even the reverse. So 
economic reintegration may not have been as large an economic benefit as 
politically inspired, multi-lateral agency reports have implied68. 
67It is ironie because Greek Cypriot rhetoric tends to call for the re-unification of the island while 
Turkish Cypriot tends to support division. 
68UN Security Council, 17 December 1993. op. cit. 
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CHAPTER 7. Conclusion 
Comparative performance and sustainability 
This thesis has attempted to describe and analyse some of the economic conséquences 
of ethno-national conflict in Cyprus. Conflict in Cyprus has been hugely costly in 
human, social and cultural1 terms. The dominant assumption is that ethno-national 
conflict has also been costly in economic terms. War arbitrarily divided an already 
small economy: destroying, damaging and dislocating resources, and at least in the 
short term, deterring and discouraging visitors and investors. Politicai realities have 
since frozen that division and left both communities on a permanent war footing. Here, 
it has been argued that in terms of economic growth, the costs of ethno-national 
conflict and de facto division in Cyprus have been far from considérable. On the 
contrary, economic growth in Cyprus appears to have been more rapid than could have 
been expected at the dawn of independence in 1960, if conflict had been restricted and 
resolved within the politicai process. 
The main objective of this work has been a comparative analysis of the diffèrent and 
separate economic developments of the island's two communities, in the context of 
their recovery from ethnie conflict and large-scale regional displacement. The 
established logie again assumes that the Greek-Cypriot economy excelled whilst the 
1 With the continued séparation of the island's two communities, much of the background to a distinct 
Cypriot culture fades and both communities' languages and customs are diluted by that of their 
respective "mainland's". 
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Turkish-Cypriot economy stagnateci. This research reveals that both communities 
experienced significant economic growth. It also reveals that economic growth has 
diverged significantly at différent historical junctures, and that much of the post-74 war 
growth has been tinged with problems, or potential problems, on both sides of the UN 
Buffer Zone. Through the use of evolved and improvised institutions in the face of 
possible market failure, both communities transcended their troubles. 
Comparisons with proposed peer économies reveal that in the 1980's, the divided 
Cypriot économies' combined performance bucks the trend, as do their performances 
individually, growing faster than almost any other economy in that difficult decade for 
developing économies (see Table 6.9). The logicai conclusion of this argument is that 
the Republic of Cyprus would not have experienced such rapid economic growth if it 
had not been for its recent economic and politicai background. The same is true of the 
Turkish-Cypriot community, with the only proviso that the base year be shifted from 
1960 to 1964, after which much of the community were effectively refugees. The 
sustainability of both of their impressive growth rates, following recovery from the 
shock of war, deserves further research. 
Here it has been suggested that sustainability is a problem in the south because some of 
the positive developments (such as the diversification of the Greek-Cypriot economy, 
following export led growth in manufacturing) were short lived. Other seemingly 
necessary developments, which also shared the 1974 watershed, were increased 
borrowing and a rising total tax bürden. Because this trend continued into the 1990s, 
remaining high relative to its peers, rising debt and a rising tax bürden are a cause for 
concera and could damage future growth prospects, particularly if the island's main 
industry and foreign exchange earner, tourism, were to falter for a season or two. 
The Turkish-Cypriot economy seems to have benefited from de facto division by 
reaping the 'wind-fall gains' of abandoned property and by being subsequently and 
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progressively absorbed into the wider Turkish economy. Whether either provide much 
of a springboard for sustainable economic development in the north, is something that 
has been questioned above. If sustainability simply means that current growth trends 
persisi into the future, there is no reason to doubt that the Turkish-Cypriot economy 
will continue to perform much as it has done. The size of the northern Cypriot 
economy and its very close relationship with Turkey (close to the extent that 
throughout the 1980s economic growth was almost identical, see Figure 6.9), means 
that regardless of policy and micro- economic performance on the island, economic 
growth rates are dépendent on décisions in Turkey. If however sustainability means the 
economic security of an independent Turkish-Cypriot economy, then it has yet to be 
achieved. Back in the 1960's, the CyprusMail quoted the Turkish-Cypriot newspaper 
Bozkurt as saying the Turkish-Cypriot "administration" had no say in Controlling 
exports, imports, monetary policy and issues, customs, prices and incomes, so could 
not claim state status and would not have such status unless it had control of these2. In 
most of these areas, very little changed following de facto division. Ail significant 
economic policy décisions affecting the Turkish-Cypriot economy are outside Turkish-
Cypriot control. 
In the preceding pages, a comparative analysis of economic development in Cyprus has 
been constructed by comparing both the recent performance of the two de facto island 
économies with each other, and with various similar économies, across a range of key 
growth indicators. On the basis of those indicators, some unusual features of the 
Cypriot économies have come to light, which may raise questions about future 
sustainability. These may raise further questions as to how internationally competitive 
two competing and mutually hostile économies, on one small island, are likely to be. 
One unusual feature which came to light in comparative context, has already been 
mentioned: the rise in the Republic's level of international borrowing. 
2 The Cyprus Mail, 5/11/1969. 
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So it is worth looking again at the key background indicator, per capita income (Figure 
7.1). Initially in the north there appears to be a certain amount of catching-up, almost 
certainly the conséquence of the windfall gains discussed ab ove, and also the 
conséquence of growth from a very low base (also discussed above). When these 
phenomena were exhausted, Turkish-Cypriot per capita income feil absolutely, and 
subsequently its graduai rise is a fall relative to Greek-Cypriot per capita income, south 
oftheUN Buffer Zone. 
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The discrepancy in the level and growth of per capita income is both obvious to 
visitors who cross the Buffer Zone and presented in the propaganda north and south, 
as a further justification of their respective politicai positions. Some Turkish-Cypriots 
argue that it is the fact that most of the fighting occurred in the north3, the Greek 
sponsored embargo4 and the south's monopoly of international récognition5 that is 
responsible for much of the discrepancy in growth rates after 1976. Many Greek-
Cypriots attribute the différence to cultural factors6. From the data presented above 
3 Interview with Rauf Denktash, carried out in his office, 28/7/95. 
4 Olgun, M.E. "Economic Overview", in Dodd C.H. 1993. (ed.) The Politicai, Social and Economic 
Development of Northern Cyprus. Huntingdon: Eothen Press, p. 288. 
5ibid., p.283. 
6 Scott, (J. 1995. Identity, Visibilitv and legitimacv in Turkish Cypriot Tourism Development, 
University of Kent at Canterbury, Dept. of Social Anthropology, PhD Thesis, submitted March 1993, 
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(Figure 5.25), Greek-Cypriots are right in considering the effects of their economic 
sanctions as having been fairly limited7. Perhaps embargo and culture have made a 
contribution to a divergent growth performance; more important and more obvious 
however are some of the standard measurable déterminants of economic growth. The 
preceding chapters have presented some of this divergence in terms of différent 
institutional development; the adaptation to différent exogenous constraints. Using a 
similar analysis to the one that determined the proxy growth rates (detailed in Chapter 
6), the graphs below (Figures 7.2 to 7.12) underline that point but also illuminate more 
controllable reasons for economic différences north and south. Essentially, these are 
the conséquence of policy, politics and the différent institutional responses to de facto 
division, north and south of the UN Buffer Zone. 
One of the main background factors, per capita income, appears to be fairly similar in 
the early stages of regionally distinct economic development (Figure 7.1). From the 
evidence available a key conditioning factor, human capital development, looks fairly 
similar too, north and south, in terms of school registration and higher éducation 
ratios8. All other things being equal, economic growth in the Greek and Turkish-
Cypriot économies should therefore have been similar. Three other key indicators 
p.97), quotes the head of the Cyprus Tourism Organisation, A. Andronicou as saying: "The Greek 
Cypriot culture may... be described as competitive and individualistic... The Turkish Cypriot culture 
differs in not attaching such great importance to achievement and wealtli, and the Turkish community 
was therefore relatively less well represented in the business and economic life of the island." 
7 Christodoulou, D. 1992. Inside The Cvnrus Miracle. Minnesota: University Of Minnesota, 
Modern Greek Studies Yearbook Supplement, Vol. 2, p. xlvi. 
8In 1960 Turkish Cypriots made up a higher proportion of the total University Graduated population 
(19.5) than their share of the population warranted (18.3). Kitromilides P.M. "From Coexistence to 
Confrontation: The Dynamics of Ethnie Conflict in Cyprus", in Attalides M.A. 1977. (ed.) Cyprus 
Reviewed. Nicosia: The Jus Cypri Association witli the Co-ordinating C'tee of Scientific and Cultural 
Organisations, p.61. Witli five Universities in the north and only one in the south, the impression is 
that Turkish Cypriots have managed to retain a similar higher éducation ratio as Greek Cypriots, 
despite the relatively high proportion of the latter engaged in tertiary éducation abroad (nearly 40% 
more than reeeived it locally in 1993). Comparable data is veiy limited but as a rough guide an 
internal Civil Service study reported that in 1988, 10.5% of working women in the "TRNC" had 
graduated from some form of tertiary éducation, ("Some Indicators of the Female Population of the 
TRNC", Unpublished 1988 Study by the State Planning Authorily - in Turkish). Conversely in 1987 
12% of Greek Cypriot females over the age of 20 had graduated from some form of tertiaiy éducation, 
Republic of Cyprus, 1995. Statistical Abstract 1993. Nicosia: Ministiy of Finance, Dept. of Statistics 
and Research, p.84, (based on a sample survey). 
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stand out however, revealing enough significant différences between the two Cypriot 
économies to offer some explanation for their différent performances. These indicators: 
the government share of economic activity, the average level of domestic investment 
and the level of openness to international trade, also offer something of a guide to 
subséquent performance, and therefore the sustainability of growth trends achieved so 
far. These bald statistics should be read in the context of the preceding pages (Chapters 
1-5) which serve as a supporting, historically informed narrative to the conclusions 
derived here. 
The graphs below (Figures 7.2 to 7.4, 7.7 to 7.12) illustrate that, particularly in the 
north, some of the key measurable factors afFecting growth seem to be widely at 
variance with developments elsewhere (clearly not helped by some of the exogenous 
factors outlined above, such as the lack of international récognition). The most obvious 
différence, north and south, is the economic role of government as detailed in Chapter 
4. Figure 7.2, below, offers a rough Statistical illustration of the narrative history 
provided here. 
Figure 7.2 The economic role of government in Cyprus, north & south, as a % of 
national income 1977-1990. 
Source: "Economic Rcporti", Nicosia ; Cetin Ugural, 1993. " An Analyst of Inilaticil & the Financial Structure of the TRNC." Lcfkosia, p.87. 
Despite the fact that, due to data limitations, the statistics are not wholly compatible, it 
does provide a guide to the différences in the economic role of government, north and 
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south. Data in the above graph also does not include the contribution made by the co-
operative movement, the Church, Evkaf, and state sector companies. As argued in the 
preceding pages, the contribution of quasi-state sector institutions is almost certainly 
considérable. Bearing in mind the contributions of these other public and quasi-public 
sector institutions (detailed in Chapters 2, 4 and 5), this offers a partial explanation as 
to why the de facto Greek-Cypriot economy in the south performed better than the de 
facto Turkish-Cypriot economy in the north. The conclusion implied by Figure 7.2 
(above) is that 'big government' may nave led to a general under-utilisation of 
resources. In the absence of an alternative, the public and quasi- public sector stepped 
in to run abandoned resources in the north; this short term recovery mechanism 
persisted into the long term. Combine big government with insecurity over property 
rights and private, long term investment suffers, and resources may remain under-
utilised. 
In the World Bank's cross-economy regression results, investment rates were the 
strongest single policy indicator correlating with economic growth9. How did the two 
Cypriot économies compare in terms of investment rates during the 1980s, both with 
each other and with the small open island économies and the "More Developed 
Mediterranean" économies discussed in Chapter 6. Figure 7.3 makes those 
comparisons, between the Republic of Cyprus, the "TRNC" and the Micro Economies. 
The Republic of Cyprus finds itself at the positive end of the spectrum, whilst the 
"TRNC" is at the other end. 
9 IBRD. 1993. The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. NY: OUP. pp. 48-54. 
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Figure 7.3 Gross domestic investment in the Micro Economies, as a % of GDP, 
1980-90. 
Republic Malta Mauritius Trinidad 
of Cyprus &Tobago 
Fiji Barbados "TRNC' 
Source: IBRD. World Tables (various); Turkish Cypriot data, Statistical Yearbooks (various), SPO. 
A similar story is true when the Cypriot économies are compared with the "More 
Developed Mediterranean" économies (Figure 7.4 below). 
Figure 7.4 Gross domestic investment in the More Developed Mediterranean, as a 






15% Yugoslavia Republic of Portugal Malta Turkey Greece Israel "TRNC" 
Cyprus 
Source: IBRD, World Tables (various); Turkish Cypriot data, Statistical Yearbooks (various), SPO. 
As stated in the introduction to this thesis, due to the unique problems facing the 
Turkish-Cypriot community, they have found access to international flinds diificult to 
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secure whilst the Greek-Cypriot economy has had relatively easy access to ali forms of 
international finance. As a conséquence, between the 1960's and the late 1980's, the 
Republic of Cyprus moved from being one of the lowest debtor countries, amongst ali 
11 peers (in Figures 7.3 and 7.4 above), to being one of the highest, and the growth in 
the total tax bürden has reflected this (see Chapter 2). However, borrowing has clearly 
boosted investment rates which have contributed to the rebuilding and restructuring of 
the economy as it concentrated itself in the south. Investment levels appear to have led 
to significant economic expansion. Investment rates in the north have been 
considerably lower, partly because of the lack of international récognition but also 
because of the way the economy has been organised (see Chapter 4), the economic 
role of government, along with the degree of openness to international trade and 
competitiveness, problems over property rights and levels of transparency10. 
On the surface however, the degree of openness of the two Cypriot économies appears 
to be the most similar of the key indicators highlighted here. Figures 7.5 and 7.6 
compare net foreign trade (imports plus exports divided by two, divided by the 
respective régions GNP) in the two économies of Cyprus. Both économies look 
similarly open to international trade, a positive signal in the search for sustainability11. 
It is also something to be expected of two micro économies with levels of development 
resulting in their resource bases being neither wide, nor deep enough to fulfil complex 
consumption patterns. 
10 See Scott J. "Property Vahles; Ownership, Legitimacy and Land Markets in Northern Cyprus", in 
Hann C.M. 1998. Property Relations; Renewing tlie Anthropological Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp 142-159. 
11 Boltho, A. 1996. "The Assessment: International Competitiveness", Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, Vol. 12, No. 3, (Autumn), pp. 1-16. 
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Figure 7.5 "TRNC netforeign trade as a % of GNP. 
50% 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 
Source: "Statistical Yearbooks", 1982-1993, State Planning Organisation, north Nicosia. 
1986 1988 1990 1992 
Figure 7.6 Republic ofCyprus, netforeign trade as a % of GNP. 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
Source: Economic Reports, 1982-92, Ministiy of Finance, Nicosia. 
While Figures 7.5 & 7.6 compare Cypriot openness to trade over time, Figures 7.7 and 
7.8 compares the two Cypriot économies level of openness with the average Micro 
Economies and the "More Developed Mediterranean" économies, between 1983-90. 
This is after the north had experienced some consistent convergence over the late 
1970s and early 80s. Between 1983 and 1992 the Republic of Cyprus was, on average, 
closer to the more open end of both the Micro and Regional groups spectrum than the 
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Turkish-Cypriot economy, though not by much. The only inkling of strangeness (other 
than the composition of trade) is that, for its size (having between a quarter and a third 
of the Republic5 s population), the "TRNC" does look a little less open than it should if 
it were a self-sustaining (non oil exporting - such as Trinidad and Tobago) micro 
economy. Generally, the smaller the economy the more open it is to international trade, 
as roughly supported by the data in Figure 7.7 and 7.8. On average, international trade, 
exports plus imports represented 80% of the GDP in the "TRNC" between 1983 and 
1992, and 114% of the Republic's. Ail other things being equal, those percentages 
should at least be reversed if comparisons were between two independent, micro-
economies. 
Figure 7.7 The degree ofopenness in the Micro Economies; exports & imports as a 
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Notes: «1982-91, #1980-89. 
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Figure 7.8 The degree of openness in the More Developed Mediterranean; exports 
& imports as a % ofGDP, 1983-92. 
140% t 
Malta * Rep. of Portugal Israel "TRNC" Greece Yugoslavia Turkey 
Cyprus # 
Source: UN Nat. Income Accounls Stat 's (various); Turkish Cyp. data, Stat. Yearbooks (various), SPO. Notes: »1982-91, #1981-90. 
When the composition of trade is dissected, the "TRNC" does appear to be a rather 
less typical economy: with imports accounting for an average of 80% of its 
international trade between 1983-92 and exports accounting for the remainder. 
Depending on definitions, officiai statistics may conceal an even more curious reality 
behind these international trade statistics. Figures 7.5 and 7.6 above reveal a fairly 
similar level of openness north and south; however, when trade with the respective 
"motherlands" (Figures 7.9 and 7.10) is deducted, the story looks very different 
(Figures 7.11 and 7.12). 
Figure 7.9 "TRNC" trade with Turkey; percentage share of total, 1976-92. 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
Source: "Statistical Yearbooks", 1982- 1993, "State" Planning Organisation, north Nicosia. 
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Source: Economic Reports, 1982-92, Mininstiy of Finance, Nicosia. 
Greece is relatively insignificant, in international trade terms, with the south (Figure 
7.10) whereas trade with Turkey is a crucial part of the north's total international trade 
(Figure 7.9). Granted they are differently sized économies and the "sanctions" may 
have made a contribution to the trade profile, though the "sanctions" do not seem to 
have affected trade with the north's largest single export market, the UK (see Figure 
5.25). Either way this politically rather than market driven trade may be another 
feature in the search for an explanation for divergent economic performance in Cyprus, 
after the emergence of two distinct, non-communicating économies. It may also say 
something about sustainability, the south being more closely linked to the dynamic 
forces of international trade while the north has been linked to less dynamic regional 
forces. Figures 7.11 and 7.12 (below) reveal the same information as Figures 7.5 and 
7.6, after trade with respective "motherlands" has been deducted. The degree of 
openness to international trade in the two de facto économies between 1976-92, no 
longer looks similar, even when its composition is ignored. 
Ultimately, more state sector involvement in the economy, less investment and less 
openness to international trade, may offer an explanation as to why the economy under 
Turkish-Cypriot control performed worse than the economy under Greek-Cypriot 
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control. There seems to be ampie explanation for the divergence in economic growth 
rates highlighted in Figure 7.1 before having to consider separately the unique political 
Problems facing the Turkish-Cypriot economy, although they must be acknowledged 
as contributing factors. 
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Source: "Statistical Yearbooks", 1982-1993, "State" Planning Organisation, north Nicosia. 
Figure 7.12 Republic ofCyprus, netforeign trade as a % of GNP, excluding trade 
with Greece, 1976-92. 
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45% --
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Source: Economic Reports, 1982-92, Ministiy of Finance, Nicosia. 
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This thesis has, however, argued against the dominant impression of a stagnant 
Turkish-Cypriot economy12. Further arguing against the mainstream,13 this thesis offers 
some economic justification for division on ethnic grounds, both from a Greek-Cypriot 
perspective (the surprising, given their rhetoric, but clear economic beneficiaries of 
division) but also from a Turkish-Cypriot perspective (see pp. 302-303). However, this 
thesis has also consistently argued that from the de facto division in December 1963, 
the Turkish-Cypriot economy has been run with priorities other than economic growth. 
For understandable and urgent reasons, security interests prevailed in the 1960s. The 
suggestion here, based both on the qualitative and quantitative evidence presented 
above, is that security continued to dominate decision making, even after it had been 
guaranteed by Nato's second largest military force. As detailed in Chapter 3, 4 & 5, 
economic growth, productivity gains and the general efficient exploitation of 
resources, have not played as large a part in the Turkish-Cypriot leadership's decisions 
as they have in the Greek-Cypriot community, partly because the Greek Cypriot's 
economy has been more market driven and more open, and therefore has attracted and 
retained more investment (which has helped it achieve a higher rate of growth and 
therefore attracted further investment). The Turkish-Cypriot economy did not join this 
virtuous circle. Security and political interests remained a primary concern amongst the 
managers of the Turkish-Cypriot economy, almost as they had in the 1960's. The 
difference for the Turkish-Cypriot community is that economic considerations now 
play a secondary role in decision making to someone else's security interests. Northern 
Cyprus has become a strategic buffer, protecting Turkey's under belly from real or 
perceived threats from Greece and / or Syria. So security concerns still dominate, 
affecting transparency and incentives to the extent that little entrepreneurial endeavour 
flourishes for long, unless there are good political connections; what Julie Scott 
referred to as "torpiF14. 
12 Wilson R. 1992. Cyprus and the International Economy. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 132-4. 
13 ibid., p. 134; UN Security Council, 17 December 1993. (Unpublished) "Report of the team of 
experts on the economic benefits of the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package". 
14 Scott 1998. op. cit., p. 151. 
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The role of tourism in the economic development of Cyprus can not be ignored. 
Tourism interconnects with many of the themes developed in earlier chapters. The role 
of the state in the south, in the immediate post-war period, was crucial, effective in 
terms of incentives though impotent in terms of regulation. Has tourism been the 
"golden egg" that the World Bank15 believed it to have been in the south? It has been 
argued here that other sectors of the economy were more important in establishing the 
recovery there. In the north, the state's involvement in the economy was far more 
pervasive, though it has not encouraged the same level of utilisation within an 
extensive pre-existing tourist infrastructure. At first, resources under Turkish-Cypriot 
control were concentrated in other áreas of the economy. Instead of attempting to fill 
and expand capacity, the leadership in the north re-allocated under-utilised tourist 
facilities to other service sector industries such as higher education and the security 
forces. Despite which, tourism in the north rapidly eclipsed other sources of foreign 
exchange. The state finally channelled more resources into tourism in 1986, 
recognising the actual and potential contribution of the sector. It is hoped that the 
relative significance of tourism (and other export sectors) has been put into some 
historical context here. In examining the effects of successful mass tourism in the 
south, some of the constraints on its development in the north have been spelled out, 
although much work is still necessary. In the context of over-development and over-
dependence on mass tourism in the south, it is worth speculating whether the north 
has, perhaps unconsciously, exploited its constraints and succeeded through a strategy 
of niche marketing, high margins and sustainable development. Like the refugee 
problem in the south, to roughly paraphrase Roger Zetter16, constraints on tourism in 
the north may have been exploited as development opportunities. 
15I.B.R.D. 1987. "Cvprus: A Long Term Development Perspective". A World Bank Country Study, 
Washington DC: World Bank Publications. 
16 Zetter R. 1992 "Refugees and Forced Migration as Development Resources", Cyprus Review, Vol.4, 
No.l, pp.7-39. 
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This thesis has been broadly sympathetic to Roger Zetter's view that 1974 provided a 
developmental spur to the Cypriot economy17. Whilst the mechanics which led Zetter 
to that conclusion have been challenged here (Chapter 5), the general ténor of the 
argument is both bold and constructive; 1974 seems to have created the conditions for 
significant and class leading economic growth, both in the Turkish and Greek-Cypriot 
communities (see Chapter 6). The reasons for renewed and relatively sustained 
economic growth (Table 6.9) over the medium term, when other developing 
économies struggled, are both différent and complex, having as much to do with local, 
regional and international politics, as the choice of economic policies. However, 
significant différences in economic policies existed north and south and offer some 
explanation for the divergent growth rates. Zetter has proved an inspiration here, even 
if he restricted his analysis to the Greek-Cypriot community and concentrated (it is 
contested here) on a less dynamic sector during their recovery from the effects of 
ethno-national conflict in 1974. 
Recovery is one thing, long term sustainability is another. The sustainability of long 
term economic growth levels in the south does look slightly problematic because debt 
and taxation levels have risen dramatically (see Chapter 2). Economic growth in the 
1990s has slowed significantly, in real terms18. The Greek-Cypriot economy is also no 
less vulnerable to external shocks in one highly sensitive industry, which has 
increasingly dominated its economy. Despite the efforts and statements of successive 
planners, the Greek-Cypriot economy became more, not less, dépendent on one 
industry and one essential produci, mass tourism. Whilst its long term economic 
growth levels may be vulnerable, the Republic's position as an independent, 
autonomous economy is not economically challenged. In the north, ironically, 
sustainability is not a problem because its independence, as an autonomous economy is 




seem to be able to grow in line with whatever the treasury in Ankara determines, 
regardless of Cypriot conditions and policies. To answer one of the questions raised in 
the introduction, it seems that the north can not be studied as an independent economy, 
but only as a part of the wider Turkish economy. Here this thesis has failed, though at 
the outset, and judging by existing, limited literature, there was no way of knowing this 
until the work was complete. To repeat comments made in the introduction; existing 
literature on the economic development of Cyprus (as a whole), is extremely limited. 
From the evidence and arguments presented above, the integration of the Turkish-
Cypriot economy into a wider Turkish economy, is a phenomenon that goes back to 
the 1960s and the breakdown of the constitution in December 1963. While mainland 
support for the Turkish-Cypriot community may have been critical in the 1960s, in 
terms of self-sustaining development, its contribution has been more ambiguous since. 
The logical extension of the argument here, is that the Turkification of the Turkish-
Cypriot economy has only been encouraged by consistent Greek-Cypriot policy dating 
back to 1960. 
Here, on both sides of the UN Buffer Zone, both communities have been given the 
benefit of the doubt. Almost exclusively, in Chapters 1-5, it is their respective data and 
their elite's dialogue that has written the story of the creation of two, non-
communicating economies on the island of Cyprus. With both communities having 
some perception of the cost of de facto division, Chapter 6 contrasts development in 
Cyprus with certain objective criteria, to attempt a dynamic benchmark of those costs. 
In many ways the story presented here has tended to suggest, seemingly conspiring to 
support the Turkish-Cypriot case, that the economy as a whole (and, ironically, 
particularly the Greek-Cypriot economy), was better off economically in the divided 
reality. That evidence also tends to suggest that the Turkish-Cypriot community did 
not maintain long term economic benefits from the political solution their leaders 
sought. The continued widespread use of improvised public and quasi-public sector 
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substitutes for free market activity, appears to have been a significant economic burden 
on a separate Turkish-Cypriot economy in northern Cyprus, forcing it to rely heavily 
on mainland Turkish subsidies. The structure of the economy, the way it has been 
organised, offers few reasons for optimism. With agriculture, government and the co-
operative organisation accounting for such a high proportion of employment (see 
Figure 5.18), sectors generally offering few prospects for much growth in productivity, 
the economy looked destined to lag behind the south after the initial recovery brought 
about largely by windfall gains. The de facto division of the island, north and south 
meant, almost immediately, that the economy under Turkish-Cypriot administration 
became more rural while the economy under Greek-Cypriot administration became 
more urban; both phenomena have growth implications. 
The evidence presented here tends to suggest that the Turkish-Cypriot community 
failed to benefit as significantly as their former compatriots, because they were 
absorbed, to all intents and purposes, into a wider Turkish economy. Development 
strategies outlined above, tend to support strategic, rather than the economic priorities. 
Their relative weakness, and the lack of self-sustainability, seems to be one of the costs 
of the security guarantee. It is a sacrifice that has effected the role of government in the 
economy, its level of openness to international trade, transparency, and the likely level 
of investment, all of which feed directly into possible economic growth rates. The 
embargo and the political status of the region may have effected all of these indicators 
but another political solution, necessitating political compromise, does not appear to 
have been a key objective. Perhaps the Greek-Cypriot leadership were aware of the 
seeming benefits derived from de facto division, and have thus been insincere in their 
declared wish for reunification along federal lines. Taken at face value, this research 
reveals something of the irony of the two communities' respective political positions, 
the party with most to lose economically declares a desire for change, and the party 
with apparently most to gain economically, wishes to retain and legitimise the current 
situation. 
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Comparisons throughout this thesis have been drawn between the reality of ethno-
national conflict with de facto division, and an idealised image of a unitary and 
integrated economy. Generally, the surprising conclusions reached here are that the 
two communities are better off in the divided reality than they may have been in the 
idealised, integrated economy (though for Turkish-Cypriots, that premise holds only 
for the most pessimistic distributional assumptions - see pp.302-303). This ignores a 
possible third way, experienced by some of Cyprus' nearest neighbours. Cyprus could 
have continued down the road of civil war begun in 1963 and followed the path taken 
by Lebanon in the 1970s. While de facto division in 1974 seemed to put an end to any 
enduring hopes of an integrated whole, it also ended the prospect of continued civil 
war, either ethnie or politicai (as it largely had become by the late 1960s). Partition, 
throughout recent post-colonial history, has generally been perceived as negative, a 
failure of vision and modernity. The negative results of ethno-national conflict in 
Cyprus are ever present; however, de facto division may have provided the best 
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